| IIª-IIae q. 47 pr. Consequenter, post virtutes theologicas, primo considerandum est, circa virtutes cardinales, de prudentia. Et primo, de prudentia secundum se; secundo, de partibus eius; tertio, de dono ei correspondente; quarto, de vitiis oppositis; quinto, de praeceptis ad hoc pertinentibus. Circa primum quaeruntur sexdecim. Primo, utrum prudentia sit in voluntate, vel in ratione. Secundo, si est in ratione, utrum in practica tantum, vel etiam in speculativa. Tertio, utrum sit cognoscitiva singularium. Quarto, utrum sit virtus. Quinto, utrum sit virtus specialis. Sexto, utrum praestituat finem virtutibus moralibus. Septimo, utrum constituat medium in eis. Octavo, utrum praecipere sit proprius actus eius. Nono, utrum sollicitudo vel vigilantia pertineat ad prudentiam. Decimo, utrum prudentia se extendat ad regimen multitudinis. Undecimo, utrum prudentia quae est respectu boni proprii sit eadem specie cum ea quae se extendit ad bonum commune duodecimo, utrum prudentia sit in subditis, an solum in principibus. Tertiodecimo, utrum inveniatur in malis. Quartodecimo, utrum inveniatur in omnibus bonis. Quintodecimo, utrum insit nobis a natura. Sextodecimo, utrum perdatur per oblivionem. | Question 47. Prudence, considered in itself Is prudence in the will or in the reason? If in the reason, is it only in the practical, or also in the speculative reason? Does it take cognizance of singulars? Is it virtue? Is it a special virtue? Does it appoint the end to the moral virtues? Does it fix the mean in the moral virtues? Is its proper act command? Does solicitude or watchfulness belong to prudence? Does prudence extend to the governing of many? Is the prudence which regards private good the same in species as that which regards the common good? Is prudence in subjects, or only in their rulers? Is prudence in the wicked? Is prudence in all good men? Is prudence in us naturally? Is prudence lost by forgetfulness? |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non sit in vi cognoscitiva, sed in appetitiva. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccle., prudentia est amor ea quibus adiuvatur ab eis quibus impeditur sagaciter eligens. Sed amor non est in cognoscitiva, sed in appetitiva. Ergo prudentia est in vi appetitiva. | Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not in the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv): "Prudence is love choosing wisely between the things that help and those that hinder." Now love is not in the cognitive, but in the appetitive faculty. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive faculty. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut ex praedicta definitione apparet, ad prudentiam pertinet eligere sagaciter. Sed electio est actus appetitivae virtutis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo prudentia non est in vi cognoscitiva, sed in appetitiva. | Objection 2. Further, as appears from the foregoing definition it belongs to prudence "to choose wisely." But choice is an act of the appetitive faculty, as stated above (I-II, 13, 1). Therefore prudence is not in the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod in arte quidem volens peccans eligibilior est, circa prudentiam autem, minus, quemadmodum et circa virtutes. Sed virtutes morales, de quibus ibi loquitur, sunt in parte appetitiva, ars autem in ratione. Ergo prudentia magis est in parte appetitiva quam in ratione. | Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art it is better to err voluntarily than involuntarily, whereas in the case of prudence, as of the virtues, it is worse." Now the moral virtues, of which he is treating there, are in the appetitive faculty, whereas art is in the reason. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive rather than in the rational faculty. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., prudentia est cognitio rerum appetendarum et fugiendarum. | On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61): "Prudence is the knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid." |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., prudens dicitur quasi porro videns, perspicax enim est, et incertorum videt casus. Visio autem non est virtutis appetitivae, sed cognoscitivae. Unde manifestum est quod prudentia directe pertinet ad vim cognoscitivam. Non autem ad vim sensitivam, quia per eam cognoscuntur solum ea quae praesto sunt et sensibus offeruntur. Cognoscere autem futura ex praesentibus vel praeteritis, quod pertinet ad prudentiam, proprie rationis est, quia hoc per quandam collationem agitur. Unde relinquitur quod prudentia proprie sit in ratione. | I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x): "A prudent man is one who sees as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he foresees the event of uncertainties." Now sight belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence belongs directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive faculty, because by the latter we know nothing but what is within reach and offers itself to the senses: while to obtain knowledge of the future from knowledge of the present or past, which pertains to prudence, belongs properly to the reason, because this is done by a process of comparison. It follows therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is in the reason. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, voluntas movet omnes potentias ad suos actus. Primus autem actus appetitivae virtutis est amor, ut supra dictum est. Sic igitur prudentia dicitur esse amor non quidem essentialiter, sed inquantum amor movet ad actum prudentiae. Unde et postea subdit Augustinus quod prudentia est amor bene discernens ea quibus adiuvetur ad tendendum in Deum ab his quibus impediri potest. Dicitur autem amor discernere, inquantum movet rationem ad discernendum. | Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (I, 82, 4) the will moves all the faculties to their acts. Now the first act of the appetitive faculty is love, as stated above (I-II, 25, 1 and 2). Accordingly prudence is said to be love, not indeed essentially, but in so far as love moves to the act of prudence. Wherefore Augustine goes on to say that "prudence is love discerning aright that which helps from that which hinders us in tending to God." Now love is said to discern because it moves the reason to discern. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod prudens considerat ea quae sunt procul inquantum ordinantur ad adiuvandum vel impediendum ea quae sunt praesentialiter agenda. Unde patet quod ea quae considerat prudentia ordinantur ad alia sicut ad finem. Eorum autem quae sunt ad finem est consilium in ratione et electio in appetitu. Quorum duorum consilium magis proprie pertinet ad prudentiam, dicit enim philosophus, in VI Ethic., quod prudens est bene consiliativus. Sed quia electio praesupponit consilium, est enim appetitus praeconsiliati, ut dicitur in III Ethic.; ideo etiam eligere potest attribui prudentiae consequenter, inquantum scilicet electionem per consilium dirigit. | Reply to Objection 2. The prudent man considers things afar off, in so far as they tend to be a help or a hindrance to that which has to be done at the present time. Hence it is clear that those things which prudence considers stand in relation to this other, as in relation to the end. Now of those things that are directed to the end there is counsel in the reason, and choice in the appetite, of which two, counsel belongs more properly to prudence, since the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5,7,9) that a prudent man "takes good counsel." But as choice presupposes counsel, since it is "the desire for what has been already counselled" (Ethic. iii, 2), it follows that choice can also be ascribed to prudence indirectly, in so far, to wit, as prudence directs the choice by means of counsel. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod laus prudentiae non consistit in sola consideratione, sed in applicatione ad opus, quod est finis practicae rationis. Et ideo si in hoc defectus accidat, maxime est contrarium prudentiae, quia sicut finis est potissimus in unoquoque, ita et defectus qui est circa finem est pessimus. Unde ibidem philosophus subdit quod prudentia non est solum cum ratione, sicut ars, habet enim, ut dictum est, applicationem ad opus, quod fit per voluntatem. | Reply to Objection 3. The worth of prudence consists not in thought merely, but in its application to action, which is the end of the practical reason. Wherefore if any defect occur in this, it is most contrary to prudence, since, the end being of most import in everything, it follows that a defect which touches the end is the worst of all. Hence the Philosopher goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is "something more than a merely rational habit," such as art is, since, as stated above (I-II, 57, 4) it includes application to action, which application is an act of the will. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non solum pertineat ad rationem practicam, sed etiam ad speculativam. Dicitur enim Prov. X, sapientia est viro prudentia. Sed sapientia principalius consistit in contemplatione. Ergo et prudentia. | Objection 1. It would seem that prudence belongs not only to the practical, but also to the speculative reason. For it is written (Proverbs 10:23): "Wisdom is prudence to a man." Now wisdom consists chiefly in contemplation. Therefore prudence does also. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit, in I de officiis, prudentia in veri investigatione versatur, et scientiae plenioris infundit cupiditatem. Sed hoc pertinet ad rationem speculativam. Ergo prudentia consistit etiam in ratione speculativa. | Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "Prudence is concerned with the quest of truth, and fills us with the desire of fuller knowledge." Now this belongs to the speculative reason. Therefore prudence resides also in the speculative reason. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, in eadem parte animae ponitur a philosopho ars et prudentia; ut patet in VI Ethic. Sed ars non solum invenitur practica, sed etiam speculativa, ut patet in artibus liberalibus. Ergo etiam prudentia invenitur et practica et speculativa. | Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher assigns art and prudence to the same part of the soul (Ethic. vi, 1). Now art may be not only practical but also speculative, as in the case of the liberal arts. Therefore prudence also is both practical and speculative. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod prudentia est recta ratio agibilium. Sed hoc non pertinet nisi ad rationem practicam. Ergo prudentia non est nisi in ratione practica. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is right reason applied to action. Now this belongs to none but the practical reason. Therefore prudence is in the practical reason only. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., prudentis est bene posse consiliari. Consilium autem est de his quae sunt per nos agenda in ordine ad finem aliquem. Ratio autem eorum quae sunt agenda propter finem est ratio practica. Unde manifestum est quod prudentia non consistit nisi in ratione practica. | I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "a prudent man is one who is capable of taking good counsel." Now counsel is about things that we have to do in relation to some end: and the reason that deals with things to be done for an end is the practical reason. Hence it is evident that prudence resides only in the practical reason. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sapientia considerat causam altissimam simpliciter. Unde consideratio causae altissimae in quolibet genere pertinet ad sapientiam in illo genere. In genere autem humanorum actuum causa altissima est finis communis toti vitae humanae. Et hunc finem intendit prudentia, dicit enim philosophus, in VI Ethic., quod sicut ille qui ratiocinatur bene ad aliquem finem particularem, puta ad victoriam, dicitur esse prudens non simpliciter, sed in hoc genere, scilicet in rebus bellicis; ita ille qui bene ratiocinatur ad totum bene vivere dicitur prudens simpliciter. Unde manifestum est quod prudentia est sapientia in rebus humanis, non autem sapientia simpliciter, quia non est circa causam altissimam simpliciter; est enim circa bonum humanum, homo autem non est optimum eorum quae sunt. Et ideo signanter dicitur quod prudentia est sapientia viro, non autem sapientia simpliciter. | Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (45, 1 and 3), wisdom considers the absolutely highest cause: so that the consideration of the highest cause in any particular genus belongs to wisdom in that genus. Now in the genus of human acts the highest cause is the common end of all human life, and it is this end that prudence intends. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that just as he who reasons well for the realization of a particular end, such as victory, is said to be prudent, not absolutely, but in a particular genus, namely warfare, so he that reasons well with regard to right conduct as a whole, is said to be prudent absolutely. Wherefore it is clear that prudence is wisdom about human affairs: but not wisdom absolutely, because it is not about the absolutely highest cause, for it is about human good, and this is not the best thing of all. And so it is stated significantly that "prudence is wisdom for man," but not wisdom absolutely. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Ambrosius et etiam Tullius nomen prudentiae largius sumunt pro qualibet cognitione humana tam speculativa quam practica. Quamvis dici possit quod ipse actus speculativae rationis, secundum quod est voluntarius, cadit sub electione et consilio quantum ad suum exercitium, et per consequens cadit sub ordinatione prudentiae. Sed quantum ad suam speciem, prout comparatur ad obiectum, quod est verum necessarium, non cadit sub consilio nec sub prudentia. | Reply to Objection 2. Ambrose, and Tully also (De Invent. ii, 53) take the word prudence in a broad sense for any human knowledge, whether speculative or practical. And yet it may also be replied that the act itself of the speculative reason, in so far as it is voluntary, is a matter of choice and counsel as to its exercise; and consequently comes under the direction of prudence. On the other hand, as regards its specification in relation to its object which is the "necessary true," it comes under neither counsel nor prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod omnis applicatio rationis rectae ad aliquid factibile pertinet ad artem. Sed ad prudentiam non pertinet nisi applicatio rationis rectae ad ea de quibus est consilium. Et huiusmodi sunt in quibus non sunt viae determinatae perveniendi ad finem; ut dicitur in III Ethic. Quia igitur ratio speculativa quaedam facit, puta syllogismum, propositionem et alia huiusmodi, in quibus proceditur secundum certas et determinatas vias; inde est quod respectu horum potest salvari ratio artis, non autem ratio prudentiae. Et ideo invenitur aliqua ars speculativa, non autem aliqua prudentia. | Reply to Objection 3. Every application of right reason in the work of production belongs to art: but to prudence belongs only the application of right reason in matters of counsel, which are those wherein there is no fixed way of obtaining the end, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Since then, the speculative reason makes things such as syllogisms, propositions and the like, wherein the process follows certain and fixed rules, consequently in respect of such things it is possible to have the essentials of art, but not of prudence; and so we find such a thing as a speculative art, but not a speculative prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non sit cognoscitiva singularium. Prudentia enim est in ratione, ut dictum est. Sed ratio est universalium, ut dicitur in I Physic. Ergo prudentia non est cognoscitiva nisi universalium. | Objection 1. It would seem that prudence does not take cognizance of singulars. For prudence is in the reason, as stated above (1 and 2). But "reason deals with universals," according to Phys. i, 5. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance except of universals. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, singularia sunt infinita. Sed infinita non possunt comprehendi a ratione. Ergo prudentia, quae est ratio recta, non est singularium. | Objection 2. Further, singulars are infinite in number. But the reason cannot comprehend an infinite number of things. Therefore prudence which is right reason, is not about singulars. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, particularia per sensum cognoscuntur. Sed prudentia non est in sensu, multi enim habentes sensus exteriores perspicaces non sunt prudentes. Ergo prudentia non est singularium. | Objection 3. Further, particulars are known by the senses. But prudence is not in a sense, for many persons who have keen outward senses are devoid of prudence. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance of singulars. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod prudentia non est universalium solum, sed oportet et singularia cognoscere. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that "prudence does not deal with universals only, but needs to take cognizance of singulars also." |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad prudentiam pertinet non solum consideratio rationis, sed etiam applicatio ad opus, quae est finis practicae rationis. Nullus autem potest convenienter aliquid alteri applicare nisi utrumque cognoscat, scilicet et id quod applicandum est et id cui applicandum est. Operationes autem sunt in singularibus. Et ideo necesse est quod prudens et cognoscat universalia principia rationis, et cognoscat singularia, circa quae sunt operationes. | I answer that, As stated above (1, ad 3), to prudence belongs not only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to action, which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the thing to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now actions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason, and the singulars about which actions are concerned. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio primo quidem et principaliter est universalium, potest tamen universales rationes ad particularia applicare (unde syllogismorum conclusiones non solum sunt universales, sed etiam particulares); quia intellectus per quandam reflexionem se ad materiam extendit, ut dicitur in III de anima. | Reply to Objection 1. Reason first and chiefly is concerned with universals, and yet it is able to apply universal rules to particular cases: hence the conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but also particular, because the intellect by a kind of reflection extends to matter, as stated in De Anima iii. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod quia infinitas singularium non potest ratione humana comprehendi, inde est quod sunt incertae providentiae nostrae, ut dicitur Sap. IX. Tamen per experientiam singularia infinita reducuntur ad aliqua finita quae ut in pluribus accidunt, quorum cognitio sufficit ad prudentiam humanam. | Reply to Objection 2. It is because the infinite number of singulars cannot be comprehended by human reason, that "our counsels are uncertain" (Wisdom 9:14). Nevertheless experience reduces the infinity of singulars to a certain finite number which occur as a general rule, and the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., prudentia non consistit in sensu exteriori, quo cognoscimus sensibilia propria, sed in sensu interiori, qui perficitur per memoriam et experimentum ad prompte iudicandum de particularibus expertis. Non tamen ita quod prudentia sit in sensu interiori sicut in subiecto principali, sed principaliter quidem est in ratione, per quandam autem applicationem pertingit ad huiusmodi sensum. | Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8), prudence does not reside in the external senses whereby we know sensible objects, but in the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and experience so as to judge promptly of particular cases. This does not mean however that prudence is in the interior sense as in its principle subject, for it is chiefly in the reason, yet by a kind of application it extends to this sense. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non sit virtus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Lib. Arb., quod prudentia est appetendarum et vitandarum rerum scientia. Sed scientia contra virtutem dividitur; ut patet in praedicamentis. Ergo prudentia non est virtus. | Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not a virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that "prudence is the science of what to desire and what to avoid." Now science is condivided with virtue, as appears in the Predicaments (vi). Therefore prudence is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, virtutis non est virtus. Sed artis est virtus; ut philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic. Ergo ars non est virtus. Sed in arte est prudentia, dicitur enim II Paral. II de Hiram quod sciebat caelare omnem sculpturam, et adinvenire prudenter quodcumque in opere necessarium est. Ergo prudentia non est virtus. | Objection 2. Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but "there is a virtue of art," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5): wherefore art is not a virtue. Now there is prudence in art, for it is written (2 Chronicles 2:14) concerning Hiram, that he knew "to grave all sort of graving, and to devise ingeniously [prudenter] all that there may be need of in the work." Therefore prudence is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, nulla virtus potest esse immoderata. Sed prudentia est immoderata, alioquin frustra diceretur in Prov. XXIII, prudentiae tuae pone modum. Ergo prudentia non est virtus. | Objection 3. Further, no virtue can be immoderate. But prudence is immoderate, else it would be useless to say (Proverbs 23:4): "Set bounds to thy prudence." Therefore prudence is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, in II Moral., prudentiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem et iustitiam dicit esse quatuor virtutes. | On the contrary, Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) that prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice are four virtues. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est cum de virtutibus in communi ageretur, virtus est quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit. Bonum autem potest dici dupliciter, uno modo, materialiter, pro eo quod est bonum; alio modo, formaliter, secundum rationem boni. Bonum autem, inquantum huiusmodi, est obiectum appetitivae virtutis. Et ideo si qui habitus sunt qui faciant rectam considerationem rationis non habito respectu ad rectitudinem appetitus, minus habent de ratione virtutis, tanquam ordinantes ad bonum materialiter, idest ad id quod est bonum non sub ratione boni, plus autem habent de ratione virtutis habitus illi qui respiciunt rectitudinem appetitus, quia respiciunt bonum non solum materialiter, sed etiam formaliter, idest id quod est bonum sub ratione boni. Ad prudentiam autem pertinet, sicut dictum est, applicatio rectae rationis ad opus, quod non fit sine appetitu recto. Et ideo prudentia non solum habet rationem virtutis quam habent aliae virtutes intellectuales; sed etiam habet rationem virtutis quam habent virtutes morales, quibus etiam connumeratur. | I answer that, As stated above (I-II, 55, 3; I-II, 56, 1) when we were treating of virtues in general, "virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." Now good may be understood in a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing that is good, secondly, formally, under the aspect of good. Good, under the aspect of good, is the object of the appetitive power. Hence if any habits rectify the consideration of reason, without regarding the rectitude of the appetite, they have less of the nature of a virtue since they direct man to good materially, that is to say, to the thing which is good, but without considering it under the aspect of good. On the other hand those virtues which regard the rectitude of the appetite, have more of the nature of virtue, because they consider the good not only materially, but also formally, in other words, they consider that which is good under the aspect of good. Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above (1, ad 3; 3) to apply right reason to action, and this is not done without a right appetite. Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the other intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral virtues have it, among which virtues it is enumerated. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ibi large accepit scientiam pro qualibet recta ratione. | Reply to Objection 1. Augustine there takes science in the broad sense for any kind of right reason. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod philosophus dicit artis esse virtutem, quia non importat rectitudinem appetitus, et ideo ad hoc quod homo recte utatur arte, requiritur quod habeat virtutem, quae faciat rectitudinem appetitus. Prudentia autem non habet locum in his quae sunt artis, tum quia ars ordinatur ad aliquem particularem finem; tum quia ars habet determinata media per quae pervenitur ad finem. Dicitur tamen aliquis prudenter operari in his quae sunt artis per similitudinem quandam, in quibusdam enim artibus, propter incertitudinem eorum quibus pervenitur ad finem, necessarium est consilium, sicut in medicinali et in navigatoria, ut dicitur in III Ethic. | Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art, because art does not require rectitude of the appetite; wherefore in order that a man may make right use of his art, he needs to have a virtue which will rectify his appetite. Prudence however has nothing to do with the matter of art, because art is both directed to a particular end, and has fixed means of obtaining that end. And yet, by a kind of comparison, a man may be said to act prudently in matters of art. Moreover in certain arts, on account of the uncertainty of the means for obtaining the end, there is need for counsel, as for instance in the arts of medicine and navigation, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod illud dictum sapientis non est sic intelligendum quasi ipsa prudentia sit moderanda, sed quia secundum prudentiam est aliis modus imponendus. | Reply to Objection 3. This saying of the wise man does not mean that prudence itself should be moderate, but that moderation must be imposed on other things according to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non sit specialis virtus. Nulla enim specialis virtus ponitur in communi definitione virtutis. Sed prudentia ponitur in communi definitione virtutis, quia in II Ethic. definitur virtus habitus electivus in medietate existens determinata ratione quoad nos, prout sapiens determinabit; recta autem ratio intelligitur secundum prudentiam, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo prudentia non est specialis virtus. | Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not a special virtue. For no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general, since virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) "an elective habit that follows a mean appointed by reason in relation to ourselves, even as a wise man decides." Now right reason is reason in accordance with prudence, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore prudence is not a special virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod virtus moralis recte facit operari finem, prudentia autem ea quae sunt ad finem. Sed in qualibet virtute sunt aliqua operanda propter finem. Ergo prudentia est in qualibet virtute. Non est ergo virtus specialis. | Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 13) that "the effect of moral virtue is right action as regards the end, and that of prudence, right action as regards the means." Now in every virtue certain things have to be done as means to the end. Therefore prudence is in every virtue, and consequently is not a special virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, specialis virtus habet speciale obiectum. Sed prudentia non habet speciale obiectum, est enim recta ratio agibilium, ut dicitur in VI Ethic.; agibilia autem sunt omnia opera virtutum. Ergo prudentia non est specialis virtus. | Objection 3. Further, a special virtue has a special object. But prudence has not a special object, for it is right reason "applied to action" (Ethic. vi, 5); and all works of virtue are actions. Therefore prudence is not a special virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod condividitur et connumeratur aliis virtutibus, dicitur enim Sap. VIII. Sobrietatem et prudentiam docet, iustitiam et virtutem. | On the contrary, It is distinct from and numbered among the other virtues, for it is written (Wisdom 8:7): "She teacheth temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude." |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod cum actus et habitus recipiant speciem ex obiectis, ut ex supradictis patet, necesse est quod habitus cui respondet speciale obiectum ab aliis distinctum specialis sit habitus, et si est bonus, est specialis virtus. Speciale autem obiectum dicitur non secundum materialem considerationem ipsius, sed magis secundum rationem formalem, ut ex supradictis patet, nam una et eadem res cadit sub actu diversorum habituum, et etiam diversarum potentiarum, secundum rationes diversas. Maior autem diversitas obiecti requiritur ad diversitatem potentiae quam ad diversitatem habitus, cum plures habitus inveniantur in una potentia, ut supra dictum est. Diversitas ergo rationis obiecti quae diversificat potentiam, multo magis diversificat habitum. Sic igitur dicendum est quod cum prudentia sit in ratione, ut dictum est, diversificatur quidem ab aliis virtutibus intellectualibus secundum materialem diversitatem obiectorum. Nam sapientia, scientia et intellectus sunt circa necessaria; ars autem et prudentia circa contingentia; sed ars circa factibilia, quae scilicet in exteriori materia constituuntur, sicut domus, cultellus et huiusmodi; prudentia autem est circa agibilia, quae scilicet in ipso operante consistunt, ut supra habitum est. Sed a virtutibus moralibus distinguitur prudentia secundum formalem rationem potentiarum distinctivam, scilicet intellectivi, in quo est prudentia; et appetitivi, in quo est virtus moralis. Unde manifestum est prudentiam esse specialem virtutem ab omnibus aliis virtutibus distinctam. | I answer that, Since acts and habits take their species from their objects, as shown above (I-II, 01, 3; I-II, 18, 2; I-II, 54, 2), any habit that has a corresponding special object, distinct from other objects, must needs be a special habit, and if it be a good habit, it must be a special virtue. Now an object is called special, not merely according to the consideration of its matter, but rather according to its formal aspect, as explained above (I-II, 54, 2, ad 1). Because one and the same thing is the subject matter of the acts of different habits, and also of different powers, according to its different formal aspects. Now a yet greater difference of object is requisite for a difference of powers than for a difference of habits, since several habits are found in the same power, as stated above (I-II, 54, 1). Consequently any difference in the aspect of an object, that requires a difference of powers, will "a fortiori" require a difference of habits. Accordingly we must say that since prudence is in the reason, as stated above (Article 2), it is differentiated from the other intellectual virtues by a material difference of objects. "Wisdom," "knowledge" and "understanding" are about necessary things, whereas "art" and "prudence" are about contingent things, art being concerned with "things made," that is, with things produced in external matter, such as a house, a knife and so forth; and prudence, being concerned with "things done," that is, with things that have their being in the doer himself, as stated above (I-II, 57, 4). On the other hand prudence is differentiated from the moral virtues according to a formal aspect distinctive of powers, i.e. the intellective power, wherein is prudence, and the appetitive power, wherein is moral virtue. Hence it is evident that prudence is a special virtue, distinct from all other virtues. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa definitio non datur de virtute in communi, sed de virtute morali. In cuius definitione convenienter ponitur virtus intellectualis communicans in materia cum ipsa, scilicet prudentia, quia sicut virtutis moralis subiectum est aliquid participans ratione, ita virtus moralis habet rationem virtutis inquantum participat virtutem intellectualem. | Reply to Objection 1. This is not a definition of virtue in general, but of moral virtue, the definition of which fittingly includes an intellectual virtue, viz., prudence, which has the same matter in common with moral virtue; because, just as the subject of moral virtue is something that partakes of reason, so moral virtue has the aspect of virtue, in so far as it partakes of intellectual virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ex illa ratione habetur quod prudentia adiuvet omnes virtutes, et in omnibus operetur. Sed hoc non sufficit ad ostendendum quod non sit virtus specialis, quia nihil prohibet in aliquo genere esse aliquam speciem quae aliqualiter operetur in omnibus speciebus eiusdem generis; sicut sol aliqualiter influit in omnia corpora. | Reply to Objection 2. This argument proves that prudence helps all the virtues, and works in all of them; but this does not suffice to prove that it is not a special virtue; for nothing prevents a certain genus from containing a species which is operative in every other species of that same genus, even as the sun has an influence over all bodies. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod agibilia sunt quidem materia prudentiae secundum quod sunt obiectum rationis, scilicet sub ratione veri. Sunt autem materia moralium virtutum secundum quod sunt obiectum virtutis appetitivae, scilicet sub ratione boni. | Reply to Objection 3. Things done are indeed the matter of prudence, in so far as they are the object of reason, that is, considered as true: but they are the matter of the moral virtues, in so far as they are the object of the appetitive power, that is, considered as good. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia praestituat finem virtutibus moralibus. Cum enim prudentia sit in ratione, virtus autem moralis in vi appetitiva, videtur quod hoc modo se habeat prudentia ad virtutem moralem sicut ratio ad vim appetitivam. Sed ratio praestituit finem potentiae appetitivae. Ergo prudentia praestituit finem virtutibus moralibus. | Objection 1. It would seem that prudence appoints the end to moral virtues. Since prudence is in the reason, while moral virtue is in the appetite, it seems that prudence stands in relation to moral virtue, as reason to the appetite. Now reason appoints the end to the appetitive power. Therefore prudence appoints the end to the moral virtues. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, homo excedit res irrationales secundum rationem, sed secundum alia cum eis communicat. Sic igitur se habent aliae partes hominis ad rationem sicut se habent creaturae irrationales ad hominem. Sed homo est finis creaturarum irrationalium ut dicitur in I Politic. ergo omnes aliae partes hominis ordinantur ad rationem sicut ad finem. Sed prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, ut dictum est. Ergo omnia agibilia ordinantur ad prudentiam sicut ad finem. Ipsa ergo praestituit finem omnibus virtutibus moralibus. | Objection 2. Further, man surpasses irrational beings by his reason, but he has other things in common with them. Accordingly the other parts of man are in relation to his reason, what man is in relation to irrational creatures. Now man is the end of irrational creatures, according to Polit. i, 3. Therefore all the other parts of man are directed to reason as to their end. But prudence is "right reason applied to action," as stated above (Article 2). Therefore all actions are directed to prudence as their end. Therefore prudence appoints the end to all moral virtues. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, proprium est virtutis vel artis seu potentiae ad quam pertinet finis ut praecipiat aliis virtutibus seu artibus ad quas pertinent ea quae sunt ad finem. Sed prudentia disponit de aliis virtutibus moralibus et praecipit eis. Ergo praestituit eis finem. | Objection 3. Further, it belongs to the virtue, art, or power that is concerned about the end, to command the virtues or arts that are concerned about the means. Now prudence disposes of the other moral virtues, and commands them. Therefore it appoints their end to them. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod virtus moralis intentionem finis facit rectam, prudentia autem quae ad hanc. Ergo ad prudentiam non pertinet praestituere finem virtutibus moralibus, sed solum disponere de his quae sunt ad finem. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "moral virtue ensures the rectitude of the intention of the end, while prudence ensures the rectitude of the means." Therefore it does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod finis virtutum moralium est bonum humanum. Bonum autem humanae animae est secundum rationem esse; ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Unde necesse est quod fines moralium virtutum praeexistant in ratione. Sicut autem in ratione speculativa sunt quaedam ut naturaliter nota, quorum est intellectus; et quaedam quae per illa innotescunt, scilicet conclusiones, quarum est scientia, ita in ratione practica praeexistunt quaedam ut principia naturaliter nota, et huiusmodi sunt fines virtutum moralium, quia finis se habet in operabilibus sicut principium in speculativis, ut supra habitum est; et quaedam sunt in ratione practica ut conclusiones, et huiusmodi sunt ea quae sunt ad finem, in quae pervenimus ex ipsis finibus. Et horum est prudentia, applicans universalia principia ad particulares conclusiones operabilium. Et ideo ad prudentiam non pertinet praestituere finem virtutibus moralibus, sed solum disponere de his quae sunt ad finem. | I answer that, The end of moral virtues is human good. Now the good of the human soul is to be in accord with reason, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). Wherefore the ends of moral virtue must of necessity pre-exist in the reason. Now, just as, in the speculative reason, there are certain things naturally known, about which is "understanding," and certain things of which we obtain knowledge through them, viz. conclusions, about which is "science," so in the practical reason, certain things pre-exist, as naturally known principles, and such are the ends of the moral virtues, since the end is in practical matters what principles are in speculative matters, as stated above (23, 07, ad 2; I-II, 13, 3); while certain things are in the practical reason by way of conclusions, and such are the means which we gather from the ends themselves. About these is prudence, which applies universal principles to the particular conclusions of practical matters. Consequently it does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutibus moralibus praestituit finem ratio naturalis quae dicitur synderesis, ut in primo habitum est, non autem prudentia, ratione iam dicta. | Reply to Objection 1. Natural reason known by the name of "synderesis" appoints the end to moral virtues, as stated above (I, 79, 12): but prudence does not do this for the reason given above. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 6 ad 2 Et per hoc etiam patet responsio ad secundum. | This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod finis non pertinet ad virtutes morales tanquam ipsae praestituant finem, sed quia tendunt in finem a ratione naturali praestitutum. Ad quod iuvantur per prudentiam, quae eis viam parat, disponendo ea quae sunt ad finem. Unde relinquitur quod prudentia sit nobilior virtutibus moralibus, et moveat eas. Sed synderesis movet prudentiam, sicut intellectus principiorum scientiam. | Reply to Objection 3. The end concerns the moral virtues, not as though they appointed the end, but because they tend to the end which is appointed by natural reason. On this they are helped by prudence, which prepares the way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it follows that prudence is more excellent than the moral virtues, and moves them: yet "synderesis" moves prudence, just as the understanding of principles moves science. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad prudentiam non pertineat invenire medium in virtutibus moralibus. Consequi enim medium est finis moralium virtutum. Sed prudentia non praestituit finem moralibus virtutibus, ut ostensum est. Ergo non invenit in eis medium. | Objection 1. It would seem that it does not belong to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues. For the achievement of the mean is the end of moral virtues. But prudence does not appoint the end to moral virtues, as shown above (Article 6). Therefore it does not find the mean in them. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud quod est per se non videtur causam habere, sed ipsum esse est sui ipsius causa, quia unumquodque dicitur esse per causam suam. Sed existere in medio convenit virtuti morali per se, quasi positum in eius definitione, ut ex dictis patet. Non ergo prudentia causat medium in virtutibus moralibus. | Objection 2. Further, that which of itself has being, would seem to have no cause, but its very being is its cause, since a thing is said to have being by reason of its cause. Now "to follow the mean" belongs to moral virtue by reason of itself, as part of its definition, as shown above (5, Objection 1). Therefore prudence does not cause the mean in moral virtues. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, prudentia operatur secundum modum rationis. Sed virtus moralis tendit ad medium per modum naturae, quia ut Tullius dicit, in II Rhet., virtus est habitus per modum naturae rationi consentaneus. Ergo prudentia non praestituit medium virtutibus moralibus. | Objection 3. Further, prudence works after the manner of reason. But moral virtue tends to the mean after the manner of nature, because, as Tully states (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53), "virtue is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Therefore prudence does not appoint the mean to moral virtues. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod in supraposita definitione virtutis moralis dicitur quod est in medietate existens determinata ratione prout sapiens determinabit. | On the contrary, In the foregoing definition of moral virtue (5, Objection 1) it is stated that it "follows a mean appointed by reason . . . even as a wise man decides." |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod est conformari rationi rectae est finis proprius cuiuslibet moralis virtutis, temperantia enim hoc intendit, ne propter concupiscentias homo divertat a ratione; et similiter fortitudo ne a recto iudicio rationis divertat propter timorem vel audaciam. Et hic finis praestitutus est homini secundum naturalem rationem, naturalis enim ratio dictat unicuique ut secundum rationem operetur. Sed qualiter et per quae homo in operando attingat medium rationis pertinet ad dispositionem prudentiae. Licet enim attingere medium sit finis virtutis moralis, tamen per rectam dispositionem eorum quae sunt ad finem medium invenitur. | I answer that, The proper end of each moral virtue consists precisely in conformity with right reason. For temperance intends that man should not stray from reason for the sake of his concupiscences; fortitude, that he should not stray from the right judgment of reason through fear or daring. Moreover this end is appointed to man according to natural reason, since natural reason dictates to each one that he should act according to reason. But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and by what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds. For though the attainment of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet this mean is found by the right disposition of these things that are directed to the end. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 7 ad 1 Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. | This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut agens naturale facit ut forma sit in materia, non tamen facit ut formae conveniant ea quae per se ei insunt; ita etiam prudentia medium constituit in passionibus et operationibus, non tamen facit quod medium quaerere conveniat virtuti. | Reply to Objection 2. Just as a natural agent makes form to be in matter, yet does not make that which is essential to the form to belong to it, so too, prudence appoints the mean in passions and operations, and yet does not make the searching of the mean to belong to virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod virtus moralis per modum naturae intendit pervenire ad medium. Sed quia medium non eodem modo invenitur in omnibus, ideo inclinatio naturae, quae semper eodem modo operatur, ad hoc non sufficit, sed requiritur ratio prudentiae. | Reply to Objection 3. Moral virtue after the manner of nature intends to attain the mean. Since, however, the mean as such is not found in all matters after the same manner, it follows that the inclination of nature which ever works in the same manner, does not suffice for this purpose, and so the ruling of prudence is required. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecipere non sit principalis actus prudentiae. Praecipere enim pertinet ad bona quae sunt fienda. Sed Augustinus, XIV de Trin., ponit actum prudentiae praecavere insidias. Ergo praecipere non est principalis actus prudentiae. | Objection 1. It would seem that command is not the chief act of prudence. For command regards the good to be ensued. Now Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) states that it is an act of prudence "to avoid ambushes." Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod prudentis videtur esse bene consiliari. Sed alius actus videtur esse consiliari et praecipere, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo prudentiae principalis actus non est praecipere. | Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "the prudent man takes good counsel." Now "to take counsel" and "to command" seem to be different acts, as appears from what has been said above (I-II, 57, 6). Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, praecipere, vel imperare, videtur pertinere ad voluntatem, cuius obiectum est finis et quae movet alias potentias animae. Sed prudentia non est in voluntate, sed in ratione. Ergo prudentiae actus non est praecipere. | Objection 3. Further, it seems to belong to the will to command and to rule, since the will has the end for its object, and moves the other powers of the soul. Now prudence is not in the will, but in the reason. Therefore command is not an act of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod prudentia praeceptiva est. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 10) that "prudence commands." |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, ut supra dictum est. Unde oportet quod ille sit praecipuus actus prudentiae qui est praecipuus actus rationis agibilium. Cuius quidem sunt tres actus. Quorum primus est consiliari, quod pertinet ad inventionem, nam consiliari est quaerere, ut supra habitum est. Secundus actus est iudicare de inventis, et hic sistit speculativa ratio. Sed practica ratio, quae ordinatur ad opus, procedit ulterius et est tertius actus eius praecipere, qui quidem actus consistit in applicatione consiliatorum et iudicatorum ad operandum. Et quia iste actus est propinquior fini rationis practicae, inde est quod iste est principalis actus rationis practicae, et per consequens prudentiae. Et huius signum est quod perfectio artis consistit in iudicando, non autem in praecipiendo. Ideo reputatur melior artifex qui volens peccat in arte, quasi habens rectum iudicium, quam qui peccat nolens, quod videtur esse ex defectu iudicii. Sed in prudentia est e converso, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., imprudentior enim est qui volens peccat, quasi deficiens in principali actu prudentiae, qui est praecipere, quam qui peccat nolens. | I answer that, Prudence is "right reason applied to action," as stated above (Article 2). Hence that which is the chief act of reason in regard to action must needs be the chief act of prudence. Now there are three such acts. The first is "to take counsel," which belongs to discovery, for counsel is an act of inquiry, as stated above (I-II, 14, 1). The second act is "to judge of what one has discovered," and this is an act of the speculative reason. But the practical reason, which is directed to action, goes further, and its third act is "to command," which act consists in applying to action the things counselled and judged. And since this act approaches nearer to the end of the practical reason, it follows that it is the chief act of the practical reason, and consequently of prudence. In confirmation of this we find that the perfection of art consists in judging and not in commanding: wherefore he who sins voluntarily against his craft is reputed a better craftsman than he who does so involuntarily, because the former seems to do so from right judgment, and the latter from a defective judgment. On the other hand it is the reverse in prudence, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5, for it is more imprudent to sin voluntarily, since this is to be lacking in the chief act of prudence, viz. command, than to sin involuntarily. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod actus praecipiendi se extendit et ad bona prosequenda et ad mala cavenda. Et tamen praecavere insidias non attribuit Augustinus prudentiae quasi principalem actum ipsius, sed quia iste actus prudentiae non manet in patria. | Reply to Objection 1. The act of command extends both to the ensuing of good and to the avoidance of evil. Nevertheless Augustine ascribes "the avoidance of ambushes" to prudence, not as its chief act, but as an act of prudence that does not continue in heaven. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod bonitas consilii requiritur ut ea quae sunt bene inventa applicentur ad opus. Et ideo praecipere pertinet ad prudentiam, quae est bene consiliativa. | Reply to Objection 2. Good counsel is required in order that the good things discovered may be applied to action: wherefore command belongs to prudence which takes good counsel. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod movere absolute pertinet ad voluntatem. Sed praecipere importat motionem cum quadam ordinatione. Et ideo est actus rationis, ut supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3. Simply to move belongs to the will: but command denotes motion together with a kind of ordering, wherefore it is an act of the reason, as stated above (I-II, 17, 1). |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sollicitudo non pertineat ad prudentiam. Sollicitudo enim inquietudinem quandam importat, dicit enim Isidorus, in libro Etymol., quod sollicitus dicitur qui est inquietus. Sed motio maxime pertinet ad vim appetitivam. Ergo et sollicitudo. Sed prudentia non est in vi appetitiva, sed in ratione, ut supra habitum est. Ergo sollicitudo non pertinet ad prudentiam. | Objection 1. It would seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence. For solicitude implies disquiet, wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a solicitous man is a restless man." Now motion belongs chiefly to the appetitive power: wherefore solicitude does also. But prudence is not in the appetitive power, but in the reason, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore solicitude does not belong to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, sollicitudini videtur opponi certitudo veritatis, unde dicitur I Reg. IX quod Samuel dixit ad Saul, de asinis quas nudiustertius perdidisti ne sollicitus sis, quia inventae sunt. Sed certitudo veritatis pertinet ad prudentiam, cum sit virtus intellectualis. Ergo sollicitudo opponitur prudentiae, magis quam ad eam pertineat. | Objection 2. Further, the certainty of truth seems opposed to solicitude, wherefore it is related (1 Samuel 9:20) that Samuel said to Saul: "As for the asses which were lost three days ago, be not solicitous, because they are found." Now the certainty of truth belongs to prudence, since it is an intellectual virtue. Therefore solicitude is in opposition to prudence rather than belonging to it. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod ad magnanimum pertinet pigrum esse et otiosum. Pigritiae autem opponitur sollicitudo. Cum ergo prudentia non opponatur magnanimitati, quia bonum non est bono contrarium, ut dicitur in Praedic.; videtur quod sollicitudo non pertineat ad prudentiam. | Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) the "magnanimous man is slow and leisurely." Now slowness is contrary to solicitude. Since then prudence is not opposed to magnanimity, for "good is not opposed to good," as stated in the Predicaments (viii) it would seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 9 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Pet. IV, estote prudentes, et vigilate in orationibus. Sed vigilantia est idem sollicitudini. Ergo sollicitudo pertinet ad prudentiam. | On the contrary, It is written (1 Peter 4:7): "Be prudent . . . and watch in prayers." But watchfulness is the same as solicitude. Therefore solicitude belongs to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 9 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Isidorus, in libro Etymol., sollicitus dicitur quasi solers citus, inquantum scilicet aliquis ex quadam solertia animi velox est ad prosequendum ea quae sunt agenda. Hoc autem pertinet ad prudentiam, cuius praecipuus actus est circa agenda praecipere de praeconsiliatis et iudicatis. Unde philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod oportet operari quidem velociter consiliata, consiliari autem tarde. Et inde est quod sollicitudo proprie ad prudentiam pertinet. Et propter hoc Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod prudentiae sunt excubiae atque diligentissima vigilantia ne, subrepente paulatim mala suasione, fallamur. | I answer that, According to Isidore (Etym. x), a man is said to be solicitous through being shrewd [solers] and alert [citus], in so far as a man through a certain shrewdness of mind is on the alert to do whatever has to be done. Now this belongs to prudence, whose chief act is a command about what has been already counselled and judged in matters of action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one should be quick in carrying out the counsel taken, but slow in taking counsel." Hence it is that solicitude belongs properly to prudence, and for this reason Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxiv) that "prudence keeps most careful watch and ward, lest by degrees we be deceived unawares by evil counsel." |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 9 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod motus pertinet quidem ad vim appetitivam sicut ad principium movens, tamen secundum directionem et praeceptum rationis, in quo consistit ratio sollicitudinis. | Reply to Objection 1. Movement belongs to the appetitive power as to the principle of movement, in accordance however, with the direction and command of reason, wherein solicitude consists. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 9 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in I Ethic., certitudo non est similiter quaerenda in omnibus, sed in unaquaque materia secundum proprium modum. Quia vero materiae prudentiae sunt singularia contingentia, circa quae sunt operationes humanae, non potest certitudo prudentiae tanta esse quod omnino sollicitudo tollatur. | Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), "equal certainty should not be sought in all things, but in each matter according to its proper mode." And since the matter of prudence is the contingent singulars about which are human actions, the certainty of prudence cannot be so great as to be devoid of all solicitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 9 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod magnanimus dicitur esse piger et otiosus, non quia de nullo sit sollicitus, sed quia non est superflue sollicitus de multis, sed confidit in his de quibus confidendum est, et circa illa non superflue sollicitatur. Superfluitas enim timoris et diffidentiae facit superfluitatem sollicitudinis, quia timor facit consiliativos, ut supra dictum est cum de passione timoris ageretur. | Reply to Objection 3. The magnanimous man is said to be "slow and leisurely" not because he is solicitous about nothing, but because he is not over-solicitous about many things, and is trustful in matters where he ought to have trust, and is not over-solicitous about them: for over-much fear and distrust are the cause of over-solicitude, since fear makes us take counsel, as stated above (I-II, 44, 2) when we were treating of the passion of fear. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 10 arg. 1 Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non se extendat ad regimen multitudinis, sed solum ad regimen sui ipsius. Dicit enim philosophus, in V Ethic., quod virtus relata ad bonum commune est iustitia. Sed prudentia differt a iustitia. Ergo prudentia non refertur ad bonum commune. | Objection 1. It would seem that prudence does not extend to the governing of many, but only to the government of oneself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that virtue directed to the common good is justice. But prudence differs from justice. Therefore prudence is not directed to the common good. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 10 arg. 2 Praeterea, ille videtur esse prudens qui sibi ipsi bonum quaerit et operatur. Sed frequenter illi qui quaerunt bona communia negligunt sua. Ergo non sunt prudentes. | Objection 2. Further, he seems to be prudent, who seeks and does good for himself. Now those who seek the common good often neglect their own. Therefore they are not prudent. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 10 arg. 3 Praeterea, prudentia dividitur contra temperantiam et fortitudinem. Sed temperantia et fortitudo videntur dici solum per comparationem ad bonum proprium. Ergo etiam et prudentia. | Objection 3. Further, prudence is specifically distinct from temperance and fortitude. But temperance and fortitude seem to be related only to a man's own good. Therefore the same applies to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 10 s. c. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Matth. XXIV, quis, putas, est fidelis servus et prudens, quem constituit dominus super familiam suam? | On the contrary, Our Lord said (Matthew 24:45): "Who, thinkest thou, is a faithful and prudent [Douay: 'wise'] servant whom his lord hath appointed over his family?" |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 10 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quidam posuerunt quod prudentia non se extendit ad bonum commune, sed solum ad bonum proprium. Et hoc ideo quia existimabant quod non oportet hominem quaerere nisi bonum proprium. Sed haec aestimatio repugnat caritati, quae non quaerit quae sua sunt, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XIII. Unde et apostolus de seipso dicit, I ad Cor. X, non quaerens quod mihi utile sit, sed quod multis, ut salvi fiant. Repugnat etiam rationi rectae, quae hoc iudicat, quod bonum commune sit melius quam bonum unius. Quia igitur ad prudentiam pertinet recte consiliari, iudicare et praecipere de his per quae pervenitur ad debitum finem, manifestum est quod prudentia non solum se habet ad bonum privatum unius hominis, sed etiam ad bonum commune multitudinis. | I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) some have held that prudence does not extend to the common good, but only to the good of the individual, and this because they thought that man is not bound to seek other than his own good. But this opinion is opposed to charity, which "seeketh not her own" (1 Corinthians 13:5): wherefore the Apostle says of himself (1 Corinthians 10:33): "Not seeking that which is profitable to myself, but to many, that they may be saved." Moreover it is contrary to right reason, which judges the common good to be better than the good of the individual. Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge, and command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is evident that prudence regards not only the private good of the individual, but also the common good of the multitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 10 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus ibi loquitur de virtute morali. Sicut autem omnis virtus moralis relata ad bonum commune dicitur legalis iustitia, ita prudentia relata ad bonum commune vocatur politica, ut sic se habeat politica ad iustitiam legalem, sicut se habet prudentia simpliciter dicta ad virtutem moralem. | Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking there of moral virtue. Now just as every moral virtue that is directed to the common good is called "legal" justice, so the prudence that is directed to the common good is called "political" prudence, for the latter stands in the same relation to legal justice, as prudence simply so called to moral virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 10 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui quaerit bonum commune multitudinis ex consequenti etiam quaerit bonum suum, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia bonum proprium non potest esse sine bono communi vel familiae vel civitatis aut regni. Unde et maximus Valerius dicit de antiquis Romanis quod malebant esse pauperes in divite imperio quam divites in paupere imperio. Secundo quia, cum homo sit pars domus et civitatis, oportet quod homo consideret quid sit sibi bonum ex hoc quod est prudens circa bonum multitudinis, bona enim dispositio partis accipitur secundum habitudinem ad totum; quia ut Augustinus dicit, in libro Confess., turpis est omnis pars suo toti non congruens. | Reply to Objection 2. He that seeks the good of the many, seeks in consequence his own good, for two reasons. First, because the individual good is impossible without the common good of the family, state, or kingdom. Hence Valerius Maximus says [Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv, 6 of the ancient Romans that "they would rather be poor in a rich empire than rich in a poor empire." Secondly, because, since man is a part of the home and state, he must needs consider what is good for him by being prudent about the good of the many. For the good disposition of parts depends on their relation to the whole; thus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8) that "any part which does not harmonize with its whole, is offensive." |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 10 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam temperantia et fortitudo possunt referri ad bonum commune, unde de actibus earum dantur praecepta legis, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Magis tamen prudentia et iustitia, quae pertinent ad partem rationalem, ad quam directe pertinent communia, sicut ad partem sensitivam pertinent singularia. | Reply to Objection 3. Even temperance and fortitude can be directed to the common good, hence there are precepts of law concerning them as stated in Ethic. v, 1: more so, however, prudence and justice, since these belong to the rational faculty which directly regards the universal, just as the sensitive part regards singulars. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 11 arg. 1 Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia quae est respectu boni proprii sit eadem specie cum ea quae se extendit ad bonum commune. Dicit enim philosophus, in VI Ethic., quod politica et prudentia idem habitus est, esse autem non idem ipsis. | Objection 1. It seems that prudence about one's own good is the same specifically as that which extends to the common good. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "political prudence, and prudence are the same habit, yet their essence is not the same." |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 11 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III Polit., quod eadem est virtus boni viri et boni principis. Sed politica maxime est in principe, in quo est sicut architectonica. Cum ergo prudentia sit virtus boni viri, videtur quod sit idem habitus prudentia et politica. | Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "virtue is the same in a good man and in a good ruler." Now political prudence is chiefly in the ruler, in whom it is architectonic, as it were. Since then prudence is a virtue of a good man, it seems that prudence and political prudence are the same habit. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 11 arg. 3 Praeterea, ea quorum unum ordinatur ad aliud non diversificant speciem aut substantiam habitus. Sed bonum proprium, quod pertinet ad prudentiam simpliciter dictam, ordinatur ad bonum commune, quod pertinet ad politicam. Ergo politica et prudentia neque differunt specie, neque secundum habitus substantiam. | Objection 3. Further, a habit is not diversified in species or essence by things which are subordinate to one another. But the particular good, which belongs to prudence simply so called, is subordinate to the common good, which belongs to political prudence. Therefore prudence and political prudence differ neither specifically nor essentially. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 11 s. c. Sed contra est quod diversae scientiae sunt politica, quae ordinatur ad bonum commune civitatis; et oeconomica, quae est de his quae pertinent ad bonum commune domus vel familiae; et monastica, quae est de his quae pertinent ad bonum unius personae. Ergo pari ratione et prudentiae sunt species diversae secundum hanc diversitatem materiae. | On the contrary, "Political prudence," which is directed to the common good of the state, "domestic economy" which is of such things as relate to the common good of the household or family, and "monastic economy" which is concerned with things affecting the good of one person, are all distinct sciences. Therefore in like manner there are different kinds of prudence, corresponding to the above differences of matter. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 11 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, species habituum diversificantur secundum diversitatem obiecti quae attenditur penes rationem formalem ipsius. Ratio autem formalis omnium quae sunt ad finem attenditur ex parte finis; sicut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo necesse est quod ex relatione ad diversos fines diversificentur species habitus. Diversi autem fines sunt bonum proprium unius, et bonum familiae, et bonum civitatis et regni. Unde necesse est quod et prudentiae differant specie secundum differentiam horum finium, ut scilicet una sit prudentia simpliciter dicta, quae ordinatur ad bonum proprium; alia autem oeconomica, quae ordinatur ad bonum commune domus vel familiae; et tertia politica, quae ordinatur ad bonum commune civitatis vel regni. | I answer that, As stated above (5; 54, 2, ad 1), the species of habits differ according to the difference of object considered in its formal aspect. Now the formal aspect of all things directed to the end, is taken from the end itself, as shown above (I-II, Prolog.; I-II, 102, 1), wherefore the species of habits differ by their relation to different ends. Again the individual good, the good of the family, and the good of the city and kingdom are different ends. Wherefore there must needs be different species of prudence corresponding to these different ends, so that one is "prudence" simply so called, which is directed to one's own good; another, "domestic prudence" which is directed to the common good of the home; and a third, "political prudence," which is directed to the common good of the state or kingdom. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 11 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus non intendit dicere quod politica sit idem secundum substantiam habitus cuilibet prudentiae, sed prudentiae quae ordinatur ad bonum commune. Quae quidem prudentia dicitur secundum communem rationem prudentiae, prout scilicet est quaedam recta ratio agibilium, dicitur autem politica secundum ordinem ad bonum commune. | Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher means, not that political prudence is substantially the same habit as any kind of prudence, but that it is the same as the prudence which is directed to the common good. This is called "prudence" in respect of the common notion of prudence, i.e. as being right reason applied to action, while it is called "political," as being directed to the common good. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 11 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, ad bonum virum pertinet posse bene principari et bene subiici. Et ideo in virtute boni viri includitur etiam virtus principis. Sed virtus principis et subditi differt specie, sicut etiam virtus viri et mulieris, ut ibidem dicitur. | Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher declares (Polit. iii, 2), "it belongs to a good man to be able to rule well and to obey well," wherefore the virtue of a good man includes also that of a good ruler. Yet the virtue of the ruler and of the subject differs specifically, even as the virtue of a man and of a woman, as stated by the same authority (Polit. iii, 2). |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 11 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam diversi fines quorum unus ordinatur ad alium diversificant speciem habitus, sicut equestris et militaris et civilis differunt specie, licet finis unius ordinetur ad finem alterius. Et similiter, licet bonum unius ordinetur ad bonum multitudinis, tamen hoc non impedit quin talis diversitas faciat habitus differre specie. Sed ex hoc sequitur quod habitus qui ordinatur ad finem ultimum sit principalior, et imperet aliis habitibus. | Reply to Objection 3. Even different ends, one of which is subordinate to the other, diversify the species of a habit, thus for instance, habits directed to riding, soldiering, and civic life, differ specifically although their ends are subordinate to one another. On like manner, though the good of the individual is subordinate to the good of the many, that does not prevent this difference from making the habits differ specifically; but it follows that the habit which is directed to the last end is above the other habits and commands them. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 12 arg. 1 Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non sit in subditis, sed solum in principibus. Dicit enim philosophus, in III Polit., quod prudentia sola est propria virtus principis, aliae autem virtutes sunt communes subditorum et principum. Subditi autem non est virtus prudentia, sed opinio vera. | Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not in subjects but only in their rulers. For the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "prudence alone is the virtue proper to a ruler, while other virtues are common to subjects and rulers, and the prudence of the subject is not a virtue but a true opinion." |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 12 arg. 2 Praeterea, in I Polit. dicitur quod servus omnino non habet quid consiliativum. Sed prudentia facit bene consiliativos; ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo prudentia non competit servis, seu subditis. | Objection 2. Further, it is stated in Polit. i, 5 that "a slave is not competent to take counsel." But prudence makes a man take good counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence is not befitting slaves or subjects. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 12 arg. 3 Praeterea, prudentia est praeceptiva, ut supra dictum est. Sed praecipere non pertinet ad servos vel subditos, sed solum ad principes. Ergo prudentia non est in subditis, sed solum in principibus. | Objection 3. Further, prudence exercises command, as stated above (Article 8). But command is not in the competency of slaves or subjects but only of rulers. Therefore prudence is not in subjects but only in rulers. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 12 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod prudentiae politicae sunt duae species, una quae est legum positiva, quae pertinet ad principes; alia quae retinet commune nomen politicae, quae est circa singularia. Huiusmodi autem singularia peragere pertinet etiam ad subditos. Ergo prudentia non solum est principum, sed etiam subditorum. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are two kinds of political prudence, one of which is "legislative" and belongs to rulers, while the other "retains the common name political," and is about "individual actions." Now it belongs also to subjects to perform these individual actions. Therefore prudence is not only in rulers but also in subjects. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 12 co. Respondeo dicendum quod prudentia in ratione est. Regere autem et gubernare proprie rationis est. Et ideo unusquisque inquantum participat de regimine et gubernatione, intantum convenit sibi habere rationem et prudentiam. Manifestum est autem quod subditi inquantum est subditus, et servi inquantum est servus, non est regere et gubernare, sed magis regi et gubernari. Et ideo prudentia non est virtus servi inquantum est servus, nec subditi inquantum est subditus. Sed quia quilibet homo, inquantum est rationalis, participat aliquid de regimine secundum arbitrium rationis, intantum convenit ei prudentiam habere. Unde manifestum est quod prudentia quidem in principe est ad modum artis architectonicae, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., in subditis autem ad modum artis manu operantis. | I answer that, Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling and governing belong properly to the reason; and therefore it is proper to a man to reason and be prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling and governing. But it is evident that the subject as subject, and the slave as slave, are not competent to rule and govern, but rather to be ruled and governed. Therefore prudence is not the virtue of a slave as slave, nor of a subject as subject. Since, however, every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share in ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is proportionately competent to have prudence. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is in the ruler "after the manner of a mastercraft" (Ethic. vi, 8), but in the subjects, "after the manner of a handicraft." |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 12 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum philosophi est intelligendum per se loquendo, quia scilicet virtus prudentiae non est virtus subditi inquantum huiusmodi. | Reply to Objection 1. The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood strictly, namely, that prudence is not the virtue of a subject as such. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 12 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod servus non habet consiliativum inquantum est servus, sic enim est instrumentum domini. Est tamen consiliativus inquantum est animal rationale. | Reply to Objection 2. A slave is not capable of taking counsel, in so far as he is a slave (for thus he is the instrument of his master), but he does take counsel in so far as he is a rational animal. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 12 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod per prudentiam homo non solum praecipit aliis, sed etiam sibi ipsi, prout scilicet ratio dicitur praecipere inferioribus viribus. | Reply to Objection 3. By prudence a man commands not only others, but also himself, in so far as the reason is said to command the lower powers. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 13 arg. 1 Ad decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia possit esse in peccatoribus. Dicit enim dominus, Luc. XVI, filii huius saeculi prudentiores filiis lucis in generatione sua sunt. Sed filii huius saeculi sunt peccatores. Ergo in peccatoribus potest esse prudentia. | Objection 1. It would seem that there can be prudence in sinners. For our Lord said (Luke 16:8): "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation than the children of light." Now the children of this world are sinners. Therefore there be prudence in sinners. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 13 arg. 2 Praeterea, fides est nobilior virtus quam prudentia. Sed fides potest esse in peccatoribus. Ergo et prudentia. | Objection 2. Further, faith is a more excellent virtue than prudence. But there can be faith in sinners. Therefore there can be prudence also. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 13 arg. 3 Praeterea, prudentis hoc opus maxime dicimus, bene consiliari; ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed multi peccatores sunt boni consilii. Ergo multi peccatores habent prudentiam. | Objection 3. Further, according to Ethic. vi, 7, "we say that to be of good counsel is the work of prudent man especially." Now many sinners can take good counsel. Therefore sinners can have prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 13 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., impossibile prudentem esse non entem bonum. Sed nullus peccator est bonus. Ergo nullus peccator est prudens. | On the contrary, The Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 12) that "it is impossible for a man be prudent unless he be good." Now no inner is a good man. Therefore no sinner is prudent. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 13 co. Respondeo dicendum quod prudentia dicitur tripliciter. Est enim quaedam prudentia falsa, vel per similitudinem dicta. Cum enim prudens sit qui bene disponit ea quae sunt agenda propter aliquem bonum finem, ille qui propter malum finem aliqua disponit congruentia illi fini habet falsam prudentiam, inquantum illud quod accipit pro fine non est vere bonum, sed secundum similitudinem, sicut dicitur aliquis bonus latro. Hoc enim modo potest secundum similitudinem dici prudens latro qui convenientes vias adinvenit ad latrocinandum. Et huiusmodi est prudentia de qua apostolus dicit, ad Rom. VIII, prudentia carnis mors est, quae scilicet finem ultimum constituit in delectatione carnis. Secunda autem prudentia est quidem vera, quia adinvenit vias accommodatas ad finem vere bonum; sed est imperfecta, duplici ratione. Uno modo, quia illud bonum quod accipit pro fine non est communis finis totius humanae vitae, sed alicuius specialis negotii, puta cum aliquis adinvenit vias accommodatas ad negotiandum vel ad navigandum, dicitur prudens negotiator vel nauta. Alio modo, quia deficit in principali actu prudentiae, puta cum aliquis bene consiliatur et recte iudicat etiam de his quae pertinent ad totam vitam, sed non efficaciter praecipit. Tertia autem prudentia est et vera et perfecta, quae ad bonum finem totius vitae recte consiliatur, iudicat et praecipit. Et haec sola dicitur prudentia simpliciter. Quae in peccatoribus esse non potest. Prima autem prudentia est in solis peccatoribus. Prudentia autem imperfecta est communis bonis et malis, maxime illa quae est imperfecta propter finem particularem. Nam illa quae est imperfecta propter defectum principalis actus etiam non est nisi in malis. | I answer that, Prudence is threefold. There is a false prudence, which takes its name from its likeness to true prudence. For since a prudent man is one who disposes well of the things that have to be done for a good end, whoever disposes well of such things as are fitting for an evil end, has false prudence, in far as that which he takes for an end, is good, not in truth but in appearance. Thus man is called "a good robber," and in this way may speak of "a prudent robber," by way of similarity, because he devises fitting ways of committing robbery. This is the prudence of which the Apostle says (Romans 8:6): "The prudence [Douay: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is death," because, to wit, it places its ultimate end in the pleasures of the flesh. The second prudence is indeed true prudence, because it devises fitting ways of obtaining a good end; and yet it is imperfect, from a twofold source. First, because the good which it takes for an end, is not the common end of all human life, but of some particular affair; thus when a man devises fitting ways of conducting business or of sailing a ship, he is called a prudent businessman, or a prudent sailor; secondly, because he fails in the chief act of prudence, as when a man takes counsel aright, and forms a good judgment, even about things concerning life as a whole, but fails to make an effective command. The third prudence is both true and perfect, for it takes counsel, judges and commands aright in respect of the good end of man's whole life: and this alone is prudence simply so-called, and cannot be in sinners, whereas the first prudence is in sinners alone, while imperfect prudence is common to good and wicked men, especially that which is imperfect through being directed to a particular end, since that which is imperfect on account of a failing in the chief act, is only in the wicked. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 13 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud verbum domini intelligitur de prima prudentia. Unde non dicitur simpliciter quod sint prudentes; sed quod sint prudentes in generatione sua. | Reply to Objection 1. This saying of our Lord is to be understood of the first prudence, wherefore it is not said that they are prudent absolutely, but that they are prudent in "their generation." |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 13 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod fides in sui ratione non importat aliquam conformitatem ad appetitum rectorum operum, sed ratio fidei consistit in sola cognitione. Sed prudentia importat ordinem ad appetitum rectum. Tum quia principia prudentiae sunt fines operabilium, de quibus aliquis habet rectam aestimationem per habitus virtutum moralium, quae faciunt appetitum rectum, unde prudentia non potest esse sine virtutibus moralibus, ut supra ostensum est. Tum etiam quia prudentia est praeceptiva rectorum operum, quod non contingit nisi existente appetitu recto. Unde fides licet sit nobilior quam prudentia propter obiectum, tamen prudentia secundum sui rationem magis repugnat peccato, quod procedit ex perversitate appetitus. | Reply to Objection 2. The nature of faith consists not in conformity with the appetite for certain right actions, but in knowledge alone. On the other hand prudence implies a relation to a right appetite. First because its principles are the ends in matters of action; and of such ends one forms a right estimate through the habits of moral virtue, which rectify the appetite: wherefore without the moral virtues there is no prudence, as shown above (I-II, 58, 5); secondly because prudence commands right actions, which does not happen unless the appetite be right. Wherefore though faith on account of its object is more excellent than prudence, yet prudence, by its very nature, is more opposed to sin, which arises from a disorder of the appetite. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 13 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod peccatores possunt quidem esse bene consiliativi ad aliquem finem malum, vel ad aliquod particulare bonum, ad finem autem bonum totius vitae non sunt bene consiliativi perfecte, quia consilium ad effectum non perducunt. Unde non est in eis prudentia, quae se habet solum ad bonum, sed sicut philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., est in talibus deinotica idest naturalis industria, quae se habet ad bonum et ad malum; vel astutia, quae se habet solum ad malum, quam supra diximus falsam prudentiam vel prudentiam carnis. | Reply to Objection 3. Sinners can take good counsel for an evil end, or for some particular good, but they do not perfectly take good counsel for the end of their whole life, since they do not carry that counsel into effect. Hence they lack prudence which is directed to the good only; and yet in them, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12) there is "cleverness," [deinotike] i.e. natural diligence which may be directed to both good and evil; or "cunning," [panourgia] which is directed only to evil, and which we have stated above, to be "false prudence" or "prudence of the flesh." |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 14 arg. 1 Ad decimumquartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non sit in omnibus habentibus gratiam. Ad prudentiam enim requiritur industria quaedam, per quam sciant bene providere quae agenda sunt. Sed multi habentes gratiam carent tali industria. Ergo non omnes habentes gratiam habent prudentiam. | Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not in all who have grace. Prudence requires diligence, that one may foresee aright what has to be done. But many who have grace have not this diligence. Therefore not all who have grace have prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 14 arg. 2 Praeterea, prudens dicitur qui est bene consiliativus, ut dictum est. Sed multi habent gratiam qui non sunt bene consiliativi, sed necesse habent regi consilio alieno. Ergo non omnes habentes gratiam habent prudentiam. | Objection 2. Further, a prudent man is one who takes good counsel, as stated above (8, Objection 2; 13, Objection 3). Yet many have grace who do not take good counsel, and need to be guided by the counsel of others. Therefore not all who have grace, have prudence |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 14 arg. 3 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III Topic., quod iuvenes non constat esse prudentes. Sed multi iuvenes habent gratiam. Ergo prudentia non invenitur in omnibus gratiam habentibus. | Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "young people are not obviously prudent." Yet many young people have grace. Therefore prudence is not to be found in all who have grace. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 14 s. c. Sed contra est quod nullus habet gratiam nisi sit virtuosus. Sed nullus potest esse virtuosus nisi habeat prudentiam, dicit enim Gregorius, in II Moral., quod ceterae virtutes, nisi ea quae appetunt prudenter agant, virtutes esse nequaquam possunt. Ergo omnes habentes gratiam habent prudentiam. | On the contrary, No man has grace unless he be virtuous. Now no man can be virtuous without prudence, for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 46) that "the other virtues cannot be virtues at all unless they effect prudently what they desire to accomplish." Therefore all who have grace have prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 14 co. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est virtutes esse connexas, ita ut qui unam habet omnes habeat, ut supra ostensum est. Quicumque autem habet gratiam habet caritatem. Unde necesse est quod habeat omnes alias virtutes. Et ita, cum prudentia sit virtus, ut ostensum est, necesse est quod habeat prudentiam. | I answer that, The virtues must needs be connected together, so that whoever has one has all, as stated above (I-II, 65, 1). Now whoever has grace has charity, so that he must needs have all the other virtues, and hence, since prudence is a virtue, as shown above (Article 4), he must, of necessity, have prudence also. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 14 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duplex est industria. Una quidem quae est sufficiens ad ea quae sunt de necessitate salutis. Et talis industria datur omnibus habentibus gratiam, quos unctio docet de omnibus, ut dicitur I Ioan. II. Est autem alia industria plenior, per quam aliquis sibi et aliis potest providere, non solum de his quae sunt necessaria ad salutem sed etiam de quibuscumque pertinentibus ad humanam vitam. Et talis industria non est in omnibus habentibus gratiam. | Reply to Objection 1. Diligence is twofold: one is merely sufficient with regard to things necessary for salvation; and such diligence is given to all who have grace, whom "His unction teacheth of all things" (1 John 2:27). There is also another diligence which is more than sufficient, whereby a man is able to make provision both for himself and for others, not only in matters necessary for salvation, but also in all things relating to human life; and such diligence as this is not in all who have grace. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 14 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illi qui indigent regi consilio alieno saltem in hoc sibi ipsis consulere sciunt, si gratiam habent, ut aliorum requirant consilia, et discernant consilia bona a malis. | Reply to Objection 2. Those who require to be guided by the counsel of others, are able, if they have grace, to take counsel for themselves in this point at least, that they require the counsel of others and can discern good from evil counsel. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 14 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod prudentia acquisita causatur ex exercitio actuum, unde indiget ad sui generationem experimento et tempore, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Unde non potest esse in iuvenibus nec secundum habitum nec secundum actum. Sed prudentia gratuita causatur ex infusione divina. Unde in pueris baptizatis nondum habentibus usum rationis est prudentia secundum habitum, sed non secundum actum, sicut et in amentibus. In his autem qui iam habent usum rationis est etiam secundum actum quantum ad ea quae sunt de necessitate salutis, sed per exercitium meretur augmentum quousque perficiatur, sicut et ceterae virtutes. Unde et apostolus dicit, ad Heb. V, quod perfectorum est solidus cibus, qui pro consuetudine exercitatos habent sensus ad discretionem boni et mali. | Reply to Objection 3. Acquired prudence is caused by the exercise of acts, wherefore "its acquisition demands experience and time" (Ethic. ii, 1), hence it cannot be in the young, neither in habit nor in act. On the other hand gratuitous prudence is caused by divine infusion. Wherefore, in children who have been baptized but have not come to the use of reason, there is prudence as to habit but not as to act, even as in idiots; whereas in those who have come to the use of reason, it is also as to act, with regard to things necessary for salvation. This by practice merits increase, until it becomes perfect, even as the other virtues. Hence the Apostle says (Hebrews 5:14) that "strong meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil." |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 15 arg. 1 Ad decimumquintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia insit nobis a natura. Dicit enim philosophus, in VI Ethic., quod ea quae pertinent ad prudentiam naturalia videntur esse, scilicet synesis, gnome et huiusmodi, non autem ea quae pertinent ad sapientiam speculativam. Sed eorum quae sunt unius generis eadem est originis ratio. Ergo etiam prudentia inest nobis a natura. | Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is in us by nature. The Philosopher says that things connected with prudence "seem to be natural," namely "synesis, gnome" [synesis and gnome, Cf. I-II, 57, 6 and the like, but not those which are connected with speculative wisdom. Now things belonging to the same genus have the same kind of origin. Therefore prudence also is in us from nature. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 15 arg. 2 Praeterea, aetatum variatio est secundum naturam. Sed prudentia consequitur aetates, secundum illud Iob XII, in antiquis est sapientia, et in multo tempore prudentia. Ergo prudentia est naturalis. | Objection 2. Further, the changes of age are according to nature. Now prudence results from age, according to Job 12:12: "In the ancient is wisdom, and in length of days prudence." Therefore prudence is natural. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 15 arg. 3 Praeterea, prudentia magis convenit naturae humanae quam naturae brutorum animalium. Sed bruta animalia habent quasdam naturales prudentias; ut patet per philosophum, in VIII de historiis Animal. Ergo prudentia est naturalis. | Objection 3. Further, prudence is more consistent with human nature than with that of dumb animals. Now there are instances of a certain natural prudence in dumb animals, according to the Philosopher (De Hist. Anim. viii, 1). Therefore prudence is natural. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 15 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod virtus intellectualis plurimum ex doctrina habet et generationem et augmentum, ideo experimento indiget et tempore. Sed prudentia est virtus intellectualis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo prudentia non inest nobis a natura, sed ex doctrina et experimento. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue is both originated and fostered by teaching; it therefore demands experience and time." Now prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above (Article 4). Therefore prudence is in us, not by nature, but by teaching and experience. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 15 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex praemissis patet, prudentia includit cognitionem et universalium et singularium operabilium, ad quae prudens universalia principia applicat. Quantum igitur ad universalem cognitionem, eadem ratio est de prudentia et de scientia speculativa. Quia utriusque prima principia universalia sunt naturaliter nota, ut ex supradictis patet, nisi quod principia communia prudentiae sunt magis connaturalia homini; ut enim philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., vita quae est secundum speculationem est melior quam quae est secundum hominem. Sed alia principia universalia posteriora, sive sint rationis speculativae sive practicae, non habentur per naturam, sed per inventionem secundum viam experimenti, vel per disciplinam. Quantum autem ad particularem cognitionem eorum circa quae operatio consistit est iterum distinguendum. Quia operatio consistit circa aliquid vel sicut circa finem; vel sicut circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Fines autem recti humanae vitae sunt determinati. Et ideo potest esse naturalis inclinatio respectu horum finium, sicut supra dictum est quod quidam habent ex naturali dispositione quasdam virtutes quibus inclinantur ad rectos fines, et per consequens etiam habent naturaliter rectum iudicium de huiusmodi finibus. Sed ea quae sunt ad finem in rebus humanis non sunt determinata, sed multipliciter diversificantur secundum diversitatem personarum et negotiorum. Unde quia inclinatio naturae semper est ad aliquid determinatum, talis cognitio non potest homini inesse naturaliter, licet ex naturali dispositione unus sit aptior ad huiusmodi discernenda quam alius; sicut etiam accidit circa conclusiones speculativarum scientiarum. Quia igitur prudentia non est circa fines, sed circa ea quae sunt ad finem, ut supra habitum est; ideo prudentia non est naturalis. | I answer that, As shown above (Article 3), prudence includes knowledge both of universals, and of the singular matters of action to which prudence applies the universal principles. Accordingly, as regards the knowledge of universals, the same is to be said of prudence as of speculative science, because the primary universal principles of either are known naturally, as shown above (Article 6): except that the common principles of prudence are more connatural to man; for as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 7) "the life which is according to the speculative reason is better than that which is according to man": whereas the secondary universal principles, whether of the speculative or of the practical reason, are not inherited from nature, but are acquired by discovery through experience, or through teaching. On the other hand, as regards the knowledge of particulars which are the matter of action, we must make a further distinction, because this matter of action is either an end or the means to an end. Now the right ends of human life are fixed; wherefore there can be a natural inclination in respect of these ends; thus it has been stated above (I-II, 51, 1; I-II, 63, 1) that some, from a natural inclination, have certain virtues whereby they are inclined to right ends; and consequently they also have naturally a right judgment about such like ends. But the means to the end, in human concerns, far from being fixed, are of manifold variety according to the variety of persons and affairs. Wherefore since the inclination of nature is ever to something fixed, the knowledge of those means cannot be in man naturally, although, by reason of his natural disposition, one man has a greater aptitude than another in discerning them, just as it happens with regard to the conclusions of speculative sciences. Since then prudence is not about the ends, but about the means, as stated above (6; I-II, 57, 5), it follows that prudence is not from nature. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 15 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus ibi loquitur de pertinentibus ad prudentiam secundum quod ordinantur ad fines, unde supra praemiserat quod principia sunt eius quod est cuius gratia, idest finis. Et propter hoc non facit mentionem de eubulia, quae est consiliativa eorum quae sunt ad finem. | Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking there of things relating to prudence, in so far as they are directed to ends. Wherefore he had said before (Ethic. vi, 5,11) that "they are the principles of the ou heneka" [Literally, 'for the sake of which' (are the means)], namely, the end; and so he does not mention euboulia among them, because it takes counsel about the means. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 15 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod prudentia magis est in senibus non solum propter naturalem dispositionem, quietatis motibus passionum sensibilium, sed etiam propter experientiam longi temporis. | Reply to Objection 2. Prudence is rather in the old, not only because their natural disposition calms the movement of the sensitive passions, but also because of their long experience. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 15 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in brutis animalibus sunt determinatae viae perveniendi ad finem, unde videmus quod omnia animalia eiusdem speciei similiter operantur. Sed hoc non potest esse in homine, propter rationem eius, quae, cum sit cognoscitiva universalium, ad infinita singularia se extendit. | Reply to Objection 3. Even in dumb animals there are fixed ways of obtaining an end, wherefore we observe that all the animals of a same species act in like manner. But this is impossible in man, on account of his reason, which takes cognizance of universals, and consequently extends to an infinity of singulars. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 16 arg. 1 Ad decimumsextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia possit amitti per oblivionem. Scientia enim, cum sit necessariorum, est certior quam prudentia, quae est contingentium operabilium. Sed scientia amittitur per oblivionem. Ergo multo magis prudentia. | Objection 1. It would seem that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness. For since science is about necessary things, it is more certain than prudence which is about contingent matters of action. But science is lost by forgetfulness. Much more therefore is prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 16 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., virtus ex eisdem generatur et corrumpitur contrario modo factis. Sed ad generationem prudentiae necessarium est experimentum, quod fit ex multis memoriis, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Ergo, cum oblivio memoriae opponatur, videtur quod prudentia per oblivionem possit amitti. | Objection 2. Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) "the same things, but by a contrary process, engender and corrupt virtue." Now the engendering of prudence requires experience which is made up "of many memories," as he states at the beginning of his Metaphysics (i, 1). Therefore since forgetfulness is contrary to memory, it seems that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 16 arg. 3 Praeterea, prudentia non est sine cognitione universalium. Sed universalium cognitio potest per oblivionem amitti. Ergo et prudentia. | Objection 3. Further, there is no prudence without knowledge of universals. But knowledge of universals can be lost through forgetfulness. Therefore prudence can also. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 16 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod oblivio est artis, et non prudentiae. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "forgetfulness is possible to art but not to prudence." |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 16 co. Respondeo dicendum quod oblivio respicit cognitionem tantum. Et ideo per oblivionem potest aliquis artem totaliter perdere, et similiter scientiam, quae in ratione consistunt. Sed prudentia non consistit in sola cognitione, sed etiam in appetitu, quia ut dictum est, principalis eius actus est praecipere, quod est applicare cognitionem habitam ad appetendum et operandum. Et ideo prudentia non directe tollitur per oblivionem, sed magis corrumpitur per passiones, dicit enim philosophus, in VI Ethic., quod delectabile et triste pervertit existimationem prudentiae. Unde Dan. XIII dicitur, species decepit te, et concupiscentia subvertit cor tuum; et Exod. XXIII dicitur, ne accipias munera, quae excaecant etiam prudentes. Oblivio tamen potest impedire prudentiam, inquantum procedit ad praecipiendum ex aliqua cognitione, quae per oblivionem tolli potest. | I answer that, Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, wherefore one can forget art and science, so as to lose them altogether, because they belong to the reason. But prudence consists not in knowledge alone, but also in an act of the appetite, because as stated above (Article 8), its principal act is one of command, whereby a man applies the knowledge he has, to the purpose of appetition and operation. Hence prudence is not taken away directly by forgetfulness, but rather is corrupted by the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasure and sorrow pervert the estimate of prudence": wherefore it is written (Daniel 13:56): "Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath subverted thy heart," and (Exodus 23:8): "Neither shalt thou take bribes which blind even the prudent [Douay: 'wise']." Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the latter's command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 16 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod scientia est in sola ratione. Unde de ea est alia ratio, ut supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1. Science is in the reason only: hence the comparison fails, as stated above [Cf. I-II, 53, 1]. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 16 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod experimentum prudentiae non acquiritur ex sola memoria, sed ex exercitio recte praecipiendi. | Reply to Objection 2. The experience required by prudence results not from memory alone, but also from the practice of commanding aright. |
| IIª-IIae q. 47 a. 16 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod prudentia principaliter consistit non in cognitione universalium, sed in applicatione ad opera, ut dictum est. Et ideo oblivio universalis cognitionis non corrumpit id quod est principale in prudentia, sed aliquid impedimentum ei affert, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3. Prudence consists chiefly, not in the knowledge of universals, but in applying them to action, as stated above (Article 3). Wherefore forgetting the knowledge of universals does not destroy the principal part of prudence, but hinders it somewhat, as stated above. |
| IIª-IIae q. 48 pr. Deinde considerandum est de partibus prudentiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor, primo, quae sint partes prudentiae; secundo, de partibus quasi integralibus eius; tertio, de partibus subiectivis eius; quarto, de partibus potentialibus. | Question 48. The parts of prudence The three parts of prudence: integral, subjective, and potential |
| IIª-IIae q. 48 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter assignentur partes prudentiae. Tullius enim, in II Rhet., ponit tres partes prudentiae, scilicet memoriam, intelligentiam et providentiam. Macrobius autem, secundum sententiam Plotini, attribuit prudentiae sex, scilicet rationem, intellectum, circumspectionem, providentiam, docilitatem et cautionem. Aristoteles autem, in VI Ethic., dicit ad prudentiam pertinere eubuliam, synesim et gnomen. Facit etiam mentionem circa prudentiam de Eustochia et solertia, sensu et intellectu. Quidam autem alius philosophus Graecus dicit quod ad prudentiam decem pertinent, scilicet eubulia, solertia, providentia, regnativa, militaris, politica, oeconomica, dialectica, rhetorica, physica. Ergo videtur quod vel una assignatio sit superflua, vel alia diminuta. | Objection 1. It would seem that the parts of prudence are assigned unfittingly. Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) assigns three parts of prudence, namely, "memory," "understanding" and "foresight." Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) following the opinion of Plotinus ascribes to prudence six parts, namely, "reasoning," "understanding," "circumspection," "foresight," "docility" and "caution." Aristotle says (Ethic. vi, 9,10,11) that "good counsel," "synesis" and "gnome" belong to prudence. Again under the head of prudence he mentions "conjecture," "shrewdness," "sense" and "understanding." And another Greek philosopher [Andronicus; Cf. 80, Objection 4] says that ten things are connected with prudence, namely, "good counsel," "shrewdness," "foresight," "regnative [Regnativa]," "military," "political" and "domestic prudence," "dialectics," "rhetoric" and "physics." Therefore it seems that one or the other enumeration is either excessive or deficient. |
| IIª-IIae q. 48 arg. 2 Praeterea, prudentia dividitur contra scientiam. Sed politica, oeconomica, dialectica, rhetorica, physica sunt quaedam scientiae. Non ergo sunt partes prudentiae. | Objection 2. Further, prudence is specifically distinct from science. But politics, economics, logic, rhetoric, physics are sciences. Therefore they are not parts of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 48 arg. 3 Praeterea, partes non excedunt totum. Sed memoria intellectiva, vel intelligentia, ratio, sensus et docilitas non solum pertinent ad prudentiam, sed etiam ad omnes habitus cognoscitivos. Ergo non debent poni partes prudentiae. | Objection 3. Further, the parts do not exceed the whole. Now the intellective memory or intelligence, reason, sense and docility, belong not only to prudence but also to all the cognitive habits. Therefore they should not be set down as parts of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 48 arg. 4 Praeterea, sicut consiliari et iudicare et praecipere sunt actus rationis practicae, ita etiam et uti, sicut supra habitum est. Sicut ergo eubulia adiungitur prudentiae, quae pertinet ad consilium, et synesis et gnome, quae pertinent ad iudicium; ita etiam debuit poni aliquid pertinens ad usum. | Objection 4. Further, just as counselling, judging and commanding are acts of the practical reason, so also is using, as stated above (I-II, 16, 1). Therefore, just as "eubulia" which refers to counsel, is connected with prudence, and "synesis" and "gnome" which refer to judgment, so also ought something to have been assigned corresponding to use. |
| IIª-IIae q. 48 arg. 5 Praeterea, sollicitudo ad prudentiam pertinet, sicut supra habitum est. Ergo etiam inter partes prudentiae sollicitudo poni debuit. | Objection 5. Further, solicitude pertains to prudence, as stated above (Question 47, Article 09). Therefore solicitude also should have been mentioned among the parts of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 48 co. Respondeo dicendum quod triplex est pars, scilicet integralis, ut paries, tectum et fundamentum sunt partes domus; subiectiva, sicut bos et leo sunt partes animalis; et potentialis, sicut nutritivum et sensitivum sunt partes animae. Tribus ergo modis possunt assignari partes alicui virtuti. Uno modo, ad similitudinem partium integralium, ut scilicet illa dicantur esse partes virtutis alicuius quae necesse est concurrere ad perfectum actum virtutis illius. Et sic ex omnibus enumeratis possunt accipi octo partes prudentiae, scilicet sex quas enumerat Macrobius; quibus addenda est septima, scilicet memoria, quam ponit Tullius; et Eustochia sive solertia, quam ponit Aristoteles (nam sensus prudentiae etiam intellectus dicitur, unde philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., horum igitur oportet habere sensum, hic autem est intellectus). Quorum octo quinque pertinent ad prudentiam secundum id quod est cognoscitiva, scilicet memoria, ratio, intellectus, docilitas et solertia, tria vero alia pertinent ad eam secundum quod est praeceptiva, applicando cognitionem ad opus, scilicet providentia, circumspectio et cautio. Quorum diversitatis ratio patet ex hoc quod circa cognitionem tria sunt consideranda. Primo quidem, ipsa cognitio. Quae si sit praeteritorum, est memoria, si autem praesentium, sive contingentium sive necessariorum, vocatur intellectus sive intelligentia. Secundo, ipsa cognitionis acquisitio. Quae fit vel per disciplinam, et ad hoc pertinet docilitas, vel per inventionem, et ad hoc pertinet Eustochia, quae est bona coniecturatio. Huius autem pars, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., est solertia, quae est velox coniecturatio medii, ut dicitur in I Poster. Tertio considerandus est usus cognitionis, secundum scilicet quod ex cognitis aliquis procedit ad alia cognoscenda vel iudicanda. Et hoc pertinet ad rationem. Ratio autem, ad hoc quod recte praecipiat, tria debet habere. Primo quidem, ut ordinet aliquid accommodum ad finem, et hoc pertinet ad providentiam. Secundo, ut attendat circumstantias negotii, quod pertinet ad circumspectionem. Tertio, ut vitet impedimenta, quod pertinet ad cautionem. Partes autem subiectivae virtutis dicuntur species eius diversae. Et hoc modo partes prudentiae, secundum quod proprie sumuntur, sunt prudentia per quam aliquis regit seipsum, et prudentia per quam aliquis regit multitudinem, quae differunt specie, ut dictum est, et iterum prudentia quae est multitudinis regitiva dividitur in diversas species secundum diversas species multitudinis. Est autem quaedam multitudo adunata ad aliquod speciale negotium, sicut exercitus congregatur ad pugnandum, cuius regitiva est prudentia militaris. Quaedam vero multitudo est adunata ad totam vitam, sicut multitudo unius domus vel familiae, cuius regitiva est prudentia oeconomica; et multitudo unius civitatis vel regni, cuius quidem directiva est in principe regnativa, in subditis autem politica simpliciter dicta. Si vero prudentia sumatur large, secundum quod includit etiam scientiam speculativam, ut supra dictum est; tunc etiam partes eius ponuntur dialectica, rhetorica et physica, secundum tres modos procedendi in scientiis. Quorum unus est per demonstrationem ad scientiam causandam, quod pertinet ad physicam; ut sub physica intelligantur omnes scientiae demonstrativae. Alius modus est ex probabilibus ad opinionem faciendam, quod pertinet ad dialecticam. Tertius modus est ex quibusdam coniecturis ad suspicionem inducendam, vel ad aliqualiter persuadendum, quod pertinet ad rhetoricam. Potest tamen dici quod haec tria pertinent ad prudentiam etiam proprie dictam, quae ratiocinatur interdum quidem ex necessariis, interdum ex probabilibus, interdum autem ex quibusdam coniecturis. Partes autem potentiales alicuius virtutis dicuntur virtutes adiunctae quae ordinantur ad aliquos secundarios actus vel materias, quasi non habentes totam potentiam principalis virtutis. Et secundum hoc ponuntur partes prudentiae eubulia, quae est circa consilium; et synesis, quae est circa iudicium eorum quae communiter accidunt; et gnome, quae est circa iudicium eorum in quibus oportet quandoque a communi lege recedere. Prudentia vero est circa principalem actum, qui est praecipere. | I answer that, Parts are of three kinds, namely, "integral," as wall, roof, and foundations are parts of a house; "subjective," as ox and lion are parts of animal; and "potential," as the nutritive and sensitive powers are parts of the soul. Accordingly, parts can be assigned to a virtue in three ways. First, in likeness to integral parts, so that the things which need to concur for the perfect act of a virtue, are called the parts of that virtue. On this way, out of all the things mentioned above, eight may be taken as parts of prudence, namely, the six assigned by Macrobius; with the addition of a seventh, viz. "memory" mentioned by Tully; and eustochia or "shrewdness" mentioned by Aristotle. For the "sense" of prudence is also called "understanding": wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): "Of such things one needs to have the sense, and this is understanding." Of these eight, five belong to prudence as a cognitive virtue, namely, "memory," "reasoning," "understanding," "docility" and "shrewdness": while the three others belong thereto, as commanding and applying knowledge to action, namely, "foresight," "circumspection" and "caution." The reason of their difference is seen from the fact that three things may be observed in reference to knowledge. On the first place, knowledge itself, which, if it be of the past, is called "memory," if of the present, whether contingent or necessary, is called "understanding" or "intelligence." Secondly, the acquiring of knowledge, which is caused either by teaching, to which pertains "docility," or by "discovery," and to this belongs to eustochia, i.e. "a happy conjecture," of which "shrewdness" is a part, which is a "quick conjecture of the middle term," as stated in Poster. i, 9. Thirdly, the use of knowledge, in as much as we proceed from things known to knowledge or judgment of other things, and this belongs to "reasoning." And the reason, in order to command aright, requires to have three conditions. First, to order that which is befitting the end, and this belongs to "foresight"; secondly, to attend to the circumstances of the matter in hand, and this belongs to "circumspection"; thirdly, to avoid obstacles, and this belongs to "caution." The subjective parts of a virtue are its various species. On this way the parts of prudence, if we take them properly, are the prudence whereby a man rules himself, and the prudence whereby a man governs a multitude, which differ specifically as stated above (Question 47, Article 11). Again, the prudence whereby a multitude is governed, is divided into various species according to the various kinds of multitude. There is the multitude which is united together for some particular purpose; thus an army is gathered together to fight, and the prudence that governs this is called "military." There is also the multitude that is united together for the whole of life; such is the multitude of a home or family, and this is ruled by "domestic prudence": and such again is the multitude of a city or kingdom, the ruling principle of which is "regnative prudence" in the ruler, and "political prudence," simply so called, in the subjects. If, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as including also speculative knowledge, as stated above (47, 2, ad 2) then its parts include "dialectics," "rhetoric" and "physics," according to three methods of prudence in the sciences. The first of these is the attaining of science by demonstration, which belongs to "physics" (if physics be understood to comprise all demonstrative sciences). The second method is to arrive at an opinion through probable premises, and this belongs to "dialectics." The third method is to employ conjectures in order to induce a certain suspicion, or to persuade somewhat, and this belongs to "rhetoric." It may be said, however, that these three belong also to prudence properly so called, since it argues sometimes from necessary premises, sometimes from probabilities, and sometimes from conjectures. The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it, which are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having, as it were, the whole power of the principal virtue. On this way the parts of prudence are "good counsel," which concerns counsel, "synesis," which concerns judgment in matters of ordinary occurrence, and "gnome," which concerns judgment in matters of exception to the law: while "prudence" is about the chief act, viz. that of commanding. |
| IIª-IIae q. 48 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod diversae assignationes differunt secundum quod diversa genera partium ponuntur; vel secundum quod sub una parte unius assignationis includuntur multae partes alterius assignationis. Sicut Tullius sub providentia includit cautionem et circumspectionem; sub intelligentia autem rationem, docilitatem et solertiam. | Reply to Objection 1. The various enumerations differ, either because different kinds of parts are assigned, or because that which is mentioned in one enumeration includes several mentioned in another enumeration. Thus Tully includes "caution" and "circumspection" under "foresight," and "reasoning," "docility" and "shrewdness" under "understanding." |
| IIª-IIae q. 48 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod oeconomica et politica non accipiuntur hic secundum quod sunt scientiae; sed secundum quod sunt prudentiae quaedam. De aliis autem tribus patet responsio ex dictis. | Reply to Objection 2. Here domestic and civic prudence are not to be taken as sciences, but as kinds of prudence. As to the other three, the reply may be gathered from what has been said. |
| IIª-IIae q. 48 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia illa ponuntur partes prudentiae non secundum suam communitatem; sed secundum quod se habent ad ea quae pertinent ad prudentiam. | Reply to Objection 3. All these things are reckoned parts of prudence, not by taking them altogether, but in so far as they are connected with things pertaining to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 48 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod recte praecipere et recte uti semper se comitantur, quia ad praeceptum rationis sequitur obedientia inferiorum virium, quae pertinent ad usum. | Reply to Objection 4. Right command and right use always go together, because the reason's command is followed by obedience on the part of the lower powers, which pertain to use. |
| IIª-IIae q. 48 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod sollicitudo includitur in ratione providentiae. | Reply to Objection 5. Solicitude is included under foresight. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 pr. Deinde considerandum est de singulis prudentiae partibus quasi integralibus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, de memoria. Secundo, de intellectu vel intelligentia. Tertio, de docilitate. Quarto, de solertia. Quinto, de ratione. Sexto, de providentia. Septimo, de circumspectione. Octavo, de cautione. | Question 49. Each quasi-integral part of prudence Memory Understanding or Intelligence Docility Shrewdness Reason foresight Circumspection Caution |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod memoria non sit pars prudentiae. Memoria enim, ut probat philosophus, est in parte animae sensitiva. Prudentia autem est in ratiocinativa; ut patet in VI Ethic. Ergo memoria non est pars prudentiae. | Objection 1. It would seem that memory is not a part of prudence. For memory, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. i), is in the sensitive part of the soul: whereas prudence is in the rational part (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore memory is not a part of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, prudentia per exercitium acquiritur et proficit. Sed memoria inest nobis a natura. Ergo memoria non est pars prudentiae. | Objection 2. Further, prudence is acquired and perfected by experience, whereas memory is in us from nature. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, memoria est praeteritorum. Prudentia autem futurorum operabilium, de quibus est consilium, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo memoria non est pars prudentiae. | Objection 3. Further, memory regards the past, whereas prudence regards future matters of action, about which counsel is concerned, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2,7. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Tullius, in II Rhet., ponit memoriam inter partes prudentiae. | On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) places memory among the parts of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod prudentia est circa contingentia operabilia, sicut dictum est. In his autem non potest homo dirigi per ea quae sunt simpliciter et ex necessitate vera, sed ex his quae ut in pluribus accidunt, oportet enim principia conclusionibus esse proportionata, et ex talibus talia concludere, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Quid autem in pluribus sit verum oportet per experimentum considerare, unde et in II Ethic. philosophus dicit quod virtus intellectualis habet generationem et augmentum ex experimento et tempore. Experimentum autem est ex pluribus memoriis; ut patet in I Metaphys. Unde consequens est quod ad prudentiam requiritur plurium memoriam habere. Unde convenienter memoria ponitur pars prudentiae. | I answer that, Prudence regards contingent matters of action, as stated above (Question 47, Article 5). Now in such like matters a man can be directed, not by those things that are simply and necessarily true, but by those which occur in the majority of cases: because principles must be proportionate to their conclusions, and "like must be concluded from like" (Ethic. vi [Anal. Post. i. 32). But we need experience to discover what is true in the majority of cases: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue is engendered and fostered by experience and time." Now experience is the result of many memories as stated in Metaph. i, 1, and therefore prudence requires the memory of many things. Hence memory is fittingly accounted a part of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quia, sicut dictum est, prudentia applicat universalem cognitionem ad particularia, quorum est sensus, inde multa quae pertinent ad partem sensitivam requiruntur ad prudentiam. Inter quae est memoria. | Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (47, 3,6), prudence applies universal knowledge to particulars which are objects of sense: hence many things belonging to the sensitive faculties are requisite for prudence, and memory is one of them. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut prudentia aptitudinem quidem habet ex natura, sed eius complementum est ex exercitio vel gratia ita etiam, ut Tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, memoria non solum a natura proficiscitur, sed etiam habet plurimum artis et industriae. Et sunt quatuor per quae homo proficit in bene memorando. Quorum primum est ut eorum quae vult memorari quasdam similitudines assumat convenientes, nec tamen omnino consuetas, quia ea quae sunt inconsueta magis miramur, et sic in eis animus magis et vehementius detinetur; ex quo fit quod eorum quae in pueritia vidimus magis memoremur. Ideo autem necessaria est huiusmodi similitudinum vel imaginum adinventio, quia intentiones simplices et spirituales facilius ex anima elabuntur nisi quibusdam similitudinibus corporalibus quasi alligentur, quia humana cognitio potentior est circa sensibilia. Unde et memorativa ponitur in parte sensitiva. Secundo, oportet ut homo ea quae memoriter vult tenere sua consideratione ordinate disponat, ut ex uno memorato facile ad aliud procedatur. Unde philosophus dicit, in libro de Mem., a locis videntur reminisci aliquando, causa autem est quia velociter ab alio in aliud veniunt. Tertio, oportet ut homo sollicitudinem apponat et affectum adhibeat ad ea quae vult memorari, quia quo aliquid magis fuerit impressum animo, eo minus elabitur. Unde et Tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod sollicitudo conservat integras simulacrorum figuras. Quarto, oportet quod ea frequenter meditemur quae volumus memorari. Unde philosophus dicit, in libro de Mem., quod meditationes memoriam salvant, quia, ut in eodem libro dicitur, consuetudo est quasi natura; unde quae multoties intelligimus cito reminiscimur, quasi naturali quodam ordine ab uno ad aliud procedentes. | Reply to Objection 2. Just as aptitude for prudence is in our nature, while its perfection comes through practice or grace, so too, as Tully says in his Rhetoric [Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii, 16,24, memory not only arises from nature, but is also aided by art and diligence. There are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when a man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable yet somewhat unwonted illustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us more, and so makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; the mind; and this explains why we remember better what we saw when we were children. Now the reason for the necessity of finding these illustrations or images, is that simple and spiritual impressions easily slip from the mind, unless they be tied as it were to some corporeal image, because human knowledge has a greater hold on sensible objects. For this reason memory is assigned to the sensitive part of the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes to retain in his memory he must carefully consider and set in order, so that he may pass easily from one memory to another. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii): "Sometimes a place brings memories back to us: the reason being that we pass quickly from the one to the other." Thirdly, we must be anxious and earnest about the things we wish to remember, because the more a thing is impressed on the mind, the less it is liable to slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric [Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii.] that "anxiety preserves the figures of images entire." Fourthly, we should often reflect on the things we wish to remember. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i) that "reflection preserves memories," because as he remarks (De Memoria ii) "custom is a second nature": wherefore when we reflect on a thing frequently, we quickly call it to mind, through passing from one thing to another by a kind of natural order. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ex praeteritis oportet nos quasi argumentum sumere de futuris. Et ideo memoria praeteritorum necessaria est ad bene consiliandum de futuris. | Reply to Objection 3. It behooves us to argue, as it were, about the future from the past; wherefore memory of the past is necessary in order to take good counsel for the future. Understanding: Otherwise intuition; Aristotle's word is nous |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit pars prudentiae. Eorum enim quae ex opposito dividuntur unum non est pars alterius. Sed intellectus ponitur virtus intellectualis condivisa prudentiae, ut patet in VI Ethic. Ergo intellectus non debet poni pars prudentiae. | Objection 1. It would seem that understanding is not a part of prudence. When two things are members of a division, one is not part of the other. But intellectual virtue is divided into understanding and prudence, according to Ethic. vi, 3. Therefore understanding should not be reckoned a part of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, intellectus ponitur inter dona spiritus sancti, et correspondet fidei, ut supra habitum est. Sed prudentia est alia virtus a fide, ut per supradicta patet. Ergo intellectus non pertinet ad prudentiam. | Objection 2. Further, understanding is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and corresponds to faith, as stated above (8, 1 and 8). But prudence is a virtue other than faith, as is clear from what has been said above (4, 8; I-II, 62, 2). Therefore understanding does not pertain to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, prudentia est singularium operabilium, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed intellectus est universalium cognoscitivus et immaterialium; ut patet in III de anima. Ergo intellectus non est pars prudentiae. | Objection 3. Further, prudence is about singular matters of action (Ethic. vi, 7): whereas understanding takes cognizance of universal and immaterial objects (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore understanding is not a part of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Tullius ponit intelligentiam partem prudentiae, et Macrobius intellectum, quod in idem redit. | On the contrary, Tully [De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53 accounts "intelligence" a part of prudence, and Macrobius [In Somn. Scip. i, 8 mentions "understanding," which comes to the same. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus non sumitur hic pro potentia intellectiva, sed prout importat quandam rectam aestimationem alicuius extremi principii quod accipitur ut per se notum, sicut et prima demonstrationum principia intelligere dicimur. Omnis autem deductio rationis ab aliquibus procedit quae accipiuntur ut prima. Unde oportet quod omnis processus rationis ab aliquo intellectu procedat. Quia igitur prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, ideo necesse est quod totus processus prudentiae ab intellectu derivetur. Et propter hoc intellectus ponitur pars prudentiae. | I answer that, Understanding denotes here, not the intellectual power, but the right estimate about some final principle, which is taken as self-evident: thus we are said to understand the first principles of demonstrations. Now every deduction of reason proceeds from certain statements which are taken as primary: wherefore every process of reasoning must needs proceed from some understanding. Therefore since prudence is right reason applied to action, the whole process of prudence must needs have its source in understanding. Hence it is that understanding is reckoned a part of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio prudentiae terminatur, sicut ad conclusionem quandam, ad particulare operabile, ad quod applicat universalem cognitionem, ut ex dictis patet. Conclusio autem singularis syllogizatur ex universali et singulari propositione. Unde oportet quod ratio prudentiae ex duplici intellectu procedat. Quorum unus est qui est cognoscitivus universalium. Quod pertinet ad intellectum qui ponitur virtus intellectualis, quia naturaliter nobis cognita sunt non solum universalia principia speculativa, sed etiam practica, sicut nulli esse malefaciendum, ut ex dictis patet. Alius autem intellectus est qui, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., est cognoscitivus extremi, idest alicuius primi singularis et contingentis operabilis, propositionis scilicet minoris, quam oportet esse singularem in syllogismo prudentiae, ut dictum est. Hoc autem primum singulare est aliquis singularis finis, ut ibidem dicitur. Unde intellectus qui ponitur pars prudentiae est quaedam recta aestimatio de aliquo particulari fine. | Reply to Objection 1. The reasoning of prudence terminates, as in a conclusion, in the particular matter of action, to which, as stated above (47, A3,6), it applies the knowledge of some universal principle. Now a singular conclusion is argued from a universal and a singular proposition. Wherefore the reasoning of prudence must proceed from a twofold understanding. The one is cognizant of universals, and this belongs to the understanding which is an intellectual virtue, whereby we know naturally not only speculative principles, but also practical universal principles, such as "One should do evil to no man," as shown above (Question 47, Article 6). The other understanding, as stated in Ethic. vi, 11, is cognizant of an extreme, i.e. of some primary singular and contingent practical matter, viz. the minor premiss, which must needs be singular in the syllogism of prudence, as stated above (47, 3,6). Now this primary singular is some singular end, as stated in the same place. Wherefore the understanding which is a part of prudence is a right estimate of some particular end. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus qui ponitur donum spiritus sancti est quaedam acuta perspectio divinorum, ut ex supradictis patet. Aliter autem ponitur intellectus pars prudentiae, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2. The understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is a quick insight into divine things, as shown above (8, 1 and 2). It is in another sense that it is accounted a part of prudence, as stated above. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsa recta aestimatio de fine particulari et intellectus dicitur, inquantum est alicuius principii; et sensus, inquantum est particularis. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., horum, scilicet singularium, oportet habere sensum, hic autem est intellectus. Non autem hoc est intelligendum de sensu particulari quo cognoscimus propria sensibilia, sed de sensu interiori quo de particulari iudicamus. | Reply to Objection 3. The right estimate about a particular end is called both "understanding," in so far as its object is a principle, and "sense," in so far as its object is a particular. This is what the Philosopher means when he says (Ethic. v, 11): "Of such things we need to have the sense, and this is understanding." But this is to be understood as referring, not to the particular sense whereby we know proper sensibles, but to the interior sense, whereby we judge of a particular. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod docilitas non debeat poni pars prudentiae. Illud enim quod requiritur ad omnem virtutem intellectualem non debet appropriari alicui earum. Sed docilitas necessaria est ad quamlibet virtutem intellectualem. Ergo non debet poni pars prudentiae. | Objection 1. It would seem that docility should not be accounted a part of prudence. For that which is a necessary condition of every intellectual virtue, should not be appropriated to one of them. But docility is requisite for every intellectual virtue. Therefore it should not be accounted a part of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, ea quae ad virtutes humanas pertinent sunt in nobis, quia secundum ea quae in nobis sunt laudamur vel vituperamur. Sed non est in potestate nostra quod dociles simus, sed hoc ex naturali dispositione quibusdam contingit. Ergo non est pars prudentiae. | Objection 2. Further, that which pertains to a human virtue is in our power, since it is for things that are in our power that we are praised or blamed. Now it is not in our power to be docile, for this is befitting to some through their natural disposition. Therefore it is not a part of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, docilitas ad discipulum pertinet. Sed prudentia, cum sit praeceptiva, magis videtur ad magistros pertinere, qui etiam praeceptores dicuntur. Ergo docilitas non est pars prudentiae. | Objection 3. Further, docility is in the disciple: whereas prudence, since it makes precepts, seems rather to belong to teachers, who are also called "preceptors." Therefore docility is not a part of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Macrobius, secundum sententiam Plotini, ponit docilitatem inter partes prudentiae. | On the contrary, Macrobius [In Somn. Scip. i, 8 following the opinion of Plotinus places docility among the parts of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, prudentia consistit circa particularia operabilia. In quibus cum sint quasi infinitae diversitates, non possunt ab uno homine sufficienter omnia considerari, nec per modicum tempus, sed per temporis diuturnitatem. Unde in his quae ad prudentiam pertinent maxime indiget homo ab alio erudiri, et praecipue ex senibus, qui sanum intellectum adepti sunt circa fines operabilium. Unde philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., oportet attendere expertorum et seniorum et prudentium indemonstrabilibus enuntiationibus et opinionibus non minus quam demonstrationibus, propter experientiam enim vident principia. Unde et Prov. III dicitur, ne innitaris prudentiae tuae; et Eccli. VI dicitur, in multitudine presbyterorum, idest seniorum, prudentium sta, et sapientiae illorum ex corde coniungere. Hoc autem pertinet ad docilitatem, ut aliquis sit bene disciplinae susceptivus. Et ideo convenienter ponitur docilitas pars prudentiae. | I answer that, As stated above (2, ad 1; 47, 3) prudence is concerned with particular matters of action, and since such matters are of infinite variety, no one man can consider them all sufficiently; nor can this be done quickly, for it requires length of time. Hence in matters of prudence man stands in very great need of being taught by others, especially by old folk who have acquired a sane understanding of the ends in practical matters. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): "It is right to pay no less attention to the undemonstrated assertions and opinions of such persons as are experienced, older than we are, and prudent, than to their demonstrations, for their experience gives them an insight into principles." Thus it is written (Proverbs 3:5): "Lean not on thy own prudence," and (Sirach 6:35): "Stand in the multitude of the ancients" (i.e. the old men), "that are wise, and join thyself from thy heart to their wisdom." Now it is a mark of docility to be ready to be taught: and consequently docility is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etsi docilitas utilis sit ad quamlibet virtutem intellectualem, praecipue tamen ad prudentiam, ratione iam dicta. | Reply to Objection 1. Although docility is useful for every intellectual virtue, yet it belongs to prudence chiefly, for the reason given above. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod docilitas, sicut et alia quae ad prudentiam pertinent, secundum aptitudinem quidem est a natura, sed ad eius consummationem plurimum valet humanum studium, dum scilicet homo sollicite, frequenter et reverenter applicat animum suum documentis maiorum, non negligens ea propter ignaviam, nec contemnens propter superbiam. | Reply to Objection 2. Man has a natural aptitude for docility even as for other things connected with prudence. Yet his own efforts count for much towards the attainment of perfect docility: and he must carefully, frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings of the learned, neither neglecting them through laziness, nor despising them through pride. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod per prudentiam aliquis praecipit non solum aliis, sed etiam sibi ipsi, ut dictum est. Unde etiam in subditis locum habet, ut supra dictum est, ad quorum prudentiam pertinet docilitas. Quamvis etiam ipsos maiores oporteat dociles quantum ad aliqua esse, quia nullus in his quae subsunt prudentiae sibi quantum ad omnia sufficit, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3. By prudence man makes precepts not only for others, but also for himself, as stated above (47, 12, ad 3). Hence as stated (Ethic. vi, 11), even in subjects, there is place for prudence; to which docility pertains. And yet even the learned should be docile in some respects, since no man is altogether self-sufficient in matters of prudence, as stated above. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod solertia non sit pars prudentiae. Solertia enim se habet ad facile invenienda media in demonstrationibus; ut patet in I Poster. Sed ratio prudentiae non est demonstrativa, cum sit contingentium. Ergo ad prudentiam non pertinet solertia. | Objection 1. It would seem that shrewdness is not a part of prudence. For shrewdness consists in easily finding the middle term for demonstrations, as stated in Poster. i, 34. Now the reasoning of prudence is not a demonstration since it deals with contingencies. Therefore shrewdness does not pertain to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad prudentiam pertinet bene consiliari, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed in bene consiliando non habet locum solertia, quae est Eustochia quaedam, idest bona coniecturatio, quae est sine ratione et velox; oportet autem consiliari tarde; ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo solertia non debet poni pars prudentiae. | Objection 2. Further, good counsel pertains to prudence according to Ethic. vi, 5,7,9. Now there is no place in good counsel for shrewdness [Ethic. vi, 9; Poster. i, 34 which is a kind of eustochia, i.e. "a happy conjecture": for the latter is "unreasoning and rapid," whereas counsel needs to be slow, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9. Therefore shrewdness should not be accounted a part of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, solertia, ut dictum est, est quaedam bona coniecturatio. Sed coniecturis uti est proprie rhetorum. Ergo solertia magis pertinet ad rhetoricam quam ad prudentiam. | Objection 3. Further, shrewdness as stated above (Article 48) is a "happy conjecture." Now it belongs to rhetoricians to make use of conjectures. Therefore shrewdness belongs to rhetoric rather than to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., sollicitus dicitur quasi solers et citus. Sed sollicitudo ad prudentiam pertinet, ut supra dictum est. Ergo et solertia. | On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): "A solicitous man is one who is shrewd and alert [solers citus]." But solicitude belongs to prudence, as stated above (Question 47, Article 09). Therefore shrewdness does also. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod prudentis est rectam aestimationem habere de operandis. Recta autem aestimatio sive opinio acquiritur in operativis, sicut in speculativis, dupliciter, uno quidem modo, per se inveniendo; alio modo, ab alio addiscendo. Sicut autem docilitas ad hoc pertinet ut homo bene se habeat in acquirendo rectam opinionem ab alio; ita solertia ad hoc pertinet ut homo bene se habeat in acquirendo rectam existimationem per seipsum. Ita tamen ut solertia accipiatur pro Eustochia, cuius est pars. Nam Eustochia est bene coniecturativa de quibuscumque, solertia autem est facilis et prompta coniecturatio circa inventionem medii, ut dicitur in I Poster. Tamen ille philosophus qui ponit solertiam partem prudentiae, accipit eam communiter pro omni Eustochia, unde dicit quod solertia est habitus qui provenit ex repentino, inveniens quod convenit. | I answer that, Prudence consists in a right estimate about matters of action. Now a right estimate or opinion is acquired in two ways, both in practical and in speculative matters, first by discovering it oneself, secondly by learning it from others. Now just as docility consists in a man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from another man, so shrewdness is an apt disposition to acquire a right estimate by oneself, yet so that shrewdness be taken for eustochia, of which it is a part. For eustochia is a happy conjecture about any matter, while shrewdness is "an easy and rapid conjecture in finding the middle term" (Poster. i, 34). Nevertheless the philosopher [Andronicus; Cf. 48, Objection 1] who calls shrewdness a part of prudence, takes it for eustochia, in general, hence he says: "Shrewdness is a habit whereby congruities are discovered rapidly." |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod solertia non solum se habet circa inventionem medii in demonstrativis, sed etiam in operativis, puta cum aliquis videns aliquos amicos factos coniecturat eos esse inimicos eiusdem, ut ibidem philosophus dicit. Et hoc modo solertia pertinet ad prudentiam. | Reply to Objection 1. Shrewdness is concerned with the discovery of the middle term not only in demonstrative, but also in practical syllogisms, as, for instance, when two men are seen to be friends they are reckoned to be enemies of a third one, as the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 34). On this way shrewdness belongs to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod philosophus veram rationem inducit in VI Ethic. ad ostendendum quod eubulia, quae est bene consiliativa, non est Eustochia, cuius laus est in veloci consideratione eius quod oportet, potest autem esse aliquis bene consiliativus etiam si diutius consilietur vel tardius. Nec tamen propter hoc excluditur quin bona coniecturatio ad bene consiliandum valeat. Et quandoque necessaria est, quando scilicet ex improviso occurrit aliquid agendum. Et ideo solertia convenienter ponitur pars prudentiae. | Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher adduces the true reason (Ethic. vi, 9) to prove that euboulia, i.e. good counsel, is not eustochia, which is commended for grasping quickly what should be done. Now a man may take good counsel, though he be long and slow in so doing, and yet this does not discount the utility of a happy conjecture in taking good counsel: indeed it is sometimes a necessity, when, for instance, something has to be done without warning. It is for this reason that shrewdness is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod rhetorica etiam ratiocinatur circa operabilia. Unde nihil prohibet idem ad rhetoricam et prudentiam pertinere. Et tamen coniecturatio hic non sumitur solum secundum quod pertinet ad coniecturas quibus utuntur rhetores, sed secundum quod in quibuscumque dicitur homo coniicere veritatem. | Reply to Objection 3. Rhetoric also reasons about practical matters, wherefore nothing hinders the same thing belonging both to rhetoric and prudence. Nevertheless, conjecture is taken here not only in the sense in which it is employed by rhetoricians, but also as applicable to all matters whatsoever wherein man is said to conjecture the truth. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio non debeat poni pars prudentiae. Subiectum enim accidentis non est pars eius. Sed prudentia est in ratione sicut in subiecto, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo ratio non debet poni pars prudentiae. | Objection 1. It would seem that reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For the subject of an accident is not a part thereof. But prudence is in the reason as its subject (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud quod est multis commune non debet alicuius eorum poni pars, vel, si ponatur, debet poni pars eius cui potissime convenit. Ratio autem necessaria est in omnibus virtutibus intellectualibus, et praecipue in sapientia et scientia, quae utuntur ratione demonstrativa. Ergo ratio non debet poni pars prudentiae. | Objection 2. Further, that which is common to many, should not be reckoned a part of any one of them; or if it be so reckoned, it should be reckoned a part of that one to which it chiefly belongs. Now reason is necessary in all the intellectual virtues, and chiefly in wisdom and science, which employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, ratio non differt per essentiam potentiae ab intellectu, ut prius habitum est. Si ergo intellectus ponitur pars prudentiae, superfluum fuit addere rationem. | Objection 3. Further, reason as a power does not differ essentially from the intelligence, as stated above (I, 79, 8). If therefore intelligence be reckoned a part of prudence, it is superfluous to add reason. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Macrobius, secundum sententiam Plotini, rationem numerat inter partes prudentiae. | On the contrary, Macrobius [In Somn. Scip. i], following the opinion of Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod opus prudentis est esse bene consiliativum, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Consilium autem est inquisitio quaedam ex quibusdam ad alia procedens. Hoc autem est opus rationis. Unde ad prudentiam necessarium est quod homo sit bene ratiocinativus. Et quia ea quae exiguntur ad perfectionem prudentiae dicuntur exigitivae vel quasi integrales partes prudentiae, inde est quod ratio inter partes prudentiae connumerari debet. | I answer that, The work of prudence is to take good counsel, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Now counsel is a research proceeding from certain things to others. But this is the work of reason. Wherefore it is requisite for prudence that man should be an apt reasoner. And since the things required for the perfection of prudence are called requisite or quasi-integral parts of prudence, it follows that reason should be numbered among these parts. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio non sumitur hic pro ipsa potentia rationis, sed pro eius bono usu. | Reply to Objection 1. Reason denotes here, not the power of reason, but its good use. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod certitudo rationis est ex intellectu, sed necessitas rationis est ex defectu intellectus, illa enim in quibus vis intellectiva plenarie viget ratione non indigent, sed suo simplici intuitu veritatem comprehendunt, sicut Deus et Angeli. Particularia autem operabilia, in quibus prudentia dirigit, recedunt praecipue ab intelligibilium conditione, et tanto magis quanto minus sunt certa seu determinata. Ea enim quae sunt artis, licet sint singularia, tamen sunt magis determinata et certa, unde in pluribus eorum non est consilium, propter certitudinem, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo quamvis in quibusdam aliis virtutibus intellectualibus sit certior ratio quam prudentia, tamen ad prudentiam maxime requiritur quod sit homo bene ratiocinativus, ut possit bene applicare universalia principia ad particularia, quae sunt varia et incerta. | Reply to Objection 2. The certitude of reason comes from the intellect. Yet the need of reason is from a defect in the intellect, since those things in which the intellective power is in full vigor, have no need for reason, for they comprehend the truth by their simple insight, as do God and the angels. On the other hand particular matters of action, wherein prudence guides, are very far from the condition of things intelligible, and so much the farther, as they are less certain and fixed. Thus matters of art, though they are singular, are nevertheless more fixed and certain, wherefore in many of them there is no room for counsel on account of their certitude, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Hence, although in certain other intellectual virtues reason is more certain than in prudence, yet prudence above all requires that man be an apt reasoner, so that he may rightly apply universals to particulars, which latter are various and uncertain. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod etsi intellectus et ratio non sunt diversae potentiae, tamen denominantur ex diversis actibus, nomen enim intellectus sumitur ab intima penetratione veritatis; nomen autem rationis ab inquisitione et discursu. Et ideo utrumque ponitur pars prudentiae, ut ex dictis patet. | Reply to Objection 3. Although intelligence and reason are not different powers, yet they are named after different acts. For intelligence takes its name from being an intimate penetration of the truth [Cf. II-II, 08, 1, while reason is so called from being inquisitive and discursive. Hence each is accounted a part of reason as explained above (2; 47, 2,3). Foresight: "Providentia," which may be translated either "providence" or "foresight." |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod providentia non debeat poni pars prudentiae. Nihil enim est pars sui ipsius. Sed providentia videtur idem esse quod prudentia, quia ut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., prudens dicitur quasi porro videns, et ex hoc etiam nomen providentiae sumitur, ut Boetius dicit, in fine de Consol. Ergo providentia non est pars prudentiae. | Objection 1. It would seem that foresight should not be accounted a part of prudence. For nothing is part of itself. Now foresight seems to be the same as prudence, because according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a prudent man is one who sees from afar [porro videns]": and this is also the derivation of "providentia [foresight]," according to Boethius (De Consol. v). Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, prudentia est solum practica. Sed providentia potest etiam esse speculativa, quia visio, ex qua sumitur nomen providentiae, magis pertinet ad speculativam quam ad operativam. Ergo providentia non est pars prudentiae. | Objection 2. Further, prudence is only practical, whereas foresight may be also speculative, because "seeing," whence we have the word "to foresee," has more to do with speculation than operation. Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, principalis actus prudentiae est praecipere, secundarii autem iudicare et consiliari. Sed nihil horum videtur importari proprie per nomen providentiae. Ergo providentia non est pars prudentiae. | Objection 3. Further, the chief act of prudence is to command, while its secondary act is to judge and to take counsel. But none of these seems to be properly implied by foresight. Therefore foresight is not part of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est auctoritas Tullii et Macrobii, qui ponunt providentiam partem prudentiae, ut ex dictis patet. | On the contrary stands the authority of Tully and Macrobius, who number foresight among the parts of prudence, as stated above (Article 48). |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, prudentia proprie est circa ea quae sunt ad finem; et hoc ad eius officium proprie pertinet, ut ad finem debite ordinentur. Et quamvis aliqua necessaria sint propter finem quae subiiciuntur divinae providentiae, humanae tamen prudentiae non subiiciuntur nisi contingentia operabilia quae per hominem possunt fieri propter finem. Praeterita autem in necessitatem quandam transeunt, quia impossibile est non esse quod factum est. Similiter etiam praesentia, inquantum huiusmodi, necessitatem quandam habent, necesse est enim Socratem sedere dum sedet. Unde consequens est quod contingentia futura, secundum quod sunt per hominem in finem humanae vitae ordinabilia, pertineant ad prudentiam. Utrumque autem horum importatur in nomine providentiae, importat enim providentia respectum quendam alicuius distantis, ad quod ea quae in praesenti occurrunt ordinanda sunt. Unde providentia est pars prudentiae. | I answer that, As stated above (47, 1, ad 2, 6,13), prudence is properly about the means to an end, and its proper work is to set them in due order to the end. And although certain things are necessary for an end, which are subject to divine providence, yet nothing is subject to human providence except the contingent matters of actions which can be done by man for an end. Now the past has become a kind of necessity, since what has been done cannot be undone. On like manner, the present as such, has a kind of necessity, since it is necessary that Socrates sit, so long as he sits. Consequently, future contingents, in so far as they can be directed by man to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence: and each of these things is implied in the word foresight, for it implies the notion of something distant, to which that which occurs in the present has to be directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quandocumque multa requiruntur ad unum, necesse est unum eorum esse principale, ad quod omnia alia ordinantur. Unde et in quolibet toto necesse est esse unam partem formalem et praedominantem, a qua totum unitatem habet. Et secundum hoc providentia est principalior inter omnes partes prudentiae, quia omnia alia quae requiruntur ad prudentiam ad hoc necessaria sunt ut aliquid recte ordinetur ad finem. Et ideo nomen ipsius prudentiae sumitur a providentia, sicut a principaliori sua parte. | Reply to Objection 1. Whenever many things are requisite for a unity, one of them must needs be the principal to which all the others are subordinate. Hence in every whole one part must be formal and predominant, whence the whole has unity. Accordingly foresight is the principal of all the parts of prudence, since whatever else is required for prudence, is necessary precisely that some particular thing may be rightly directed to its end. Hence it is that the very name of prudence is taken from foresight [providentia] as from its principal part. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod speculatio est circa universalia et circa necessaria, quae secundum se non sunt procul, cum sint ubique et semper, etsi sint procul quoad nos, inquantum ab eorum cognitione deficimus. Unde providentia non proprie dicitur in speculativis, sed solum in practicis. | Reply to Objection 2. Speculation is about universal and necessary things, which, in themselves, are not distant, since they are everywhere and always, though they are distant from us, in so far as we fail to know them. Hence foresight does not apply properly to speculative, but only to practical matters. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in recta ordinatione ad finem, quae includitur in ratione providentiae, importatur rectitudo consilii et iudicii et praecepti, sine quibus recta ordinatio ad finem esse non potest. | Reply to Objection 3. Right order to an end which is included in the notion of foresight, contains rectitude of counsel, judgment and command, without which no right order to the end is possible. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod circumspectio non possit esse pars prudentiae. Circumspectio enim videtur esse consideratio quaedam eorum quae circumstant. Huiusmodi autem sunt infinita, quae non possunt comprehendi ratione, in qua est prudentia. Ergo circumspectio non debet poni pars prudentiae. | Objection 1. It would seem that circumspection cannot be a part of prudence. For circumspection seems to signify looking at one's surroundings. But these are of infinite number, and cannot be considered by the reason wherein is prudence. Therefore circumspection should not be reckoned a part of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, circumstantiae magis videntur pertinere ad virtutes morales quam ad prudentiam. Sed circumspectio nihil aliud esse videtur quam respectus circumstantiarum. Ergo circumspectio magis videtur pertinere ad morales virtutes quam ad prudentiam. | Objection 2. Further, circumstances seem to be the concern of moral virtues rather than of prudence. But circumspection seems to denote nothing but attention to circumstances. Therefore circumspection apparently belongs to the moral virtues rather than to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, qui potest videre quae procul sunt multo magis potest videre quae circa sunt. Sed per providentiam homo est potens prospicere quae procul sunt. Ergo ipsa sufficit ad considerandum ea quae circumstant. Non ergo oportuit, praeter providentiam, ponere circumspectionem partem prudentiae. | Objection 3. Further, whoever can see things afar off can much more see things that are near. Now foresight enables a man to look on distant things. Therefore there is no need to account circumspection a part of prudence in addition to foresight. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est auctoritas Macrobii, ut supra dictum est. | On the contrary stands the authority of Macrobius, quoted above (Article 48). |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ad prudentiam, sicut dictum est, praecipue pertinet recte ordinare aliquid in finem. Quod quidem recte non fit nisi et finis sit bonus, et id quod ordinatur in finem sit etiam bonum et conveniens fini. Sed quia prudentia, sicut dictum est, est circa singularia operabilia, in quibus multa concurrunt, contingit aliquid secundum se consideratum esse bonum et conveniens fini, quod tamen ex aliquibus concurrentibus redditur vel malum vel non opportunum ad finem. Sicut ostendere signa amoris alicui, secundum se consideratum, videtur esse conveniens ad alliciendum eius animum ad amorem, sed si contingat in animo illius superbia vel suspicio adulationis, non erit hoc conveniens ad finem. Et ideo necessaria est circumspectio ad prudentiam, ut scilicet homo id quod ordinatur in finem comparet etiam cum his quae circumstant. | I answer that, As stated above (Article 6), it belongs to prudence chiefly to direct something aright to an end; and this is not done aright unless both the end be good, and the means good and suitable. Since, however, prudence, as stated above (Question 47, Article 3) is about singular matters of action, which contain many combinations of circumstances, it happens that a thing is good in itself and suitable to the end, and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end, by reason of some combination of circumstances. Thus to show signs of love to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to arouse love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flattery arise in his heart, it will no longer be a means suitable to the end. Hence the need of circumspection in prudence, viz. of comparing the means with the circumstances. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod licet ea quae possunt circumstare sint infinita, tamen ea quae circumstant in actu non sunt infinita, sed pauca quaedam sunt quae immutant iudicium rationis in agendis. | Reply to Objection 1. Though the number of possible circumstances be infinite, the number of actual circumstances is not; and the judgment of reason in matters of action is influenced by things which are few in number |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod circumstantiae pertinent ad prudentiam quidem sicut ad determinandum eas, ad virtutes autem morales inquantum per circumstantiarum determinationem perficiuntur. | Reply to Objection 2. Circumstances are the concern of prudence, because prudence has to fix them; on the other hand they are the concern of moral virtues, in so far as moral virtues are perfected by the fixing of circumstances. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut ad providentiam pertinet prospicere id quod est per se conveniens fini, ita ad circumspectionem pertinet considerare an sit conveniens fini secundum ea quae circumstant. Utrumque autem horum habet specialem difficultatem. Et ideo utrumque eorum seorsum ponitur pars prudentiae. | Reply to Objection 3. Just as it belongs to foresight to look on that which is by its nature suitable to an end, so it belongs to circumspection to consider whether it be suitable to the end in view of the circumstances. Now each of these presents a difficulty of its own, and therefore each is reckoned a distinct part of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod cautio non debeat poni pars prudentiae. In his enim in quibus non potest malum esse non est necessaria cautio. Sed virtutibus nemo male utitur, ut dicitur in libro de Lib. Arb. Ergo cautio non pertinet ad prudentiam, quae est directiva virtutum. | Objection 1. It would seem that caution should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For when no evil is possible, no caution is required. Now no man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore caution does not belong to prudence which directs the virtues. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, eiusdem est providere bona et cavere mala, sicut eiusdem artis est facere sanitatem et curare aegritudinem. Sed providere bona pertinet ad providentiam. Ergo etiam cavere mala. Non ergo cautio debet poni alia pars prudentiae a providentia. | Objection 2. Further, to foresee good and to avoid evil belong to the same faculty, just as the same art gives health and cures ill-health. Now it belongs to foresight to foresee good, and consequently, also to avoid evil. Therefore caution should not be accounted a part of prudence, distinct from foresight. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, nullus prudens conatur ad impossibile. Sed nullus potest praecavere omnia mala quae possunt contingere. Ergo cautio non pertinet ad prudentiam. | Objection 3. Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible. But no man can take precautions against all possible evils. Therefore caution does not belong to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, videte quomodo caute ambuletis. | On the contrary, The Apostle says (Ephesians 5:15): "See how you walk cautiously [Douay: 'circumspectly']." |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ea circa quae est prudentia sunt contingentia operabilia, in quibus, sicut verum potest admisceri falso, ita et malum bono, propter multiformitatem huiusmodi operabilium, in quibus bona plerumque impediuntur a malis, et mala habent speciem boni. Et ideo necessaria est cautio ad prudentiam, ut sic accipiantur bona quod vitentur mala. | I answer that, The things with which prudence is concerned, are contingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with true, so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety of these matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by evil, and evil has the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs caution, so that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cautio non est necessaria in moralibus actibus ut aliquis sibi caveat ab actibus virtutum, sed ut sibi caveat ab eis per quae actus virtutum impediri possunt. | Reply to Objection 1. Caution is required in moral acts, that we may be on our guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance of acts of virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod opposita mala cavere eiusdem rationis est et prosequi bona. Sed vitare aliqua impedimenta extrinseca, hoc pertinet ad aliam rationem. Et ideo cautio distinguitur a providentia, quamvis utrumque pertineat ad unam virtutem prudentiae. | Reply to Objection 2. It is the same in idea, to ensue good and to avoid the opposite evil, but the avoidance of outward hindrances is different in idea. Hence caution differs from foresight, although they both belong to the one virtue of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 49 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod malorum quae homini vitanda occurrunt quaedam sunt quae ut in pluribus accidere solent. Et talia comprehendi ratione possunt. Et contra haec ordinatur cautio, ut totaliter vitentur, vel ut minus noceant. Quaedam vero sunt quae ut in paucioribus et casualiter accidunt. Et haec, cum sint infinita, ratione comprehendi non possunt, nec sufficienter homo potest ea praecavere, quamvis per officium prudentiae homo contra omnes fortunae insultus disponere possit ut minus laedatur. | Reply to Objection 3. Of the evils which man has to avoid, some are of frequent occurrence; the like can be grasped by reason, and against them caution is directed, either that they may be avoided altogether, or that they may do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and by chance, and these, since they are infinite in number, cannot be grasped by reason, nor is man able to take precautions against them, although by exercising prudence he is able to prepare against all the surprises of chance, so as to suffer less harm thereby. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 pr. Deinde considerandum est de partibus subiectivis prudentiae. Et quia de prudentia per quam aliquis regit seipsum iam dictum est, restat dicendum de speciebus prudentiae quibus multitudo gubernatur. Circa quas quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum legispositiva debeat poni species prudentiae. Secundo, utrum politica. Tertio, utrum oeconomica. Quarto, utrum militaris. | Question 50. The subjective parts of prudence Is a species of prudence regnative? Is political economy a species of prudence? Is domestic economy a species of prudence? Is military prudence? |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod regnativa non debeat poni species prudentiae. Regnativa enim ordinatur ad iustitiam conservandam, dicitur enim in V Ethic. quod princeps est custos iusti. Ergo regnativa magis pertinet ad iustitiam quam ad prudentiam. | Objection 1. It would seem that regnative should not be reckoned a species of prudence. For regnative prudence is directed to the preservation of justice, since according to Ethic. v, 6 the prince is the guardian of justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to justice rather than to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in III Polit., regnum est una sex politiarum. Sed nulla species prudentiae sumitur secundum alias quinque politias, quae sunt aristocratia, politia (quae alio nomine dicitur timocratia), tyrannis, oligarchia, democratia. Ergo nec secundum regnum debet sumi regnativa. | Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 5) a kingdom [regnum] is one of six species of government. But no species of prudence is ascribed to the other five forms of government, which are "aristocracy," "polity," also called "timocracy" [Cf. Ethic. viii, 10, "tyranny," "oligarchy" and "democracy." Therefore neither should a regnative species be ascribed to a kingdom. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, leges condere non solum pertinet ad reges, sed etiam ad quosdam alios principatus, et etiam ad populum; ut patet per Isidorum, in libro Etymol. Sed philosophus, in VI Ethic., ponit legispositivam partem prudentiae. Inconvenienter igitur loco eius ponitur regnativa. | Objection 3. Further, lawgiving belongs not only to kings, but also to certain others placed in authority, and even to the people, according to Isidore (Etym. v). Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a part of prudence to be "legislative." Therefore it is not becoming to substitute regnative prudence in its place. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Polit., quod prudentia est propria virtus principis. Ergo specialis prudentia debet esse regnativa. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) that "prudence is a virtue which is proper to the prince." Therefore a special kind of prudence is regnative. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod sicut ex supradictis patet, ad prudentiam pertinet regere et praecipere. Et ideo ubi invenitur specialis ratio regiminis et praecepti in humanis actibus, ibi etiam invenitur specialis ratio prudentiae. Manifestum est autem quod in eo qui non solum seipsum habet regere, sed etiam communitatem perfectam civitatis vel regni, invenitur specialis et perfecta ratio regiminis, tanto enim regimen perfectius est quanto est universalius, ad plura se extendens et ulteriorem finem attingens. Et ideo regi, ad quem pertinet regere civitatem vel regnum, prudentia competit secundum specialem et perfectissimam sui rationem. Et propter hoc regnativa ponitur species prudentiae. | I answer that, As stated above (47, 8,10), it belongs to prudence to govern and command, so that wherever in human acts we find a special kind of governance and command, there must be a special kind of prudence. Now it is evident that there is a special and perfect kind of governance in one who has to govern not only himself but also the perfect community of a city or kingdom; because a government is the more perfect according as it is more universal, extends to more matters, and attains a higher end. Hence prudence in its special and most perfect sense, belongs to a king who is charged with the government of a city or kingdom: for which reason a species of prudence is reckoned to be regnative. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnia quae sunt virtutum moralium pertinent ad prudentiam sicut ad dirigentem, unde et ratio recta prudentiae ponitur in definitione virtutis moralis, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo etiam executio iustitiae, prout ordinatur ad bonum commune, quae pertinet ad officium regis, indiget directione prudentiae. Unde istae duae virtutes sunt maxime propriae regi, scilicet prudentia et iustitia, secundum illud Ierem. XXIII, regnabit rex, et sapiens erit et faciet iudicium et iustitiam in terra. Quia tamen dirigere magis pertinet ad regem, exequi vero ad subditos, ideo regnativa magis ponitur species prudentiae, quae est directiva, quam iustitiae, quae est executiva. | Reply to Objection 1. All matters connected with moral virtue belong to prudence as their guide, wherefore "right reason in accord with prudence" is included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated above (47, 5, ad 1; I-II, 58, 2, ad 4). For this reason also the execution of justice in so far as it is directed to the common good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guidance of prudence. Hence these two virtues--prudence and justice--belong most properly to a king, according to Jeremiah 23:5: "A king shall reign and shall be wise, and shall execute justice and judgment in the earth." Since, however, direction belongs rather to the king, and execution to his subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species of prudence which is directive, rather than to justice which is executive. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod regnum inter alias politias est optimum regimen, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Et ideo species prudentiae magis debuit denominari a regno. Ita tamen quod sub regnativa comprehendantur omnia alia regimina recta, non autem perversa, quae virtuti opponuntur, unde non pertinent ad prudentiam. | Reply to Objection 2. A kingdom is the best of all governments, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence should be denominated rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under regnative all other rightful forms of government, but not perverse forms which are opposed to virtue, and which, accordingly, do not pertain to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod philosophus denominat regnativam a principali actu regis, qui est leges ponere. Quod etsi conveniat aliis, non convenit eis nisi secundum quod participant aliquid de regimine regis. | Reply to Objection 3. The Philosopher names regnative prudence after the principal act of a king which is to make laws, and although this applies to the other forms of government, this is only in so far as they have a share of kingly government. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod politica inconvenienter ponatur pars prudentiae. Regnativa enim est pars politicae prudentiae, ut dictum est. Sed pars non debet dividi contra totum. Ergo politica non debet poni alia species prudentiae. | Objection 1. It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly accounted a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political prudence, as stated above (Article 1). But a part should not be reckoned a species with the whole. Therefore political prudence should not be reckoned a part of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, species habituum distinguuntur secundum diversa obiecta. Sed eadem sunt quae oportet regnantem praecipere et subditum exequi. Ergo politica, secundum quod pertinet ad subditos, non debet poni species prudentiae distincta a regnativa. | Objection 2. Further, the species of habits are distinguished by their various objects. Now what the ruler has to command is the same as what the subject has to execute. Therefore political prudence as regards the subjects, should not be reckoned a species of prudence distinct from regnative prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, unusquisque subditorum est singularis persona. Sed quaelibet singularis persona seipsam sufficienter dirigere potest per prudentiam communiter dictam. Ergo non oportet poni aliam speciem prudentiae quae dicatur politica. | Objection 3. Further, each subject is an individual person. Now each individual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence commonly so called. Therefore there is no need of a special kind of prudence called political. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., eius autem quae circa civitatem haec quidem ut architectonica prudentia legispositiva; haec autem commune nomen habet politica, circa singularia existens. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "of the prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a master-prudence and is called legislative; another kind bears the common name political, and deals with individuals." |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod servus per imperium movetur a domino et subditus a principante, aliter tamen quam irrationalia et inanimata moveantur a suis motoribus. Nam inanimata et irrationalia aguntur solum ab alio, non autem ipsa agunt seipsa quia non habent dominium sui actus per liberum arbitrium. Et ideo rectitudo regiminis ipsorum non est in ipsis, sed solum in motoribus. Sed homines servi, vel quicumque subditi, ita aguntur ab aliis per praeceptum quod tamen agunt seipsos per liberum arbitrium. Et ideo requiritur in eis quaedam rectitudo regiminis per quam seipsos dirigant in obediendo principatibus. Et ad hoc pertinet species prudentiae quae politica vocatur. | I answer that, A slave is moved by his master, and a subject by his ruler, by command, but otherwise than as irrational and inanimate beings are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and inanimate beings are moved only by others and do not put themselves in motion, since they have no free-will whereby to be masters of their own actions, wherefore the rectitude of their government is not in their power but in the power of their movers. On the other hand, men who are slaves or subjects in any sense, are moved by the commands of others in such a way that they move themselves by their free-will; wherefore some kind of rectitude of government is required in them, so that they may direct themselves in obeying their superiors; and to this belongs that species of prudence which is called political. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut dictum est, regnativa est perfectissima species prudentiae. Et ideo prudentia subditorum, quae deficit a prudentia regnativa, retinet sibi nomen commune, ut politica dicatur, sicut in logicis convertibile quod non significat essentiam retinet sibi commune nomen proprii. | Reply to Objection 1. As stated above, regnative is the most perfect species of prudence, wherefore the prudence of subjects, which falls short of regnative prudence, retains the common name of political prudence, even as in logic a convertible term which does not denote the essence of a thing retains the name of "proper." |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod diversa ratio obiecti diversificat habitum secundum speciem, ut ex supradictis patet. Eadem autem agenda considerantur quidem a rege secundum universaliorem rationem quam considerentur a subdito, qui obedit, uni enim regi in diversis officiis multi obediunt. Et ideo regnativa comparatur ad hanc politicam de qua loquimur sicut ars architectonica ad eam quae manu operatur. | Reply to Objection 2. A different aspect of the object diversifies the species of a habit, as stated above (Question 47, Article 5). Now the same actions are considered by the king, but under a more general aspect, as by his subjects who obey: since many obey one king in various departments. Hence regnative prudence is compared to this political prudence of which we are speaking, as mastercraft to handicraft. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod per prudentiam communiter dictam regit homo seipsum in ordine ad proprium bonum, per politicam autem de qua loquimur, in ordine ad bonum commune. | Reply to Objection 3. Man directs himself by prudence commonly so called, in relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of which we speak, he directs himself in relation to the common good. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod oeconomica non debeat poni species prudentiae. Quia ut philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., prudentia ordinatur ad bene vivere totum. Sed oeconomica ordinatur ad aliquem particularem finem, scilicet ad divitias, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo oeconomica non est species prudentiae. | Objection 1. It would seem that domestic should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "prudence is directed to a good life in general": whereas domestic prudence is directed to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to Ethic. i, 1. Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut supra habitum est, prudentia non est nisi bonorum. Sed oeconomica potest esse etiam malorum, multi enim peccatores providi sunt in gubernatione familiae. Ergo oeconomica non debet poni species prudentiae. | Objection 2. Further, as stated above (Question 47, Article 13) prudence is only in good people. But domestic prudence may be also in wicked people, since many sinners are provident in governing their household. Therefore domestic prudence should not be reckoned a species of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut in regno invenitur principans et subiectum, ita etiam in domo. Si ergo oeconomica est species prudentiae sicut et politica, deberet etiam paterna prudentia poni, sicut et regnativa. Non autem ponitur. Ergo nec oeconomica debet poni species prudentiae. | Objection 3. Further, just as in a kingdom there is a ruler and subject, so also is there in a household. If therefore domestic like political is a species of prudence, there should be a paternal corresponding to regnative prudence. Now there is no such prudence. Therefore neither should domestic prudence be accounted a species of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod illarum, scilicet prudentiarum quae se habent ad regimen multitudinis, haec quidem oeconomica, haec autem legispositiva, haec autem politica. | On the contrary, The Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are various kinds of prudence in the government of a multitude, "one of which is domestic, another legislative, and another political." |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ratio obiecti diversificata secundum universale et particulare, vel secundum totum et partem, diversificat artes et virtutes, secundum quam diversitatem una est principalis respectu alterius. Manifestum est autem quod domus medio modo se habet inter unam singularem personam et civitatem vel regnum, nam sicut una singularis persona est pars domus, ita una domus est pars civitatis vel regni. Et ideo sicut prudentia communiter dicta, quae est regitiva unius, distinguitur a politica prudentia, ita oportet quod oeconomica distinguatur ab utraque. | I answer that, Different aspects of an object, in respect of universality and particularity, or of totality and partiality, diversify arts and virtues; and in respect of such diversity one act of virtue is principal as compared with another. Now it is evident that a household is a mean between the individual and the city or kingdom, since just as the individual is part of the household, so is the household part of the city or kingdom. And therefore, just as prudence commonly so called which governs the individual, is distinct from political prudence, so must domestic prudence be distinct from both. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod divitiae comparantur ad oeconomicam non sicut finis ultimus, sed sicut instrumenta quaedam, ut dicitur in I Polit. Finis autem ultimus oeconomicae est totum bene vivere secundum domesticam conversationem. Philosophus autem I Ethic. ponit exemplificando divitias finem oeconomicae secundum studium plurimorum. | Reply to Objection 1. Riches are compared to domestic prudence, not as its last end, but as its instrument, as stated in Polit. i, 3. On the other hand, the end of political prudence is "a good life in general" as regards the conduct of the household. On Ethic. i, 1 the Philosopher speaks of riches as the end of political prudence, by way of example and in accordance with the opinion of many. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ad aliqua particularia quae sunt in domo disponenda possunt aliqui peccatores provide se habere, sed non ad ipsum totum bene vivere domesticae conversationis, ad quod praecipue requiritur vita virtuosa. | Reply to Objection 2. Some sinners may be provident in certain matters of detail concerning the disposition of their household, but not in regard to "a good life in general" as regards the conduct of the household, for which above all a virtuous life is required. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod pater in domo habet quandam similitudinem regii principatus, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic., non tamen habet perfectam potestatem regiminis sicut rex. Et ideo non ponitur separatim paterna species prudentiae, sicut regnativa. | Reply to Objection 3. The father has in his household an authority like that of a king, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10, but he has not the full power of a king, wherefore paternal government is not reckoned a distinct species of prudence, like regnative prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod militaris non debeat poni species prudentiae. Prudentia enim contra artem dividitur, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed militaris videtur esse quaedam ars in rebus bellicis; sicut patet per philosophum, in III Ethic. Ergo militaris non debet poni species prudentiae. | Objection 1. It would seem that military prudence should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For prudence is distinct from art, according to Ethic. vi, 3. Now military prudence seems to be the art of warfare, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore military prudence should not be accounted a species of prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut militare negotium continetur sub politico, ita etiam et plura alia negotia, sicut mercatorum, artificum et aliorum huiusmodi. Sed secundum alia negotia quae sunt in civitate non accipiuntur aliquae species prudentiae. Ergo etiam neque secundum militare negotium. | Objection 2. Further, just as military business is contained under political affairs, so too are many other matters, such as those of tradesmen, craftsmen, and so forth. But there are no species of prudence corresponding to other affairs in the state. Neither therefore should any be assigned to military business. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, in rebus bellicis plurimum valet militum fortitudo. Ergo militaris magis pertinet ad fortitudinem quam ad prudentiam. | Objection 3. Further, the soldiers' bravery counts for a great deal in warfare. Therefore military prudence pertains to fortitude rather than to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. XXIV, cum dispositione initur bellum, et erit salus ubi sunt multa consilia. Sed consiliari pertinet ad prudentiam. Ergo in rebus bellicis maxime necessaria est aliqua species prudentiae quae militaris dicitur. | On the contrary, It is written (Proverbs 24:6): "War is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels." Now it belongs to prudence to take counsel. Therefore there is great need in warfare for that species of prudence which is called "military." |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ea quae secundum artem et rationem aguntur conformia esse oportet his quae sunt secundum naturam, quae a ratione divina sunt instituta. Natura autem ad duo intendit primo quidem, ad regendum unamquamque rem in seipsa; secundo vero, ad resistendum extrinsecis impugnantibus et corruptivis. Et propter hoc non solum dedit animalibus vim concupiscibilem, per quam moveantur ad ea quae sunt saluti eorum accommoda; sed etiam vim irascibilem, per quam animal resistit impugnantibus. Unde et in his quae sunt secundum rationem non solum oportet esse prudentiam politicam, per quam convenienter disponantur ea quae pertinent ad bonum commune; sed etiam militarem, per quam hostium insultus repellantur. | I answer that, Whatever things are done according to art or reason, should be made to conform to those which are in accordance with nature, and are established by the Divine Reason. Now nature has a twofold tendency: first, to govern each thing in itself, secondly, to withstand outward assailants and corruptives: and for this reason she has provided animals not only with the concupiscible faculty, whereby they are moved to that which is conducive to their well-being, but also with the irascible power, whereby the animal withstands an assailant. Therefore in those things also which are in accordance with reason, there should be not only "political" prudence, which disposes in a suitable manner such things as belong to the common good, but also a "military" prudence, whereby hostile attacks are repelled. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod militaris potest esse ars secundum quod habet quasdam regulas recte utendi quibusdam exterioribus rebus, puta armis et equis, sed secundum quod ordinatur ad bonum commune, habet magis rationem prudentiae. | Reply to Objection 1. Military prudence may be an art, in so far as it has certain rules for the right use of certain external things, such as arms and horses, but in so far as it is directed to the common good, it belongs rather to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod alia negotia quae sunt in civitate ordinantur ad aliquas particulares utilitates, sed militare negotium ordinatur ad tuitionem totius boni communis. | Reply to Objection 2. Other matters in the state are directed to the profit of individuals, whereas the business of soldiering is directed to the service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, protection of the entire common good. |
| IIª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod executio militiae pertinet ad fortitudinem, sed directio ad prudentiam, et praecipue secundum quod est in duce exercitus. | Reply to Objection 3. The execution of military service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the commander-in-chief, belongs to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 pr. Deinde considerandum est de virtutibus adiunctis prudentiae, quae sunt quasi partes potentiales ipsius. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum eubulia sit virtus. Secundo, utrum sit specialis virtus a prudentia distincta. Tertio, utrum synesis sit specialis virtus. Quarto, utrum gnome sit specialis virtus. | Question 51. The virtues which are connected with prudence Is euboulia a virtue? Is it a special virtue, distinct from prudence? Is synesis a special virtue? Is gnome a special virtue? |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod eubulia non sit virtus. Quia secundum Augustinum, in libro de Lib. Arb., virtutibus nullus male utitur. Sed eubulia, quae est bene consiliativa, aliqui male utuntur, vel quia astuta consilia excogitant ad malos fines consequendos; aut quia etiam ad bonos fines consequendos aliqua peccata ordinant, puta qui furatur ut eleemosynam det. Ergo eubulia non est virtus. | Objection 1. It would seem that euboulia (deliberating well) is not a virtue. For, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) "no man makes evil use of virtue." Now some make evil use of euboulia (deliberating well) or good counsel, either through devising crafty counsels in order to achieve evil ends, or through committing sin in order that they may achieve good ends, as those who rob that they may give alms. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, virtus perfectio quaedam est, ut dicitur in VII Phys. Sed eubulia circa consilium consistit, quod importat dubitationem et inquisitionem, quae imperfectionis sunt. Ergo eubulia non est virtus. | Objection 2. Further, virtue is a perfection, according to Phys. vii. But euboulia (deliberating well) is concerned with counsel, which implies doubt and research, and these are marks of imperfection. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, virtutes sunt connexae ad invicem, ut supra habitum est. Sed eubulia non est connexa aliis virtutibus multi enim peccatores sunt bene consiliativi, et multi iusti sunt in consiliis tardi. Ergo eubulia non est virtus. | Objection 3. Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated above (I-II, 65). Now euboulia (deliberating well) is not connected with the other virtues, since many sinners take good-counsel, and many godly men are slow in taking counsel. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod eubulia est rectitudo consilii, ut philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic. Sed recta ratio perficit rationem virtutis. Ergo eubulia est virtus. | On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9) euboulia (deliberating well) "is a right counselling." Now the perfection of virtue consists in right reason. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, de ratione virtutis humanae est quod faciat actum hominis bonum. Inter ceteros autem actus hominis proprium est ei consiliari, quia hoc importat quandam rationis inquisitionem circa agenda, in quibus consistit vita humana; nam vita speculativa est supra hominem, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Eubulia autem importat bonitatem consilii, dicitur enim ab eu, quod est bonum, et boule, quod est consilium, quasi bona consiliatio, vel potius bene consiliativa. Unde manifestum est quod eubulia est virtus humana. | I answer that, As stated above (Question 47, Article 4) the nature of a human virtue consists in making a human act good. Now among the acts of man, it is proper to him to take counsel, since this denotes a research of the reason about the actions he has to perform and whereof human life consists, for the speculative life is above man, as stated in Ethic. x. But euboulia (deliberating well) signifies goodness of counsel, for it is derived from the eu, good, and boule, counsel, being "a good counsel" or rather "a disposition to take good counsel." Hence it is evident that euboulia (deliberating well) is a human virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non est bonum consilium sive aliquis malum finem sibi in consiliando praestituat, sive etiam ad bonum finem malas vias adinveniat. Sicut etiam in speculativis non est bona ratiocinatio sive aliquis falsum concludat, sive etiam concludat verum ex falsis, quia non utitur convenienti medio. Et ideo utrumque praedictorum est contra rationem eubuliae, ut philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic. | Reply to Objection 1. There is no good counsel either in deliberating for an evil end, or in discovering evil means for attaining a good end, even as in speculative matters, there is no good reasoning either in coming to a false conclusion, or in coming to a true conclusion from false premisses through employing an unsuitable middle term. Hence both the aforesaid processes are contrary to euboulia (deliberating well), as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9). |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod etsi virtus sit essentialiter perfectio quaedam, non tamen oportet quod omne illud quod est materia virtutis perfectionem importet. Oportet enim circa omnia humana perfici per virtutes, et non solum circa actus rationis, inter quos est consilium; sed etiam circa passiones appetitus sensitivi, quae adhuc sunt multo imperfectiores. Vel potest dici quod virtus humana est perfectio secundum modum hominis, qui non potest per certitudinem comprehendere veritatem rerum simplici intuitu; et praecipue in agibilibus, quae sunt contingentia. | Reply to Objection 2. Although virtue is essentially a perfection, it does not follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue implies perfection. For man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his parts, and this not only as regards the acts of reason, of which counsel is one, but also as regards the passions of the sensitive appetite, which are still more imperfect. It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection according to the mode of man, who is unable by simple insight to comprehend with certainty the truth of things, especially in matters of action which are contingent. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in nullo peccatore, inquantum huiusmodi, invenitur eubulia. Omne enim peccatum est contra bonam consiliationem. Requiritur enim ad bene consiliandum non solum adinventio vel excogitatio eorum quae sunt opportuna ad finem, sed etiam aliae circumstantiae, scilicet tempus congruum, ut nec nimis tardus nec nimis velox sit in consiliis; et modus consiliandi, ut scilicet sit firmus in suo consilio; et aliae huiusmodi debitae circumstantiae, quae peccator peccando non observat. Quilibet autem virtuosus est bene consiliativus in his quae ordinantur ad finem virtutis, licet forte in aliquibus particularibus negotiis non sit bene consiliativus, puta in mercationibus vel in rebus bellicis vel in aliquo huiusmodi. | Reply to Objection 3. In no sinner as such is euboulia (deliberating well) to be found: since all sin is contrary to taking good counsel. For good counsel requires not only the discovery or devising of fit means for the end, but also other circumstances. Such are suitable time, so that one be neither too slow nor too quick in taking counsel, and the mode of taking counsel, so that one be firm in the counsel taken, and other like due circumstances, which sinners fail to observe when they sin. On the other hand, every virtuous man takes good counsel in those things which are directed to the end of virtue, although perhaps he does not take good counsel in other particular matters, for instance in matters of trade, or warfare, or the like. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod eubulia non sit virtus distincta a prudentia. Quia ut philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., videtur prudentis esse bene consiliari. Sed hoc pertinet ad eubuliam, ut dictum est. Ergo eubulia non distinguitur a prudentia. | Objection 1. It would seem that euboulia (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), the "prudent man is, seemingly, one who takes good counsel." Now this belongs to euboulia (deliberating well) as stated above. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not distinct from prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, humani actus, ad quos ordinantur humanae virtutes, praecipue specificantur ex fine, ut supra habitum est. Sed ad eundem finem ordinantur eubulia et prudentia, ut dicitur VI Ethic., idest non ad quendam particularem finem, sed ad communem finem totius vitae. Ergo eubulia non est virtus distincta a prudentia. | Objection 2. Further, human acts to which human virtues are directed, are specified chiefly by their end, as stated above (I-II, 01, 3; I-II, 18, 4,6). Now euboulia (deliberating well) and prudence are directed to the same end, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9, not indeed to some particular end, but to the common end of all life. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, in scientiis speculativis ad eandem scientiam pertinet inquirere et determinare. Ergo pari ratione in operativis hoc pertinet ad eandem virtutem. Sed inquirere pertinet ad eubuliam, determinare autem ad prudentiam. Ergo eubulia non est alia virtus a prudentia. | Objection 3. Further, in speculative sciences, research and decision belong to the same science. Therefore in like manner these belong to the same virtue in practical matters. Now research belongs to euboulia (deliberating well), while decision belongs to prudence. There euboulia (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, prudentia est praeceptiva, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Hoc autem non convenit eubuliae. Ergo eubulia est alia virtus a prudentia. | On the contrary, Prudence is preceptive, according to Ethic. vi, 10. But this does not apply to euboulia (deliberating well). Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is a distinct virtue from prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est supra, virtus proprie ordinatur ad actum, quem reddit bonum. Et ideo oportet secundum differentiam actuum esse diversas virtutes, et maxime quando non est eadem ratio bonitatis in actibus. Si enim esset eadem ratio bonitatis in eis, tunc ad eandem virtutem pertinerent diversi actus, sicut ex eodem dependet bonitas amoris, desiderii et gaudii, et ideo omnia ista pertinent ad eandem virtutem caritatis. Actus autem rationis ordinati ad opus sunt diversi, nec habent eandem rationem bonitatis, ex alia enim efficitur homo bene consiliativus, et bene iudicativus, et bene praeceptivus; quod patet ex hoc quod ista aliquando ab invicem separantur. Et ideo oportet aliam esse virtutem eubuliam, per quam homo est bene consiliativus; et aliam prudentiam, per quam homo est bene praeceptivus. Et sicut consiliari ordinatur ad praecipere tanquam ad principalius, ita etiam eubulia ordinatur ad prudentiam tanquam ad principaliorem virtutem; sine qua nec virtus esset, sicut nec morales virtutes sine prudentia, nec ceterae virtutes sine caritate. | I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), virtue is properly directed to an act which it renders good; and consequently virtues must differ according to different acts, especially when there is a different kind of goodness in the acts. For, if various acts contained the same kind of goodness, they would belong to the same virtue: thus the goodness of love, desire and joy depends on the same, wherefore all these belong to the same virtue of charity. Now acts of the reason that are ordained to action are diverse, nor have they the same kind of goodness: since it is owing to different causes that a man acquires good counsel, good judgment, or good command, inasmuch as these are sometimes separated from one another. Consequently euboulia (deliberating well) which makes man take good counsel must needs be a distinct virtue from prudence, which makes man command well. And since counsel is directed to command as to that which is principal, so euboulia (deliberating well) is directed to prudence as to a principal virtue, without which it would be no virtue at all, even as neither are the moral virtues without prudence, nor the other virtues without charity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad prudentiam pertinet bene consiliari imperative, ad eubuliam autem elicitive. | Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to prudence to take good counsel by commanding it, to euboulia (deliberating well) by eliciting it. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ad unum finem ultimum, quod est bene vivere totum, ordinantur diversi actus secundum quendam gradum, nam praecedit consilium, sequitur iudicium, et ultimum est praeceptum, quod immediate se habet ad finem ultimum, alii autem duo actus remote se habent. Qui tamen habent quosdam proximos fines, consilium quidem inventionem eorum quae sunt agenda; iudicium autem certitudinem. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod eubulia et prudentia non sint diversae virtutes, sed quod eubulia ordinetur ad prudentiam sicut virtus secundaria ad principalem. | Reply to Objection 2. Different acts are directed in different degrees to the one end which is "a good life in general" [Ethic. vi, 5: for counsel comes first, judgment follows, and command comes last. The last named has an immediate relation to the last end: whereas the other two acts are related thereto remotely. Nevertheless these have certain proximate ends of their own, the end of counsel being the discovery of what has to be done, and the end of judgment, certainty. Hence this proves not that euboulia (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence, but that it is subordinate thereto, as a secondary to a principal virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam in speculativis alia rationalis scientia est dialectica, quae ordinatur ad inquisitionem inventivam; et alia scientia demonstrativa, quae est veritatis determinativa. | Reply to Objection 3. Even in speculative matters the rational science of dialectics, which is directed to research and discovery, is distinct from demonstrative science, which decides the truth. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod synesis non sit virtus. Virtutes enim non insunt nobis a natura, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed synesis inest aliquibus a natura, ut dicit philosophus, in VI Ethic. Ergo synesis non est virtus. | Objection 1. It would seem that synesis is not a virtue. Virtues are not in us by nature, according to Ethic. ii, 1. But synesis (judging well according to common law) is natural to some, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 11). Therefore synesis (judging well according to common law) is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, synesis, ut in eodem libro dicitur, est solum iudicativa. Sed iudicium solum, sine praecepto, potest esse etiam in malis. Cum ergo virtus sit solum in bonis, videtur quod synesis non sit virtus. | Objection 2. Further, as stated in the same book (10), synesis (judging well according to common law) is nothing but "a faculty of judging." But judgment without command can be even in the wicked. Since then virtue is only in the good, it seems that synesis (judging well according to common law) is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, nunquam est defectus in praecipiendo nisi sit aliquis defectus in iudicando, saltem in particulari operabili, in quo omnis malus errat. Si ergo synesis ponitur virtus ad bene iudicandum, videtur quod non sit necessaria alia virtus ad bene praecipiendum. Et ideo prudentia erit superflua, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo synesis est virtus. | Objection 3. Further, there is never a defective command, unless there be a defective judgment, at least in a particular matter of action; for it is in this that every wicked man errs. If therefore synesis (judging well according to common law) be reckoned a virtue directed to good judgment, it seems that there is no need for any other virtue directed to good command: and consequently prudence would be superfluous, which is not reasonable. Therefore synesis (judging well according to common law) is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, iudicium est perfectius quam consilium. Sed eubulia, quae est bene consiliativa, est virtus. Ergo multo magis synesis, quae est bene iudicativa, est virtus. | On the contrary, Judgment is more perfect than counsel. But euboulia, or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is synesis (judging well according to common law) a virtue, as being good judgment. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod synesis importat iudicium rectum non quidem circa speculabilia, sed circa particularia operabilia, circa quae etiam est prudentia. Unde secundum synesim dicuntur in Graeco aliqui syneti, idest sensati, vel eusyneti, idest homines boni sensus, sicut e contrario qui carent hac virtute dicuntur asyneti, idest insensati. Oportet autem quod secundum differentiam actuum qui non reducuntur in eandem causam sit etiam diversitas virtutum. Manifestum est autem quod bonitas consilii et bonitas iudicii non reducuntur in eandem causam, multi enim sunt bene consiliativi qui tamen non sunt bene sensati, quasi recte iudicantes. Sicut etiam in speculativis aliqui sunt bene inquirentes, propter hoc quod ratio eorum prompta est ad discurrendum per diversa, quod videtur provenire ex dispositione imaginativae virtutis, quae de facili potest formare diversa phantasmata, et tamen huiusmodi quandoque non sunt boni iudicii, quod est propter defectum intellectus, qui maxime contingit ex mala dispositione communis sensus non bene iudicantis. Et ideo oportet praeter eubuliam esse aliam virtutem quae est bene iudicativa. Et haec dicitur synesis. | I answer that, synesis (judging well according to common law) signifies a right judgment, not indeed about speculative matters, but about particular practical matters, about which also is prudence. Hence in Greek some, in respect of synesis (judging well according to common law) are said to be synetoi, i.e. "persons of sense," or eusynetoi, i.e. "men of good sense," just as on the other hand, those who lack this virtue are called asynetoi, i.e. "senseless." Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the same cause, must correspond to different virtues. And it is evident that goodness of counsel and goodness of judgment are not reducible to the same cause, for many can take good counsel, without having good sense so as to judge well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good at research, through their reason being quick at arguing from one thing to another (which seems to be due to a disposition of their power of imagination, which has a facility in forming phantasms), and yet such persons sometimes lack good judgment (and this is due to a defect in the intellect arising chiefly from a defective disposition of the common sense which fails to judge aright). Hence there is need, besides euboulia (deliberating well), for another virtue, which judges well, and this is called synesis (judging well according to common law). |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod rectum iudicium in hoc consistit quod vis cognoscitiva apprehendat rem aliquam secundum quod in se est. Quod quidem provenit ex recta dispositione virtutis apprehensivae, sicut in speculo, si fuerit bene dispositum, imprimuntur formae corporum secundum quod sunt; si vero fuerit speculum male dispositum, apparent ibi imagines distortae et prave se habentes. Quod autem virtus cognoscitiva sit bene disposita ad recipiendum res secundum quod sunt, contingit quidem radicaliter ex natura, consummative autem ex exercitio vel ex munere gratiae. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, directe ex parte ipsius cognoscitivae virtutis, puta quia non est imbuta pravis conceptionibus, sed veris et rectis, et hoc pertinet ad synesim secundum quod est specialis virtus. Alio modo, indirecte, ex bona dispositione appetitivae virtutis, ex qua sequitur quod homo bene iudicet de appetibilibus. Et sic bonum virtutis iudicium consequitur habitus virtutum moralium, sed circa fines, synesis autem est magis circa ea quae sunt ad finem. | Reply to Objection 1. Right judgment consists in the cognitive power apprehending a thing just as it is in reality, and this is due to the right disposition of the apprehensive power. Thus if a mirror be well disposed the forms of bodies are reflected in it just as they are, whereas if it be ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted and misshapen. Now that the cognitive power be well disposed to receive things just as they are in reality, is radically due to nature, but, as to its consummation, is due to practice or to a gift of grace, and this in two ways. First directly, on the part of the cognitive power itself, for instance, because it is imbued, not with distorted, but with true and correct ideas: this belongs to synesis (judging well according to common law) which in this respect is a special virtue. Secondly indirectly, through the good disposition of the appetitive power, the result being that one judges well of the objects of appetite: and thus a good judgment of virtue results from the habits of moral virtue; but this judgment is about the ends, whereas synesis (judging well according to common law) is rather about the means. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in malis potest quidem iudicium rectum esse in universali, sed in particulari agibili semper eorum iudicium corrumpitur, ut supra habitum est. | Reply to Objection 2. In wicked men there may be right judgment of a universal principle, but their judgment is always corrupt in the particular matter of action, as stated above (Question 47, Article 13). |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod contingit quandoque id quod bene iudicatum est differri, vel negligenter agi aut inordinate. Et ideo post virtutem quae est bene iudicativa necessaria est finalis virtus principalis quae sit bene praeceptiva, scilicet prudentia. | Reply to Objection 3. Sometimes after judging aright we delay to execute or execute negligently or inordinately. Hence after the virtue which judges aright there is a further need of a final and principal virtue, which commands aright, and this is prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gnome non sit specialis virtus a synesi distincta. Quia secundum synesim dicitur aliquis bene iudicativus. Sed nullus potest dici bene iudicativus nisi in omnibus bene iudicet. Ergo synesis se extendit ad omnia diiudicanda. Non est ergo aliqua alia virtus bene iudicativa quae gnome vocatur. | Objection 1. It would seem that gnome (judging well according to general law) is not a special virtue distinct from synesis (judging well according to common law). For a man is said, in respect of synesis (judging well according to common law), to have good judgment. Now no man can be said to have good judgment, unless he judge aright in all things. Therefore synesis (judging well according to common law) extends to all matters of judgment, and consequently there is no other virtue of good judgment called gnome (judging well according to general law). |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, iudicium medium est inter consilium et praeceptum. Sed una tantum virtus est bene consiliativa, scilicet eubulia; et una tantum virtus est bene praeceptiva, scilicet prudentia. Ergo una tantum est virtus bene iudicativa, scilicet synesis. | Objection 2. Further, judgment is midway between counsel and precept. Now there is only one virtue of good counsel, viz. euboulia (deliberating well) and only one virtue of good command, viz. prudence. Therefore there is only one virtue of good judgment, viz. synesis (judging well according to common law). |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, ea quae raro accidunt, in quibus oportet a communibus legibus discedere, videntur praecipue casualia esse, quorum non est ratio, ut dicitur in II Phys. Omnes autem virtutes intellectuales pertinent ad rationem rectam. Ergo circa praedicta non est aliqua virtus intellectualis. | Objection 3. Further, rare occurrences wherein there is need to depart from the common law, seem for the most part to happen by chance, and with such things reason is not concerned, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. Now all the intellectual virtues depend on right reason. Therefore there is no intellectual virtue about such matters. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus determinat, in VI Ethic., gnomen esse specialem virtutem. | On the contrary, The Philosopher concludes (Ethic. vi, 11) that gnome (judging well according to general law) is a special virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod habitus cognoscitivi distinguuntur secundum altiora vel inferiora principia, sicut sapientia in speculativis altiora principia considerat quam scientia, et ideo ab ea distinguitur. Et ita etiam oportet esse in activis. Manifestum est autem quod illa quae sunt praeter ordinem inferioris principii sive causae reducuntur quandoque in ordinem altioris principii, sicut monstruosi partus animalium sunt praeter ordinem virtutis activae in semine, tamen cadunt sub ordine altioris principii, scilicet caelestis corporis, vel ulterius providentiae divinae. Unde ille qui consideraret virtutem activam in semine non posset iudicium certum ferre de huiusmodi monstris, de quibus tamen potest iudicari secundum considerationem divinae providentiae. Contingit autem quandoque aliquid esse faciendum praeter communes regulas agendorum, puta cum impugnatori patriae non est depositum reddendum, vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi. Et ideo oportet de huiusmodi iudicare secundum aliqua altiora principia quam sint regulae communes, secundum quas iudicat synesis. Et secundum illa altiora principia exigitur altior virtus iudicativa, quae vocatur gnome, quae importat quandam perspicacitatem iudicii. | I answer that cognitive habits differ according to higher and lower principles: thus in speculative matters wisdom considers higher principles than science does, and consequently is distinguished from it; and so must it be also in practical matters. Now it is evident that what is beside the order of a lower principle or cause, is sometimes reducible to the order of a higher principle; thus monstrous births of animals are beside the order of the active seminal force, and yet they come under the order of a higher principle, namely, of a heavenly body, or higher still, of Divine Providence. Hence by considering the active seminal force one could not pronounce a sure judgment on such monstrosities, and yet this is possible if we consider Divine Providence. Now it happens sometimes that something has to be done which is not covered by the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of the enemy of one's country, when it would be wrong to give him back his deposit, or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to judge of such matters according to higher principles than the common laws, according to which synesis (judging according to common law) judges: and corresponding to such higher principles it is necessary to have a higher virtue of judgment, which is called gnome (judging according to general law), and which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod synesis est vere iudicativa de omnibus quae secundum communes regulas fiunt. Sed praeter communes regulas sunt quaedam alia diiudicanda, ut iam dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1. Synesis (judging well according to common law) judges rightly about all actions that are covered by the common rules: but certain things have to be judged beside these common rules, as stated above. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod iudicium debet sumi ex propriis principiis rei, inquisitio autem fit etiam per communia. Unde etiam in speculativis dialectica, quae est inquisitiva, procedit ex communibus, demonstrativa autem, quae est iudicativa, procedit ex propriis. Et ideo eubulia, ad quam pertinet inquisitio consilii, est una de omnibus, non autem synesis, quae est iudicativa. Praeceptum autem respicit in omnibus unam rationem boni. Et ideo etiam prudentia non est nisi una. | Reply to Objection 2. Judgment about a thing should be formed from the proper principles thereof, whereas research is made by employing also common principles. Wherefore also in speculative matters, dialectics which aims at research proceeds from common principles; while demonstration which tends to judgment, proceeds from proper principles. Hence euboulia (deliberating well) to which the research of counsel belongs is one for all, but not so synesis (judging well according to common law) whose act is judicial. Command considers in all matters the one aspect of good, wherefore prudence also is only one. |
| IIª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia illa quae praeter communem cursum contingere possunt considerare pertinet ad solam providentiam divinam, sed inter homines ille qui est magis perspicax potest plura horum sua ratione diiudicare. Et ad hoc pertinet gnome, quae importat quandam perspicacitatem iudicii. | Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to Divine Providence alone to consider all things that may happen beside the common course. On the other hand, among men, he who is most discerning can judge a greater number of such things by his reason: this belongs to gnome (judging well according to general law), which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment. |