| IIª-IIae q. 52 pr. Deinde considerandum est de dono consilii, quod respondet prudentiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum consilium debeat poni inter septem dona spiritus sancti. Secundo, utrum donum consilii respondeat virtuti prudentiae. Tertio, utrum donum consilii maneat in patria. Quarto, utrum quinta beatitudo, quae est, beati misericordes, respondeat dono consilii. | Question 52. The gift of counsel Should counsel be reckoned among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost? Does the gift of counsel correspond to prudence? Does the gift of counsel remain in heaven? Does the fifth beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," etc. correspond to the gift of counsel? |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod consilium non debeat poni inter dona spiritus sancti. Dona enim spiritus sancti in adiutorium virtutum dantur; ut patet per Gregorium, in II Moral. Sed ad consiliandum homo sufficienter perficitur per virtutem prudentiae, vel etiam eubuliae, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo consilium non debet poni inter dona spiritus sancti. | Objection 1. It would seem that counsel should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are given as a help to the virtues, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49). Now for the purpose of taking counsel, man is sufficiently perfected by the virtue of prudence, or even of euboulia (deliberating well), as is evident from what has been said (47, 1, ad 2; 51, 1,2). Therefore counsel should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, haec videtur esse differentia inter septem dona spiritus sancti et gratias gratis datas, quod gratiae gratis datae non dantur omnibus, sed distribuuntur diversis; dona autem spiritus sancti dantur omnibus habentibus spiritum sanctum. Sed consilium videtur esse de his quae specialiter aliquibus a spiritu sancto dantur, secundum illud I Machab. II, ecce Simon, frater vester, ipse vir consilii est. Ergo consilium magis debet poni inter gratias gratis datas quam inter septem dona spiritus sancti. | Objection 2. Further, the difference between the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost and the gratuitous graces seems to be that the latter are not given to all, but are divided among various people, whereas the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to all who have the Holy Ghost. But counsel seems to be one of those things which are given by the Holy Ghost specially to certain persons, according to 1 Maccabees 2:65: "Behold . . . your brother Simon is a man of counsel." Therefore counsel should be numbered among the gratuitous graces rather than among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, Rom. VIII dicitur, qui spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt. Sed his qui ab alio aguntur non competit consilium. Cum igitur dona spiritus sancti maxime competant filiis Dei, qui acceperunt spiritum adoptionis filiorum, videtur quod consilium inter dona spiritus sancti poni non debeat. | Objection 3. Further, it is written (Romans 8:14): "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." But counselling is not consistent with being led by another. Since then the gifts of the Holy Ghost are most befitting the children of God, who "have received the spirit of adoption of sons," it would seem that counsel should not be numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Isaiae XI dicitur, requiescet super eum spiritus consilii et fortitudinis. | On the contrary, It is written (Isaiah 11:2): "(The Spirit of the Lord) shall rest upon him . . . the spirit of counsel, and of fortitude." |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod dona spiritus sancti, ut supra dictum est, sunt quaedam dispositiones quibus anima redditur bene mobilis a spiritu sancto. Deus autem movet unumquodque secundum modum eius quod movetur, sicut creaturam corporalem movet per tempus et locum, creaturam autem spiritualem per tempus et non per locum, ut Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt. Est autem proprium rationali creaturae quod per inquisitionem rationis moveatur ad aliquid agendum, quae quidem inquisitio consilium dicitur. Et ideo spiritus sanctus per modum consilii creaturam rationalem movet. Et propter hoc consilium ponitur inter dona spiritus sancti. | I answer that, As stated above (I-II, 68, 1), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are dispositions whereby the soul is rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now God moves everything according to the mode of the thing moved: thus He moves the corporeal creature through time and place, and the spiritual creature through time, but not through place, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22). Again, it is proper to the rational creature to be moved through the research of reason to perform any particular action, and this research is called counsel. Hence the Holy Ghost is said to move the rational creature by way of counsel, wherefore counsel is reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prudentia vel eubulia, sive sit acquisita sive infusa, dirigit hominem in inquisitione consilii secundum ea quae ratio comprehendere potest, unde homo per prudentiam vel eubuliam fit bene consilians vel sibi vel alii. Sed quia humana ratio non potest comprehendere singularia et contingentia quae occurrere possunt, fit quod cogitationes mortalium sunt timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae, ut dicitur Sap. IX. Et ideo indiget homo in inquisitione consilii dirigi a Deo, qui omnia comprehendit. Quod fit per donum consilii, per quod homo dirigitur quasi consilio a Deo accepto. Sicut etiam in rebus humanis qui sibi ipsis non sufficiunt in inquisitione consilii a sapientioribus consilium requirunt. | Reply to Objection 1. Prudence or euboulia (deliberating well), whether acquired or infused, directs man in the research of counsel according to principles that the reason can grasp; hence prudence or euboulia (deliberating well) makes man take good counsel either for himself or for another. Since, however, human reason is unable to grasp the singular and contingent things which may occur, the result is that "the thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain" (Wisdom 9:14). Hence in the research of counsel, man requires to be directed by God who comprehends all things: and this is done through the gift of counsel, whereby man is directed as though counseled by God, just as, in human affairs, those who are unable to take counsel for themselves, seek counsel from those who are wiser. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc potest pertinere ad gratiam gratis datam quod aliquis sit ita boni consilii quod aliis consilium praebeat. Sed quod aliquis a Deo consilium habeat quid fieri oporteat in his quae sunt necessaria ad salutem, hoc est commune omnium sanctorum. | Reply to Objection 2. That a man be of such good counsel as to counsel others, may be due to a gratuitous grace; but that a man be counselled by God as to what he ought to do in matters necessary for salvation is common to all holy persons. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod filii Dei aguntur a spiritu sancto secundum modum eorum, salvato scilicet libero arbitrio, quae est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Et sic inquantum ratio a spiritu sancto instruitur de agendis, competit filiis Dei donum consilii. | Reply to Objection 3. The children of God are moved by the Holy Ghost according to their mode, without prejudice to their free-will which is the "faculty of will and reason" [Sent. iii, D, 24]. Accordingly the gift of counsel is befitting the children of God in so far as the reason is instructed by the Holy Ghost about what we have to do. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod donum consilii non respondeat convenienter virtuti prudentiae. Inferius enim in suo supremo attingit id quod est superius, ut patet per Dionysium, VII cap. de Div. Nom., sicut homo attingit Angelum secundum intellectum. Sed virtus cardinalis est inferior dono, ut supra habitum est. Cum ergo consilium sit primus et infimus actus prudentiae, supremus autem actus eius est praecipere, medius autem iudicare; videtur quod donum respondens prudentiae non sit consilium, sed magis iudicium vel praeceptum. | Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of counsel does not fittingly correspond to the virtue of prudence. For "the highest point of that which is underneath touches that which is above," as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii), even as a man comes into contact with the angel in respect of his intellect. Now cardinal virtues are inferior to the gifts, as stated above (I-II, 68, 8). Since, then, counsel is the first and lowest act of prudence, while command is its highest act, and judgment comes between, it seems that the gift corresponding to prudence is not counsel, but rather a gift of judgment or command. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, uni virtuti sufficienter auxilium praebetur per unum donum, quia quanto aliquid est superius tanto est magis unitum, ut probatur in libro de causis. Sed prudentiae auxilium praebetur per donum scientiae, quae non solum est speculativa, sed etiam practica, ut supra habitum est. Ergo donum consilii non respondet virtuti prudentiae. | Objection 2. Further, one gift suffices to help one virtue, since the higher a thing is the more one it is, as proved in De Causis. Now prudence is helped by the gift of knowledge, which is not only speculative but also practical, as shown above (Question 9, Article 3). Therefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad prudentiam proprie pertinet dirigere, ut supra habitum est. Sed ad donum consilii pertinet quod homo dirigatur a Deo, sicut dictum est. Ergo donum consilii non pertinet ad virtutem prudentiae. | Objection 3. Further, it belongs properly to prudence to direct, as stated above (Question 47, Article 8). But it belongs to the gift of counsel that man should be directed by God, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod donum consilii est circa ea quae sunt agenda propter finem. Sed circa haec etiam est prudentia. Ergo sibi invicem correspondent. | On the contrary, The gift of counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of the end. Now prudence is about the same matter. Therefore they correspond to one another. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod principium motivum inferius praecipue adiuvatur et perficitur per hoc quod movetur a superiori motivo principio, sicut corpus in hoc quod movetur a spiritu. Manifestum est autem quod rectitudo rationis humanae comparatur ad rationem divinam sicut principium motivum inferius ad superius, ratio enim aeterna est suprema regula omnis humanae rectitudinis. Et ideo prudentia, quae importat rectitudinem rationis, maxime perficitur et iuvatur secundum quod regulatur et movetur a spiritu sancto. Quod pertinet ad donum consilii, ut dictum est. Unde donum consilii respondet prudentiae, sicut ipsam adiuvans et perficiens. | I answer that, A lower principle of movement is helped chiefly, and is perfected through being moved by a higher principle of movement, as a body through being moved by a spirit. Now it is evident that the rectitude of human reason is compared to the Divine Reason, as a lower motive principle to a higher: for the Eternal Reason is the supreme rule of all human rectitude. Consequently prudence, which denotes rectitude of reason, is chiefly perfected and helped through being ruled and moved by the Holy Ghost, and this belongs to the gift of counsel, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence, as helping and perfecting it. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iudicare et praecipere non est moti, sed moventis. Et quia in donis spiritus sancti mens humana non se habet ut movens, sed magis ut mota, ut supra dictum est; inde est quod non fuit conveniens quod donum correspondens prudentiae praeceptum diceretur vel iudicium, sed consilium, per quod potest significari motio mentis consiliatae ab alio consiliante. | Reply to Objection 1. To judge and command belongs not to the thing moved, but to the mover. Wherefore, since in the gifts of the Holy Ghost, the position of the human mind is of one moved rather than of a mover, as stated above (1; I-II, 68, 1), it follows that it would be unfitting to call the gift corresponding to prudence by the name of command or judgment rather than of counsel whereby it is possible to signify that the counselled mind is moved by another counselling it. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod scientiae donum non directe respondet prudentiae, cum sit in speculativa, sed secundum quandam extensionem eam adiuvat. Donum autem consilii directe respondet prudentiae, sicut circa eadem existens. | Reply to Objection 2. The gift of knowledge does not directly correspond to prudence, since it deals with speculative matters: yet by a kind of extension it helps it. On the other hand the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence directly, because it is concerned about the same things. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod movens motum ex hoc quod movetur movet. Unde mens humana ex hoc ipso quod dirigitur a spiritu sancto, fit potens dirigere se et alios. | Reply to Objection 3. The mover that is moved, moves through being moved. Hence the human mind, from the very fact that it is directed by the Holy Ghost, is enabled to direct itself and others. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod donum consilii non maneat in patria. Consilium enim est eorum quae sunt agenda propter finem. Sed in patria nihil erit agendum propter finem, quia ibi homines ultimo fine potiuntur. Ergo in patria non est donum consilii. | Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of counsel does not remain in heaven. For counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of an end. But in heaven nothing will have to be done for the sake of an end, since there man possesses the last end. Therefore the gift of counsel is not in heaven. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, consilium dubitationem importat, in his enim quae manifesta sunt ridiculum est consiliari, sicut patet per philosophum, in III Ethic. In patria autem tolletur omnis dubitatio. Ergo in patria non erit consilium. | Objection 2. Further, counsel implies doubt, for it is absurd to take counsel in matters that are evident, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii, 3). Now all doubt will cease in heaven. Therefore there is no counsel in heaven. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, in patria sancti maxime Deo conformantur, secundum illud I Ioan. III, cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus. Sed Deo non convenit consilium, secundum illud Rom. XI, quis consiliarius eius fuit? Ergo etiam neque sanctis in patria competit donum consilii. | Objection 3. Further, the saints in heaven are most conformed to God, according to 1 John 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him." But counsel is not becoming to God, according to Romans 11:34, "Who hath been His counsellor?" Therefore neither to the saints in heaven is the gift of counsel becoming. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Gregorius, XVII Moral., cumque uniuscuiusque gentis vel culpa vel iustitia ad supernae curiae consilium ducitur, eiusdem gentis praepositus vel obtinuisse in certamine vel non obtinuisse perhibetur. | On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xvii, 12): "When either the guilt or the righteousness of each nation is brought into the debate of the heavenly Court, the guardian of that nation is said to have won in the conflict, or not to have won." |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dona spiritus sancti ad hoc pertinent quod creatura rationalis movetur a Deo. Circa motionem autem humanae mentis a Deo duo considerari oportet. Primo quidem, quod alia est dispositio eius quod movetur dum movetur; et alia dum est in termino motus. Et quidem quando movens est solum principium movendi, cessante motu cessat actio moventis super mobile, quod iam pervenit ad terminum, sicut domus, postquam aedificata est, non aedificatur ulterius ab aedificatore. Sed quando movens non solum est causa movendi, sed etiam est causa ipsius formae ad quam est motus, tunc non cessat actio moventis etiam post adeptionem formae, sicut sol illuminat aerem etiam postquam est illuminatus. Et hoc modo Deus causat in nobis et virtutem et cognitionem non solum quando primo acquirimus, sed etiam quandiu in eis perseveramus. Et sic cognitionem agendorum causat Deus in beatis, non quasi in ignorantibus, sed quasi continuando in eis cognitionem eorum quae agenda sunt. Tamen quaedam sunt quae beati, vel Angeli vel homines, non cognoscunt, quae non sunt de essentia beatitudinis, sed pertinent ad gubernationem rerum secundum divinam providentiam. Et quantum ad hoc est aliud considerandum, scilicet quod mens beatorum aliter movetur a Deo, et aliter mens viatorum. Nam mens viatorum movetur a Deo in agendis per hoc quod sedatur anxietas dubitationis in eis praecedens. In mente vero beatorum circa ea quae non cognoscunt est simplex nescientia, a qua etiam Angeli purgantur, secundum Dionysium, VI cap. Eccl. Hier., non autem praecedit in eis inquisitio dubitationis, sed simplex conversio ad Deum. Et hoc est Deum consulere, sicut Augustinus dicit, V super Gen. ad Litt., quod Angeli de inferioribus Deum consulunt. Unde et instructio qua super hoc a Deo instruuntur consilium dicitur. Et secundum hoc donum consilii est in beatis, inquantum in eis a Deo continuatur cognitio eorum quae sciunt; et inquantum illuminantur de his quae nesciunt circa agenda. | I answer that, As stated above (2; I-II, 68, 1), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected with the motion of the rational creature by God. Now we must observe two points concerning the motion of the human mind by God. First, that the disposition of that which is moved, differs while it is being moved from its disposition when it is in the term of movement. Indeed if the mover is the principle of the movement alone, when the movement ceases, the action of the mover ceases as regards the thing moved, since it has already reached the term of movement, even as a house, after it is built, ceases being built by the builder. On the other hand, when the mover is cause not only of the movement, but also of the form to which the movement tends, then the action of the mover does not cease even after the form has been attained: thus the sun lightens the air even after it is lightened. On this way, then, God causes in us virtue and knowledge, not only when we first acquire them, but also as long as we persevere in them: and it is thus that God causes in the blessed a knowledge of what is to be done, not as though they were ignorant, but by continuing that knowledge in them. Nevertheless there are things which the blessed, whether angels or men, do not know: such things are not essential to blessedness, but concern the government of things according to Divine Providence. As regards these, we must make a further observation, namely, that God moves the mind of the blessed in one way, and the mind of the wayfarer, in another. For God moves the mind of the wayfarer in matters of action, by soothing the pre-existing anxiety of doubt; whereas there is simple nescience in the mind of the blessed as regards the things they do not know. From this nescience the angel's mind is cleansed, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), nor does there precede in them any research of doubt, for they simply turn to God; and this is to take counsel of God, for as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) "the angels take counsel of God about things beneath them": wherefore the instruction which they receive from God in such matters is called "counsel." Accordingly the gift of counsel is in the blessed, in so far as God preserves in them the knowledge that they have, and enlightens them in their nescience of what has to be done. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etiam in beatis sunt aliqui actus ordinati ad finem, vel quasi procedentes ex consecutione finis, sicut quod Deum laudant; vel quibus alios pertrahunt ad finem quem ipsi sunt consecuti, sicut sunt ministeria Angelorum et orationes sanctorum. Et quantum ad hoc habet in eis locum donum consilii. | Reply to Objection 1. Even in the blessed there are acts directed to an end, or resulting, as it were, from their attainment of the end, such as the acts of praising God, or of helping on others to the end which they themselves have attained, for example the ministrations of the angels, and the prayers of the saints. On this respect the gift of counsel finds a place in them. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod dubitatio pertinet ad consilium secundum statum vitae praesentis, non autem pertinet secundum quod est consilium in patria. Sicut etiam virtutes cardinales non habent omnino eosdem actus in patria et in via. | Reply to Objection 2. Doubt belongs to counsel according to the present state of life, but not to that counsel which takes place in heaven. Even so neither have the theological virtues quite the same acts in heaven as on the way thither. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod consilium non est in Deo sicut in recipiente, sed sicut in dante. Hoc autem modo conformantur Deo sancti in patria, sicut recipiens influenti. | Reply to Objection 3. Counsel is in God, not as receiving but as giving it: and the saints in heaven are conformed to God, as receivers to the source whence they receive. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod quinta beatitudo, quae est de misericordia, non respondeat dono consilii. Omnes enim beatitudines sunt quidam actus virtutum, ut supra habitum est. Sed per consilium in omnibus virtutum actibus dirigimur. Ergo consilio non respondet magis quinta beatitudo quam alia. | Objection 1. It would seem that the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy, does not correspond to the gift of counsel. For all the beatitudes are acts of virtue, as stated above (I-II, 69, 1). Now we are directed by counsel in all acts of virtue. Therefore the fifth beatitude does not correspond more than any other to counsel. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, praecepta dantur de his quae sunt de necessitate salutis, consilium autem datur de his quae non sunt de necessitate salutis. Misericordia autem est de necessitate salutis, secundum illud Iac. II, iudicium sine misericordia ei qui non fecit misericordiam, paupertas autem non est de necessitate salutis, sed pertinet ad perfectionem vitae, ut patet Matth. XIX. Ergo dono consilii magis respondet beatitudo paupertatis quam beatitudo misericordiae. | Objection 2. Further, precepts are given about matters necessary for salvation, while counsel is given about matters which are not necessary for salvation. Now mercy is necessary for salvation, according to James 2:13, "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy." On the other hand poverty is not necessary for salvation, but belongs to the life of perfection, according to Matthew 19:21. Therefore the beatitude of poverty corresponds to the gift of counsel, rather than to the beatitude of mercy. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, fructus consequuntur ad beatitudines, important enim delectationem quandam spiritualem quae consequitur perfectos actus virtutum. Sed inter fructus non ponitur aliquid respondens dono consilii, ut patet Gal. V. Ergo etiam beatitudo misericordiae non respondet dono consilii. | Objection 3. Further, the fruits result from the beatitudes, for they denote a certain spiritual delight resulting from perfect acts of virtue. Now none of the fruits correspond to the gift of counsel, as appears from Galatians 5:22-23. Therefore neither does the beatitude of mercy correspond to the gift of counsel. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, consilium convenit misericordibus, quia unicum remedium est de tantis malis erui, dimittere aliis et dare. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. iv): "Counsel is befitting the merciful, because the one remedy is to be delivered from evils so great, to pardon, and to give." |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod consilium proprie est de his quae sunt utilia ad finem. Unde ea quae maxime sunt utilia ad finem maxime debent correspondere dono consilii. Hoc autem est misericordia, secundum illud I ad Tim. IV, pietas ad omnia utilis est. Et ideo specialiter dono consilii respondet beatitudo misericordiae, non sicut elicienti, sed sicut dirigenti. | I answer that, Counsel is properly about things useful for an end. Hence such things as are of most use for an end, should above all correspond to the gift of counsel. Now such is mercy, according to 1 Timothy 4:8, "Godliness ['Pietas,' which our English word 'pity,' which is the same as mercy; see note on II-II, 30, 1 is profitable to all things." Therefore the beatitude of mercy specially corresponds to the gift of counsel, not as eliciting but as directing mercy. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etsi consilium dirigat in omnibus actibus virtutum, specialiter tamen dirigit in operibus misericordiae, ratione iam dicta. | Reply to Objection 1. Although counsel directs in all the acts of virtue, it does so in a special way in works of mercy, for the reason given above. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod consilium, secundum quod est donum spiritus sancti, dirigit nos in omnibus quae ordinantur in finem vitae aeternae, sive sint de necessitate salutis sive non. Et tamen non omne opus misericordiae est de necessitate salutis. | Reply to Objection 2. Counsel considered as a gift of the Holy Ghost guides us in all matters that are directed to the end of eternal life whether they be necessary for salvation or not, and yet not every work of mercy is necessary for salvation. |
| IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod fructus importat quoddam ultimum. In practicis autem non est ultimum in cognitione, sed in operatione, quae est finis. Et ideo inter fructus nihil ponitur quod pertineat ad cognitionem practicam, sed solum ea quae pertinent ad operationes, in quibus cognitio practica dirigit. Inter quae ponitur bonitas et benignitas, quae respondent misericordiae. | Reply to Objection 3. Fruit denotes something ultimate. Now the ultimate in practical matters consists not in knowledge but in an action which is the end. Hence nothing pertaining to practical knowledge is numbered among the fruits, but only such things as pertain to action, in which practical knowledge is the guide. Among these we find "goodness" and "benignity" which correspond to mercy. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 pr. Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis prudentiae. Dicit autem Augustinus, in IV contra Iulian., quod omnibus virtutibus non solum sunt vitia manifesta discretione contraria, sicut prudentiae temeritas, verum etiam vicina quodammodo, nec veritate, sed quadam specie fallente similia, sicut ipsi prudentiae astutia. Primo ergo considerandum est de vitiis quae manifeste contrarietatem habent ad prudentiam, quae scilicet vitia proveniunt ex defectu prudentiae vel eorum quae ad prudentiam requiruntur; secundo, de vitiis quae habent quandam similitudinem falsam cum prudentia quae scilicet contingunt per abusum eorum quae ad prudentiam requiruntur. Quia vero sollicitudo ad prudentiam pertinet, circa primum consideranda sunt duo, primo quidem, de imprudentia; secundo, de negligentia, quae sollicitudini opponitur. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, de imprudentia, utrum sit peccatum. Secundo, utrum sit speciale peccatum. Tertio, de praecipitatione, sive temeritate. Quarto, de inconsideratione. Quinto, de inconstantia. Sexto, de origine horum vitiorum. | Question 53. Imprudence 1. Is imprudence a sin? 2. Is it a special sin? 3. Precipitation or temerity 4. Thoughtlessness 5. Inconstancy 6. The origin of these vices |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imprudentia non sit peccatum. Omne enim peccatum est voluntarium, ut Augustinus dicit. Imprudentia autem non est aliquid voluntarium, nullus enim vult esse imprudens. Ergo imprudentia non est peccatum. | Objection 1. It would seem that imprudence is not a sin. For every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine [De Vera Relig. xiv]; whereas imprudence is not voluntary, since no man wishes to be imprudent. Therefore imprudence is not a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, nullum peccatum nascitur cum homine nisi originale. Sed imprudentia nascitur cum homine, unde et iuvenes imprudentes sunt. Nec est originale peccatum, quod opponitur originali iustitiae. Ergo imprudentia non est peccatum. | Objection 2. Further, none but original sin comes to man with his birth. But imprudence comes to man with his birth, wherefore the young are imprudent; and yet it is not original sin which is opposed to original justice. Therefore imprudence is not a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, omne peccatum per poenitentiam tollitur. Sed imprudentia non tollitur per poenitentiam. Ergo imprudentia non est peccatum. | Objection 3. Further, every sin is taken away by repentance. But imprudence is not taken away by repentance. Therefore imprudence is not a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, spiritualis thesaurus gratiae non tollitur nisi per peccatum. Tollitur autem per imprudentiam, secundum illud Prov. XXI, thesaurus desiderabilis et oleum in habitaculo iusti, et homo imprudens dissipabit illud. | On the contrary, The spiritual treasure of grace is not taken away save by sin. But it is taken away by imprudence, according to Proverbs 21:20, "There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just, and the imprudent [Douay: 'foolish'] man shall spend it." Therefore imprudence is a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod imprudentia dupliciter accipi potest, uno modo, privative; alio modo, contrarie. Negative autem non proprie dicitur, ita scilicet quod importet solam carentiam prudentiae, quae potest esse sine peccato. Privative quidem imprudentia dicitur inquantum aliquis caret prudentia quam natus est et debet habere. Et secundum hoc imprudentia est peccatum ratione negligentiae, qua quis non adhibet studium ad prudentiam habendam. Contrarie vero accipitur imprudentia secundum quod ratio contrario modo movetur vel agit prudentiae. Puta, si recta ratio prudentiae agit consiliando, imprudens consilium spernit, et sic de aliis quae in actu prudentis observanda sunt. Et hoc modo imprudentia est peccatum secundum rationem propriam prudentiae. Non enim potest hoc contingere quod homo contra prudentiam agat, nisi divertens a regulis quibus ratio prudentiae rectificatur. Unde si hoc contingat per aversionem a regulis divinis, est peccatum mortale, puta cum quis quasi contemnens et repudians divina documenta, praecipitanter agit. Si vero praeter eas agat absque contemptu, et absque detrimento eorum quae sunt de necessitate salutis, est peccatum veniale. | I answer that, Imprudence may be taken in two ways, first, as a privation, secondly, as a contrary. Properly speaking it is not taken as a negation, so as merely to signify the absence of prudence, for this can be without any sin. Taken as a privation, imprudence denotes lack of that prudence which a man can and ought to have, and in this sense imprudence is a sin by reason of a man's negligence in striving to have prudence. Imprudence is taken as a contrary, in so far as the movement or act of reason is in opposition to prudence: for instance, whereas the right reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent man despises counsel, and the same applies to the other conditions which require consideration in the act of prudence. On this way imprudence is a sin in respect of prudence considered under its proper aspect, since it is not possible for a man to act against prudence, except by infringing the rules on which the right reason of prudence depends. Wherefore, if this should happen through aversion from the Divine Law, it will be a mortal sin, as when a man acts precipitately through contempt and rejection of the Divine teaching: whereas if he act beside the Law and without contempt, and without detriment to things necessary for salvation, it will be a venial sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod deformitatem imprudentiae nullus vult, sed actum imprudentiae vult temerarius, qui vult praecipitanter agere. Unde et philosophus dicit, VI Ethic., quod ille qui circa prudentiam peccat volens, minus acceptatur. | Reply to Objection 1. No man desires the deformity of imprudence, but the rash man wills the act of imprudence, because he wishes to act precipitately. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "he who sins willingly against prudence is less to be commended." |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de imprudentia secundum quod sumitur negative. Sciendum tamen quod carentia prudentiae et cuiuslibet virtutis includitur in carentia originalis iustitiae, quae totam animam perficiebat. Et secundum hoc omnes isti defectus virtutum possunt reduci ad originale peccatum. | Reply to Objection 2. This argument takes imprudence in the negative sense. It must be observed however that lack of prudence or of any other virtue is included in the lack of original justice which perfected the entire soul. Accordingly all such lack of virtue may be ascribed to original sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod per poenitentiam restituitur prudentia infusa, et sic cessat carentia huius prudentiae. Non tamen restituitur prudentia acquisita quantum ad habitum, sed tollitur actus contrarius, in quo proprie consistit peccatum imprudentiae. | Reply to Objection 3. Repentance restores infused prudence, and thus the lack of this prudence ceases; but acquired prudence is not restored as to the habit, although the contrary act is taken away, wherein properly speaking the sin of imprudence consists. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imprudentia non sit speciale peccatum. Quicumque enim peccat agit contra rationem rectam, quae est prudentia. Sed imprudentia consistit in hoc quod aliquis agit contra prudentiam, ut dictum est. Ergo imprudentia non est speciale peccatum. | Objection 1. It would seem that imprudence is not a special sin. For whoever sins, acts against right reason, i.e. against prudence. But imprudence consists in acting against prudence, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore imprudence is not a special sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, prudentia magis est affinis moralibus actibus quam scientia. Sed ignorantia, quae opponitur scientiae, ponitur inter generales causas peccati. Ergo multo magis imprudentia. | Objection 2. Further, prudence is more akin to moral action than knowledge is.But ignorance which is opposed to knowledge, is reckoned one of the general causes of sin. Much more therefore should imprudence be reckoned among those causes. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, peccata contingunt ex hoc quod virtutum circumstantiae corrumpuntur, unde et Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod malum contingit ex singularibus defectibus. Sed multa requiruntur ad prudentiam, sicut ratio, intellectus, docilitas, et cetera quae supra posita sunt. Ergo multae sunt imprudentiae species. Ergo non est peccatum speciale. | Objection 3. Further, sin consists in the corruption of the circumstances of virtue, wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil results from each single defect." Now many things are requisite for prudence; for instance, reason, intelligence docility, and so on, as stated above (Q48;49). Therefore there are many species of imprudence, so that it is not a special sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, imprudentia est contrarium prudentiae, ut dictum est. Sed prudentia est una virtus specialis. Ergo imprudentia est unum vitium speciale. | On the contrary, Imprudence is opposed to prudence, as stated above (Article 1). Now prudence is a special virtue. Therefore imprudence too is one special vice. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquod vitium vel peccatum potest dici generale dupliciter, uno modo, absolute, quia scilicet est generale respectu omnium peccatorum; alio modo, quia est generale respectu quorundam vitiorum quae sunt species eius. Primo autem modo potest dici aliquod vitium generale dupliciter. Uno modo, per essentiam, quia scilicet praedicatur de omnibus peccatis. Et hoc modo imprudentia non est generale peccatum, sicut nec prudentia generalis virtus, cum sint circa actus speciales, scilicet circa ipsos actus rationis. Alio modo, per participationem. Et hoc modo imprudentia est generale peccatum. Sicut enim prudentia participatur quodammodo in omnibus virtutibus, inquantum est directiva earum, ita et imprudentia in omnibus vitiis et peccatis, nullum enim peccatum accidere potest nisi sit defectus in aliquo actu rationis dirigentis, quod pertinet ad imprudentiam. Si vero dicatur peccatum generale non simpliciter, sed secundum aliquod genus, quia scilicet continet sub se multas species; sic imprudentia est generale peccatum. Continet enim sub se diversas species tripliciter. Uno quidem modo, per oppositum ad diversas partes subiectivas prudentiae. Sicut enim distinguitur prudentia in monasticam, quae est regitiva unius, et in alias species prudentiae quae sunt multitudinis regitivae, ut supra habitum est; ita etiam imprudentia. Alio modo, secundum partes quasi potentiales prudentiae, quae sunt virtutes adiunctae, et accipiuntur secundum diversos actus rationis. Et hoc modo, quantum ad defectum consilii, circa quod est eubulia, est praecipitatio, sive temeritas, imprudentiae species. Quantum vero ad defectum iudicii, circa quod sunt synesis et gnome, est inconsideratio. Quantum vero ad ipsum praeceptum, quod est proprius actus prudentiae, est inconstantia et negligentia. Tertio modo possunt sumi per oppositum ad ea quae requiruntur ad prudentiam, quae sunt quasi partes integrales prudentiae. Sed quia omnia illa ordinantur ad dirigendum praedictos tres rationis actus, inde est quod omnes defectus oppositi reducuntur ad quatuor praedictas partes. Sicut incautela et incircumspectio includitur sub inconsideratione. Quod autem aliquis deficiat a docilitate vel memoria vel ratione, pertinet ad praecipitationem. Improvidentia vero et defectus intelligentiae et solertiae pertinent ad negligentiam et inconstantiam. | I answer that, A vice or sin may be styled general in two ways; first, absolutely, because, to wit, it is general in respect of all sins; secondly, because it is general in respect of certain vices, which are its species. On the first way, a vice may be said to be general on two counts: first, essentially, because it is predicated of all sins: and in this way imprudence is not a general sin, as neither is prudence a general virtue: since it is concerned with special acts, namely the very acts of reason: secondly, by participation; and in this way imprudence is a general sin: for, just as all the virtues have a share of prudence, in so far as it directs them, so have all vices and sins a share of imprudence, because no sin can occur, without some defect in an act of the directing reason, which defect belongs to imprudence. If, on the other hand, a sin be called general, not simply but in some particular genus, that is, as containing several species of sin, then imprudence is a general sin. For it contains various species in three ways. First, by opposition to the various subjective parts of prudence, for just as we distinguish the prudence that guides the individual, from other kinds that govern communities, as stated above (48; 50, 07), so also we distinguish various kinds of imprudence. Secondly, in respect of the quasi-potential parts of prudence, which are virtues connected with it, and correspond to the several acts of reason. Thus, by defect of "counsel" to which euboulia (deliberating well) corresponds, "precipitation" or "temerity" is a species of imprudence; by defect of "judgment," to which synesis (judging well according to common law) and gnome (judging well according to general law) refer, there is "thoughtlessness"; while "inconstancy" and "negligence" correspond to the "command" which is the proper act of prudence. Thirdly, this may be taken by opposition to those things which are requisite for prudence, which are the quasi-integral parts of prudence. Since however all these things are intended for the direction of the aforesaid three acts of reason, it follows that all the opposite defects are reducible to the four parts mentioned above. Thus incautiousness and incircumspection are included in "thoughtlessness"; lack of docility, memory, or reason is referable to "precipitation"; improvidence, lack of intelligence and of shrewdness, belong to "negligence" and "inconstancy." |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de generalitate quae est secundum participationem. | Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers generality by participation. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod quia scientia est magis remota a moralibus quam prudentia secundum propriam rationem utriusque, inde est quod ignorantia non habet de se rationem peccati moralis, sed solum ratione negligentiae praecedentis vel effectus sequentis. Et propter hoc ponitur inter generales causas peccati. Sed imprudentia secundum propriam rationem importat vitium morale. Et ideo magis potest poni speciale peccatum. | Reply to Objection 2. Since knowledge is further removed from morality than prudence is, according to their respective proper natures, it follows that ignorance has the nature of mortal sin, not of itself, but on account either of a preceding negligence, or of the consequent result, and for this reason it is reckoned one of the general causes of sin. On the other hand imprudence, by its very nature, denotes a moral vice; and for this reason it can be called a special sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quando corruptio diversarum circumstantiarum habet idem motivum, non diversificatur peccati species, sicut eiusdem speciei est peccatum ut aliquis accipiat non sua ubi non debet, et quando non debet. Sed si sint diversa motiva, tunc essent diversae species, puta si unus acciperet unde non deberet ut faceret iniuriam loco sacro, quod faceret speciem sacrilegii; alius quando non debet propter solum superfluum appetitum habendi, quod esset simplex avaritia. Et ideo defectus eorum quae requiruntur ad prudentiam non diversificant species nisi quatenus ordinantur ad diversos actus rationis, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3. When various circumstances are corrupted for the same motive, the species of sin is not multiplied: thus it is the same species of sin to take what is not one's own, where one ought not, and when one ought not. If, however, there be various motives, there are various species: for instance, if one man were to take another's property from where he ought not, so as to wrong a sacred place, this would constitute the species called sacrilege, while if another were to take another's property when he ought not, merely through the lust of possession, this would be a case of simple avarice. Hence the lack of those things which are requisite for prudence, does not constitute a diversity of species, except in so far as they are directed to different acts of reason, as stated above. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecipitatio non sit peccatum sub imprudentia contentum. Imprudentia enim opponitur virtuti prudentiae. Sed praecipitatio opponitur dono consilii, dicit enim Gregorius, in II Moral., quod donum consilii datur contra praecipitationem. Ergo praecipitatio non est peccatum sub imprudentia contentum. | Objection 1. It would seem that precipitation is not a sin included in imprudence. Imprudence is opposed to the virtue of prudence; whereas precipitation is opposed to the gift of counsel, according to Gregory, who says (Moral. ii, 49) that the gift of "counsel is given as a remedy to precipitation." Therefore precipitation is not a sin contained under imprudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, praecipitatio videtur ad temeritatem pertinere. Temeritas autem praesumptionem importat, quae pertinet ad superbiam. Ergo praecipitatio non est vitium sub imprudentia contentum. | Objection 2. Further, precipitation seemingly pertains to rashness. Now rashness implies presumption, which pertains to pride. Therefore precipitation is not a vice contained under imprudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, praecipitatio videtur importare quandam inordinatam festinationem. Sed in consiliando non solum contingit esse peccatum per hoc quod aliquis est festinus, sed etiam si sit nimis tardus, ita quod praetereat opportunitas operis; et etiam secundum inordinationes aliarum circumstantiarum, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo non magis praecipitatio debet poni peccatum sub imprudentia contentum quam tarditas, aut aliqua alia huiusmodi ad inordinationem consilii pertinentia. | Objection 3. Further, precipitation seems to denote inordinate haste. Now sin happens in counselling not only through being over hasty but also through being over slow, so that the opportunity for action passes by, and through corruption of other circumstances, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9. Therefore there is no reason for reckoning precipitation as a sin contained under imprudence, rather than slowness, or something else of the kind pertaining to inordinate counsel. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. IV, via impiorum tenebrosa, nesciunt ubi corruant. Tenebrae autem viae impietatis pertinent ad imprudentiam. Ergo corruere, sive praecipitari, ad imprudentiam pertinet. | On the contrary, It is written (Proverbs 4:19): "The way of the wicked is darksome, they know not where they fall." Now the darksome ways of ungodliness belong to imprudence. Therefore imprudence leads a man to fall or to be precipitate. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod praecipitatio in actibus animae metaphorice dicitur secundum similitudinem a corporali motu acceptam. Dicitur autem praecipitari secundum corporalem motum quod a superiori in ima pervenit secundum impetum quendam proprii motus vel alicuius impellentis, non ordinate incedendo per gradus. Summum autem animae est ipsa ratio. Imum autem est operatio per corpus exercita. Gradus autem medii, per quos oportet ordinate descendere, sunt memoria praeteritorum, intelligentia praesentium, solertia in considerandis futuris eventibus, ratiocinatio conferens unum alteri, docilitas, per quam aliquis acquiescit sententiis maiorum, per quos quidem gradus aliquis ordinate descendit recte consiliando. Si quis autem feratur ad agendum per impetum voluntatis vel passionis, pertransitis huiusmodi gradibus, erit praecipitatio. Cum ergo inordinatio consilii ad imprudentiam pertineat, manifestum est quod vitium praecipitationis sub imprudentia continetur. | I answer that, Precipitation is ascribed metaphorically to acts of the soul, by way of similitude to bodily movement. Now a thing is said to be precipitated as regards bodily movement, when it is brought down from above by the impulse either of its own movement or of another's, and not in orderly fashion by degrees. Now the summit of the soul is the reason, and the base is reached in the action performed by the body; while the steps that intervene by which one ought to descend in orderly fashion are "memory" of the past, "intelligence" of the present, "shrewdness" in considering the future outcome, "reasoning" which compares one thing with another, "docility" in accepting the opinions of others. He that takes counsel descends by these steps in due order, whereas if a man is rushed into action by the impulse of his will or of a passion, without taking these steps, it will be a case of precipitation. Since then inordinate counsel pertains to imprudence, it is evident that the vice of precipitation is contained under imprudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod consilii rectitudo pertinet ad donum consilii et ad virtutem prudentiae, licet diversimode, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo praecipitatio utrique contrariatur. | Reply to Objection 1. Rectitude of counsel belongs to the gift of counsel and to the virtue of prudence; albeit in different ways, as stated above (Question 52, Article 2), and consequently precipitation is opposed to both. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illa dicuntur fieri temere quae ratione non reguntur. Quod quidem potest contingere dupliciter. Uno modo, ex impetu voluntatis vel passionis. Alio modo, ex contemptu regulae dirigentis, et hoc proprie importat temeritas. Unde videtur ex radice superbiae provenire, quae refugit subesse regulae alienae. Praecipitatio autem se habet ad utrumque. Unde temeritas sub praecipitatione continetur, quamvis praecipitatio magis respiciat primum. | Reply to Objection 2. Things are said to be done rashly when they are not directed by reason: and this may happen in two ways; first through the impulse of the will or of a passion, secondly through contempt of the directing rule; and this is what is meant by rashness properly speaking, wherefore it appears to proceed from that root of pride, which refuses to submit to another's ruling. But precipitation refers to both, so that rashness is contained under precipitation, although precipitation refers rather to the first. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in inquisitione consilii multa particularia sunt consideranda, et ideo philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., oportet consiliari tarde. Unde praecipitatio directius opponitur rectitudini consilii quam tarditas superflua, quae habet quandam similitudinem recti consilii. | Reply to Objection 3. Many things have to be considered in the research of reason; hence the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one should be slow in taking counsel." Hence precipitation is more directly opposed to rectitude of counsel than over slowness is, for the latter bears a certain likeness to right counsel. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconsideratio non sit peccatum speciale sub imprudentia contentum. Lex enim divina ad nullum peccatum nos inducit, secundum illud Psalm., lex domini immaculata. Inducit autem ad non considerandum, secundum illud Matth. X, nolite cogitare quomodo aut quid loquamini. Ergo inconsideratio non est peccatum. | Objection 1. It would seem that thoughtlessness is not a special sin included in imprudence. For the Divine law does not incite us to any sin, according to Psalm 18:8, "The law of the Lord is unspotted"; and yet it incites us to be thoughtless, according to Matthew 10:19, "Take no thought how or what to speak." Therefore thoughtlessness is not a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, quicumque consiliatur oportet quod multa consideret. Sed per defectum consilii est praecipitatio; et per consequens ex defectu considerationis. Ergo praecipitatio sub inconsideratione continetur. Non ergo inconsideratio est speciale peccatum. | Objection 2. Further, whoever takes counsel must needs give thought to many things. Now precipitation is due to a defect of counsel and therefore to a defect of thought. Therefore precipitation is contained under thoughtlessness: and consequently thoughtlessness is not a special sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, prudentia consistit in actibus rationis practicae, qui sunt consiliari, iudicare de consiliatis, et praecipere. Sed considerare praecedit omnes istos actus, quia pertinet etiam ad intellectum speculativum. Ergo inconsideratio non est speciale peccatum sub imprudentia contentum. | Objection 3. Further, prudence consists in acts of the practical reason, viz. "counsel," "judgment" about what has been counselled, and "command" [Cf. 47, 8]. Now thought precedes all these acts, since it belongs also to the speculative intellect. Therefore thoughtlessness is not a special sin contained under imprudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. IV, oculi tui videant recta, et palpebrae tuae praecedant gressus tuos, quod pertinet ad prudentiam. Sed contrarium huius agitur per inconsiderationem. Ergo inconsideratio est speciale peccatum sub imprudentia contentum. | On the contrary, It is written (Proverbs 4:25): "Let thy eyes look straight on, and let thine eye-lids go before thy steps." Now this pertains to prudence, while the contrary pertains to thoughtlessness. Therefore thoughtlessness is a special sin contained under imprudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod consideratio importat actum intellectus veritatem rei intuentis. Sicut autem inquisitio pertinet ad rationem, ita iudicium pertinet ad intellectum, unde et in speculativis demonstrativa scientia dicitur iudicativa, inquantum per resolutionem in prima principia intelligibilia de veritate inquisitorum diiudicatur. Et ideo consideratio maxime pertinet ad iudicium. Unde et defectus recti iudicii ad vitium inconsiderationis pertinet, prout scilicet aliquis in recte iudicando deficit ex hoc quod contemnit vel negligit attendere ea ex quibus rectum iudicium procedit. Unde manifestum est quod inconsideratio est peccatum. | I answer that, Thought signifies the act of the intellect in considering the truth about. something. Now just as research belongs to the reason, so judgment belongs to the intellect. Wherefore in speculative matters a demonstrative science is said to exercise judgment, in so far as it judges the truth of the results of research by tracing those results back to the first indemonstrable principles. Hence thought pertains chiefly to judgment; and consequently the lack of right judgment belongs to the vice of thoughtlessness, in so far, to wit, as one fails to judge rightly through contempt or neglect of those things on which a right judgment depends. It is therefore evident that thoughtlessness is a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus non prohibet considerare ea quae sunt agenda vel dicenda, quando homo habet opportunitatem. Sed dat fiduciam discipulis in verbis inductis ut, deficiente sibi opportunitate vel propter imperitiam vel quia subito praeoccupantur, in solo divino confidant consilio, quia cum ignoramus quid agere debeamus, hoc solum habemus residui, ut oculos nostros dirigamus ad Deum, sicut dicitur II Paral. XX. Alioquin, si homo praetermittat facere quod potest, solum divinum auxilium expectans, videtur tentare Deum. | Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord did not forbid us to take thought, when we have the opportunity, about what we ought to do or say, but, in the words quoted, He encourages His disciples, so that when they had no opportunity of taking thought, either through lack of knowledge or through a sudden call, they should trust in the guidance of God alone, because "as we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to God," according to 2 Chronicles 20:12: else if man, instead of doing what he can, were to be content with awaiting God's assistance, he would seem to tempt God. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod tota consideratio eorum quae in consilio attenduntur ordinatur ad recte iudicandum, et ideo consideratio in iudicio perficitur. Unde etiam inconsideratio maxime opponitur rectitudini iudicii. | Reply to Objection 2. All thought about those things of which counsel takes cognizance, is directed to the formation of a right judgment, wherefore this thought is perfected in judgment. Consequently thoughtlessness is above all opposed to the rectitude of judgment. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod inconsideratio hic accipitur secundum determinatam materiam, idest secundum agibilia humana, in quibus plura sunt attendenda ad recte iudicandum quam etiam in speculativis; quia operationes sunt in singularibus. | Reply to Objection 3. Thoughtlessness is to be taken here in relation to a determinate matter, namely, that of human action, wherein more things have to be thought about for the purpose of right judgment, than in speculative matters, because actions are about singulars. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconstantia non sit vitium sub imprudentia contentum. Inconstantia enim videtur in hoc consistere quod homo non persistat in aliquo difficili. Sed persistere in difficilibus pertinet ad fortitudinem. Ergo inconstantia magis opponitur fortitudini quam prudentiae. | Objection 1. It would seem that inconstancy is not a vice contained under imprudence. For inconstancy consists seemingly in a lack of perseverance in matters of difficulty. But perseverance in difficult matters belongs to fortitude. Therefore inconstancy is opposed to fortitude rather than to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, Iac. III dicitur, ubi zelus et contentio, ibi inconstantia et omne opus pravum. Sed zelus ad invidiam pertinet. Ergo inconstantia non pertinet ad imprudentiam, sed magis ad invidiam. | Objection 2. Further, it is written (James 3:16): "Where jealousy [Douay: 'envy'] and contention are, there are inconstancy and every evil work."But jealousy pertains to envy. Therefore inconstancy pertains not to imprudence but to envy. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, ille videtur esse inconstans qui non perseverat in eo quod proposuerat. Quod quidem pertinet in delectationibus ad incontinentem, in tristitiis autem ad mollem sive delicatum, ut dicitur VII Ethic. Ergo inconstantia non pertinet ad imprudentiam. | Objection 3. Further, a man would seem to be inconstant who fails to persevere in what he has proposed to do. Now this is a mark of "incontinency" in pleasurable matters, and of "effeminacy" or "squeamishness" in unpleasant matters, according to Ethic. vii, 1. Therefore inconstancy does not pertain to imprudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod ad prudentiam pertinet praeferre maius bonum minus bono. Ergo desistere a meliori pertinet ad imprudentiam. Sed hoc est inconstantia. Ergo inconstantia pertinet ad imprudentiam. | On the contrary, It belongs to prudence to prefer the greater good to the lesser. Therefore to forsake the greater good belongs to imprudence. Now this is inconstancy. Therefore inconstancy belongs to imprudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod inconstantia importat recessum quendam a bono proposito definito. Huiusmodi autem recessus principium quidem habet a vi appetitiva, non enim aliquis recedit a priori bono proposito nisi propter aliquid quod sibi inordinate placet. Sed iste recessus non consummatur nisi per defectum rationis, quae fallitur in hoc quod repudiat id quod recte acceptaverat, et quia, cum possit resistere impulsui passionis, si non resistat, hoc est ex debilitate ipsius, quae non tenet se firmiter in bono concepto. Et ideo inconstantia, quantum ad sui consummationem, pertinet ad defectum rationis. Sicut autem omnis rectitudo rationis practicae pertinet aliqualiter ad prudentiam, ita omnis defectus eiusdem pertinet ad imprudentiam. Et ideo inconstantia, secundum sui consummationem, ad imprudentiam pertinet. Et sicut praecipitatio est ex defectu circa actum consilii, et inconsideratio circa actum iudicii, ita inconstantia circa actum praecepti, ex hoc enim dicitur aliquis esse inconstans quod ratio deficit in praecipiendo ea quae sunt consiliata et iudicata. | I answer that, Inconstancy denotes withdrawal from a definite good purpose. Now the origin of this withdrawal is in the appetite, for a man does not withdraw from a previous good purpose, except on account of something being inordinately pleasing to him: nor is this withdrawal completed except through a defect of reason, which is deceived in rejecting what before it had rightly accepted. And since it can resist the impulse of the passions, if it fail to do this, it is due to its own weakness in not standing to the good purpose it has conceived; hence inconstancy, as to its completion, is due to a defect in the reason. Now just as all rectitude of the practical reason belongs in some degree to prudence, so all lack of that rectitude belongs to imprudence. Consequently inconstancy, as to its completion, belongs to imprudence. And just as precipitation is due to a defect in the act of counsel, and thoughtlessness to a defect in the act of judgment, so inconstancy arises from a defect in the act of command. For a man is stated to be inconstant because his reason fails in commanding what has been counselled and judged. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum prudentiae participatur in omnibus virtutibus moralibus, et secundum hoc persistere in bono pertinet ad omnes virtutes morales. Praecipue tamen ad fortitudinem, quae patitur maiorem impulsum ad contrarium. | Reply to Objection 1. The good of prudence is shared by all the moral virtues, and accordingly perseverance in good belongs to all moral virtues, chiefly, however, to fortitude, which suffers a greater impulse to the contrary. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod invidia et ira, quae est contentionis principium, faciunt inconstantiam ex parte appetitivae virtutis, ex qua est principium inconstantiae, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2. Envy and anger, which are the source of contention, cause inconstancy on the part of the appetite, to which power the origin of inconstancy is due, as stated above. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod continentia et perseverantia non videntur esse in vi appetitiva, sed solum in ratione. Continens enim patitur quidem perversas concupiscentias, et perseverans graves tristitias, quod designat defectum appetitivae virtutis, sed ratio firmiter persistit, continentis quidem contra concupiscentias, perseverantis autem contra tristitias. Unde continentia et perseverantia videntur esse species constantiae ad rationem pertinentis, ad quam etiam pertinet inconstantia. | Reply to Objection 3. Continency and perseverance seem to be not in the appetitive power, but in the reason. For the continent man suffers evil concupiscences, and the persevering man suffers grievous sorrows (which points to a defect in the appetitive power); but reason stands firm, in the continent man, against concupiscence, and in the persevering man, against sorrow. Hence continency and perseverance seem to be species of constancy which pertains to reason; and to this power inconstancy pertains also. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praedicta vitia non oriantur ex luxuria. Inconstantia enim oritur ex invidia, ut dictum est. Sed invidia est vitium distinctum a luxuria. Ergo praedicta vitia non oriuntur ex luxuria. | Objection 1. It would seem that the aforesaid vices do not arise from lust. For inconstancy arises from envy, as stated above (5, ad 2). But envy is a distinct vice from lust. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, Iac. I dicitur, vir duplex animo inconstans est in omnibus viis suis. Sed duplicitas non videtur ad luxuriam pertinere, sed magis ad dolositatem, quae est filia avaritiae, secundum Gregorium, XXXI Moral. Ergo praedicta vitia non oriuntur ex luxuria. | Objection 2. Further, it is written (James 1:8): "A double-minded man is inconstant in all his ways." Now duplicity does not seem to pertain to lust, but rather to deceitfulness, which is a daughter of covetousness, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore the aforesaid vices do not arise from lust. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, praedicta vitia pertinent ad defectum rationis. Sed vitia spiritualia propinquiora sunt rationi quam vitia carnalia. Ergo praedicta vitia magis oriuntur ex vitiis spiritualibus quam ex vitiis carnalibus. | Objection 3. Further, the aforesaid vices are connected with some defect of reason. Now spiritual vices are more akin to the reason than carnal vices. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise from spiritual vices rather than from carnal vices. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., ponit praedicta vitia ex luxuria oriri. | On the contrary, Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 45) that the aforesaid vices arise from lust. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., delectatio maxime corrumpit existimationem prudentiae, et praecipue delectatio quae est in venereis, quae totam animam absorbet et trahit ad sensibilem delectationem; perfectio autem prudentiae, et cuiuslibet intellectualis virtutis, consistit in abstractione a sensibilibus. Unde cum praedicta vitia pertineant ad defectum prudentiae et rationis practicae, sicut habitum est, sequitur quod ex luxuria maxime oriantur. | I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5) "pleasure above all corrupts the estimate of prudence," and chiefly sexual pleasure which absorbs the mind, and draws it to sensible delight. Now the perfection of prudence and of every intellectual virtue consists in abstraction from sensible objects. Wherefore, since the aforesaid vices involve a defect of prudence and of the practical reason, as stated above (A2,5), it follows that they arise chiefly from lust. |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod invidia et ira causant inconstantiam pertrahendo rationem ad aliud, sed luxuria causat inconstantiam totaliter extinguendo iudicium rationis. Unde philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod incontinens irae audit quidem rationem, sed non perfecte, incontinens autem concupiscentiae totaliter eam non audit. | Reply to Objection 1. Envy and anger cause inconstancy by drawing away the reason to something else; whereas lust causes inconstancy by destroying the judgment of reason entirely. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "the man who is incontinent through anger listens to reason, yet not perfectly, whereas he who is incontinent through lust does not listen to it at all." |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam duplicitas animi est quoddam consequens ad luxuriam, sicut et inconstantia, prout duplicitas animi importat vertibilitatem animi ad diversa. Unde et Terentius dicit, in eunucho, quod in amore est bellum, et rursus pax et indutiae. | Reply to Objection 2. Duplicity also is something resulting from lust, just as inconstancy is, if by duplicity we understand fluctuation of the mind from one thing to another. Hence Terence says (Eunuch. act 1, sc. 1) that "love leads to war, and likewise to peace and truce." |
| IIª-IIae q. 53 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod vitia carnalia intantum magis extinguunt iudicium rationis inquantum longius abducunt a ratione. | Reply to Objection 3. Carnal vices destroy the judgment of reason so much the more as they lead us away from reason. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 pr. Deinde considerandum est de negligentia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum negligentia sit peccatum speciale. Secundo, cui virtuti opponatur. Tertio, utrum negligentia sit peccatum mortale. | Question 54. Negligence 1. Is negligence a special sin? 2. To which virtue is it opposed? 3. Is negligence a mortal sin? |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod negligentia non sit peccatum speciale. Negligentia enim diligentiae opponitur. Sed diligentia requiritur in qualibet virtute, sicut et eligentia. Ergo negligentia non est peccatum speciale. | Objection 1. It would seem that negligence is not a special sin. For negligence is opposed to diligence. But diligence is required in every virtue. Therefore negligence is not a special sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud quod invenitur in quolibet peccato non est speciale peccatum. Sed negligentia invenitur in quolibet peccato, quia omnis qui peccat negligit ea per quae a peccato retraheretur; et qui in peccato perseverat negligit conteri de peccato. Ergo negligentia non est speciale peccatum. | Objection 2. Further, that which is common to every sin is not a special sin. Now negligence is common to every sin, because he who sins neglects that which withdraws him from sin, and he who perseveres in sin neglects to be contrite for his sin. Therefore negligence is not a special sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, omne peccatum speciale habet materiam determinatam. Sed negligentia non videtur habere determinatam materiam, neque enim est circa mala aut indifferentia, quia ea praetermittere nulli ad negligentiam deputatur; similiter etiam non est circa bona, quia si negligenter aguntur, iam non sunt bona. Ergo videtur quod negligentia non sit vitium speciale. | Objection 3. Further, every special sin had a determinate matter. But negligence seems to have no determinate matter: since it is neither about evil or indifferent things (for no man is accused of negligence if he omit them), nor about good things, for if these be done negligently, they are no longer good. Therefore it seems that negligence is not a special vice. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod peccata quae committuntur ex negligentia distinguuntur contra peccata quae committuntur ex contemptu. | On the contrary, Sins committed through negligence, are distinguished from those which are committed through contempt. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod negligentia importat defectum debitae sollicitudinis. Omnis autem defectus debiti actus habet rationem peccati. Unde manifestum est quod negligentia habet rationem peccati, et eo modo quo sollicitudo est specialis virtutis actus, necesse est quod negligentia sit speciale peccatum. Sunt enim aliqua peccata specialia quia sunt circa aliquam materiam specialem, sicut luxuria est circa venerea, quaedam autem sunt vitia specialia propter specialitatem actus se extendentis ad omnem materiam. Et huiusmodi sunt omnia vitia quae sunt circa actum rationis, nam quilibet actus rationis se extendit ad quamlibet materiam moralem. Et ideo, cum sollicitudo sit quidam specialis actus rationis, ut supra habitum est, consequens est quod negligentia, quae importat defectum sollicitudinis, sit speciale peccatum. | I answer that, Negligence denotes lack of due solicitude. Now every lack of a due act is sinful: wherefore it is evident that negligence is a sin, and that it must needs have the character of a special sin according as solicitude is the act of a special virtue. For certain sins are special through being about a special matter, as lust is about sexual matters, while some vices are special on account of their having a special kind of act which extends to all kinds of matter, and such are all vices affecting an act of reason, since every act of reason extends to any kind of moral matter. Since then solicitude is a special act of reason, as stated above (Question 47, Article 09), it follows that negligence, which denotes lack of solicitude, is a special sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod diligentia videtur esse idem sollicitudini, quia in his quae diligimus maiorem sollicitudinem adhibemus. Unde diligentia, sicut et sollicitudo, requiritur ad quamlibet virtutem, inquantum in qualibet virtute requiruntur debiti actus rationis. | Reply to Objection 1. Diligence seems to be the same as solicitude, because the more we love [diligimus] a thing the more solicitous are we about it. Hence diligence, no less than solicitude, is required for every virtue, in so far as due acts of reason are requisite for every virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in quolibet peccato necesse est esse defectum circa aliquem actum rationis, puta defectum consilii et aliorum huiusmodi. Unde sicut praecipitatio est speciale peccatum propter specialem actum rationis qui praetermittitur, scilicet consilium, quamvis possit inveniri in quolibet genere peccatorum; ita negligentia est speciale peccatum propter defectum specialis actus rationis qui est sollicitudo, quamvis inveniatur aliqualiter in omnibus peccatis. | Reply to Objection 2. In every sin there must needs be a defect affecting an act of reason, for instance a defect in counsel or the like. Hence just as precipitation is a special sin on account of a special act of reason which is omitted, namely counsel, although it may be found in any kind of sin; so negligence is a special sin on account of the lack of a special act of reason, namely solicitude, although it is found more or less in all sins. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod materia negligentiae proprie sunt bona quae quis agere debet, non quod ipsa sunt bona cum negligenter aguntur; sed quia per negligentiam accidit defectus bonitatis in eis, sive praetermittatur totaliter actus debitus propter defectum sollicitudinis, sive etiam aliqua debita circumstantia actus. | Reply to Objection 3. Properly speaking the matter of negligence is a good that one ought to do, not that it is a good when it is done negligently, but because on account of negligence it incurs a lack of goodness, whether a due act be entirely omitted through lack of solicitude, or some due circumstance be omitted. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod negligentia non opponatur prudentiae. Negligentia enim videtur esse idem quod pigritia vel torpor, qui pertinet ad acediam, ut patet per Gregorium, XXXI Moral. Acedia autem non opponitur prudentiae, sed magis caritati, ut supra dictum est. Ergo negligentia non opponitur prudentiae. | Objection 1. It would seem that negligence is not opposed to prudence. For negligence seems to be the same as idleness or laziness, which belongs to sloth, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Now sloth is not opposed to prudence, but to charity, as stated above (Question 35, Article 3). Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad negligentiam videtur pertinere omne peccatum omissionis. Sed peccatum omissionis non opponitur prudentiae, sed magis virtutibus moralibus executivis. Ergo negligentia non opponitur prudentiae. | Objection 2. Further, every sin of omission seems to be due to negligence. But sins of omission are not opposed to prudence, but to the executive moral virtues. Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, imprudentia est circa aliquem actum rationis. Sed negligentia non importat defectum neque circa consilium, in quo deficit praecipitatio; neque circa iudicium, in quo deficit inconsideratio; neque circa praeceptum, in quo deficit inconstantia. Ergo negligentia non pertinet ad imprudentiam. | Objection 3. Further, imprudence relates to some act of reason. But negligence does not imply a defect of counsel, for that is "precipitation," nor a defect of judgment, since that is "thoughtlessness," nor a defect of command, because that is "inconstancy." Therefore negligence does not pertain to imprudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, dicitur Eccle. VII, qui timet Deum nihil negligit. Sed unumquodque peccatum praecipue excluditur per virtutem oppositam. Ergo negligentia magis opponitur timori quam prudentiae. | Objection 4. Further, it is written (Ecclesiastes 7:19): "He that feareth God, neglecteth nothing." But every sin is excluded by the opposite virtue. Therefore negligence is opposed to fear rather than to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XX, lascivus et imprudens non observant tempus. Sed hoc pertinet ad negligentiam. Ergo negligentia opponitur prudentiae. | On the contrary, It is written (Sirach 20:7): "A babbler and a fool [imprudens] will regard no time." Now this is due to negligence. Therefore negligence is opposed to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod negligentia directe opponitur sollicitudini. Sollicitudo autem ad rationem pertinet, et rectitudo sollicitudinis ad prudentiam. Unde, per oppositum, negligentia ad imprudentiam pertinet. Et hoc etiam ex ipso nomine apparet. Quia sicut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., negligens dicitur quasi nec eligens. Electio autem recta eorum quae sunt ad finem ad prudentiam pertinet. Unde negligentia pertinet ad imprudentiam. | I answer that, Negligence is directly opposed to solicitude. Now solicitude pertains to the reason, and rectitude of solicitude to prudence. Hence, on the other hand, negligence pertains to imprudence. This appears from its very name, because, as Isidore observes (Etym. x) "a negligent man is one who fails to choose [nec eligens]": and the right choice of the means belongs to prudence. Therefore negligence pertains to imprudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod negligentia consistit in defectu interioris actus, ad quem pertinet etiam electio. Pigritia autem et torpor magis pertinent ad executionem, ita tamen quod pigritia importat tarditatem ad exequendum; torpor remissionem quandam importat in ipsa executione. Et ideo convenienter torpor ex acedia nascitur, quia acedia est tristitia aggravans, idest impediens animum ab operando. | Reply to Objection 1. Negligence is a defect in the internal act, to which choice also belongs: whereas idleness and laziness denote slowness of execution, yet so that idleness denotes slowness in setting about the execution, while laziness denotes remissness in the execution itself. Hence it is becoming that laziness should arise from sloth, which is "an oppressive sorrow," i.e. hindering, the mind from action [Cf. 35, 1; I-II, 35, 8]. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod omissio pertinet ad exteriorem actum, est enim omissio quando praetermittitur aliquis actus debitus. Et ideo opponitur iustitiae. Et est effectus negligentiae, sicut etiam executio iusti operis est effectus rationis rectae. | Reply to Objection 2. Omission regards the external act, for it consists in failing to perform an act which is due. Hence it is opposed to justice, and is an effect of negligence, even as the execution of a just deed is the effect of right reason. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod negligentia est circa actum praecipiendi ad quem etiam pertinet sollicitudo. Aliter tamen circa hunc actum deficit negligens, et aliter inconstans. Inconstans enim deficit in praecipiendo quasi ab aliquo impeditus, negligens autem per defectum promptae voluntatis. | Reply to Objection 3. Negligence regards the act of command, which solicitude also regards. Yet the negligent man fails in regard to this act otherwise than the inconstant man: for the inconstant man fails in commanding, being hindered as it were, by something, whereas the negligent man fails through lack of a prompt will. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod timor Dei operatur ad vitationem cuiuslibet peccati, quia ut dicitur Prov. XV, per timorem domini declinat omnis a malo. Et ideo timor facit negligentiam vitare. Non tamen ita quod directe negligentia timori opponatur, sed inquantum timor excitat hominem ad actus rationis. Unde etiam supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur, quod timor facit consiliativos. | Reply to Objection 4. The fear of God helps us to avoid all sins, because according to Proverbs 15:27, "by the fear of the Lord everyone declineth from evil." Hence fear makes us avoid negligence, yet not as though negligence were directly opposed to fear, but because fear incites man to acts of reason. Wherefore also it has been stated above (I-II, 44, 2) when we were treating of the passions, that "fear makes us take counsel." |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod negligentia non possit esse peccatum mortale. Quia super illud Iob IX, verebar opera mea etc., dicit Glossa Gregorii quod illam, scilicet negligentiam, minor amor Dei exaggerat. Sed ubicumque est peccatum mortale, totaliter tollitur amor Dei. Ergo negligentia non est peccatum mortale. | Objection 1. It would seem that negligence cannot be a mortal sin. For a gloss of Gregory [Moral. ix. 34 on Job 9:28, "I feared all my works," etc.] says that "too little love of God aggravates the former," viz. negligence. But wherever there is mortal sin, the love of God is done away with altogether. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, super illud Eccli. VII, de negligentia purga te cum paucis, dicit Glossa, quamvis oblatio parva sit, multorum delictorum purgat negligentias. Sed hoc non esset si negligentia esset peccatum mortale. Ergo negligentia non est peccatum mortale. | Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Sirach 7:34, "For thy negligences purify thyself with a few," says: "Though the offering be small it cleanses the negligences of many sins." Now this would not be, if negligence were a mortal sin. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, in lege fuerunt statuta sacrificia pro peccatis mortalibus, sicut patet in Levitico. Sed nullum fuit statutum sacrificium pro negligentia. Ergo negligentia non est peccatum mortale. | Objection 3. Further, under the law certain sacrifices were prescribed for mortal sins, as appears from the book of Leviticus. Yet no sacrifice was prescribed for negligence. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod habetur Prov. XIX, qui negligit vitam suam mortificabitur. | On the contrary, It is written (Proverbs 19:16): "He that neglecteth his own life [Vulgate: 'way'] shall die." |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, negligentia provenit ex quadam remissione voluntatis, per quam contingit quod ratio non sollicitatur ut praecipiat ea quae debet vel eo modo quo debet. Potest ergo dupliciter contingere quod negligentia sit peccatum mortale. Uno modo, ex parte eius quod praetermittitur per negligentiam. Quod quidem si sit de necessitate salutis, sive sit actus sive circumstantia, erit peccatum mortale. Alio modo, ex parte causae. Si enim voluntas intantum sit remissa circa ea quae sunt Dei ut totaliter a Dei caritate deficiat, talis negligentia est peccatum mortale. Et hoc praecipue contingit quando negligentia sequitur ex contemptu. Alioquin, si negligentia consistat in praetermissione alicuius actus vel circumstantiae quae non sit de necessitate salutis; nec hoc fiat ex contemptu, sed ex aliquo defectu fervoris, qui impeditur interdum per aliquod veniale peccatum, tunc negligentia non est peccatum mortale, sed veniale. | I answer that, As stated above (2, ad 3), negligence arises out of a certain remissness of the will, the result being a lack of solicitude on the part of the reason in commanding what it should command, or as it should command. Accordingly negligence may happen to be a mortal sin in two ways. First on the part of that which is omitted through negligence. If this be either an act or a circumstance necessary for salvation, it will be a mortal sin. Secondly on the part of the cause: for if the will be so remiss about Divine things, as to fall away altogether from the charity of God, such negligence is a mortal sin, and this is the case chiefly when negligence is due to contempt. But if negligence consists in the omission of an act or circumstance that is not necessary for salvation, it is not a mortal but a venial sin, provided the negligence arise, not from contempt, but from some lack of fervor, to which venial sin is an occasional obstacle. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod minor amor Dei potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, per defectum fervoris caritatis, et sic causatur negligentia quae est peccatum veniale. Alio modo, per defectum ipsius caritatis, sicut dicitur minor amor Dei quando aliquis diligit Deum solum amore naturali. Et tunc causatur negligentia quae est peccatum mortale. | Reply to Objection 1. Man may be said to love God less in two ways. First through lack of the fervor of charity, and this causes the negligence that is a venial sin: secondly through lack of charity itself, in which sense we say that a man loves God less when he loves Him with a merely natural love; and this causes the negligence that is a mortal sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod parva oblatio cum humili mente et pura dilectione facta, ut ibi dicitur, non solum purgat peccata venialia, sed etiam mortalia. | Reply to Objection 2. According to the same authority (gloss), a small offering made with a humble mind and out of pure love, cleanses man not only from venial but also from mortal sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quando negligentia consistit in praetermissione eorum quae sunt de necessitate salutis, tunc trahitur ad aliud genus peccati magis manifestum. Peccata enim quae consistunt in interioribus actibus sunt magis occulta. Et ideo pro eis certa sacrificia non iniungebantur in lege, quia sacrificiorum oblatio erat quaedam publica protestatio peccati, quae non est facienda de peccato occulto. | Reply to Objection 3. When negligence consists in the omission of that which is necessary for salvation, it is drawn to the other more manifest genus of sin. Because those sins that consist of inward actions, are more hidden, wherefore no special sacrifices were prescribed for them in the Law, since the offering of sacrifices was a kind of public confession of sin, whereas hidden sins should not be confessed in public. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 pr. Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis prudentiae quae habent similitudinem cum ipsa. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum prudentia carnis sit peccatum. Secundo, utrum sit peccatum mortale. Tertio, utrum astutia sit peccatum speciale. Quarto, de dolo. Quinto, de fraude. Sexto, de sollicitudine temporalium rerum. Septimo, de sollicitudine futurorum. Octavo, de origine horum vitiorum. | Question 55. Vices opposed to prudence by way of resemblance 1. Is prudence of the flesh a sin? 2. Is it a mortal sin? 3. Is craftiness a special sin? 4. Guile 5. Fraud 6. Solicitude about temporal things 7. Solicitude about the future 8. The origin of these vices |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia carnis non sit peccatum. Prudentia enim est nobilior virtus quam aliae virtutes morales, utpote omnium regitiva. Sed nulla iustitia vel temperantia est peccatum. Ergo etiam neque aliqua prudentia est peccatum. | Objection 1. It would seem that prudence of the flesh is not a sin. For prudence is more excellent than the other moral virtues, since it governs them all. But no justice or temperance is sinful. Neither therefore is any prudence a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, prudenter operari ad finem qui licite amatur non est peccatum. Sed caro licite amatur, nemo enim unquam carnem suam odio habuit, ut habetur ad Ephes. V. Ergo prudentia carnis non est peccatum. | Objection 2. Further, it is not a sin to act prudently for an end which it is lawful to love. But it is lawful to love the flesh, "for no man ever hated his own flesh" (Ephesians 5:29). Therefore prudence of the flesh is not a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut homo tentatur a carne, ita etiam tentatur a mundo, et etiam a Diabolo. Sed non ponitur inter peccata aliqua prudentia mundi, vel etiam Diaboli. Ergo neque debet poni inter peccata aliqua prudentia carnis. | Objection 3. Further, just as man is tempted by the flesh, so too is he tempted by the world and the devil. But no prudence of the world, or of the devil is accounted a sin. Therefore neither should any prudence of the flesh be accounted among sins. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, nullus est inimicus Deo nisi propter iniquitatem, secundum illud Sap. XIV, simul odio sunt Deo impius et impietas eius. Sed sicut dicitur ad Rom. VIII, prudentia carnis inimica est Deo. Ergo prudentia carnis est peccatum. | On the contrary, No man is an enemy to God save for wickedness according to Wisdom 14:9, "To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike." Now it is written (Romans 8:7): "The prudence [Vulgate: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God." Therefore prudence of the flesh is a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, prudentia est circa ea quae sunt ad finem totius vitae. Et ideo prudentia carnis proprie dicitur secundum quod aliquis bona carnis habet ut ultimum finem suae vitae. Manifestum est autem quod hoc est peccatum, per hoc enim homo deordinatur circa ultimum finem, qui non consistit in bonis corporis, sicut supra habitum est. Et ideo prudentia carnis est peccatum. | I answer that, As stated above (Question 47, Article 13), prudence regards things which are directed to the end of life as a whole. Hence prudence of the flesh signifies properly the prudence of a man who looks upon carnal goods as the last end of his life. Now it is evident that this is a sin, because it involves a disorder in man with respect to his last end, which does not consist in the goods of the body, as stated above (I-II, 02, 5). Therefore prudence of the flesh is a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iustitia et temperantia in sui ratione important id unde virtus laudatur, scilicet aequalitatem et concupiscentiarum refrenationem, et ideo nunquam accipiuntur in malo. Sed nomen prudentiae sumitur a providendo, sicut supra dictum est, quod potest etiam ad mala extendi. Et ideo, licet prudentia simpliciter dicta in bono accipiatur, aliquo tamen addito potest accipi in malo. Et secundum hoc dicitur prudentia carnis esse peccatum. | Reply to Objection 1. Justice and temperance include in their very nature that which ranks them among the virtues, viz. equality and the curbing of concupiscence; hence they are never taken in a bad sense. On the other hand prudence is so called from foreseeing [providendo], as stated above (47, 1; 49, 6), which can extend to evil things also. Therefore, although prudence is taken simply in a good sense, yet, if something be added, it may be taken in a bad sense: and it is thus that prudence of the flesh is said to be a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod caro est propter animam sicut materia propter formam et instrumentum propter principale agens. Et ideo sic licite diligitur caro ut ordinetur ad bonum animae sicut ad finem. Si autem in ipso bono carnis constituatur ultimus finis, erit inordinata et illicita dilectio. Et hoc modo ad amorem carnis ordinatur prudentia carnis. | Reply to Objection 2. The flesh is on account of the soul, as matter is on account of the form, and the instrument on account of the principal agent. Hence the flesh is loved lawfully, if it be directed to the good of the soul as its end. If, however, a man place his last end in a good of the flesh, his love will be inordinate and unlawful, and it is thus that the prudence of the flesh is directed to the love of the flesh. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Diabolus nos tentat non per modum appetibilis, sed per modum suggerentis. Et ideo, cum prudentia importet ordinem ad aliquem finem appetibilem, non ita dicitur prudentia Diaboli sicut prudentia respectu alicuius mali finis, sub cuius ratione tentat nos mundus et caro, inquantum scilicet proponuntur nobis ad appetendum bona mundi vel carnis. Et ideo dicitur prudentia carnis, et etiam prudentia mundi, secundum illud Luc. XVI, filii huius saeculi prudentiores sunt in generatione sua et cetera. Apostolus autem totum comprehendit sub prudentia carnis, quia etiam exteriores res mundi appetimus propter carnem. Potest tamen dici quod quia prudentia quodammodo dicitur sapientia, ut supra dictum est, ideo secundum tres tentationes potest intelligi triplex prudentia. Unde dicitur Iac. III sapientia esse terrena, animalis, diabolica, ut supra expositum est cum de sapientia ageretur. | Reply to Objection 3. The devil tempts us, not through the good of the appetible object, but by way of suggestion. Wherefore, since prudence implies direction to some appetible end, we do not speak of "prudence of the devil," as of a prudence directed to some evil end, which is the aspect under which the world and the flesh tempt us, in so far as worldly or carnal goods are proposed to our appetite. Hence we speak of "carnal" and again of "worldly" prudence, according to Luke 16:8, "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation," etc. The Apostle includes all in the "prudence of the flesh," because we covet the external things of the world on account of the flesh. We may also reply that since prudence is in a certain sense called "wisdom," as stated above (47, 2, ad 1), we may distinguish a threefold prudence corresponding to the three kinds of temptation. Hence it is written (James 3:15) that there is a wisdom which is "earthly, sensual and devilish," as explained above (45, 1, ad 1), when we were treating of wisdom. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia carnis sit peccatum mortale. Rebellare enim divinae legi est peccatum mortale quia per hoc dominus contemnitur. Sed prudentia carnis non est subiecta legi Dei, ut habetur Rom. VIII. Ergo prudentia carnis est peccatum mortale. | Objection 1. It would seem that prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin. For it is a mortal sin to rebel against the Divine law, since this implies contempt of God. Now "the prudence [Douay: 'wisdom'] of the flesh . . . is not subject to the law of God" (Romans 8:7). Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, omne peccatum in spiritum sanctum est peccatum mortale. Sed prudentia carnis videtur esse peccatum in spiritum sanctum, non enim potest esse subiecta legi Dei, ut dicitur Rom. VIII; et ita videtur esse peccatum irremissibile, quod est proprium peccati in spiritum sanctum. Ergo prudentia carnis est peccatum mortale. | Objection 2. Further, every sin against the Holy Ghost is a mortal sin. Now prudence of the flesh seems to be a sin against the Holy Ghost, for "it cannot be subject to the law of God" (Romans 8:7), and so it seems to be an unpardonable sin, which is proper to the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, maximo bono opponitur maximum malum; ut patet in VIII Ethic. Sed prudentia carnis opponitur prudentiae quae est praecipua inter virtutes morales. Ergo prudentia carnis est praecipuum inter peccata moralia. Et ita est peccatum mortale. | Objection 3. Further, the greatest evil is opposed to the greatest good, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10. Now prudence of the flesh is opposed to that prudence which is the chief of the moral virtues. Therefore prudence of the flesh is chief among mortal sins, so that it is itself a mortal sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, illud quod diminuit peccatum non importat de se rationem peccati mortalis. Sed caute prosequi ea quae pertinent ad curam carnis, quod videtur ad prudentiam carnis pertinere, diminuit peccatum. Ergo prudentia carnis de sui ratione non importat peccatum mortale. | On the contrary, That which diminishes a sin has not of itself the nature of a mortal sin. Now the thoughtful quest of things pertaining to the care of the flesh, which seems to pertain to carnal prudence, diminishes sin [Cf. Proverbs 6:30. Therefore prudence of the flesh has not of itself the nature of a mortal sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, prudens dicitur aliquis dupliciter, uno modo, simpliciter, scilicet in ordine ad finem totius vitae; alio modo, secundum quid, scilicet in ordine ad finem aliquem particularem, puta sicut dicitur aliquis prudens in negotiatione vel in aliquo huiusmodi. Si ergo prudentia carnis accipiatur secundum absolutam prudentiae rationem, ita scilicet quod in cura carnis constituatur ultimus finis totius vitae, sic est peccatum mortale, quia per hoc homo avertitur a Deo, cum impossibile sit esse plures fines ultimos, ut supra habitum est. Si vero prudentia carnis accipiatur secundum rationem particularis prudentiae, sic prudentia carnis est peccatum veniale. Contingit enim quandoque quod aliquis inordinate afficitur ad aliquod delectabile carnis absque hoc quod avertatur a Deo per peccatum mortale, unde non constituit finem totius vitae in delectatione carnis. Et sic adhibere studium ad hanc delectationem consequendam est peccatum veniale, quod pertinet ad prudentiam carnis. Si vero aliquis actu curam carnis referat in finem honestum, puta cum aliquis studet comestioni propter corporis sustentationem, non vocatur prudentia carnis, quia sic utitur homo cura carnis ut ad finem. | I answer that, As stated above (47, 2, ad 1; 13), a man is said to be prudent in two ways. First, simply, i.e. in relation to the end of life as a whole. Secondly, relatively, i.e. in relation to some particular end; thus a man is said to be prudent in business or something else of the kind. Accordingly if prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding to prudence in its absolute signification, so that a man place the last end of his whole life in the care of the flesh, it is a mortal sin, because he turns away from God by so doing, since he cannot have several last ends, as stated above (I-II, 01, 5). If, on the other hand, prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding to particular prudence, it is a venial sin. For it happens sometimes that a man has an inordinate affection for some pleasure of the flesh, without turning away from God by a mortal sin; in which case he does not place the end of his whole life in carnal pleasure. To apply oneself to obtain this pleasure is a venial sin and pertains to prudence of the flesh. But if a man actually refers the care of the flesh to a good end, as when one is careful about one's food in order to sustain one's body, this is no longer prudence of the flesh, because then one uses the care of the flesh as a means to an end. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus loquitur de prudentia carnis secundum quod finis totius vitae humanae constituitur in bonis carnis. Et sic est peccatum mortale. | Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle is speaking of that carnal prudence whereby a man places the end of his whole life in the goods of the flesh, and this is a mortal sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod prudentia carnis non importat peccatum in spiritum sanctum. Quod enim dicitur quod non potest esse subiecta legi Dei, non sic est intelligendum quasi ille qui habet prudentiam carnis non possit converti et subiici legi Dei, sed quia ipsa prudentia carnis legi Dei non potest esse subiecta, sicut nec iniustitia potest esse iusta, nec calor potest esse frigidus, quamvis calidum posset esse frigidum. | Reply to Objection 2. Prudence of the flesh does not imply a sin against the Holy Ghost. For when it is stated that "it cannot be subject to the law of God," this does not mean that he who has prudence of the flesh, cannot be converted and submit to the law of God, but that carnal prudence itself cannot be subject to God's law, even as neither can injustice be just, nor heat cold, although that which is hot may become cold. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod omne peccatum opponitur prudentiae, sicut et prudentia participatur in omni virtute. Sed ideo non oportet quod quodlibet peccatum prudentiae oppositum sit gravissimum, sed solum quando opponitur prudentiae in aliquo maximo. | Reply to Objection 3. Every sin is opposed to prudence, just as prudence is shared by every virtue. But it does not follow that every sin opposed to prudence is most grave, but only when it is opposed to prudence in some very grave matter. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod astutia non sit speciale peccatum. Verba enim sacrae Scripturae non inducunt aliquem ad peccatum. Inducunt autem ad astutiam, secundum illud Prov. I, ut detur parvulis astutia. Ergo astutia non est peccatum. | Objection 1. It would seem that craftiness is not a special sin. For the words of Holy Writ do not induce anyone to sin; and yet they induce us to be crafty, according to Proverbs 1:4, "To give craftiness [Douay: 'subtlety'] to little ones." Therefore craftiness is not a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, Prov. XIII dicitur, astutus omnia agit cum consilio. Aut ergo ad finem bonum; aut ad finem malum. Si ad finem bonum, non videtur esse peccatum. Si autem ad finem malum, videtur pertinere ad prudentiam carnis vel saeculi. Ergo astutia non est speciale peccatum a prudentia carnis distinctum. | Objection 2. Further, it is written (Proverbs 13:16): "The crafty [Douay: 'prudent'] man doth all things with counsel." Therefore, he does so either for a good or for an evil end. If for a good end, there is no sin seemingly, and if for an evil end, it would seem to pertain to carnal or worldly prudence. Therefore craftiness is not a special sin distinct from prudence of the flesh. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, Gregorius, X Moral., exponens illud Iob XII, deridetur iusti simplicitas, dicit, sapientia huius mundi est cor machinationibus tegere, sensum verbis velare, quae falsa sunt vera ostendere, quae vera sunt falsa demonstrare. Et postea subdit, haec prudentia usu a iuvenibus scitur, a pueris pretio discitur. Sed ea quae praedicta sunt videntur ad astutiam pertinere. Ergo astutia non distinguitur a prudentia carnis vel mundi; et ita non videtur esse speciale peccatum. | Objection 3. Further, Gregory expounding the words of Job 12, "The simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn," says (Moral. x, 29): "The wisdom of this world is to hide one's thoughts by artifice, to conceal one's meaning by words, to represent error as truth, to make out the truth to be false," and further on he adds: "This prudence is acquired by the young, it is learnt at a price by children." Now the above things seem to belong to craftiness. Therefore craftiness is not distinct from carnal or worldly prudence, and consequently it seems not to be a special sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. IV, abdicamus occulta dedecoris, non ambulantes in astutia, neque adulterantes verbum Dei. Ergo astutia est quoddam peccatum. | On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Corinthians 4:2): "We renounce the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor adulterating the word of God." Therefore craftiness is a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, sicut scientia est recta ratio scibilium. Contingit autem contra rectitudinem scientiae dupliciter peccari in speculativis, uno quidem modo, quando ratio inducitur ad aliquam conclusionem falsam quae apparet vera; alio modo, ex eo quod ratio procedit ex aliquibus falsis quae videntur esse vera, sive sint ad conclusionem veram sive ad conclusionem falsam. Ita etiam aliquod peccatum potest esse contra prudentiam habens aliquam similitudinem eius dupliciter. Uno modo, quia studium rationis ordinatur ad finem qui non est vere bonus sed apparens, et hoc pertinet ad prudentiam carnis. Alio modo, inquantum aliquis ad finem aliquem consequendum, vel bonum vel malum, utitur non veris viis, sed simulatis et apparentibus, et hoc pertinet ad peccatum astutiae. Unde est quoddam peccatum prudentiae oppositum a prudentia carnis distinctum. | I answer that, Prudence is "right reason applied to action," just as science is "right reason applied to knowledge." On speculative matters one may sin against rectitude of knowledge in two ways: in one way when the reason is led to a false conclusion that appears to be true; in another way when the reason proceeds from false premises, that appear to be true, either to a true or to a false conclusion. Even so a sin may be against prudence, through having some resemblance thereto, in two ways. First, when the purpose of the reason is directed to an end which is good not in truth but in appearance, and this pertains to prudence of the flesh; secondly, when, in order to obtain a certain end, whether good or evil, a man uses means that are not true but fictitious and counterfeit, and this belongs to the sin of craftiness. This is consequently a sin opposed to prudence, and distinct from prudence of the flesh. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in IV contra Iulian., sicut prudentia abusive quandoque in malo accipitur, ita etiam astutia quandoque in bono, et hoc propter similitudinem unius ad alterum. Proprie tamen astutia in malo accipitur; sicut et philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic. | Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine observes (Contra Julian. iv, 3) just as prudence is sometimes improperly taken in a bad sense, so is craftiness sometimes taken in a good sense, and this on account of their mutual resemblance. Properly speaking, however, craftiness is taken in a bad sense, as the Philosopher states in Ethic. vi, 12. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod astutia potest consiliari et ad finem bonum et ad finem malum, nec oportet ad finem bonum falsis viis pervenire et simulatis, sed veris. Unde etiam astutia si ordinetur ad bonum finem, est peccatum. | Reply to Objection 2. Craftiness can take counsel both for a good end and for an evil end: nor should a good end be pursued by means that are false and counterfeit but by such as are true. Hence craftiness is a sin if it be directed to a good end. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Gregorius sub prudentia mundi accepit omnia quae possunt ad falsam prudentiam pertinere. Unde etiam sub hac comprehenditur astutia. | Reply to Objection 3. Under "worldly prudence" Gregory included everything that can pertain to false prudence, so that it comprises craftiness also. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolus non sit peccatum ad astutiam pertinens. Peccatum enim in perfectis viris non invenitur, praecipue mortale. Invenitur autem in eis aliquis dolus, secundum illud II ad Cor. XII, cum essem astutus, dolo vos cepi. Ergo dolus non est semper peccatum. | Objection 1. It would seem that guile is not a sin pertaining to craftiness. For sin, especially mortal, has no place in perfect men. Yet a certain guile is to be found in them, according to 2 Corinthians 12:16, "Being crafty I caught you by guile." Therefore guile is not always a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, dolus maxime ad linguam pertinere videtur, secundum illud Psalm., linguis suis dolose agebant. Astutia autem, sicut et prudentia, est in ipso actu rationis. Ergo dolus non pertinet ad astutiam. | Objection 2. Further, guile seems to pertain chiefly to the tongue, according to Psalm 5:11, "They dealt deceitfully with their tongues." Now craftiness like prudence is in the very act of reason. Therefore guile does not pertain to craftiness. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, Prov. XII dicitur, dolus in corde cogitantium mala. Sed non omnis malorum cogitatio pertinet ad astutiam. Ergo dolus non videtur ad astutiam pertinere. | Objection 3. Further, it is written (Proverbs 12:20): "Guile [Douay: 'Deceit'] is in the heart of them that think evil things." But the thought of evil things does not always pertain to craftiness. Therefore guile does not seem to belong to craftiness. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod astutia ad circumveniendum ordinatur, secundum illud apostoli, ad Ephes. IV, in astutia ad circumventionem erroris. Ad quod etiam dolus ordinatur. Ergo dolus pertinet ad astutiam. | On the contrary, Craftiness aims at lying in wait, according to Ephesians 4:14, "By cunning craftiness by which they lie in wait to deceive": and guile aims at this also. Therefore guile pertains to craftiness. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad astutiam pertinet assumere vias non veras, sed simulatas et apparentes, ad aliquem finem prosequendum vel bonum vel malum. Assumptio autem harum viarum potest dupliciter considerari. Uno quidem modo, in ipsa excogitatione viarum huiusmodi, et hoc proprie pertinet ad astutiam, sicut etiam excogitatio rectarum viarum ad debitum finem pertinet ad prudentiam. Alio modo potest considerari talium viarum assumptio secundum executionem operis, et secundum hoc pertinet ad dolum. Et ideo dolus importat quandam executionem astutiae. Et secundum hoc ad astutiam pertinet. | I answer that, As stated above (Article 3), it belongs to craftiness to adopt ways that are not true but counterfeit and apparently true, in order to attain some end either good or evil. Now the adopting of such ways may be subjected to a twofold consideration; first, as regards the process of thinking them out, and this belongs properly to craftiness, even as thinking out right ways to a due end belongs to prudence. Secondly the adopting of such like ways may be considered with regard to their actual execution, and in this way it belongs to guile. Hence guile denotes a certain execution of craftiness, and accordingly belongs thereto. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut astutia proprie accipitur in malo, abusive autem in bono; ita etiam et dolus, qui est astutiae executio. | Reply to Objection 1. Just as craftiness is taken properly in a bad sense, and improperly in a good sense, so too is guile which is the execution of craftiness. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod executio astutiae ad decipiendum primo quidem et principaliter fit per verba, quae praecipuum locum tenent inter signa quibus homo significat aliquid alteri, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro de Doct. Christ. Et ideo dolus maxime attribuitur locutioni. Contingit tamen esse dolum et in factis, secundum illud Psalm., et dolum facerent in servos eius. Est etiam et dolus in corde, secundum illud Eccli. XIX. Interiora eius plena sunt dolo. Sed hoc est secundum quod aliquis dolos excogitat, secundum illud Psalm., dolos tota die meditabantur. | Reply to Objection 2. The execution of craftiness with the purpose of deceiving, is effected first and foremost by words, which hold the chief place among those signs whereby a man signifies something to another man, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), hence guile is ascribed chiefly to speech. Yet guile may happen also in deeds, according to Psalm 104:25, "And to deal deceitfully with his servants." Guile is also in the heart, according to Sirach 19:23, "His interior is full of deceit," but this is to devise deceits, according to Psalm 37:13: "They studied deceits all the day long." |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quicumque cogitant aliquod malum facere, necesse est quod excogitent aliquas vias ad hoc quod suum propositum impleant, et ut plurimum excogitant vias dolosas, quibus facilius propositum consequantur. Quamvis contingat quandoque quod absque astutia et dolo aliqui aperte et per violentiam malum operentur. Sed hoc, quia difficilius fit, in paucioribus accidit. | Reply to Objection 3. Whoever purposes to do some evil deed, must needs devise certain ways of attaining his purpose, and for the most part he devises deceitful ways, whereby the more easily to obtain his end. Nevertheless it happens sometimes that evil is done openly and by violence without craftiness and guile; but as this is more difficult, it is of less frequent occurrence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fraus ad astutiam non pertineat. Non enim est laudabile quod aliquis decipi se patiatur, ad quod astutia tendit. Est autem laudabile quod aliquis patiatur fraudem, secundum illud I ad Cor. VI, quare non magis fraudem patimini? Ergo fraus non pertinet ad astutiam. | Objection 1. It would seem that fraud does not pertain to craftiness. For a man does not deserve praise if he allows himself to be deceived, which is the object of craftiness; and yet a man deserves praise for allowing himself to be defrauded, according to 1 Corinthians 6:1, "Why do you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, fraus pertinere videtur ad illicitam acceptionem vel receptionem exteriorum rerum, dicitur enim Act. V quod vir quidam nomine Ananias, cum Saphira uxore sua, vendidit agrum et fraudavit de pretio agri. Sed illicite usurpare vel retinere res exteriores pertinet ad iniustitiam vel illiberalitatem. Ergo fraus non pertinet ad astutiam, quae opponitur prudentiae. | Objection 2. Further, fraud seems to consist in unlawfully taking or receiving external things, for it is written (Acts 5:1) that "a certain man named Ananias with Saphira his wife, sold a piece of land, and by fraud kept back part of the price of the land." Now it pertains to injustice or illiberality to take possession of or retain external things unjustly. Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness which is opposed to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, nullus astutia utitur contra seipsum. Sed aliquorum fraudes sunt contra seipsos, dicitur enim Prov. I de quibusdam quod moliuntur fraudes contra animas suas. Ergo fraus non pertinet ad astutiam. | Objection 3. Further, no man employs craftiness against himself. But the frauds of some are against themselves, for it is written (Proverbs 1:18) concerning some "that they practice frauds [Douay: 'deceits'] against their own souls." Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra, fraus ad deceptionem ordinatur, secundum illud Iob XIII, numquid decipietur ut homo vestris fraudulentiis? Ad idem etiam ordinatur astutia. Ergo fraus ad astutiam pertinet. | On the contrary, The object of fraud is to deceive, according to Job 13:9, "Shall he be deceived as a man, with your fraudulent [Douay: 'deceitful'] dealings?" Now craftiness is directed to the same object. Therefore fraud pertains to craftiness. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod sicut dolus consistit in executione astutiae, ita etiam et fraus, sed in hoc differre videntur quod dolus pertinet universaliter ad executionem astutiae, sive fiat per verba sive per facta; fraus autem magis proprie pertinet ad executionem astutiae secundum quod fit per facta. | I answer that, Just as "guile" consists in the execution of craftiness, so also does "fraud." But they seem to differ in the fact that "guile" belongs in general to the execution of craftiness, whether this be effected by words, or by deeds, whereas "fraud" belongs more properly to the execution of craftiness by deeds. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus non inducit fideles ad hoc quod decipiantur in cognoscendo, sed ad hoc quod effectum deceptionis patienter tolerent in sustinendis iniuriis fraudulenter illatis. | Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle does not counsel the faithful to be deceived in their knowledge, but to bear patiently the effect of being deceived, and to endure wrongs inflicted on them by fraud. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod executio astutiae potest fieri per aliquod aliud vitium, sicut et executio prudentiae fit per virtutes. Et hoc modo nihil prohibet defraudationem pertinere ad avaritiam vel illiberalitatem. | Reply to Objection 2. The execution of craftiness may be carried out by another vice, just as the execution of prudence by the virtues: and accordingly nothing hinders fraud from pertaining to covetousness or illiberality. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod illi qui fraudes faciunt ex eorum intentione non moliuntur aliquid contra seipsos vel contra animas suas, sed ex iusto Dei iudicio provenit ut id quod contra alios moliuntur contra eos retorqueatur; secundum illud Psalm., incidit in foveam quam fecit. | Reply to Objection 3. Those who commit frauds, do not design anything against themselves or their own souls; it is through God's just judgment that what they plot against others, recoils on themselves, according to Psalm 7:16, "He is fallen into the hole he made." |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod licitum sit sollicitudinem habere de temporalibus rebus. Ad praesidentem enim pertinet sollicitum esse de his quibus praeest, secundum illud Rom. XII, qui praeest in sollicitudine. Sed homo praeest ex divina ordinatione temporalibus rebus, secundum illud Psalm., omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius, oves et boves et cetera. Ergo homo debet habere sollicitudinem de temporalibus rebus. | Objection 1. It would seem lawful to be solicitous about temporal matters. Because a superior should be solicitous for his subjects, according to Romans 12:8, "He that ruleth, with solicitude." Now according to the Divine ordering, man is placed over temporal things, according to Psalm 8:8, "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet," etc. Therefore man should be solicitous about temporal things. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, unusquisque sollicitus est de fine propter quem operatur. Sed licitum est hominem operari propter temporalia, quibus vitam sustentet, unde apostolus dicit, II ad Thess. III, si quis non vult operari, non manducet. Ergo licitum est sollicitari de rebus temporalibus. | Objection 2. Further, everyone is solicitous about the end for which he works. Now it is lawful for a man to work for the temporal things whereby he sustains life, wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thessalonians 3:10): "If any man will not work, neither let him eat." Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous about temporal things. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, sollicitudo de operibus misericordiae laudabilis est, secundum illud II ad Tim. I, cum Romam venisset, sollicite me quaesivit. Sed sollicitudo temporalium rerum quandoque pertinet ad opera misericordiae, puta cum quis sollicitudinem adhibet ad procurandum negotia pupillorum et pauperum. Ergo sollicitudo temporalium rerum non est illicita. | Objection 3. Further, solicitude about works of mercy is praiseworthy, according to 2 Timothy 1:17, "When he was come to Rome, he carefully sought me." Now solicitude about temporal things is sometimes connected with works of mercy; for instance, when a man is solicitous to watch over the interests of orphans and poor persons. Therefore solicitude about temporal things is not unlawful. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Matth. VI, nolite solliciti esse, dicentes, quid manducabimus aut quid bibemus, aut quo operiemur? Quae tamen sunt maxime necessaria. | On the contrary, Our Lord said (Matthew 6:31): "Be not solicitous . . . saying, What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we be clothed?" And yet such things are very necessary. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod sollicitudo importat studium quoddam adhibitum ad aliquid consequendum. Manifestum est autem quod maius studium adhibetur ubi est timor deficiendi, et ideo ubi est securitas consequendi, minor intervenit sollicitudo. Sic ergo sollicitudo temporalium rerum tripliciter potest esse illicita. Uno quidem modo, ex parte eius de quo sollicitamur, si scilicet temporalia tanquam finem quaeramus. Unde et Augustinus dicit, in libro de operibus Monach., cum dominus dicit, nolite solliciti esse etc., hoc dicit ut non ista intueantur, et propter ista faciant quidquid in Evangelii praedicatione facere iubentur. Alio modo potest esse temporalium sollicitudo illicita propter superfluum studium quod apponitur ad temporalia procuranda, propter quod homo a spiritualibus, quibus principalius inservire debet, retrahitur. Et ideo dicitur Matth. XIII quod sollicitudo saeculi suffocat verbum. Tertio modo, ex parte timoris superflui, quando scilicet aliquis timet ne, faciendo quod debet, necessaria sibi deficiant. Quod dominus tripliciter excludit. Primo, propter maiora beneficia homini praestita divinitus praeter suam sollicitudinem, scilicet corpus et animam. Secundo, propter subventionem qua Deus animalibus et plantis subvenit absque opere humano, secundum proportionem suae naturae. Tertio, ex divina providentia, propter cuius ignorantiam gentiles circa temporalia bona quaerenda principalius sollicitantur. Et ideo concludit quod principaliter nostra sollicitudo esse debet de spiritualibus bonis, sperantes quod etiam temporalia nobis provenient ad necessitatem, si fecerimus quod debemus. | I answer that, Solicitude denotes an earnest endeavor to obtain something. Now it is evident that the endeavor is more earnest when there is fear of failure, so that there is less solicitude when success is assured. Accordingly solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful in three ways. First on the part of the object of solicitude; that is, if we seek temporal things as an end. Hence Augustine says (De Operibus Monach. xxvi): "When Our Lord said: 'Be not solicitous,' etc. . . . He intended to forbid them either to make such things their end, or for the sake of these things to do whatever they were commanded to do in preaching the Gospel." Secondly, solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful, through too much earnestness in endeavoring to obtain temporal things, the result being that a man is drawn away from spiritual things which ought to be the chief object of his search, wherefore it is written (Matthew 13:22) that "the care of this world . . . chokes up the word." Thirdly, through over much fear, when, to wit, a man fears to lack necessary things if he do what he ought to do. Now our Lord gives three motives for laying aside this fear. First, on account of the yet greater favors bestowed by God on man, independently of his solicitude, viz. his body and soul (Matthew 6:26); secondly, on account of the care with which God watches over animals and plants without the assistance of man, according to the requirements of their nature; thirdly, because of Divine providence, through ignorance of which the gentiles are solicitous in seeking temporal goods before all others. Consequently He concludes that we should be solicitous most of all about spiritual goods, hoping that temporal goods also may be granted us according to our needs, if we do what we ought to do. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod temporalia bona subiecta sunt homini ut eis utatur ad necessitatem, non ut in eis finem constituat, et superflue circa ea sollicitetur. | Reply to Objection 1. Temporal goods are subjected to man that he may use them according to his needs, not that he may place his end in them and be over solicitous about them. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod sollicitudo eius qui corporali labore panem acquirit non est superflua, sed moderata. Et ideo Hieronymus dicit quod labor exercendus est, sollicitudo tollenda, superflua scilicet, animum inquietans. | Reply to Objection 2. The solicitude of a man who gains his bread by bodily labor is not superfluous but proportionate; hence Jerome says on Matthew 6:31, "Be not solicitous," that "labor is necessary, but solicitude must be banished," namely superfluous solicitude which unsettles the mind. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod sollicitudo temporalium in operibus misericordiae ordinatur ad finem caritatis. Et ideo non est illicita, nisi sit superflua. | Reply to Objection 3. In the works of mercy solicitude about temporal things is directed to charity as its end, wherefore it is not unlawful, unless it be superfluous. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis debeat esse sollicitus in futurum. Dicitur enim Prov. VI, vade ad formicam, o piger, et considera vias eius, et disce sapientiam, quae cum non habeat ducem nec praeceptorem, parat in aestate cibum sibi, et congregat in messe quod comedat. Sed hoc est in futurum sollicitari. Ergo laudabilis est sollicitudo futurorum. | Objection 1. It would seem that we should be solicitous about the future. For it is written (Proverbs 6:6-8): "Go to the ant, O sluggard, and consider her ways and learn wisdom; which, although she hath no guide, nor master . . . provideth her meat for herself in the summer, and gathereth her food in the harvest." Now this is to be solicitous about the future. Therefore solicitude about the future is praiseworthy. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, sollicitudo ad prudentiam pertinet. Sed prudentia praecipue est futurorum, praecipua enim pars eius est providentia futurorum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtuosum est sollicitari de futuris. | Objection 2. Further, solicitude pertains to prudence. But prudence is chiefly about the future, since its principal part is "foresight of future things," as stated above (49, 6, ad 1). Therefore it is virtuous to be solicitous about the future. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, quicumque reponit aliquid in posterum conservandum sollicitus est in futurum. Sed ipse Christus legitur, Ioan. XII, loculos habuisse ad aliquid conservandum, quos Iudas deferebat. Apostoli etiam conservabant pretia praediorum, quae ante pedes eorum ponebantur, ut legitur Act. IV. Ergo licitum est in futurum sollicitari. | Objection 3. Further, whoever puts something by that he may keep it for the morrow, is solicitous about the future. Now we read (John 12:6) that Christ had a bag for keeping things in, which Judas carried, and (Acts 4:34-37) that the Apostles kept the price of the land, which had been laid at their feet. Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous about the future. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Matth. VI, nolite solliciti esse in crastinum. Cras autem ibi ponitur pro futuro, sicut dicit Hieronymus. | On the contrary, Our Lord said (Matthew 6:34): "Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow"; where "tomorrow" stands for the future, as Jerome says in his commentary on this passage. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nullum opus potest esse virtuosum nisi debitis circumstantiis vestiatur; inter quas una est debitum tempus, secundum illud Eccle. VIII, omni negotio tempus est et opportunitas. Quod non solum in exterioribus operibus, sed etiam in interiori sollicitudine locum habet. Unicuique enim tempori competit propria sollicitudo, sicut tempori aestatis competit sollicitudo metendi, tempori autumni sollicitudo vindemiae. Si quis ergo tempore aestatis de vindemia iam esset sollicitus, superflue praeoccuparet futuri temporis sollicitudinem. Unde huiusmodi sollicitudinem tanquam superfluam dominus prohibet, dicens, nolite solliciti esse in crastinum. Unde subdit, crastinus enim dies sollicitus erit sibi ipsi, idest, suam propriam sollicitudinem habebit, quae sufficiet ad animum affligendum. Et hoc est quod subdit, sufficit diei malitia sua, idest afflictio sollicitudinis. | I answer that, No work can be virtuous, unless it be vested with its due circumstances, and among these is the due time, according to Ecclesiastes 8:6, "There is a time and opportunity for every business"; which applies not only to external deeds but also to internal solicitude. For every time has its own fitting proper solicitude; thus solicitude about the crops belongs to the summer time, and solicitude about the vintage to the time of autumn. Accordingly if a man were solicitous about the vintage during the summer, he would be needlessly forestalling the solicitude belonging to a future time. Hence Our Lord forbids such like excessive solicitude, saying: "Be . . . not solicitous for tomorrow," wherefore He adds, "for the morrow will be solicitous for itself," that is to say, the morrow will have its own solicitude, which will be burden enough for the soul. This is what He means by adding: "Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof," namely, the burden of solicitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod formica habet sollicitudinem congruam tempori, et hoc nobis imitandum proponitur. | Reply to Objection 1. The ant is solicitous at a befitting time, and it is this that is proposed for our example. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ad prudentiam pertinet providentia debita futurorum. Esset autem inordinata futurorum providentia vel sollicitudo si quis temporalia, in quibus dicitur praeteritum et futurum, tanquam fines quaereret; vel si superflua quaereret ultra praesentis vitae necessitatem; vel si tempus sollicitudinis praeoccuparet. | Reply to Objection 2. Due foresight of the future belongs to prudence. But it would be an inordinate foresight or solicitude about the future, if a man were to seek temporal things, to which the terms "past" and "future" apply, as ends, or if he were to seek them in excess of the needs of the present life, or if he were to forestall the time for solicitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, cum viderimus aliquem servum Dei providere ne ista necessaria sibi desint, non iudicemus eum de crastino sollicitum esse. Nam et ipse dominus propter exemplum loculos habere dignatus est; et in actibus apostolorum scriptum est ea quae ad victum sunt necessaria procurata esse in futurum propter imminentem famem. Non ergo dominus improbat si quis humano more ista procuret, sed si quis propter ista militet Deo. | Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17), "when we see a servant of God taking thought lest he lack these needful things, we must not judge him to be solicitous for the morrow, since even Our Lord deigned for our example to have a purse, and we read in the Acts of the Apostles that they procured the necessary means of livelihood in view of the future on account of a threatened famine. Hence Our Lord does not condemn those who according to human custom, provide themselves with such things, but those who oppose themselves to God for the sake of these things." |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod huiusmodi vitia non oriantur ex avaritia. Quia sicut dictum est, per luxuriam maxime ratio patitur defectum in sua rectitudine. Sed huiusmodi vitia opponuntur rationi rectae, scilicet prudentiae. Ergo huiusmodi vitia maxime ex luxuria oriuntur, praesertim cum philosophus dicat, in VII Ethic., quod Venus est dolosa, et eius corrigia est varia, et quod ex insidiis agit incontinens concupiscentiae. | Objection 1. It would seem that these vices do not arise from covetousness. As stated above (Question 43, Article 6) lust is the chief cause of lack of rectitude in the reason. Now these vices are opposed to right reason, i.e. to prudence. Therefore they arise chiefly from lust; especially since the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "Venus is full of guile and her girdle is many colored" and that "he who is incontinent in desire acts with cunning." |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, praedicta vitia habent quandam similitudinem prudentiae, ut dictum est. Sed ad prudentiam, cum sit in ratione, maiorem propinquitatem habere videntur vitia magis spiritualia, sicut superbia et inanis gloria. Ergo huiusmodi vitia magis videntur ex superbia oriri quam ex avaritia. | Objection 2. Further, these vices bear a certain resemblance to prudence, as stated above (Question 47, Article 13). Now, since prudence is in the reason, the more spiritual vices seem to be more akin thereto, such as pride and vainglory. Therefore the aforesaid vices seem to arise from pride rather than from covetousness. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, homo insidiis utitur non solum in diripiendis bonis alienis, sed etiam in machinando aliorum caedes, quorum primum pertinet ad avaritiam, secundum ad iram. Sed insidiis uti pertinet ad astutiam, dolum et fraudem. Ergo praedicta vitia non solum oriuntur ex avaritia, sed etiam ex ira. | Objection 3. Further, men make use of stratagems not only in laying hold of other people's goods, but also in plotting murders, the former of which pertains to covetousness, and the latter to anger. Now the use of stratagems pertains to craftiness, guile, and fraud. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise not only from covetousness, but also from anger. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., ponit fraudem filiam avaritiae. | On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that fraud is a daughter of covetousness. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, prudentia carnis et astutia, cum dolo et fraude, quandam similitudinem habent cum prudentia in aliquali usu rationis. Praecipue autem inter alias virtutes morales usus rationis rectae apparet in iustitia, quae est in appetitu rationali. Et ideo usus rationis indebitus etiam maxime apparet in vitiis oppositis iustitiae. Opponitur autem sibi maxime avaritia. Et ideo praedicta vitia maxime ex avaritia oriuntur. | I answer that, As stated above (3; 47, 13), carnal prudence and craftiness, as well as guile and fraud, bear a certain resemblance to prudence in some kind of use of the reason. Now among all the moral virtues it is justice wherein the use of right reason appears chiefly, for justice is in the rational appetite. Hence the undue use of reason appears chiefly in the vices opposed to justice, the chief of which is covetousness. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise chiefly from covetousness. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod luxuria, propter vehementiam delectationis et concupiscentiae, totaliter opprimit rationem, ne prodeat in actum. In praedictis autem vitiis aliquis usus rationis est, licet inordinatus. Unde praedicta vitia non oriuntur directe ex luxuria. Quod autem philosophus Venerem dolosam appellat, hoc dicitur secundum quandam similitudinem, inquantum scilicet subito hominem surripit, sicut et in dolis agitur; non tamen per astutias, sed magis per violentiam concupiscentiae et delectationis. Unde et subdit quod Venus furatur intellectum multum sapientis. | Reply to Objection 1. On account of the vehemence of pleasure and of concupiscence, lust entirely suppresses the reason from exercising its act: whereas in the aforesaid vices there is some use of reason, albeit inordinate. Hence these vices do not arise directly from lust. When the Philosopher says that "Venus is full of guile," he is referring to a certain resemblance, in so far as she carries man away suddenly, just as he is moved in deceitful actions, yet not by means of craftiness but rather by the vehemence of concupiscence and pleasure; wherefore he adds that "Venus doth cozen the wits of the wisest man" [Cf. Iliad xiv, 214-217. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ex insidiis agere ad quandam pusillanimitatem pertinere videtur, magnanimus enim in omnibus vult manifestus esse, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Et ideo quia superbia quandam similitudinem magnanimitatis habet vel fingit, inde est quod non directe ex superbia huiusmodi vitia oriuntur, quae utuntur fraude et dolis. Magis autem hoc pertinet ad avaritiam, quae utilitatem quaerit, parvipendens excellentiam. | Reply to Objection 2. To do anything by stratagem seems to be due to pusillanimity: because a magnanimous man wishes to act openly, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Wherefore, as pride resembles or apes magnanimity, it follows that the aforesaid vices which make use of fraud and guile, do not arise directly from pride, but rather from covetousness, which seeks its own profit and sets little by excellence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 55 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ira habet subitum motum, unde praecipitanter agit et absque consilio; quo utuntur praedicta vitia, licet inordinate. Quod autem aliqui insidiis utantur ad caedes aliorum, non provenit ex ira, sed magis ex odio, quia iracundus appetit esse manifestus in nocendo, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhet. | Reply to Objection 3. Anger's movement is sudden, hence it acts with precipitation, and without counsel, contrary to the use of the aforesaid vices, though these use counsel inordinately. That men use stratagems in plotting murders, arises not from anger but rather from hatred, because the angry man desires to harm manifestly, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2,3) [Cf. Ethic. vii, 6. |
| IIª-IIae q. 56 pr. Deinde considerandum est de praeceptis ad prudentiam pertinentibus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, de praeceptis pertinentibus ad prudentiam. Secundo, de praeceptis pertinentibus ad vitia opposita. | Question 56. The precepts relating to prudence 1. The precepts of prudence 2. The precepts relating to the opposite vices |
| IIª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod de prudentia fuerit dandum aliquod praeceptum inter praecepta Decalogi. De principaliori enim virtute principaliora praecepta dari debent. Sed principaliora praecepta legis sunt praecepta Decalogi. Cum ergo prudentia sit principalior inter virtutes morales, videtur quod de prudentia fuerit dandum aliquod praeceptum inter praecepta Decalogi. | Objection 1. It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence. For the chief precepts should include a precept of the chief virtue. Now the chief precepts are those of the decalogue. Since then prudence is the chief of the moral virtues, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, in doctrina evangelica continetur lex maxime quantum ad praecepta Decalogi. Sed in doctrina evangelica datur praeceptum de prudentia, ut patet Matth. X, estote prudentes sicut serpentes. Ergo inter praecepta Decalogi debuit praecipi actus prudentiae. | Objection 2. Further, the teaching of the Gospel contains the Law especially with regard to the precepts of the decalogue. Now the teaching of the Gospel contains a precept of prudence (Matthew 10:16): "Be ye . . . prudent [Douay: 'wise'] as serpents." Therefore the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, alia documenta veteris testamenti ad praecepta Decalogi ordinantur, unde et Malach. ult. dicitur, mementote legis Moysi, servi mei, quam mandavi ei in Horeb. Sed in aliis documentis veteris testamenti dantur praecepta de prudentia, sicut Prov. III, ne innitaris prudentiae tuae; et infra, IV cap., palpebrae tuae praecedant gressus tuos. Ergo et in lege debuit aliquod praeceptum de prudentia dari, et praecipue inter praecepta Decalogi. | Objection 3. Further, the other lessons of the Old Testament are directed to the precepts of the decalogue: wherefore it is written (Malachi 4:4): "Remember the law of Moses My servant, which I commanded him in Horeb." Now the other lessons of the Old Testament include precepts of prudence; for instance (Proverbs 3:5): "Lean not upon thy own prudence"; and further on (Proverbs 4:25): "Let thine eyelids go before thy steps." Therefore the Law also should have contained a precept of prudence, especially among the precepts of the decalogue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 s. c. Sed contrarium patet enumeranti praecepta Decalogi. | The contrary however appears to anyone who goes through the precepts of the decalogue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est cum de praeceptis ageretur, praecepta Decalogi, sicut data sunt omni populo, ita etiam cadunt in aestimatione omnium, quasi ad naturalem rationem pertinentia. Praecipue autem sunt de dictamine rationis naturalis fines humanae vitae, qui se habent in agendis sicut principia naturaliter cognita in speculativis, ut ex supradictis patet. Prudentia autem non est circa finem, sed circa ea quae sunt ad finem, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non fuit conveniens ut inter praecepta Decalogi aliquod praeceptum poneretur ad prudentiam directe pertinens. Ad quam tamen omnia praecepta Decalogi pertinent secundum quod ipsa est directiva omnium virtuosorum actuum. | I answer that, As stated above (I-II, 100, 3; 5, ad 1) when we were treating of precepts, the commandments of the decalogue being given to the whole people, are a matter of common knowledge to all, as coming under the purview of natural reason. Now foremost among the things dictated by natural reason are the ends of human life, which are to the practical order what naturally known principles are to the speculative order, as shown above (Question 47, Article 6). Now prudence is not about the end, but about the means, as stated above (Question 47, Article 6). Hence it was not fitting that the precepts of the decalogue should include a precept relating directly to prudence. And yet all the precepts of the decalogue are related to prudence, in so far as it directs all virtuous acts. |
| IIª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod licet prudentia sit simpliciter principalior virtus aliis virtutibus moralibus, iustitia tamen principalius respicit rationem debiti, quod requiritur ad praeceptum, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo principalia praecepta legis, quae sunt praecepta Decalogi, magis debuerunt ad iustitiam quam ad prudentiam pertinere. | Reply to Objection 1. Although prudence is simply foremost among all the moral virtues, yet justice, more than any other virtue, regards its object under the aspect of something due, which is a necessary condition for a precept, as stated above (44, 1; I-II, 99, 1,5). Hence it behooved the chief precepts of the Law, which are those of the decalogue, to refer to justice rather than to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod doctrina evangelica est doctrina perfectionis, et ideo oportuit quod in ipsa perfecte instrueretur homo de omnibus quae pertinent ad rectitudinem vitae, sive sint fines sive ea quae sunt ad finem. Et propter hoc oportuit in doctrina evangelica etiam de prudentia praecepta dari. | Reply to Objection 2. The teaching of the Gospel is the doctrine of perfection. Therefore it needed to instruct man perfectly in all matters relating to right conduct, whether ends or means: wherefore it behooved the Gospel teaching to contain precepts also of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut alia doctrina veteris testamenti ordinatur ad praecepta Decalogi ut ad finem, ita etiam conveniens fuit ut in subsequentibus documentis veteris testamenti homines instruerentur de actu prudentiae, qui est circa ea quae sunt ad finem. | Reply to Objection 3. Just as the rest of the teaching of the Old Testament is directed to the precepts of the decalogue as its end, so it behooved man to be instructed by the subsequent lessons of the Old Testament about the act of prudence which is directed to the means. |
| IIª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in veteri lege fuerint inconvenienter praecepta prohibitiva proposita de vitiis oppositis prudentiae. Opponuntur enim prudentiae non minus illa quae habent directam oppositionem ad ipsam, sicut imprudentia et partes eius, quam illa quae cum ipsa similitudinem habent, sicut astutia et quae ad ipsam pertinent. Sed haec vitia prohibentur in lege, dicitur enim Lev. XIX, non facies calumniam proximo tuo; et Deut. XXV, non habebis in sacculo tuo diversa pondera, maius et minus. Ergo et de illis vitiis quae directe opponuntur prudentiae aliqua praecepta prohibitiva dari debuerunt. | Objection 1. It would seem that the prohibitive precepts relating to the vices opposed to prudence are unfittingly propounded in the Old Law. For such vices as imprudence and its parts which are directly opposed to prudence are not less opposed thereto, than those which bear a certain resemblance to prudence, such as craftiness and vices connected with it. Now the latter vices are forbidden in the Law: for it is written (Leviticus 19:13): "Thou shalt not calumniate thy neighbor," and (Deuteronomy 25:13): "Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag, a greater and a less." Therefore there should have also been prohibitive precepts about the vices directly opposed to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, in multis aliis rebus potest fraus fieri quam in emptione et venditione. Inconvenienter igitur fraudem in sola emptione et venditione lex prohibuit. | Objection 2. Further, there is room for fraud in other things than in buying and selling. Therefore the Law unfittingly forbade fraud solely in buying and selling. |
| IIª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, eadem ratio est praecipiendi actum virtutis et prohibendi actum vitii oppositi. Sed actus prudentiae non inveniuntur in lege praecepti. Ergo nec aliqua opposita vitia debuerunt in lege prohiberi. | Objection 3. Further, there is the same reason for prescribing an act of virtue as for prohibiting the act of a contrary vice. But acts of prudence are not prescribed in the Law. Therefore neither should any contrary vices have been forbidden in the Law. |
| IIª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 s. c. Sed contrarium patet per praecepta legis inducta. | The contrary, however, appears from the precepts of the Law which are quoted in the first objection. |
| IIª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, iustitia maxime respicit rationem debiti, quod requiritur ad praeceptum, quia iustitia est ad reddendum debitum alteri, ut infra dicetur. Astutia autem quantum ad executionem maxime committitur in his circa quae est iustitia, ut dictum est. Et ideo conveniens fuit ut praecepta prohibitiva darentur in lege de executione astutiae inquantum ad iniustitiam pertinet, sicut cum dolo vel fraude aliquis alicui calumniam ingerit, vel eius bona surripit. | I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), justice, above all, regards the aspect of something due, which is a necessary condition for a precept, because justice tends to render that which is due to another, as we shall state further on (58, 2). Now craftiness, as to its execution, is committed chiefly in matters of justice, as stated above (Question 55, Article 8): and so it was fitting that the Law should contain precepts forbidding the execution of craftiness, in so far as this pertains to injustice, as when a man uses guile and fraud in calumniating another or in stealing his goods. |
| IIª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa vitia quae directe opponuntur prudentiae manifesta contrarietate non ita pertinent ad iniustitiam sicut executio astutiae. Et ideo non ita prohibentur in lege sicut fraus et dolus, quae ad iniustitiam pertinent. | Reply to Objection 1. Those vices that are manifestly opposed to prudence, do not pertain to injustice in the same way as the execution of craftiness, and so they are not forbidden in the Law, as fraud and guile are, which latter pertain to injustice |
| IIª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod omnis fraus vel dolus commissa in his quae ad iustitiam pertinent potest intelligi esse prohibita, Lev. XIX, in prohibitione calumniae. Praecipue autem solet fraus exerceri et dolus in emptione et venditione, secundum illud Eccli. XXVI, non iustificabitur caupo a peccato labiorum. Propter hoc specialiter praeceptum prohibitivum datur in lege de fraude circa emptiones et venditiones commissa. | Reply to Objection 2. All guile and fraud committed in matters of injustice, can be understood to be forbidden in the prohibition of calumny (Leviticus 19:13). Yet fraud and guile are wont to be practiced chiefly in buying and selling, according to Sirach 26:28, "A huckster shall not be justified from the sins of the lips": and it is for this reason that the Law contained a special precept forbidding fraudulent buying and selling. |
| IIª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia praecepta de actibus iustitiae in lege data pertinent ad executionem prudentiae, sicut et praecepta prohibitiva data de furto, calumnia et fraudulenta venditione pertinent ad executionem astutiae. | Reply to Objection 3. All the precepts of the Law that relate to acts of justice pertain to the execution of prudence, even as the precepts prohibitive of stealing, calumny and fraudulent selling pertain to the execution of craftiness. |