| IIª-IIae q. 128 pr. Deinde considerandum est de partibus fortitudinis. Et primo considerandum est quae sint fortitudinis partes; secundo, de singulis partibus est agendum. | Question 128. The parts of fortitude |
| IIª-IIae q. 128 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter partes fortitudinis enumerentur. Tullius enim, in sua rhetorica, ponit fortitudinis quatuor partes, scilicet magnificentiam, fiduciam, patientiam et perseverantiam. Et videtur quod inconvenienter. Magnificentia enim videtur ad liberalitatem pertinere, quia utraque est circa pecunias, et necesse est magnificum liberalem esse, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Sed liberalitas est pars iustitiae, ut supra habitum est. Ergo magnificentia non debet poni pars fortitudinis. | Objection 1. It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably assigned. For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) assigns four parts to fortitude, namely "magnificence," "confidence," "patience," and "perseverance." Now magnificence seems to pertain to liberality; since both are concerned about money, and "a magnificent man must needs be liberal," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is a part of justice, as stated above (Question 117, Article 5). Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 128 arg. 2 Praeterea, fiducia nihil aliud esse videtur quam spes. Sed spes non videtur ad fortitudinem pertinere, sed ponitur per se virtus. Ergo fiducia non debet poni pars fortitudinis. | Objection 2. Further, confidence is apparently the same as hope. But hope does not seem to pertain to fortitude, but is rather a virtue by itself. Therefore confidence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 128 arg. 3 Praeterea, fortitudo facit hominem bene se habere circa pericula. Sed magnificentia et fiducia non important in sui ratione aliquam habitudinem ad pericula. Ergo non ponuntur convenienter partes fortitudinis. | Objection 3. Further, fortitude makes a man behave aright in face of danger. But magnificence and confidence do not essentially imply any relation to danger. Therefore they are not suitably reckoned as parts of fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 128 arg. 4 Praeterea, patientia, secundum Tullium, importat difficilium perpessionem, quod etiam ipse attribuit fortitudini. Ergo patientia est idem fortitudini, et non est pars eius. | Objection 4. Further, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) patience denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same to fortitude. Therefore patience is the same as fortitude and not a part thereof. |
| IIª-IIae q. 128 arg. 5 Praeterea, illud quod requiritur in qualibet virtute, non debet poni pars alicuius specialis virtutis. Sed perseverantia requiritur in qualibet virtute, dicitur enim Matth. XXIV, qui perseveraverit usque in finem, hic salvus erit. Ergo perseverantia non debet poni pars fortitudinis. | Objection 5. Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue should not be reckoned a part of a special virtue. But perseverance is required in every virtue: for it is written (Matthew 24:13): "He that shall persevere to the end he shall be saved." Therefore perseverance should not be accounted a part of fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 128 arg. 6 Praeterea, Macrobius ponit septem partes fortitudinis, scilicet magnanimitatem, fiduciam, securitatem, magnificentiam, constantiam, tolerantiam, firmitatem. Andronicus etiam ponit septem virtutes annexas fortitudini, quae sunt eupsychia, lema, magnanimitas, virilitas, perseverantia, magnificentia, andragathia. Ergo videtur quod insufficienter Tullius partes fortitudinis enumeraverat. | Objection 6. Further, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) reckons seven parts of fortitude, namely "magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence, constancy, forbearance, stability." Andronicus also reckons seven virtues annexed to fortitude, and these are, "courage, strength of will, magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnificence." Therefore it seems that Tully's reckoning of the parts of fortitude is incomplete. |
| IIª-IIae q. 128 arg. 7 Praeterea, Aristoteles, in III Ethic., ponit quinque modos fortitudinis. Quorum prima est politica, quae fortiter operatur propter timorem exhonorationis vel poenae; secunda militaris, quae fortiter operatur propter artem et experientiam rei bellicae; tertia est fortitudo quae fortiter operatur ex passione, praecipue irae; quarta est fortitudo quae fortiter operatur propter consuetudinem victoriae; quinta autem est quae fortiter operatur propter ignorantiam periculorum. Has autem fortitudines nulla praedictarum divisionum continet. Ergo praedictae enumerationes partium fortitudinis videntur esse inconvenientes. | Objection 7. Further, Aristotle (Ethic. iii) reckons five parts of fortitude. The first is "civic" fortitude, which produces brave deeds through fear of dishonor or punishment; the second is "military" fortitude, which produces brave deeds as a result of warlike art or experience; the third is the fortitude which produces brave deeds resulting from passion, especially anger; the fourth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through being accustomed to overcome; the fifth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through being unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds of fortitude are not comprised under any of the above enumerations. Therefore these enumerations of the parts of fortitude are unfitting. |
| IIª-IIae q. 128 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, alicuius virtutis possunt esse triplices partes, scilicet subiectivae, integrales et potentiales. Fortitudini autem, secundum quod est specialis virtus, non possunt assignari partes subiectivae, eo quod non dividitur in multas virtutes specie differentes, quia est circa materiam valde specialem. Assignantur autem ei partes quasi integrales, et potentiales, integrales quidem secundum ea quae oportet concurrere ad actum fortitudinis; potentiales autem secundum quod ea quae fortitudo observat circa difficillima, scilicet circa pericula mortis, aliquae aliae virtutes observant circa quasdam alias materias minus difficiles; quae quidem virtutes adiunguntur fortitudini sicut secundariae principali. Est autem, sicut supra dictum est, duplex fortitudinis actus, scilicet aggredi, et sustinere. Ad actum autem aggrediendi duo requiruntur. Quorum primum pertinet ad animi praeparationem, ut scilicet aliquis promptum animum habeat ad aggrediendum. Et quantum ad hoc ponit Tullius fiduciam. Unde dicit quod fiducia est per quam magnis et honestis rebus multum ipse animus in se fiduciae cum spe collocavit. Secundum autem pertinet ad operis executionem, ne scilicet aliquis deficiat in executione illorum quae fiducialiter inchoavit. Et quantum ad hoc ponit Tullius magnificentiam. Unde dicit quod magnificentia est rerum magnarum et excelsarum cum animi ampla quadam et splendida propositione cogitatio atque administratio, idest executio, ut scilicet amplo proposito administratio non desit. Haec ergo duo, si coarctentur ad propriam materiam fortitudinis, scilicet ad pericula mortis, erunt quasi partes integrales ipsius, sine quibus fortitudo esse non potest. Si autem referantur ad aliquas alias materias in quibus est minus difficultatis, erunt virtutes distinctae a fortitudine secundum speciem, tamen adiungentur ei sicut secundarium principali, sicut magnificentia a philosopho, in IV Ethic., ponitur circa magnos sumptus; magnanimitas autem, quae videtur idem esse fiduciae, circa magnos honores. Ad alium autem actum fortitudinis, qui est sustinere, duo requiruntur. Quorum primum est ne difficultate imminentium malorum animus frangatur per tristitiam, et decidat a sua magnitudine. Et quantum ad hoc ponit patientiam. Unde dicit quod patientia est honestatis aut utilitatis causa rerum arduarum ac difficilium voluntaria ac diuturna perpessio. Aliud autem est ut ex diuturna difficilium passione homo non fatigetur usque ad hoc quod desistat, secundum illud Heb. XII, non fatigemini, animis vestris deficientes. Et quantum ad hoc ponit perseverantiam. Unde dicit quod perseverantia est in ratione bene considerata stabilis et perpetua permansio. Haec etiam duo, si coarctentur ad propriam materiam fortitudinis, erunt partes quasi integrales ipsius. Si autem ad quascumque materias difficiles referantur, erunt virtutes a fortitudine distinctae, et tamen ei adiungentur sicut secundariae principali. | I answer that, As stated above (Article 48), a virtue can have three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. But fortitude, taken as a special virtue, cannot have subjective parts, since it is not divided into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is about a very special matter. However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts assigned to it: integral parts, with regard to those things the concurrence of which is requisite for an act of fortitude; and potential parts, because what fortitude practices in face of the greatest hardships, namely dangers of death, certain other virtues practice in the matter of certain minor hardships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as secondary virtues to the principal virtue. As stated above (123, 3,6), the act of fortitude is twofold, aggression and endurance. Now two things are required for the act of aggression. The first regards preparation of the mind, and consists in one's having a mind ready for aggression. On this respect Tully mentions "confidence," of which he says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "with this the mind is much assured and firmly hopeful in great and honorable undertakings." The second regards the accomplishment of the deed, and consists in not failing to accomplish what one has confidently begun. On this respect Tully mentions "magnificence," which he describes as being "the discussion and administration," i.e. accomplishment "of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind," so as to combine execution with greatness of purpose. Accordingly if these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to dangers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because without them there can be no fortitude; whereas if they be referred to other matters involving less hardship, they will be virtues specifically distinct from fortitude, but annexed thereto as secondary virtues to principal: thus "magnificence" is referred by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv) to great expenses, and "magnanimity," which seems to be the same as confidence, to great honors. Again, two things are requisite for the other act of fortitude, viz. endurance. The first is that the mind be not broken by sorrow, and fall away from its greatness, by reason of the stress of threatening evil. On this respect he mentions "patience," which he describes as "the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." The other is that by the prolonged suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose courage, according to Hebrews 12:3, "That you be not wearied, fainting in your minds." On this respect he mentions "perseverance," which accordingly he describes as "the fixed and continued persistence in a well considered purpose." If these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be referred to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct from fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal. |
| IIª-IIae q. 128 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod magnificentia circa materiam liberalitatis addit quandam magnitudinem, quae pertinet ad rationem ardui, quod est obiectum irascibilis, quam principaliter perficit fortitudo. Et ex hac parte pertinet ad fortitudinem. | Reply to Objection 1. Magnificence in the matter of liberality adds a certain greatness: this is connected with the notion of difficulty which is the object of the irascible faculty, that is perfected chiefly by fortitude: and to this virtue, in this respect, it belongs. |
| IIª-IIae q. 128 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod spes qua quis de Deo confidit, ponitur virtus theologica, ut supra habitum est. Sed per fiduciam quae nunc ponitur fortitudinis pars, homo habet spem in seipso, tamen sub Deo. | Reply to Objection 2. Hope whereby one confides in God is accounted a theological virtue, as stated above (17, 5; I-II, 62, 3). But by confidence which here is accounted a part of fortitude, man hopes in himself, yet under God withal. |
| IIª-IIae q. 128 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quascumque magnas res aggredi videtur esse periculosum, quia in his deficere est valde nocivum. Unde etiam si magnificentia et fiducia circa quaecumque alia magna operanda vel aggredienda ponantur, habent quandam affinitatem cum fortitudine, ratione periculi imminentis. | Reply to Objection 3. To venture on anything great seems to involve danger, since to fail in such things is very disastrous. Wherefore although magnificence and confidence are referred to the accomplishment of or venturing on any other great things, they have a certain connection with fortitude by reason of the imminent danger. |
| IIª-IIae q. 128 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod patientia non solum perpetitur pericula mortis, circa quae est fortitudo, absque superabundanti tristitia, sed etiam quaecumque alia difficilia seu periculosa. Et secundum hoc ponitur virtus adiuncta fortitudini. Inquantum autem est circa pericula mortis, est pars integralis ipsius. | Reply to Objection 4. Patience endures not only dangers of death, with which fortitude is concerned, without excessive sorrow, but also any other hardships or dangers. On this respect it is accounted a virtue annexed to fortitude: but as referred to dangers of death, it is an integral part thereof. |
| IIª-IIae q. 128 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod perseverantia secundum quod dicit continuitatem boni operis usque in finem, circumstantia omnis virtutis esse potest. Ponitur autem pars fortitudinis secundum quod dictum est. | Reply to Objection 5. Perseverance as denoting persistence in a good deed unto the end, may be a circumstance of every virtue, but it is reckoned a part of fortitude in the sense stated in the body of the Article. |
| IIª-IIae q. 128 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum quod Macrobius ponit quatuor praedicta a Tullio posita, scilicet fiduciam, magnificentiam, tolerantiam, quam ponit loco patientiae, et firmitatem, quam ponit loco perseverantiae. Superaddit autem tria. Quorum duo, scilicet magnanimitas et securitas, a Tullio sub fiducia comprehenduntur, sed Macrobius magis per specialia distinguit. Nam fiducia importat spem hominis ad magna. Spes autem cuiuslibet rei praesupponit appetitum in magna protensum per desiderium, quod pertinet ad magnanimitatem; dictum est enim supra quod spes praesupponit amorem et desiderium rei speratae. Vel melius potest dici quod fiducia pertinet ad spei certitudinem; magnanimitas autem ad magnitudinem rei speratae. Spes autem firma esse non potest nisi amoveatur contrarium, quandoque enim aliquis, quantum ex seipso est, speraret aliquid, sed spes tollitur propter impedimentum timoris; timor enim quodammodo spei contrariatur, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo Macrobius addit securitatem, quae excludit timorem. Tertium autem addit, scilicet constantiam, quae sub magnificentia comprehendi potest, oportet enim in his quae magnifice aliquis facit, constantem animum habere. Et ideo Tullius ad magnificentiam pertinere dicit non solum administrationem rerum magnarum, sed etiam animi amplam excogitationem ipsarum. Potest etiam constantia ad perseverantiam pertinere, ut perseverans dicatur aliquis ex eo quod non desistit propter diuturnitatem; constans autem ex eo quod non desistit propter quaecumque alia repugnantia. Illa etiam quae Andronicus ponit ad eadem pertinere videntur. Ponit enim perseverantiam et magnificentiam cum Tullio et Macrobio; magnanimitatem autem cum Macrobio. Lema autem est idem quod patientia vel tolerantia, dicit enim quod lema est habitus promptus tribuens ad conari qualia oportet, et sustinere quae ratio dicit. Eupsychia autem, idest bona animositas, idem videtur esse quod securitas, dicit enim quod est robur animae ad perficiendum opera ipsius. Virilitas autem idem esse videtur quod fiducia, dicit enim quod virilitas est habitus per se sufficiens tributus in his quae secundum virtutem. Magnificentiae autem addit andragathiam, quasi virilem bonitatem, quae apud nos strenuitas potest dici. Ad magnificentiam enim pertinet non solum quod homo consistat in executione magnorum operum, quod pertinet ad constantiam, sed etiam cum quadam virili prudentia et sollicitudine ea exequatur, quod pertinet ad andragathiam sive strenuitatem. Unde dicit quod andragathia est viri virtus adinventiva communicabilium operum. Et sic patet quod omnes huiusmodi partes ad quatuor principales reducuntur quas Tullius ponit. | Reply to Objection 6. Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid mentioned by Tully, namely "confidence, magnificence, forbearance," which he puts in the place of patience, and "firmness," which he substitutes for perseverance. And he adds three, two of which, namely "magnanimity" and "security," are comprised by Tully under the head of confidence. But Macrobius is more specific in his enumeration. Because confidence denotes a man's hope for great things: and hope for anything presupposes an appetite stretching forth to great things by desire, and this belongs to magnanimity. For it has been stated above (I-II, 40, 2) that hope presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped for. A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the certitude of hope; while magnanimity refers to the magnitude of the thing hoped for. Now hope has no firmness unless its contrary be removed, for sometimes one, for one's own part, would hope for something, but hope is avoided on account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat contrary to hope, as stated above, (I-II, 40, 4, ad 1). Hence Macrobius adds security, which banishes fear. He adds a third, namely constancy, which may be comprised under magnificence. For in performing deeds of magnificence one needs to have a constant mind. For this reason Tully says that magnificence consists not only in accomplishing great things, but also in discussing them generously in the mind. Constancy may also pertain to perseverance, so that one may be called persevering through not desisting on account of delays, and constant through not desisting on account of any other obstacles. Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount to the same as the above. For with Tully and Macrobius he mentions "perseverance" and "magnificence," and with Macrobius, "magnanimity." "Strength of will" is the same as patience or forbearance, for he says that "strength of will is a habit that makes one ready to attempt what ought to be attempted, and to endure what reason says should be endured"--i.e. good courage seems to be the same as assurance, for he defines it as "strength of soul in the accomplishment of its purpose." Manliness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says that "manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of virtue." Besides magnificence he mentions andragathia, i.e. manly goodness which we may render "strenuousness." For magnificence consists not only in being constant in the accomplishment of great deeds, which belongs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain manly prudence and solicitude to that accomplishment, and this belongs to andragathia, strenuousness: wherefore he says that andragathia is the virtue of a man, whereby he thinks out profitable works. Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the four principal parts mentioned by Tully. |
| IIª-IIae q. 128 ad 7 Ad septimum dicendum quod illa quinque quae ponit Aristoteles, deficiunt a vera ratione virtutis, quia etsi conveniant in actu fortitudinis, differunt tamen in motivo, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo non ponuntur partes fortitudinis, sed quidam fortitudinis modi. | Reply to Objection 7. The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short of the true notion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of fortitude, they differ as to motive, as stated above (123, 1, ad 2); wherefore they are not reckoned parts but modes of fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 pr. Deinde considerandum est de singulis fortitudinis partibus, ita tamen ut sub quatuor principalibus quas Tullius ponit, alias comprehendamus; nisi quod magnanimitatem, de qua etiam Aristoteles tractat, loco fiduciae ponemus. Primo ergo considerandum erit de magnanimitate; secundo, de magnificentia; tertio, de patientia; quarto, de perseverantia. Circa primum, primo considerandum est de magnanimitate; secundo, de vitiis oppositis. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum magnanimitas sit circa honores. Secundo, utrum magnanimitas sit solum circa magnos honores. Tertio, utrum sit virtus. Quarto, utrum sit virtus specialis. Quinto, utrum sit pars fortitudinis. Sexto, quomodo se habeat ad fiduciam. Septimo, quomodo se habeat ad securitatem. Octavo, quomodo se habeat ad bona fortunae. | Question 129. Magnanimity 1. Is magnanimity about honors? 2. Is magnanimity only about great honors? 3. Is it a virtue? 4. Is it a special virtue? 5. Is it a part of fortitude? 6. Its relation to confidence 7. Its relation to assurance 8. Its relation to goods of fortune |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnanimitas non sit circa honores. Magnanimitas enim est in irascibili. Quod ex ipso nomine patet, nam magnanimitas dicitur quasi magnitudo animi; animus autem pro vi irascibili ponitur, ut patet in III de anima, ubi philosophus dicit quod in sensitivo appetitu est desiderium et animus, idest concupiscibilis et irascibilis. Sed honor est quoddam bonum concupiscibile, cum sit praemium virtutis. Ergo videtur quod magnanimitas non sit circa honores. | Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not about honors. For magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as its very name shows, since "magnanimity" signifies greatness of mind, and "mind" denotes the irascible part, as appears from De Anima iii, 42, where the Philosopher says that "in the sensitive appetite are desire and mind," i.e. the concupiscible and irascible parts. But honor is a concupiscible good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it seems that magnanimity is not about honors. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, magnanimitas, cum sit virtus moralis, oportet quod sit circa passiones vel operationes. Non est autem circa operationes, quia sic esset pars iustitiae. Et sic relinquitur quod sit circa passiones. Honor autem non est passio. Ergo magnanimitas non est circa honores. | Objection 2. Further, since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it must needs be about either passions or operations. Now it is not about operations, for then it would be a part of justice: whence it follows that it is about passions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore magnanimity is not about honors. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, magnanimitas videtur pertinere magis ad prosecutionem quam ad fugam, dicitur enim magnanimus quia ad magna tendit. Sed virtuosi non laudantur ex hoc quod cupiunt honores, sed magis ex hoc quod eos fugiunt. Ergo magnanimitas non est circa honores. | Objection 3. Further, the nature of magnanimity seems to regard pursuit rather than avoidance, for a man is said to be magnanimous because he tends to great things. But the virtuous are praised not for desiring honors, but for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about honors. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnanimus est circa honores et inhonorationes. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "magnanimity is about honor and dishonor." |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod magnanimitas ex suo nomine importat quandam extensionem animi ad magna. Consideratur autem habitudo virtutis ad duo, uno quidem modo, ad materiam circa quam operatur; alio modo, ad actum proprium, qui consistit in debito usu talis materiae. Et quia habitus virtutis principaliter ex actu determinatur, ex hoc principaliter dicitur aliquis magnanimus quod animum habet ad aliquem magnum actum. Aliquis autem actus potest dici dupliciter magnus, uno modo, secundum proportionem; alio modo, absolute. Magnus quidem potest dici actus secundum proportionem etiam qui consistit in usu alicuius rei parvae vel mediocris, puta si aliquis illa re optime utatur. Sed simpliciter et absolute magnus actus est qui consistit in optimo usu rei maximae. Res autem quae in usum hominis veniunt sunt res exteriores. Inter quae simpliciter maximum est honor, tum quia propinquissimum est virtuti, utpote testificatio quaedam existens de virtute alicuius, ut supra habitum est; tum etiam quia Deo et optimis exhibetur; tum etiam quia homines propter honorem consequendum et vituperium vitandum omnia alia postponunt. Sic autem dicitur aliquis magnanimus ex his quae sunt magna simpliciter et absolute, sicut dicitur aliquis fortis ex his quae sunt simpliciter difficilia. Et ideo consequens est quod magnanimitas consistat circa honores. | I answer that, Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching forth of the mind to great things. Now virtue bears a relationship to two things, first to the matter about which is the field of its activity, secondly to its proper act, which consists in the right use of such matter. And since a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly from its act, a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is minded to do some great act. Now an act may be called great in two ways: in one way proportionately, in another absolutely. An act may be called great proportionately, even if it consist in the use of some small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one make a very good use of it: but an act is simply and absolutely great when it consists in the best use of the greatest thing. The things which come into man's use are external things, and among these honor is the greatest simply, both because it is the most akin to virtue, since it is an attestation to a person's virtue, as stated above (103, 1 and 2); and because it is offered to God and to the best; and again because, in order to obtain honor even as to avoid shame, men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be magnanimous in respect of things that are great absolutely and simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of things that are difficult simply. It follows therefore that magnanimity is about honors. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum vel malum, absolute quidem considerata, pertinent ad concupiscibilem, sed inquantum additur ratio ardui, sic pertinet ad irascibilem. Et hoc modo honorem respicit magnanimitas, inquantum scilicet habet rationem magni vel ardui. | Reply to Objection 1. Good and evil absolutely considered regard the concupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of difficult is added, they belong to the irascible. Thus it is that magnanimity regards honor, inasmuch, to wit, as honor has the aspect of something great or difficult. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod honor, etsi non sit passio vel operatio, est tamen alicuius passionis obiectum, scilicet spei, quae tendit in bonum arduum. Et ideo magnanimitas est quidem immediate circa passionem spei, mediate autem circa honorem, sicut circa obiectum spei, sicut et de fortitudine supra dictum est quod est circa pericula mortis inquantum sunt obiectum timoris et audaciae. | Reply to Objection 2. Although honor is neither a passion nor an operation, yet it is the object of a passion, namely hope, which tends to a difficult good. Wherefore magnanimity is immediately about the passions of hope, and mediately about honor as the object of hope: even so, we have stated (123, 4,5) with regard to fortitude that it is about dangers of death in so far as they are the object of fear and daring. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod illi qui contemnunt honores hoc modo quod pro eis adipiscendis nihil inconveniens faciunt, nec eos nimis appretiantur, laudabiles sunt. Si quis autem hoc modo contemneret honores quod non curaret facere ea quae sunt digna honore, hoc vituperabile esset. Et hoc modo magnanimitas est circa honorem, ut videlicet studeat facere ea quae sunt honore digna, non tamen sic ut pro magno aestimet humanum honorem. | Reply to Objection 3. Those are worthy of praise who despise riches in such a way as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain them, nor have too great a desire for them. If, however, one were to despise honors so as not to care to do what is worthy of honor, this would be deserving of blame. Accordingly magnanimity is about honors in the sense that a man strives to do what is deserving of honor, yet not so as to think much of the honor accorded by man. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnanimitas de sui ratione non habeat quod sit circa magnum honorem. Propria enim materia magnanimitatis est honor, ut dictum est. Sed magnum et parvum accidunt honori. Ergo de ratione magnanimitatis non est quod sit circa magnum honorem. | Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about great honors. For the proper matter of magnanimity is honor, as stated above (Article 1). But great and little are accidental to honor. Therefore it is not essential to magnanimity to be about great honors. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut magnanimitas est circa honores, ita mansuetudo est circa iras. Sed non est de ratione mansuetudinis quod sit circa magnas iras, vel circa parvas. Ergo etiam non est de ratione magnanimitatis quod sit circa magnos honores. | Objection 2. Further, just as magnanimity is about honor, so is meekness about anger. But it is not essential to meekness to be about either great or little anger. Therefore neither is it essential to magnanimity to be about great honor. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, parvus honor minus distat a magno honore quam exhonoratio. Sed magnanimus bene se habet circa exhonorationes. Ergo etiam et circa parvos honores. Non ergo est solum circa honores magnos. | Objection 3. Further, small honor is less aloof from great honor than is dishonor. But magnanimity is well ordered in relation to dishonor, and consequently in relation to small honors also. Therefore it is not only about great honors. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod magnanimitas est circa magnos honores. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that magnanimity is about great honors. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in VII Physic., virtus est perfectio quaedam. Et intelligitur esse perfectio potentiae, ad cuius ultimum pertinet, ut patet in I de caelo. Perfectio autem potentiae non attenditur in qualicumque operatione, sed in operatione quae habet aliquam magnitudinem aut difficultatem, quaelibet enim potentia, quantumcumque imperfecta, potest in aliquam operationem modicam et debilem. Et ideo ad rationem virtutis pertinet ut sic circa difficile et bonum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Difficile autem et magnum, quae ad idem pertinent, in actu virtutis potest attendi dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte rationis, inquantum scilicet difficile est medium rationis adinvenire et in aliqua materia statuere. Et ista difficultas sola invenitur in actu virtutum intellectualium, et etiam in actu iustitiae. Alia autem est difficultas ex parte materiae, quae de se repugnantiam habere potest ad modum rationis qui est circa eam ponendus. Et ista difficultas praecipue attenditur in aliis virtutibus moralibus, quae sunt circa passiones, quia passiones pugnant contra rationem, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Circa quas considerandum est quod quaedam passiones sunt quae habent magnam vim resistendi rationi principaliter ex parte passionis, quaedam vero principaliter ex parte rerum quae sunt obiecta passionum. Passiones autem non habent magnam vim repugnandi rationi nisi fuerint vehementes, eo quod appetitus sensitivus, in quo sunt passiones, naturaliter subditur rationi. Et ideo virtutes quae sunt circa huiusmodi passiones non ponuntur nisi circa id quod est magnum in ipsis passionibus, sicut fortitudo est circa maximos timores et audacias, temperantia est circa maximarum delectationum concupiscentias, et similiter mansuetudo est circa maximas iras. Passiones autem quaedam habent magnam vim repugnandi rationi ex ipsis rebus exterioribus quae sunt passionum obiecta, sicut amor vel cupiditas pecuniae seu honoris. Et in istis oportet esse virtutem non solum circa id quod est maximum in eis, sed etiam circa mediocria vel minora, quia res exterius existentes, etiam si sint parvae, sunt multum appetibiles, utpote necessariae ad hominis vitam. Et ideo circa appetitum pecuniarum sunt duae virtutes, una quidem circa mediocres et moderatas, scilicet liberalitas; alia autem circa magnas pecunias, scilicet magnificentia. Similiter etiam et circa honores sunt duae virtutes. Una quidem circa mediocres honores, quae innominata est, nominatur tamen ex suis extremis, quae sunt philotimia, idest amor honoris, et aphilotimia, idest sine amore honoris; laudatur enim quandoque qui amat honorem, quandoque autem qui non curat de honore, prout scilicet utrumque moderate fieri potest. Circa magnos autem honores est magnanimitas. Et ideo dicendum est quod propria materia magnanimitatis est magnus honor, et ad ea tendit magnanimus quae sunt magno honore digna. | I answer that According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii, 17, 18), virtue is a perfection, and by this we are to understand the perfection of a power, and that it regards the extreme limit of that power, as stated in De Coelo i, 116. Now the perfection of a power is not perceived in every operation of that power, but in such operations as are great or difficult: for every power, however imperfect, can extend to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it is essential to a virtue to be about the difficult and the good, as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) in an act of virtue may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point of view of reason, in so far as it is difficult to find and establish the rational means in some particular matter: and this difficulty is found only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also of justice. The other difficulty is on the part of the matter, which may involve a certain opposition to the moderation of reason, which moderation has to be applied thereto: and this difficulty regards chiefly the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, because the passions resist reason as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4). Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that the greatness of this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly in some cases from the passions themselves, and in others from the things that are the objects of the passions. The passions themselves have no great power of resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive appetite, which is the seat of the passions, is naturally subject to reason. Hence the resisting virtues that are about these passions regard only that which is great in such passions: thus fortitude is about very great fear and daring; temperance about the concupiscence of the greatest pleasures, and likewise meekness about the greatest anger. On the other hand, some passions have great power of resistance to reason arising from the external things themselves that are the objects of those passions: such are the love or desire of money or of honor. And for these it is necessary to have a virtue not only regarding that which is greatest in those passions, but also about that which is ordinary or little: because things external, though they be little, are very desirable, as being necessary for human life. Hence with regard to the desire of money there are two virtues, one about ordinary or little sums of money, namely liberality, and another about large sums of money, namely "magnificence." In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary honors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated by its extremes, which are philotimia, i.e. love of honor, and aphilotimia, i.e. without love of honor: for sometimes a man is commended for loving honor, and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as both these things may be done in moderation. But with regard to great honors there is "magnanimity." Wherefore we must conclude that the proper matter of magnanimity is great honor, and that a magnanimous man tends to such things as are deserving of honor. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod magnum et parvum per accidens se habent ad honorem secundum se consideratum, sed magnam differentiam faciunt secundum quod comparantur ad rationem, cuius modum in usu honoris observari oportet, qui multo difficilius observatur in magnis honoribus quam in parvis. | Reply to Objection 1. Great and little are accidental to honor considered in itself: but they make a great difference in their relation to reason, the mode of which has to be observed in the use of honor, for it is much more difficult to observe it in great than in little honors. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in ira et in aliis materiis non habet difficultatem notabilem nisi illud quod est maximum, circa quod solum oportet esse virtutem. Alia autem ratio est de divitiis et honoribus, quae sunt res extra animam existentes. | Reply to Objection 2. In anger and other matters only that which is greatest presents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there any need of a virtue. It is different with riches and honors which are things existing outside the soul. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui bene utitur magnis, multo magis potest bene uti parvis. Magnanimitas ergo attendit magnos honores sicut quibus est dignus, vel etiam sicut minores his quibus est dignus, quia scilicet virtus non potest sufficienter honorari ab homine, cui debetur honor a Deo. Et ideo non extollitur ex magnis honoribus, quia non reputat eos supra se, sed magis eos contemnit. Et multo magis moderatos aut parvos. Et similiter etiam dehonorationibus non frangitur, sed eas contemnit, utpote quas reputat sibi indigne afferri. | Reply to Objection 3. He that makes good use of great things is much more able to make good use of little things. Accordingly the magnanimous man looks upon great honors as a thing of which he is worthy, or even little honors as something he deserves, because, to wit, man cannot sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be honored by God. Hence he is not uplifted by great honors, because he does not deem them above him; rather does he despise them, and much more such as are ordinary or little. On like manner he is not cast down by dishonor, but despises it, since he recognizes that he does not deserve it. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnanimitas non sit virtus. Omnis enim virtus moralis in medio consistit. Sed magnanimitas non consistit in medio, sed in maximo, quia maximis dignificat seipsum, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo magnanimitas non est virtus. | Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue. For every moral virtue observes the mean. But magnanimity observes not the mean but the greater extreme: because the "magnanimous man deems himself worthy of the greatest things" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, qui habet unam virtutem, habet omnes, ut supra habitum est. Sed aliquis potest habere aliquam virtutem non habens magnanimitatem, dicit enim philosophus, in IV Ethic., quod qui est parvis dignus, et his dignificat seipsum, temperatus est, magnanimus autem non. Ergo magnanimitas non est virtus. | Objection 2. Further, he that has one virtue has them all, as stated above (I-II, 65, 1). But one may have a virtue without having magnanimity: since the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "whosoever is worthy of little things and deems himself worthy of them, is temperate, but he is not magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, virtus est bona qualitas mentis, ut supra habitum est. Sed magnanimitas habet quasdam corporales dispositiones, dicit enim philosophus, in IV Ethic., quod motus lentus magnanimi videtur, et vox gravis, et locutio stabilis. Ergo magnanimitas non est virtus. | Objection 3. Further, "Virtue is a good quality of the mind," as stated above (I-II, 55, 4). But magnanimity implies certain dispositions of the body: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) of "a magnanimous man that his gait is slow, his voice deep, and his utterance calm." Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, nulla virtus opponitur alteri virtuti. Sed magnanimitas opponitur humilitati, nam magnanimus dignum se reputat magnis, et alios contemnit, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo magnanimitas non est virtus. | Objection 4. Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But magnanimity is opposed to humility, since "the magnanimous deems himself worthy of great things, and despises others," according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 3 arg. 5 Praeterea, cuiuslibet virtutis proprietates sunt laudabiles. Sed magnanimitas habet quasdam proprietates vituperabiles, primo quidem, quod non est memor benefactorum; secundo, quod est otiosus et tardus; tertio, quod utitur ironia ad multos; quarto, quod non potest alii convivere; quinto, quod magis possidet infructuosa quam fructuosa. Ergo magnanimitas non est virtus. | Objection 5. Further, the properties of every virtue are praiseworthy. But magnanimity has certain properties that call for blame. For, in the first place, the magnanimous is unmindful of favors; secondly, he is remiss and slow of action; thirdly, he employs irony [Cf. 113] towards many; fourthly, he is unable to associate with others; fifthly, because he holds to the barren things rather than to those that are fruitful. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod in laudem quorundam dicitur, II Machab. XIV, Nicanor audiens virtutem comitum Iudae, et animi magnitudinem quam pro patriae certaminibus habebant, et cetera. Laudabilia autem sunt solum virtutum opera. Ergo magnanimitas, ad quam pertinet magnum animum habere, est virtus. | On the contrary, It is written in praise of certain men (2 Maccabees 15:18): "Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas' companions, and the greatness of courage [animi magnitudinem] with which they fought for their country, was afraid to try the matter by the sword." Now, only deeds of virtue are worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity which consists in greatness of courage is a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ad rationem virtutis humanae pertinet ut in rebus humanis bonum rationis servetur, quod est proprium hominis bonum. Inter ceteras autem res humanas exteriores, honores praecipuum locum tenent, sicut dictum est. Et inde magnanimitas, quae modum rationis ponit circa magnos honores, est virtus. | I answer that, The essence of human virtue consists in safeguarding the good of reason in human affairs, for this is man's proper good. Now among external human things honors take precedence of all others, as stated above (1; I-II, 11, 2, Objection 3). Therefore magnanimity, which observes the mode of reason in great honors, is a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., magnanimus est quidem magnitudine extremus, inquantum scilicet ad maxima tendit, eo autem quod ut oportet, medius, quia videlicet ad ea quae sunt maxima, secundum rationem tendit; eo enim quod secundum dignitatem seipsum dignificat, ut ibidem dicitur, quia scilicet se non extendit ad maiora quam dignus est. | Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), "the magnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes," in so far as he tends to what is greatest, "but in the matter of becomingness, he follows the mean," because he tends to the greatest things according to reason, for "he deems himself worthy in accordance with his worth" (Ethic. iv, 3), since his aims do not surpass his deserts. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod connexio virtutum non est intelligenda secundum actus, ut scilicet cuilibet competat habere actus omnium virtutum. Unde actus magnanimitatis non competit cuilibet virtuoso, sed solum magnis. Sed secundum principia virtutum, quae sunt prudentia et gratia, omnes virtutes sunt connexae secundum habitus simul in anima existentes, vel in actu vel in propinqua dispositione. Et sic potest aliquis cui non competit actus magnanimitatis, habere magnanimitatis habitum, per quem scilicet disponitur ad talem actum exequendum si sibi secundum statum suum competeret. | Reply to Objection 2. The mutual connection of the virtues does not apply to their acts, as though every one were competent to practice the acts of all the virtues. Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not becoming to every virtuous man, but only to great men. on the other hand, as regards the principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace, all virtues are connected together, since their habits reside together in the soul, either in act or by way of a proximate disposition thereto. Thus it is possible for one to whom the act of magnanimity is not competent, to have the habit of magnanimity, whereby he is disposed to practice that act if it were competent to him according to his state. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod corporales motus diversificantur secundum diversas animae apprehensiones et affectiones. Et secundum hoc contingit quod ad magnanimitatem consequuntur quaedam determinata accidentia circa motus corporales. Velocitas enim motus provenit ex eo quod homo ad multa intendit, quae explere festinat, sed magnanimus intendit solum ad magna, quae pauca sunt, quae etiam indigent magna attentione; et ideo habet motum tardum. Similiter etiam acuitas vocis, et velocitas, praecipue competit his qui de quibuslibet contendere volunt, quod non pertinet ad magnanimos, qui non intromittunt se nisi de magnis. Et sicut praedictae dispositiones corporalium motuum conveniunt magnanimis secundum modum affectionis eorum, ita etiam in his qui sunt naturaliter dispositi ad magnanimitatem tales conditiones naturaliter inveniuntur. | Reply to Objection 3. The movements of the body are differentiated according to the different apprehensions and emotions of the soul. And so it happens that to magnanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents by way of bodily movements. For quickness of movement results from a man being intent on many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish, whereas the magnanimous is intent only on great things; these are few and require great attention, wherefore they call for slow movement. Likewise shrill and rapid speaking is chiefly competent to those who are quick to quarrel about anything, and this becomes not the magnanimous who are busy only about great things. And just as these dispositions of bodily movements are competent to the magnanimous man according to the mode of his emotions, so too in those who are naturally disposed to magnanimity these conditions are found naturally. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod in homine invenitur aliquid magnum, quod ex dono Dei possidet; et aliquis defectus, qui competit ei ex infirmitate naturae. Magnanimitas igitur facit quod homo se magnis dignificet secundum considerationem donorum quae possidet ex Deo, sicut, si habet magnam virtutem animi, magnanimitas facit quod ad perfecta opera virtutis tendat. Et similiter est dicendum de usu cuiuslibet alterius boni, puta scientiae vel exterioris fortunae. Humilitas autem facit quod homo seipsum parvipendat secundum considerationem proprii defectus. Similiter etiam magnanimitas contemnit alios secundum quod deficiunt a donis Dei, non enim tantum alios appretiatur quod pro eis aliquid indecens faciat. Sed humilitas alios honorat, et superiores aestimat, inquantum in eis aliquid inspicit de donis Dei. Unde in Psalmo dicitur de viro iusto, ad nihilum deductus est in conspectu eius malignus, quod pertinet ad contemptum magnanimi; timentes autem dominum glorificat, quod pertinet ad honorationem humilis. Et sic patet quod magnanimitas et humilitas non sunt contraria, quamvis in contraria tendere videantur, quia procedunt secundum diversas considerationes. | Reply to Objection 4. There is in man something great which he possesses through the gift of God; and something defective which accrues to him through the weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity makes a man deem himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he holds from God: thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue, magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue; and the same is to be said of the use of any other good, such as science or external fortune. On the other hand, humility makes a man think little of himself in consideration of his own deficiency, and magnanimity makes him despise others in so far as they fall away from God's gifts: since he does not think so much of others as to do anything wrong for their sake. Yet humility makes us honor others and esteem them better than ourselves, in so far as we see some of God's gifts in them. Hence it is written of the just man (Psalm 14:4): "In his sight a vile person is contemned [Douay: 'The malignant is brought to nothing, but he glorifieth,' etc.]," which indicates the contempt of magnanimity, "but he honoreth them that fear the Lord," which points to the reverential bearing of humility. It is therefore evident that magnanimity and humility are not contrary to one another, although they seem to tend in contrary directions, because they proceed according to different considerations. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 3 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod proprietates illae, secundum quod ad magnanimum pertinent, non sunt vituperabiles, sed superexcedenter laudabiles. Quod enim primo dicitur, quod magnanimus non habet in memoria a quibus beneficia recipit, intelligendum est quantum ad hoc quod non est sibi delectabile quod ab aliquibus beneficia recipiat, quin sibi maiora recompenset. Quod pertinet ad perfectionem gratitudinis, in cuius actu vult superexcellere, sicut et in actibus aliarum virtutum. Similiter etiam secundo dicitur quod est otiosus et tardus, non quia deficiat ab operando ea quae sibi conveniunt, sed quia non ingerit se quibuscumque operibus sibi convenientibus, sed solum magnis, qualia decent eum. Dicitur etiam tertio quod utitur ironia, non secundum quod opponitur veritati, ut scilicet dicat de se aliqua vilia quae non sunt vel neget aliqua magna quae sunt, sed quia non totam magnitudinem suam monstrat, maxime quantum ad inferiorum multitudinem; quia sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, ad magnanimum pertinet magnum esse ad eos qui in dignitate et bonis fortunis sunt, ad medios autem moderatum. Quarto etiam dicitur quod ad alios non potest convivere, scilicet familiariter, nisi ad amicos, quia omnino vitat adulationem et simulationem, quae pertinent ad animi parvitatem. Convivit tamen omnibus, et magnis et parvis, secundum quod oportet, ut dictum est. Quinto etiam dicitur quod vult habere magis infructuosa, non quaecumque, sed bona, idest honesta. Nam in omnibus praeponit honesta utilibus, tanquam maiora, utilia enim quaeruntur ad subveniendum alicui defectui, qui magnanimitati repugnat. | Reply to Objection 5. These properties in so far as they belong to a magnanimous man call not for blame, but for very great praise. For in the first place, when it is said that the magnanimous is not mindful of those from whom he has received favors, this points to the fact that he takes no pleasure in accepting favors from others unless he repay them with yet greater favor; this belongs to the perfection of gratitude, in the act of which he wishes to excel, even as in the acts of other virtues. Again, in the second place, it is said that he is remiss and slow of action, not that he is lacking in doing what becomes him, but because he does not busy himself with all kinds of works, but only with great works, such as are becoming to him. He is also said, in the third place, to employ irony, not as opposed to truth, and so as either to say of himself vile things that are not true, or deny of himself great things that are true, but because he does not disclose all his greatness, especially to the large number of those who are beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), "it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards persons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming towards the middle class." On the fourth place, it is said that he cannot associate with others: this means that he is not at home with others than his friends: because he altogether shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which belong to littleness of mind. But he associates with all, both great and little, according as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also said, fifthly, that he prefers to have barren things, not indeed any, but good, i.e. virtuous; for in all things he prefers the virtuous to the useful, as being greater: since the useful is sought in order to supply a defect which is inconsistent with magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnanimitas non sit specialis virtus. Nulla enim specialis virtus operatur in omnibus virtutibus. Sed philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod ad magnanimum pertinet quod est in unaquaque virtute magnum. Ergo magnanimitas non est specialis virtus. | Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not a special virtue. For no special virtue is operative in every virtue. But the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 3) that "whatever is great in each virtue belongs to the magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, nulli speciali virtuti attribuuntur actus virtutum diversarum. Sed magnanimo attribuuntur diversarum virtutum actus, dicitur enim in IV Ethic., quod ad magnanimum pertinet non fugere commonentem, quod est actus prudentiae; neque facere iniusta, quod est actus iustitiae; et quod est promptus ad benefaciendum, quod est actus caritatis; et quod ministrat prompte, quod est actus liberalitatis; et quod est veridicus, quod est actus veritatis; et quod non est planctivus, quod est actus patientiae. Ergo magnanimitas non est virtus specialis. | Objection 2. Further, the acts of different virtues are not ascribed to any special virtue. But the acts of different virtues are ascribed to the magnanimous man. For it is stated in Ethic. iv, 3 that "it belongs to the magnanimous not to avoid reproof" (which is an act of prudence), "nor to act unjustly" (which is an act of justice), "that he is ready to do favors" (which is an act of charity), "that he gives his services readily" (which is an act of liberality), that "he is truthful" (which is an act of truthfulness), and that "he is not given to complaining" (which is an act of patience). Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, quaelibet virtus est quidam spiritualis ornatus animae, secundum illud Isaiae LXI, induit me dominus vestimentis salutis; et postea subdit, quasi sponsam ornatam monilibus suis. Sed magnanimitas est ornatus omnium virtutum, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo magnanimitas est generalis virtus. | Objection 3. Further, every virtue is a special ornament of the soul, according to the saying of Isaiah 61:10, "He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation," and afterwards he adds, "and as a bride adorned with her jewels." But magnanimity is the ornament of all the virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II Ethic., distinguit eam contra alias virtutes. | On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) distinguishes it from the other virtues. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad specialem virtutem pertinet quod modum rationis in aliqua determinata materia ponat. Magnanimitas autem ponit modum rationis circa determinatam materiam, scilicet circa honores, ut supra dictum est. Honor autem, secundum se consideratus, est quoddam bonum speciale. Et secundum hoc magnanimitas, secundum se considerata, est quaedam specialis virtus. Sed quia honor est cuiuslibet virtutis praemium, ut ex supra dictis patet; ideo ex consequenti, ratione suae materiae, respicit omnes virtutes. | I answer that, As stated above (Question 123, Article 2), it belongs to a special virtue to establish the mode of reason in a determinate matter. Now magnanimity establishes the mode of reason in a determinate matter, namely honors, as stated above (1 and 2): and honor, considered in itself, is a special good, and accordingly magnanimity considered in itself is a special virtue. Since, however, honor is the reward of every virtue, as stated above (103, 1, ad 2), it follows that by reason of its matter it regards all the virtues. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod magnanimitas non est circa honorem quemcumque, sed circa magnum honorem. Sicut autem honor debetur virtuti, ita etiam magnus honor debetur magno operi virtutis. Et inde est quod magnanimus intendit magna operari in qualibet virtute, inquantum scilicet tendit ad ea quae sunt digna magno honore. | Reply to Objection 1. Magnanimity is not about any kind of honor, but great honor. Now, as honor is due to virtue, so great honor is due to a great deed of virtue. Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on doing great deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to what is worthy of great honors. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod quia magnanimus tendit ad magna, consequens est quod ad illa praecipue tendat quae important aliquam excellentiam, et illa fugiat quae pertinent ad defectum. Pertinet autem ad quandam excellentiam quod aliquis bene faciat, et quod sit communicativus, et plurium retributivus. Et ideo ad ista promptum se exhibet, inquantum habent rationem cuiusdam excellentiae, non autem secundum eam rationem qua sunt actus aliarum virtutum. Ad defectum autem pertinet quod aliquis intantum magnipendat aliqua exteriora bona vel mala quod pro eis a iustitia vel quacumque virtute declinet. Similiter etiam ad defectum pertinet omnis occultatio veritatis, quia videtur ex timore procedere. Quod etiam aliquis sit planctivus, ad defectum pertinet, quia per hoc videtur animus exterioribus malis succumbere. Et ideo haec et similia vitat magnanimus secundum quandam specialem rationem, scilicet tanquam contraria excellentiae vel magnitudini. | Reply to Objection 2. Since the magnanimous tends to great things, it follows that he tends chiefly to things that involve a certain excellence, and shuns those that imply defect. Now it savors of excellence that a man is beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore he shows himself ready to perform actions of this kind, but not as acts of the other virtues. on the other hand, it is a proof of defect, that a man thinks so much of certain external goods or evils, that for their sake he abandons and gives up justice or any virtue whatever. Again, all concealment of the truth indicates a defect, since it seems to be the outcome of fear. Also that a man be given to complaining denotes a defect, because by so doing the mind seems to give way to external evils. Wherefore these and like things the magnanimous man avoids under a special aspect, inasmuch as they are contrary to his excellence or greatness. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quaelibet virtus habet quendam decorem sive ornatum ex sua specie, qui est proprius unicuique virtuti. Sed superadditur alius ornatus ex ipsa magnitudine operis virtuosi per magnanimitatem, quae omnes virtutes maiores facit, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. | Reply to Objection 3. Every virtue derives from its species a certain luster or adornment which is proper to each virtue: but further adornment results from the very greatness of a virtuous deed, through magnanimity which makes all virtues greater as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnanimitas non sit pars fortitudinis. Idem enim non est pars sui ipsius. Sed magnanimitas videtur idem esse fortitudini. Dicit enim Seneca, in libro de quatuor Virtut., magnanimitas, quae et fortitudo dicitur, si insit animo tuo, cum magna fiducia vives. Et Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., viros fortes magnanimos esse eosdem volumus, veritatis amicos, minimeque fallaces. Ergo magnanimitas non est pars fortitudinis. | Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude. For a thing is not a part of itself. But magnanimity appears to be the same as fortitude. For Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "If magnanimity, which is also called fortitude, be in thy soul, thou shalt live in great assurance": and Tully says (De Offic. i): "If a man is brave we expect him to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far removed from deception." Therefore magnanimity is not a part of fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnanimus non est philokindynus, idest amator periculi. Ad fortem autem pertinet exponere se periculis. Ergo magnanimitas non convenit cum fortitudine, ut possit dici pars eius. | Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a magnanimous man is not philokindynos, that is, a lover of danger. But it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger. Therefore magnanimity has nothing in common with fortitude so as to be called a part thereof. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, magnanimitas respicit magnum in bonis sperandis, fortitudo autem respicit magnum in malis timendis vel audendis. Sed bonum est principalius quam malum. Ergo magnanimitas est principalior virtus quam fortitudo. Non ergo est pars eius. | Objection 3. Further, magnanimity regards the great in things to be hoped for, whereas fortitude regards the great in things to be feared or dared. But good is of more import than evil. Therefore magnanimity is a more important virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is not a part thereof. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Macrobius et Andronicus ponunt magnanimitatem fortitudinis partem. | On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnanimity as a part of fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, principalis virtus est ad quam pertinet aliquem generalem modum virtutis constituere in aliqua materia principali. Inter alios autem generales modos virtutis unus est firmitas animi, quia firmiter se habere requiritur in omni virtute, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Praecipue tamen hoc laudatur in virtutibus quae in aliquod arduum tendunt, in quibus difficillimum est firmitatem servare. Et ideo quanto difficilius est in aliquo arduo firmiter se habere, tanto principalior est virtus quae circa illud firmitatem praestat animo. Difficilius autem est firmiter se habere in periculis mortis, in quibus confirmat animum fortitudo, quam in maximis bonis sperandis vel adipiscendis, ad quae confirmat animum magnanimitas, quia sicut homo maxime diligit vitam suam, ita maxime refugit mortis pericula. Sic ergo patet quod magnanimitas convenit cum fortitudine inquantum confirmat animum circa aliquid arduum, deficit autem ab ea in hoc quod firmat animum in eo circa quod facilius est firmitatem servare. Unde magnanimitas ponitur pars fortitudinis, quia adiungitur ei sicut secundaria principali. | I answer that, As stated above (I-II, 61, 3), a principal virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a general mode of virtue in a principal matter. Now one of the general modes of virtue is firmness of mind, because "a firm standing is necessary in every virtue," according to Ethic. ii. And this is chiefly commended in those virtues that tend to something difficult, in which it is most difficult to preserve firmness. Wherefore the more difficult it is to stand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more principal is the virtue which makes the mind firm in that matter. Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, wherein fortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for or obtaining the greatest goods, wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as man loves his life above all things, so does he fly from dangers of death more than any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind about a matter wherein it is easier to stand firm. Hence magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., carere malo accipitur in ratione boni. Unde et non superari ab aliquo gravi malo, puta a periculis mortis, accipitur quodammodo pro eo quod est attingere ad magnum bonum, quorum primum pertinet ad fortitudinem, secundum ad magnanimitatem. Et secundum hoc fortitudo et magnanimitas pro eodem accipi possunt. Quia tamen alia ratio difficultatis est in utroque praedictorum, ideo, proprie loquendo, magnanimitas ab Aristotele ponitur alia virtus a fortitudine. | Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1,3), "to lack evil is looked upon as a good," wherefore not to be overcome by a grievous evil, such as the danger of death, is looked upon as though it were the obtaining of a great good, the former belonging to fortitude, and the latter to magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magnanimity may be considered as identical. Since, however, there is a difference as regards the difficulty on the part of either of the aforesaid, it follows that properly speaking magnanimity, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), is a distinct virtue from fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod amator periculi dicitur qui indifferenter se periculis exponit. Quod videtur pertinere ad eum qui indifferenter multa quasi magna existimat, quod est contra rationem magnanimi, nullus enim videtur pro aliquo se periculis exponere nisi illud magnum existimet. Sed pro his quae vere sunt magna, magnanimus promptissime periculis se exponit, quia operatur magnum in actu fortitudinis, sicut et in actibus aliarum virtutum. Unde et philosophus ibidem dicit quod magnanimus non est microkindynus, idest pro parvis periclitans, sed megalokindynus, idest pro magnis periclitans. Et Seneca dicit, in libro de quatuor Virtut., eris magnanimus, si pericula nec appetas ut temerarius, nec formides ut timidus, nam nihil timidum facit animum nisi reprehensibilis vitae conscientia. | Reply to Objection 2. A man is said to love danger when he exposes himself to all kinds of dangers, which seems to be the mark of one who thinks "many" the same as "great." This is contrary to the nature of a magnanimous man, for no one seemingly exposes himself to danger for the sake of a thing that he does not deem great. But for things that are truly great, a magnanimous man is most ready to expose himself to danger, since he does something great in the act of fortitude, even as in the acts of the other virtues. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that the magnanimous man is not mikrokindynos, i.e. endangering himself for small things, but megalokindynos, i.e. endangering himself for great things. And Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "Thou wilt be magnanimous if thou neither seekest dangers like a rash man, nor fearest them like a coward. For nothing makes the soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life." |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod malum, inquantum huiusmodi, fugiendum est, quod autem sit contra ipsum persistendum, est per accidens, inquantum scilicet oportet sustinere mala ad conservationem bonorum. Sed bonum de se est appetendum, et quod ab eo refugiatur, non est nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet existimatur excedere facultatem desiderantis. Semper autem quod est per se potius est quam id quod est per accidens. Et ideo magis repugnat firmitati animi arduum in malis quam arduum in bonis. Et ideo principalior est virtus fortitudinis quam magnanimitatis, licet enim bonum sit simpliciter principalius quam malum, malum tamen est principalius quantum ad hoc. | Reply to Objection 3. Evil as such is to be avoided: and that one has to withstand it is accidental; in so far, to wit, as one has to suffer an evil in order to safeguard a good. But good as such is to be desired, and that one avoids it is only accidental, in so far, to wit, as it is deemed to surpass the ability of the one who desires it. Now that which is so essentially is always of more account than that which is so accidentally. Wherefore the difficult in evil things is always more opposed to firmness of mind than the difficult in good things. Hence the virtue of fortitude takes precedence of the virtue of magnanimity. For though good is simply of more import than evil, evil is of more import in this particular respect. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fiducia non pertineat ad magnanimitatem. Potest enim aliquis habere fiduciam non solum de seipso, sed etiam de alio, secundum illud II ad Cor. III, fiduciam autem habemus per Iesum Christum ad Deum, non quod sumus sufficientes cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis. Sed hoc videtur esse contra rationem magnanimitatis. Ergo fiducia ad magnanimitatem non pertinet. | Objection 1. It seems that confidence does not belong to magnanimity. For a man may have assurance not only in himself, but also in another, according to 2 Corinthians 3:4-5, "Such confidence we have, through Christ towards God, not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves." But this seems inconsistent with the idea of magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, fiducia videtur timori esse opposita, secundum illud Isaiae XII, fiducialiter agam, et non timebo. Sed carere timore magis pertinet ad fortitudinem. Ergo et fiducia magis ad fortitudinem pertinet quam ad magnanimitatem. | Objection 2. Further, confidence seems to be opposed to fear, according to Isaiah 12:2, "I will deal confidently and will not fear." But to be without fear seems more akin to fortitude. Therefore confidence also belongs to fortitude rather than to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, praemium non debetur nisi virtuti. Sed fiduciae debetur praemium, dicitur enim Heb. III, quod nos sumus domus Christi, si fiduciam et gloriam spei usque in finem firmam retineamus. Ergo fiducia est quaedam virtus distincta a magnanimitate. Quod etiam videtur per hoc quod Macrobius eam magnanimitati condividit. | Objection 3. Further, reward is not due except to virtue. But a reward is due to confidence, according to Hebrews 3:6, where it is said that we are the house of Christ, "if we hold fast the confidence and glory of hope unto the end." Therefore confidence is a virtue distinct from magnanimity: and this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius enumerates it with magnanimity (In Somn. Scip. i). |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod Tullius, in sua rhetorica, videtur ponere fiduciam loco magnanimitatis, ut supra dictum est. | On the contrary, Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii) seems to substitute confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in the preceding Question (ad 6) and in the prologue to this. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen fiduciae ex fide assumptum esse videtur. Ad fidem autem pertinet aliquid et alicui credere. Pertinet autem fiducia ad spem, secundum illud Iob XI, habebis fiduciam, proposita tibi spe. Et ideo nomen fiduciae hoc principaliter significare videtur, quod aliquis spem concipiat ex hoc quod credit verbis alicuius auxilium promittentis. Sed quia fides dicitur etiam opinio vehemens; contingit autem aliquid vehementer opinari non solum ex eo quod est ab alio dictum, sed etiam ex eo quod in alio consideratur, inde est quod fiducia etiam potest dici qua aliquis spem alicuius rei concipit ex aliquo considerato; quandoque quidem in seipso, puta cum aliquis, videns se sanum, confidit se diu victurum; quandoque autem in alio, puta cum aliquis, considerans alium amicum suum esse et potentem, fiduciam habet adiuvari ab eo. Dictum est autem supra quod magnanimitas proprie est circa spem alicuius ardui. Et ideo, quia fiducia importat quoddam robur spei proveniens ex aliqua consideratione quae facit vehementem opinionem de bono assequendo, inde est quod fiducia ad magnanimitatem pertinet. | I answer that, Confidence takes its name from "fides" [faith]: and it belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody. But confidence belongs to hope, according to Job 11:18, "Thou shalt have confidence, hope being set before thee." Wherefore confidence apparently denotes chiefly that a man derives hope through believing the word of one who promises to help him. Since, however, faith signifies also a strong opinion, and since one may come to have a strong opinion about something, not only on account of another's statement, but also on account of something we observe in another, it follows that confidence may denote the hope of having something, which hope we conceive through observing something either in oneself--for instance, through observing that he is healthy, a man is confident that he will live long. or in another, for instance, through observing that another is friendly to him and powerful, a man is confident that he will receive help from him. Now it has been stated above (1, ad 2) that magnanimity is chiefly about the hope of something difficult. Wherefore, since confidence denotes a certain strength of hope arising from some observation which gives one a strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good, it follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., ad magnanimum pertinet nullo indigere, quia hoc deficientis est, hoc tamen debet intelligi secundum modum humanum; unde addit, vel vix. Hoc enim est supra hominem, ut omnino nullo indigeat. Indiget enim omnis homo, primo quidem, divino auxilio, secundario autem etiam auxilio humano, quia homo est naturaliter animal sociale, eo quod sibi non sufficit ad vitam. Inquantum ergo indiget aliis, sic ad magnanimum pertinet ut habeat fiduciam de aliis, quia hoc etiam ad excellentiam hominis pertinet, quod habeat alios in promptu qui eum possint iuvare. Inquantum autem ipse aliquid potest, intantum ad magnanimitatem pertinet fiducia quam habet de seipso. | Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), it belongs to the "magnanimous to need nothing," for need is a mark of the deficient. But this is to be understood according to the mode of a man, hence he adds "or scarcely anything." For it surpasses man to need nothing at all. For every man needs, first, the Divine assistance, secondly, even human assistance, since man is naturally a social animal, for he is sufficient by himself to provide for his own life. Accordingly, in so far as he needs others, it belongs to a magnanimous man to have confidence in others, for it is also a point of excellence in a man that he should have at hand those who are able to be of service to him. And in so far as his own ability goes, it belongs to a magnanimous man to be confident in himself. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de passionibus ageretur, spes quidem directe opponitur desperationi, quae est circa idem obiectum, scilicet circa bonum, sed secundum contrarietatem obiectorum opponitur timori, cuius obiectum est malum. Fiducia autem quoddam robur spei importat. Et ideo opponitur timori, sicut et spes. Sed quia fortitudo proprie firmat hominem contra mala, magnanimitas autem circa prosecutionem bonorum; inde est quod fiducia magis proprie pertinet ad magnanimitatem quam ad fortitudinem. Sed quia spes causat audaciam, quae pertinet ad fortitudinem, inde est quod fiducia ad fortitudinem ex consequenti pertinet. | Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (I-II, 23, 2; I-II, 40, 4), when we were treating of the passions, hope is directly opposed to despair, because the latter is about the same object, namely good. But as regards contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear, because the latter's object is evil. Now confidence denotes a certain strength of hope, wherefore it is opposed to fear even as hope is. Since, however, fortitude properly strengthens a man in respect of evil, and magnanimity in respect of the obtaining of good, it follows that confidence belongs more properly to magnanimity than to fortitude. Yet because hope causes daring, which belongs to fortitude, it follows in consequence that confidence pertains to fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod fiducia, sicut dictum est, importat quendam modum spei, est enim fiducia spes roborata ex aliqua firma opinione. Modus autem adhibitus alicui affectioni potest pertinere ad commendationem ipsius actus, ut ex hoc sit meritorius, non tamen ex hoc determinatur ad speciem virtutis, sed ex materia. Et ideo fiducia non potest, proprie loquendo, nominare aliquam virtutem, sed potest nominare conditionem virtutis. Et propter hoc numeratur inter partes fortitudinis, non quasi virtus adiuncta (nisi secundum quod accipitur pro magnanimitate a Tullio), sed sicut pars integralis, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3. Confidence, as stated above, denotes a certain mode of hope: for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion. Now the mode applied to an affection may call for commendation of the act, so that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that draws it to a species of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking, confidence cannot denote a virtue, though it may denote the conditions of a virtue. For this reason it is reckoned among the parts of fortitude, not as an annexed virtue, except as identified with magnanimity by Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii), but as an integral part, as stated in the preceding Question. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod securitas ad magnanimitatem non pertineat. Securitas enim, ut supra habitum est, importat quietem quandam a perturbatione timoris. Sed hoc maxime facit fortitudo. Ergo securitas videtur idem esse quod fortitudo. Sed fortitudo non pertinet ad magnanimitatem, sed potius e converso. Ergo neque securitas ad magnanimitatem pertinet. | Objection 1. It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity. For security, as stated above (128, ad 6), denotes freedom from the disturbance of fear. But fortitude does this most effectively. Wherefore security is seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude does not belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case. Neither therefore does security belong to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., quod securus dicitur quasi sine cura. Sed hoc videtur esse contra virtutem, quae curam habet de rebus honestis, secundum illud apostoli, II ad Tim. II, sollicite cura teipsum probabilem exhibere Deo. Ergo securitas non pertinet ad magnanimitatem, quae operatur magnum in omnibus virtutibus. | Objection 2. Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man "is said to be secure because he is without care." But this seems to be contrary to virtue, which has a care for honorable things, according to 2 Timothy 2:15, "Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God." Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity, which does great things in all the virtues. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, non est idem virtus et virtutis praemium. Sed securitas ponitur praemium virtutis, ut patet Iob XI, si iniquitatem quae est in manu tua abstuleris, defossus securus dormies. Ergo securitas non pertinet ad magnanimitatem, neque ad aliam virtutem, sicut pars eius. | Objection 3. Further, virtue is not its own reward. But security is accounted the reward of virtue, according to Job 11:14-18, "If thou wilt put away from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand . . . being buried thou shalt sleep secure." Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., quod ad magnanimum pertinet neque perturbationi animi, neque homini, neque fortunae succumbere. Sed in hoc consistit hominis securitas. Ergo securitas ad magnanimitatem pertinet. | On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists of two things," that "it belongs to magnanimity to give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune." But a man's security consists in this. Therefore security belongs to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in II suae rhetoricae, timor facit homines consiliativos, inquantum scilicet curam habent qualiter possint ea evadere quae timent. Securitas autem dicitur per remotionem huius curae quam timor ingerit. Et ideo securitas importat quandam perfectam quietem animi a timore, sicut fiducia importat quoddam robur spei. Sicut autem spes directe pertinet ad magnanimitatem, ita timor directe pertinet ad fortitudinem. Et ideo, sicut fiducia immediate pertinet ad magnanimitatem, ita securitas immediate pertinet ad fortitudinem. Considerandum tamen est quod, sicut spes est causa audaciae, ita timor est causa desperationis, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Et ideo, sicut fiducia ex consequenti pertinet ad fortitudinem, inquantum utitur audacia; ita et securitas ex consequenti pertinet ad magnanimitatem, inquantum repellit desperationem. | I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes a man take counsel," because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he fears. Now security takes its name from the removal of this care, of which fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect freedom of the mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope. Now, as hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly regards fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to magnanimity, so security belongs immediately to fortitude. It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so is fear the cause of despair, as stated above when we were treating of the passion (I-II, 45, 2). Wherefore as confidence belongs indirectly to fortitude, in so far as it makes use of daring, so security belongs indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes despair. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fortitudo non praecipue laudatur ex hoc quod non timeat, quod pertinet ad securitatem, sed inquantum importat firmitatem quandam in passionibus. Unde securitas non est idem quod fortitudo, sed est quaedam conditio eius. | Reply to Objection 1. Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because it banishes fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a firmness of mind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is not the same as fortitude, but is a condition thereof. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod non quaelibet securitas est laudabilis, sed quando deponit aliquis curam prout debet, et in quibus timere non oportet. Et hoc modo est conditio fortitudinis et magnanimitatis. | Reply to Objection 2. Not all security is worthy of praise but only when one puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should not fear: in this way it is a condition of fortitude and of magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in virtutibus est quaedam similitudo et participatio futurae beatitudinis, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo nihil prohibet securitatem quandam esse conditionem alicuius virtutis, quamvis perfecta securitas ad praemium virtutis pertineat. | Reply to Objection 3. There is in the virtues a certain likeness to, and participation of, future happiness, as stated above (I-II, 05, 3,7). Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a condition of a virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue's reward. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bona fortunae non conferant ad magnanimitatem. Quia ut Seneca dicit, in libro de ira, virtus sibi sufficiens est. Sed magnanimitas facit omnes virtutes magnas, ut dictum est. Ergo bona fortunae non conferunt ad magnanimitatem. | Objection 1. It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi): "virtue suffices for itself." Now magnanimity takes every virtue great, as stated above (4, ad 3). Therefore goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, nullus virtuosus contemnit ea quibus iuvatur. Sed magnanimus contemnit ea quae pertinent ad exteriorem fortunam, dicit enim Tullius, in I de Offic., quod magnus animus in externarum rerum despicientia commendatur. Ergo magnanimitas non adiuvatur a bonis fortunae. | Objection 2. Further, no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him. But the magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of fortune: for Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists of two things," that "a great soul is commended for despising external things." Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods of fortune. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, ibidem Tullius subdit quod ad magnum animum pertinet ea quae videntur acerba ita ferre ut nihil a statu naturae discedat, nihil a dignitate sapientis. Et Aristoteles dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnanimus in infortuniis non est tristis. Sed acerba et infortunia opponuntur bonis fortunae, quilibet autem tristatur de subtractione eorum quibus iuvatur. Ergo exteriora bona fortunae non conferunt ad magnanimitatem. | Objection 3. Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that "it belongs to a great soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to depart from his natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise man." And Aristotle says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a magnanimous man does not grieve at misfortune." Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of fortune, for every one grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him. Therefore external goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod bonae fortunae videntur conferre ad magnanimitatem. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "good fortune seems to conduce to magnanimity." |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, magnanimitas ad duo respicit, ad honorem quidem sicut ad materiam; sed ad aliquid magnum operandum sicut ad finem. Ad utrumque autem istorum bona fortunae cooperantur. Quia enim honor virtuosis non solum a sapientibus, sed etiam a multitudine exhibetur, quae maxima reputat huiusmodi exteriora bona fortunae; fit ex consequenti ut ab eis maior honor exhibeatur his quibus adsunt exteriora bona fortunae. Similiter etiam ad actus virtutum organice bona fortunae deserviunt, quia per divitias et potentiam et amicos datur nobis facultas operandi. Et ideo manifestum est quod bona fortunae conferunt ad magnanimitatem. | I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), magnanimity regards two things: honor as its matter, and the accomplishment of something great as its end. Now goods of fortune conduce to both these things. For since honor is conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise, but also by the multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the highest esteem, the result is that they show greater honor to those who possess goods of fortune. Likewise goods of fortune are useful organs or instruments of virtuous deeds: since we can easily accomplish things by means of riches, power and friends. Hence it is evident that goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus sibi sufficiens esse dicitur, quia sine his etiam exterioribus bonis esse potest. Indiget tamen his exterioribus bonis ad hoc quod expeditius operetur. | Reply to Objection 1. Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself, because it can be without even these external goods; yet it needs them in order to act more expeditiously. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod magnanimus exteriora bona contemnit, inquantum non reputat ea magna bona, pro quibus debeat aliquid indecens facere. Non tamen quantum ad hoc contemnit ea, quin reputet ea utilia ad opus virtutis exequendum. | Reply to Objection 2. The magnanimous man despises external goods, inasmuch as he does not think them so great as to be bound to do anything unbecoming for their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but that he esteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds. |
| IIª-IIae q. 129 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quicumque non reputat aliquid magnum, neque multum gaudet si illud obtineat, neque multum tristatur si illud amittat. Et ideo, quia magnanimus non aestimat exteriora bona fortunae quasi aliqua magna, inde est quod nec de eis multum extollitur si adsint, neque in eorum amissione multum deiicitur. | Reply to Objection 3. If a man does not think much of a thing, he is neither very joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it. Wherefore, since the magnanimous man does not think much of external goods, that is goods of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by them if he has them, nor much cast down by their loss. |
| IIª-IIae q. 130 pr. Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis magnanimitati. Et primo, de illis quae opponuntur sibi per excessum, quae sunt tria, scilicet praesumptio, ambitio, inanis gloria. Secundo, de pusillanimitate, quae opponitur ei per modum defectus. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum praesumptio sit peccatum. Secundo, utrum opponatur magnanimitati per excessum. | Question 130. Presumption 1. Is presumption a sin? 2. Is it opposed to magnanimity by excess? |
| IIª-IIae q. 130 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praesumptio non sit peccatum. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Philipp. III, quae retro sunt obliviscens, ad anteriora me extendo. Sed hoc videtur ad praesumptionem pertinere quod aliquis tendat in ea quae sunt supra seipsum. Ergo praesumptio non est peccatum. | Objection 1. It seems that presumption is not a sin. For the Apostle says: "Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch forth [Vulgate: 'and stretching forth'] myself to those that are before." But it seems to savor of presumption that one should tend to what is above oneself. Therefore presumption is not a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 130 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod oportet non secundum suadentes humana sapere hominem entem, neque mortalia mortalem, sed inquantum contingit immortale facere. Et in I Metaphys. dicit quod homo debet se trahere ad divina inquantum potest. Sed divina et immortalia maxime videntur esse supra hominem. Cum ergo de ratione praesumptionis sit quod aliquis tendat in ea quae sunt supra seipsum, videtur quod praesumptio non sit peccatum sed magis sit aliquid laudabile. | Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 7) "we should not listen to those who would persuade us to relish human things because we are men, or mortal things because we are mortal, but we should relish those that make us immortal": and (Metaph. i) "that man should pursue divine things as far as possible." Now divine and immortal things are seemingly far above man. Since then presumption consists essentially in tending to what is above oneself, it seems that presumption is something praiseworthy, rather than a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 130 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. III, non sumus sufficientes cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis. Si ergo praesumptio, secundum quam aliquis nititur in ea ad quae non sufficit, sit peccatum, videtur quod homo nec cogitare aliquod bonum licite possit. Quod est inconveniens. Non ergo praesumptio est peccatum. | Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (2 Corinthians 3:5): "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves." If then presumption, by which one strives at that for which one is not sufficient, be a sin, it seems that man cannot lawfully even think of anything good: which is absurd. Therefore presumption is not a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 130 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XXXVII, o praesumptio nequissima, unde creata es? Ubi respondet Glossa, de mala scilicet voluntate creaturae. Sed omne quod procedit ex radice malae voluntatis est peccatum. Ergo praesumptio est peccatum. | On the contrary, It is written (Sirach 37:3): "O wicked presumption, whence camest thou?" and a gloss answers: "From a creature's evil will." Now all that comes of the root of an evil will is a sin. Therefore presumption is a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 130 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum ea quae sunt secundum naturam sint ordinata ratione divina, quam humana ratio debet imitari, quidquid secundum rationem humanam fit quod est contra ordinem communiter in naturalibus rebus inventum, est vitiosum et peccatum. Hoc autem communiter in omnibus rebus naturalibus invenitur, quod quaelibet actio commensuratur virtuti agentis, nec aliquod agens naturale nititur ad agendum id quod excedit suam facultatem. Et ideo vitiosum est et peccatum, quasi contra ordinem naturalem existens, quod aliquis assumat ad agendum ea quae praeferuntur suae virtuti. Quod pertinet ad rationem praesumptionis, sicut et ipsum nomen manifestat. Unde manifestum est quod praesumptio est peccatum. | I answer that, Since whatever is according to nature, is ordered by the Divine Reason, which human reason ought to imitate, whatever is done in accordance with human reason in opposition to the order established in general throughout natural things is vicious and sinful. Now it is established throughout all natural things, that every action is commensurate with the power of the agent, nor does any natural agent strive to do what exceeds its ability. Hence it is vicious and sinful, as being contrary to the natural order, that any one should assume to do what is above his power: and this is what is meant by presumption, as its very name shows. Wherefore it is evident that presumption is a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 130 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse supra potentiam activam alicuius rei naturalis quod non est supra potentiam passivam eiusdem, inest enim aeri potentia passiva per quam potest transmutari in hoc quod habeat actionem et motum ignis, quae excedunt potentiam activam aeris. Sic etiam vitiosum esset et praesumptuosum quod aliquis in statu imperfectae virtutis existens attentaret statim assequi ea quae sunt perfectae virtutis, sed si quis ad hoc tendat ut proficiat in virtutem perfectam, hoc non est praesumptuosum nec vitiosum. Et hoc modo apostolus in anteriora se extendebat, scilicet per continuum profectum. | Reply to Objection 1. Nothing hinders that which is above the active power of a natural thing, and yet not above the passive power of that same thing: thus the air is possessed of a passive power by reason of which it can be so changed as to obtain the action and movement of fire, which surpass the active power of air. Thus too it would be sinful and presumptuous for a man while in a state of imperfect virtue to attempt the immediate accomplishment of what belongs to perfect virtue. But it is not presumptuous or sinful for a man to endeavor to advance towards perfect virtue. On this way the Apostle stretched himself forth to the things that were before him, namely continually advancing forward. |
| IIª-IIae q. 130 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod divina et immortalia secundum ordinem naturae sunt supra hominem, homini tamen inest quaedam naturalis potentia, scilicet intellectus, per quam potest coniungi immortalibus et divinis. Et secundum hoc philosophus dicit quod oportet hominem se attrahere ad immortalia et divina, non quidem ut ea operetur quae decet Deum facere, sed ut ei uniatur per intellectum et voluntatem. | Reply to Objection 2. Divine and immortal things surpass man according to the order of nature. Yet man is possessed of a natural power, namely the intellect, whereby he can be united to immortal and Divine things. On this respect the Philosopher says that "man ought to pursue immortal and divine things," not that he should do what it becomes God to do, but that he should be united to Him in intellect and will. |
| IIª-IIae q. 130 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quae per alios possumus, aliqualiter per nos possumus. Et ideo, quia cogitare et facere bonum possumus cum auxilio divino, non totaliter hoc excedit facultatem nostram. Et ideo non est praesumptuosum si aliquis ad aliquod opus virtuosum faciendum intendat. Esset autem praesumptuosum si ad hoc aliquis tenderet absque fiducia divini auxilii. | Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "what we can do by the help of others we can do by ourselves in a sense." Hence since we can think and do good by the help of God, this is not altogether above our ability. Hence it is not presumptuous for a man to attempt the accomplishment of a virtuous deed: but it would be presumptuous if one were to make the attempt without confidence in God's assistance. |
| IIª-IIae q. 130 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praesumptio non opponatur magnanimitati per excessum. Praesumptio enim ponitur species peccati in spiritum sanctum, ut supra habitum est. Sed peccatum in spiritum sanctum non opponitur magnanimitati, sed magis caritati. Ergo etiam neque praesumptio opponitur magnanimitati. | Objection 1. It seems that presumption is not opposed to magnanimity by excess. For presumption is accounted a species of the sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above (14, 2; 21, 1). But the sin against the Holy Ghost is not opposed to magnanimity, but to charity. Neither therefore is presumption opposed to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 130 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad magnanimitatem pertinet quod aliquis se magnis dignificet. Sed aliquis dicitur praesumptuosus etiam si se parvis dignificet, dummodo hoc excedat propriam facultatem. Non ergo directe praesumptio magnanimitati opponitur. | Objection 2. Further, it belongs to magnanimity that one should deem oneself worthy of great things. But a man is said to be presumptuous even if he deem himself worthy of small things, if they surpass his ability. Therefore presumption is not directly opposed to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 130 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, magnanimus exteriora bona reputat quasi parva. Sed secundum philosophum, in IV Ethic., praesumptuosi propter exteriorem fortunam fiunt despectores et iniuriatores aliorum, quasi magnum aliquid aestimantes exteriora bona. Ergo praesumptio non opponitur magnanimitati per excessum, sed solum per defectum. | Objection 3. Further, the magnanimous man looks upon external goods as little things. Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "on account of external fortune the presumptuous disdain and wrong others, because they deem external goods as something great." Therefore presumption is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but only by deficiency. |
| IIª-IIae q. 130 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II et IV Ethic., dicit quod magnanimo per excessum opponitur chaunus, idest furiosus vel ventosus, quem nos dicimus praesumptuosum. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 3) that the "vain man," i.e. a vaporer or a wind-bag, which with us denotes a presumptuous man, "is opposed to the magnanimous man by excess." |
| IIª-IIae q. 130 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, magnanimitas consistit in medio, non quidem secundum quantitatem eius in quod tendit, quia tendit in maximum, sed constituitur in medio secundum proportionem ad propriam facultatem; non enim in maiora tendit quam sibi conveniant. Praesumptuosus autem, quantum ad id in quod tendit, non excedit magnanimum, sed multum quandoque ab eo deficit. Excedit autem secundum proportionem suae facultatis, quam magnanimus non transcendit. Et hoc modo praesumptio opponitur magnanimitati per excessum. | I answer that, As stated above (129, 3, ad 1), magnanimity observes the means, not as regards the quantity of that to which it tends, but in proportion to our own ability: for it does not tend to anything greater than is becoming to us. Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which he tends, does not exceed the magnanimous, but sometimes falls far short of him: but he does exceed in proportion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous man does not exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess. |
| IIª-IIae q. 130 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non quaelibet praesumptio ponitur peccatum in spiritum sanctum, sed illa qua quis divinam iustitiam contemnit ex inordinata confidentia divinae misericordiae. Et talis praesumptio, ratione materiae, inquantum scilicet per eam contemnitur aliquid divinum, opponitur caritati, vel potius dono timoris, cuius est Deum revereri. Inquantum tamen talis contemptus excedit proportionem propriae facultatis, potest opponi magnanimitati. | Reply to Objection 1. It is not every presumption that is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost, but that by which one contemns the Divine justice through inordinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter kind of presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as it implies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or rather to the gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless, in so far as this contempt exceeds the proportion to one's own ability, it can be opposed to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 130 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut magnanimitas, ita et praesumptio in aliquid magnum tendere videtur, non enim multum consuevit dici aliquis praesumptuosus si in aliquo modico vires proprias transcendat. Si tamen praesumptuosus talis dicatur, haec praesumptio non opponitur magnanimitati, sed illi virtuti quae est circa mediocres honores, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2. Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to tend to something great. For we are not, as a rule, wont to call a man presumptuous for going beyond his powers in something small. If, however, such a man be called presumptuous, this kind of presumption is not opposed to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about ordinary honor, as stated above (Question 129, Article 2). |
| IIª-IIae q. 130 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod nullus attentat aliquid supra suam facultatem nisi inquantum facultatem suam aestimat maiorem quam sit. Circa quod potest esse error dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum solam quantitatem, puta cum aliquis aestimat se habere maiorem virtutem vel scientiam, vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi, quam habeat. Alio modo, secundum genus rei, puta cum aliquis ex hoc aestimat se magnum et magnis dignum ex quo non est, puta propter divitias vel propter aliqua bona fortunae; ut enim philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., qui sine virtute talia bona habent, neque iuste magnis seipsos dignificant, neque recte magnanimi dicuntur. Similiter etiam illud ad quod aliquis tendit supra vires suas, quandoque quidem secundum rei veritatem est magnum simpliciter, sicut patet de Petro, qui tendebat ad hoc quod pro Christo pateretur, quod erat supra virtutem suam. Quandoque vero non est aliquid magnum simpliciter, sed solum secundum stultorum opinionem, sicut pretiosis vestibus indui, despicere et iniuriari aliis. Quod quidem pertinet ad excessum magnanimitatis non secundum rei veritatem, sed secundum opinionem. Unde Seneca dicit, in libro de quatuor Virtut., quod magnanimitas, si se extra modum suum extollat, faciet virum minacem, inflatum, turbidum, inquietum, et in quascumque excellentias dictorum factorumque, neglecta honestate, festinum. Et sic patet quod praesumptuosus secundum rei veritatem quandoque deficit a magnanimo, sed secundum apparentiam in excessu se habet. | Reply to Objection 3. No one attempts what is above his ability, except in so far as he deems his ability greater than it is. On this one may err in two ways. First only as regards quantity, as when a man thinks he has greater virtue, or knowledge, or the like, than he has. Secondly, as regards the kind of thing, as when he thinks himself great, and worthy of great things, by reason of something that does not make him so, for instance by reason of riches or goods of fortune. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), "those who have these things without virtue, neither justly deem themselves worthy of great things, nor are rightly called magnanimous." Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in excess of his ability, is sometimes in very truth something great, simply as in the case of Peter, whose intent was to suffer for Christ, which has exceeded his power; while sometimes it is something great, not simply, but only in the opinion of fools, such as wearing costly clothes, despising and wronging others. This savors of an excess of magnanimity, not in any truth, but in people's opinion. Hence Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.) that "when magnanimity exceeds its measure, it makes a man high-handed, proud, haughty restless, and bent on excelling in all things, whether in words or in deeds, without any considerations of virtue." Thus it is evident that the presumptuous man sometimes falls short of the magnanimous in reality, although in appearance he surpasses him. |
| IIª-IIae q. 131 pr. Deinde considerandum est de ambitione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo primo, utrum ambitio sit peccatum. Secundo, utrum opponatur magnanimitati per excessum. | Question 131. Ambition 1. Is it a sin? 2. Is it opposed to magnanimity by excess? |
| IIª-IIae q. 131 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ambitio non sit peccatum. Importat enim ambitio cupiditatem honoris. Honor autem de se quoddam bonum est, et maximum inter exteriora bona, unde et illi qui de honore non curant, vituperantur. Ergo ambitio non est peccatum, sed magis aliquid laudabile, secundum quod bonum laudabiliter appetitur. | Objection 1. It seems that ambition is not a sin. For ambition denotes the desire of honor. Now honor is in itself a good thing, and the greatest of external goods: wherefore those who care not for honor are reproved. Therefore ambition is not a sin; rather is it something deserving of praise, in so far as a good is laudably desired. |
| IIª-IIae q. 131 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, quilibet absque vitio potest appetere id quod sibi debetur pro praemio. Sed honor est praemium virtutis, ut philosophus dicit, in I et VIII Ethic. Ergo ambitio honoris non est peccatum. | Objection 2. Further, anyone may, without sin, desire what is due to him as a reward. Now honor is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 12; iv, 3; viii, 14). Therefore ambition of honor is not a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 131 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud per quod homo provocatur ad bonum et revocatur a malo, non est peccatum. Sed per honorem homines provocantur ad bona facienda et mala vitanda, sicut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod fortissimi videntur esse apud quos timidi sunt inhonorati, fortes autem honorati; et Tullius dicit, in libro de Tusculan. quaest., quod honor alit artes. Ergo ambitio non est peccatum. | Objection 3. Further, that which heartens a man to do good and disheartens him from doing evil, is not a sin. Now honor heartens men to do good and to avoid evil; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "with the bravest men, cowards are held in dishonor, and the brave in honor": and Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that "honor fosters the arts." Therefore ambition is not a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 131 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur I ad Cor. XIII, quod caritas non est ambitiosa, non quaerit quae sua sunt. Nihil aut repugnat caritati nisi peccatum. Ergo ambitio est peccatum. | On the contrary, It is written (1 Corinthians 13:5) that "charity is not ambitious, seeketh not her own." Now nothing is contrary to charity, except sin. Therefore ambition is a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 131 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, honor importat quandam reverentiam alicui exhibitam in testimonium excellentiae eius. Circa excellentiam autem hominis duo sunt attendenda. Primo quidem, quod id secundum quod homo excellit, non habet homo a seipso, sed est quasi quiddam divinum in eo. Et ideo ex hoc non debetur principaliter sibi honor, sed Deo. Secundo considerandum est quod id in quo homo excellit, datur homini a Deo ut ex eo aliis prosit. Unde intantum debet homini placere testimonium suae excellentiae quod ab aliis exhibetur, inquantum ex hoc paratur sibi via ad hoc quod aliis prosit. Tripliciter ergo appetitum honoris contingit esse inordinatum. Uno modo, per hoc quod aliquis appetit testimonium de excellentia quam non habet, quod est appetere honorem supra suam proportionem. Alio modo, per hoc quod honorem sibi cupit non referendo in Deum. Tertio modo, per hoc quod appetitus eius in ipso honore quiescit, non referens honorem ad utilitatem aliorum. Ambitio autem importat inordinatum appetitum honoris. Unde manifestum est quod ambitio semper est peccatum. | I answer that, As stated above (103, 1 and 2), honor denotes reverence shown to a person in witness of his excellence. Now two things have to be considered with regard to man's honor. The first is that a man has not from himself the thing in which he excels, for this is, as it were, something Divine in him, wherefore on this count honor is due principally, not to him but to God. The second point that calls for observation is that the thing in which man excels is given to him by God, that he may profit others thereby: wherefore a man ought so far to be pleased that others bear witness to his excellence, as this enables him to profit others. Now the desire of honor may be inordinate in three ways. First, when a man desires recognition of an excellence which he has not: this is to desire more than his share of honor. Secondly, when a man desires honor for himself without referring it to God. Thirdly, when a man's appetite rests in honor itself, without referring it to the profit of others. Since then ambition denotes inordinate desire of honor, it is evident that it is always a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 131 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod appetitus boni debet regulari secundum rationem, cuius regulam si transcendat, erit vitiosus. Et hoc modo vitiosum est quod aliquis honorem appetat non secundum ordinem rationis. Vituperantur autem qui non curant de honore secundum quod ratio dictat, ut scilicet vitent ea quae sunt contraria honori. | Reply to Objection 1. The desire for good should be regulated according to reason, and if it exceed this rule it will be sinful. On this way it is sinful to desire honor in disaccord with the order of reason. Now those are reproved who care not for honor in accordance with reason's dictate that they should avoid what is contrary to honor. |
| IIª-IIae q. 131 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod honor non est praemium virtutis quoad ipsum virtuosum, ut scilicet hoc pro praemio expetere debeat, sed pro praemio expetit beatitudinem, quae est finis virtutis. Dicitur autem esse praemium virtutis ex parte aliorum, qui non habent aliquid maius quod virtuoso retribuant quam honorem, qui ex hoc ipso magnitudinem habet quod perhibet testimonium virtuti. Unde patet quod non est sufficiens praemium, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. | Reply to Objection 2. Honor is not the reward of virtue, as regards the virtuous man, in this sense that he should seek for it as his reward: since the reward he seeks is happiness, which is the end of virtue. But it is said to be the reward of virtue as regards others, who have nothing greater than honor whereby to reward the virtuous; which honor derives greatness from the very fact that it bears witness to virtue. Hence it is evident that it is not an adequate reward, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. |
| IIª-IIae q. 131 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut per appetitum honoris, quando debito modo appetitur, aliqui provocantur ad bonum et revocantur a malo; ita etiam, si inordinate appetatur, potest esse homini occasio multa mala faciendi, dum scilicet non curat qualitercumque honorem consequi possit. Unde Sallustius dicit, in Catilinario, quod gloriam, honorem et imperium bonus et ignavus aeque sibi exoptat, sed ille, scilicet bonus, vera via nititur; huic, scilicet ignavo, quia bonae artes desunt, dolis atque fallaciis contendit. Et tamen illi qui solum propter honorem vel bona faciunt vel mala vitant, non sunt virtuosi, ut patet per philosophum, in III Ethic., ubi dicit quod non sunt vere fortes qui propter honorem fortia faciunt. | Reply to Objection 3. Just as some are heartened to do good and disheartened from doing evil, by the desire of honor, if this be desired in due measure; so, if it be desired inordinately, it may become to man an occasion of doing many evil things, as when a man cares not by what means he obtains honor. Wherefore Sallust says (Catilin.) that "the good as well as the wicked covet honors for themselves, but the one," i.e. the good, "go about it in the right way," whereas "the other," i.e. the wicked, "through lack of the good arts, make use of deceit and falsehood." Yet they who, merely for the sake of honor, either do good or avoid evil, are not virtuous, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8), where he says that they who do brave things for the sake of honor are not truly brave. |
| IIª-IIae q. 131 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ambitio non opponatur magnanimitati per excessum. Uni enim medio non opponitur ex una parte nisi unum extremum. Sed magnanimitati per excessum opponitur praesumptio ut dictum est. Ergo non opponitur ei ambitio per excessum. | Objection 1. It seems that ambition is not opposed to magnanimity by excess. For one mean has only one extreme opposed to it on the one side. Now presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated above (Question 130, Article 2). Therefore ambition is not opposed to it by excess. |
| IIª-IIae q. 131 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, magnanimitas est circa honores. Sed ambitio videtur pertinere ad dignitates, dicitur enim II Machab. IV, quod Iason ambiebat summum sacerdotium. Ergo ambitio non opponitur magnanimitati. | Objection 2. Further, magnanimity is about honors; whereas ambition seems to regard positions of dignity: for it is written (2 Maccabees 4:7) that "Jason ambitiously sought the high priesthood." Therefore ambition is not opposed to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 131 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, ambitio videtur ad exteriorem apparatum pertinere, dicitur enim Act. XXV, quod Agrippa et Berenice cum multa ambitione introierunt praetorium; et II Paralip. XVI, quod super corpus Asa mortui combusserunt aromata et unguenta ambitione nimia. Sed magnanimitas non est circa exteriorem apparatum. Ergo ambitio non opponitur magnanimitati. | Objection 3. Further, ambition seems to regard outward show: for it is written (Acts 25:27) that "Agrippa and Berenice . . . with great pomp [ambitione]. . . had entered into the hall of audience" ['Praetorium.' The Vulgate has 'auditorium,' but the meaning is the same], and (2 Chronicles 16:14) that when Asa died they "burned spices and . . . ointments over his body" with very great pomp [ambitione]. But magnanimity is not about outward show. Therefore ambition is not opposed to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 131 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., quod sicut quisque magnitudine animi excellit, ita maxime vult princeps omnium solus esse. Sed hoc pertinet ad ambitionem. Ergo ambitio pertinet ad excessum magnanimitatis. | On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) that "the more a man exceeds in magnanimity, the more he desires himself alone to dominate others." But this pertains to ambition. Therefore ambition denotes an excess of magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 131 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ambitio importat inordinatum appetitum honoris. Magnanimitas autem est circa honores, et utitur eis secundum quod oportet. Unde manifestum est quod ambitio opponitur magnanimitati sicut inordinatum ordinato. | I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), ambition signifies inordinate love of honor. Now magnanimity is about honors and makes use of them in a becoming manner. Wherefore it is evident that ambition is opposed to magnanimity as the inordinate to that which is well ordered. |
| IIª-IIae q. 131 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod magnanimitas ad duo respicit. Ad unum quidem sicut ad finem intentum, quod est aliquod magnum opus, quod magnanimus attentat secundum suam facultatem. Et quantum ad hoc opponitur magnanimitati per excessum praesumptio, quae attentat aliquod magnum opus supra suam facultatem. Ad aliud autem respicit magnanimitas sicut ad materiam qua debite utitur, scilicet ad honorem. Et quantum ad hoc opponitur magnanimitati per excessum ambitio. Non est autem inconveniens secundum diversa esse plures excessus unius medii. | Reply to Objection 1. Magnanimity regards two things. It regards one as its end, in so far as it is some great deed that the magnanimous man attempts in proportion to his ability. On this way presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess: because the presumptuous man attempts great deeds beyond his ability. The other thing that magnanimity regards is its matter, viz. honor, of which it makes right use: and in this way ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess. Nor is it impossible for one mean to be exceeded in various respects. |
| IIª-IIae q. 131 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illis qui sunt in dignitate constituti, propter quandam excellentiam status, debetur honor. Et secundum hoc inordinatus appetitus dignitatum pertinet ad ambitionem. Si quis enim inordinate appeteret dignitatem non ratione honoris, sed propter debitum dignitatis usum suam facultatem excedentem, non esset ambitiosus, sed magis praesumptuosus. | Reply to Objection 2. Honor is due to those who are in a position of dignity, on account of a certain excellence of their estate: and accordingly inordinate desire for positions of dignity pertains to ambition. For if a man were to have an inordinate desire for a position of dignity, not for the sake of honor, but for the sake of a right use of a dignity exceeding his ability, he would not be ambitious but presumptuous. |
| IIª-IIae q. 131 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsa solemnitas exterioris cultus ad quendam honorem pertinet, unde et talibus consuevit honor exhiberi. Quod significatur Iac. II, si introierit in conventum vestrum vir anulum habens aureum, in veste candida, et dixeritis ei, tu sede hic bene, et cetera. Unde ambitio non est circa exteriorem cultum nisi secundum quod pertinet ad honorem. | Reply to Objection 3. The very solemnity of outward worship is a kind of honor, wherefore in such cases honor is wont to be shown. This is signified by the words of James 2:2-3: "If there shall come into your assembly a man having a golden ring, in fine apparel . . . and you . . . shall say to him: Sit thou here well," etc. Wherefore ambition does not regard outward worship, except in so far as this is a kind of honor. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 pr. Deinde considerandum est de inani gloria. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum appetitus gloriae sit peccatum. Secundo, utrum inanis gloria magnanimitati opponatur. Tertio, utrum sit peccatum mortale. Quarto, utrum sit vitium capitale. Quinto, de filiabus eius. | Question 132. Vainglory 1. Is desire of glory a sin? 2. Is it opposed to magnanimity? 3. Is it a mortal sin? 4. Is it a capital vice? 5. Its daughters |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod appetitus gloriae non sit peccatum. Nullus enim peccat in hoc quod Deo assimilatur, quinimmo mandatur, Ephes. V, estote imitatores Dei, sicut filii carissimi. Sed in hoc quod homo quaerit gloriam, videtur Deum imitari, qui ab hominibus gloriam quaerit, unde dicitur Isaiae XLIII, omnem qui invocat nomen meum, in gloriam meam creavi eum. Ergo appetitus gloriae non est peccatum. | Objection 1. It seems that the desire of glory is not a sin. For no one sins in being likened to God: in fact we are commanded (Ephesians 5:1): "Be ye . . . followers of God, as most dear children." Now by seeking glory man seems to imitate God, Who seeks glory from men: wherefore it is written (Isaiah 43:6-7): "Bring My sons from afar, and My daughters from the ends of the earth. And every one that calleth on My name, I have created him for My glory." Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud per quod aliquis provocatur ad bonum, non videtur esse peccatum. Sed per appetitum gloriae homines provocantur ad bonum, dicit enim Tullius, in libro de Tusculan. quaest., quod omnes ad studia impelluntur gloria. In sacra etiam Scriptura promittitur gloria pro bonis operibus, secundum illud Rom. II, his qui sunt secundum patientiam boni operis, gloriam et honorem. Ergo appetitus gloriae non est peccatum. | Objection 2. Further, that which incites a mar to do good is apparently not a sin. Now the desire of glory incites men to do good. For Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that "glory inflames every man to strive his utmost": and in Holy Writ glory is promised for good works, according to Romans 2:7: "To them, indeed, who according to patience in good work . . . glory and honor" [Vulgate: 'Who will render to every man according to his works, to them indeed who . . . seek glory and honor and incorruption, eternal life.']. Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, Tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod gloria est frequens de aliquo fama cum laude, et ad idem pertinet quod Ambrosius dicit, quod gloria est clara cum laude notitia. Sed appetere laudabilem famam non est peccatum, quinimmo videtur esse laudabile, secundum illud Eccli. XLI, curam habe de bono nomine; et ad Rom. XII, providentes bona non solum coram Deo, sed etiam coram omnibus hominibus. Ergo appetitus inanis gloriae non est peccatum. | Objection 3. Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that glory is "consistent good report about a person, together with praise": and this comes to the same as what Augustine says (Contra Maximin. iii), viz. that glory is, "as it were, clear knowledge with praise." Now it is no sin to desire praiseworthy renown: indeed, it seems itself to call for praise, according to Sirach 41:15, "Take care of a good name," and Romans 12:17, "Providing good things not only in the sight of God, but also in the sight of all men." Therefore the desire of vainglory is not a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, V de Civ. Dei, sanius videt qui et amorem laudis vitium esse cognoscit. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v): "He is better advised who acknowledges that even the love of praise is sinful." |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod gloria claritatem quandam significat, unde glorificari idem est quod clarificari, ut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan. Claritas autem et decorem quendam habet, et manifestationem. Et ideo nomen gloriae proprie importat manifestationem alicuius de hoc quod apud homines decorum videtur, sive illud sit bonum aliquod corporale, sive spirituale. Quia vero illud quod simpliciter clarum est, a multis conspici potest et a remotis, ideo proprie per nomen gloriae designatur quod bonum alicuius deveniat in multorum notitiam et approbationem, secundum quem modum dicitur in Tito Livio, gloriari ad unum non est. Largius tamen accepto nomine gloriae, non solum consistit in multitudinis cognitione, sed etiam paucorum vel unius, aut sui solius, dum scilicet aliquis proprium bonum considerat ut dignum laude. Quod autem aliquis bonum suum cognoscat et approbet, non est peccatum, dicitur enim I ad Cor. II, nos autem non spiritum huius mundi accepimus, sed spiritum qui ex Deo est, ut sciamus quae a Deo donata sunt nobis. Similiter etiam non est peccatum quod aliquis velit bona sua ab aliis approbari, dicitur enim Matth. V, luceat lux vestra coram hominibus. Et ideo appetitus gloriae de se non nominat aliquid vitiosum. Sed appetitus inanis vel vanae gloriae vitium importat, nam quidlibet vanum appetere vitiosum est, secundum illud Psalmi, ut quid diligitis vanitatem, et quaeritis mendacium? Potest autem gloria dici vana, uno modo, ex parte rei de qua quis gloriam quaerit, puta cum quis quaerit gloriam de eo quod non est, vel de eo quod non est gloria dignum, sicut de aliqua re fragili et caduca. Alio modo, ex parte eius a quo quis gloriam quaerit, puta hominis, cuius iudicium non est certum. Tertio modo, ex parte ipsius qui gloriam appetit, qui videlicet appetitum gloriae suae non refert in debitum finem, puta ad honorem Dei vel proximi salutem. | I answer that, Glory signifies a certain clarity, wherefore Augustine says (Tract. lxxxii, c, cxiv in Joan.) that to be "glorified is the same as to be clarified." Now clarity and comeliness imply a certain display: wherefore the word glory properly denotes the display of something as regards its seeming comely in the sight of men, whether it be a bodily or a spiritual good. Since, however, that which is clear simply can be seen by many, and by those who are far away, it follows that the word glory properly denotes that somebody's good is known and approved by many, according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin.) [The quotation is from Livy: Hist., Lib. XXII C, 39: "I must not boast while I am addressing one man]. But if we take the word glory in a broader sense, it not only consists in the knowledge of many, but also in the knowledge of few, or of one, or of oneself alone, as when one considers one's own good as being worthy of praise. Now it is not a sin to know and approve one's own good: for it is written (1 Corinthians 2:12): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God that we may know the things that are given us from God." Likewise it is not a sin to be willing to approve one's own good works: for it is written (Matthew 5:16): "Let your light shine before men." Hence the desire for glory does not, of itself, denote a sin: but the desire for empty or vain glory denotes a sin: for it is sinful to desire anything vain, according to Psalm 4:3, "Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?" Now glory may be called vain in three ways. First, on the part of the thing for which one seeks glory: as when a man seeks glory for that which is unworthy of glory, for instance when he seeks it for something frail and perishable: secondly, on the part of him from whom he seeks glory, for instance a man whose judgment is uncertain: thirdly, on the part of the man himself who seeks glory, for that he does not refer the desire of his own glory to a due end, such as God's honor, or the spiritual welfare of his neighbor. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, super illud Ioan. XIII, vos vocatis me, magister et domine, et bene dicitis, periculosum est sibi placere cui cavendum est superbire. Ille autem qui super omnia est, quantumcumque se laudet, non se extollit. Nobis namque expedit Deum nosse, non illi, nec eum quisque cognoscit, si non se indicet ipse qui novit. Unde patet quod Deus suam gloriam non quaerit propter se, sed propter nos. Et similiter etiam homo laudabiliter potest ad aliorum utilitatem gloriam suam appetere, secundum illud Matth. V, videant opera vestra bona, et glorificent patrem vestrum qui in caelis est. | Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says on John 13:13, "You call Me Master and Lord; and you say well" (Tract. lviii in Joan.): "Self-complacency is fraught with danger of one who has to beware of pride. But He Who is above all, however much He may praise Himself, does not uplift Himself. For knowledge of God is our need, not His: nor does any man know Him unless he be taught of Him Who knows." It is therefore evident that God seeks glory, not for His own sake, but for ours. On like manner a man may rightly seek his own glory for the good of others, according to Matthew 5:16, "That they may see your good works, and glorify your Father Who is in heaven." |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod gloria quae habetur a Deo, non est gloria vana, sed vera. Et talis gloria bonis operibus in praemium repromittitur. De qua dicitur, II ad Cor. X, qui gloriatur, in domino glorietur, non enim qui seipsum commendat, ille probatus est; sed quem Deus commendat. Provocantur etiam aliqui ad virtutum opera ex appetitu gloriae humanae, sicut etiam ex appetitu aliorum terrenorum bonorum, non tamen est vere virtuosus qui propter humanam gloriam opera virtutis operatur, ut Augustinus probat, in V de Civ. Dei. | Reply to Objection 2. That which we receive from God is not vain but true glory: it is this glory that is promised as a reward for good works, and of which it is written (2 Corinthians 10:17-18): "He that glorieth let him glory in the Lord, for not he who commendeth himself is approved, but he whom God commendeth." It is true that some are heartened to do works of virtue, through desire for human glory, as also through the desire for other earthly goods. Yet he is not truly virtuous who does virtuous deeds for the sake of human glory, as Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei v). |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ad perfectionem hominis pertinet quod ipse cognoscat, sed quod ipse ab aliis cognoscatur non pertinet ad eius perfectionem, et ideo non est per se appetendum. Potest tamen appeti inquantum est utile ad aliquid, vel ad hoc quod Deus ab hominibus glorificetur; vel ad hoc quod homines proficiant ex bono quod in alio cognoscunt; vel ex hoc quod ipse homo ex bonis quae in se cognoscit per testimonium laudis alienae studeat in eis perseverare et ad meliora proficere. Et secundum hoc laudabile est quod curam habeat aliquis de bono nomine, et quod provideat bona coram hominibus, non tamen quod in hominum laude inaniter delectetur. | Reply to Objection 3. It is requisite for man's perfection that he should know himself; but not that he should be known by others, wherefore it is not to be desired in itself. It may, however, be desired as being useful for something, either in order that God may be glorified by men, or that men may become better by reason of the good they know to be in another man, or in order that man, knowing by the testimony of others' praise the good which is in him, may himself strive to persevere therein and to become better. On this sense it is praiseworthy that a man should "take care of his good name," and that he should "provide good things in the sight of God and men": but not that he should take an empty pleasure in human praise. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inanis gloria magnanimitati non opponatur. Pertinet enim ad inanem gloriam, ut dictum est, quod aliquis glorietur in his quae non sunt, quod pertinet ad falsitatem; vel in rebus terrenis vel caducis, quod pertinet ad cupiditatem; vel in testimonio hominum, quorum iudicium non est certum, quod pertinet ad imprudentiam. Huiusmodi autem vitia non opponuntur magnanimitati. Ergo inanis gloria non opponitur magnanimitati. | Objection 1. It seems that vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. For, as stated above (Article 1), vainglory consists in glorying in things that are not, which pertains to falsehood; or in earthly and perishable things, which pertains to covetousness; or in the testimony of men, whose judgment is uncertain, which pertains to imprudence. Now these vices are not contrary to magnanimity. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, inanis gloria non opponitur magnanimitati per defectum, sicut pusillanimitas, quae inani gloriae repugnans videtur. Similiter etiam nec per excessum, sic enim opponitur magnanimitati praesumptio et ambitio, ut dictum est, a quibus inanis gloria differt. Ergo inanis gloria non opponitur magnanimitati. | Objection 2. Further, vainglory is not, like pusillanimity, opposed to magnanimity by way of deficiency, for this seems inconsistent with vainglory. Nor is it opposed to it by way of excess, for in this way presumption and ambition are opposed to magnanimity, as stated above (130, 2; 131, 2): and these differ from vainglory. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, Philipp. II, super illud, nihil per contentionem aut inanem gloriam, dicit Glossa, erant aliqui inter eos dissentientes, inquieti, inanis gloriae causa contendentes. Contentio autem non opponitur magnanimitati. Ergo neque inanis gloria. | Objection 3. Further, a gloss on Philippians 2:3, "Let nothing be done through contention, neither by vainglory," says: "Some among them were given to dissension and restlessness, contending with one another for the sake of vainglory." But contention [Cf. 38] is not opposed to magnanimity. Neither therefore is vainglory. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., cavenda est gloriae cupiditas, eripit enim animi libertatem, pro qua magnanimis viris omnis debet esse contentio. Ergo opponitur magnanimitati. | On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading, "Magnanimity consists in two things: We should beware of the desire for glory, since it enslaves the mind, which a magnanimous man should ever strive to keep untrammeled." Therefore it is opposed to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, gloria est quidam effectus honoris et laudis, ex hoc enim quod aliquis laudatur, vel quaecumque reverentia ei exhibetur, redditur clarus in notitia aliorum. Et quia magnanimitas est circa honorem, ut supra dictum est, consequens est etiam ut sit circa gloriam, ut scilicet sicut moderate utitur honore, ita moderate utatur gloria. Et ideo inordinatus appetitus gloriae directe magnanimitati opponitur. | I answer that, As stated above (103, 1, ad 3), glory is an effect of honor and praise: because from the fact that a man is praised, or shown any kind of reverence, he acquires charity in the knowledge of others. And since magnanimity is about honor, as stated above (129, 1 and 2), it follows that it also is about glory: seeing that as a man uses honor moderately, so too does he use glory in moderation. Wherefore inordinate desire of glory is directly opposed to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc ipsum magnitudini animi repugnat, quod aliquis res modicas tantum appretietur quod de eis glorietur, unde in IV Ethic. dicitur de magnanimo quod sibi sit honor parvum. Similiter etiam et alia quae propter honorem quaeruntur, puta potentatus et divitiae, parva reputantur ab eo. Similiter etiam magnitudini animi repugnat quod aliquis de his quae non sunt glorietur. Unde de magnanimo dicitur in IV Ethic., quod magis curat veritatem quam opinionem. Similiter etiam et magnitudini animi repugnat quod aliquis glorietur in testimonio laudis humanae, quasi hoc magnum aliquid aestimetur. Unde de magnanimo dicitur in IV Ethic., quod non est ei cura ut laudetur. Et sic ea quae aliis virtutibus opponuntur nihil prohibet opponi magnanimitati, secundum quod habent pro magnis quae parva sunt. | Reply to Objection 1. To think so much of little things as to glory in them is itself opposed to magnanimity. Wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that honor is of little account to him. On like manner he thinks little of other things that are sought for honor's sake, such as power and wealth. Likewise it is inconsistent with magnanimity to glory in things that are not; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that he cares more for truth than for opinion. Again it is incompatible with magnanimity for a man to glory in the testimony of human praise, as though he deemed this something great; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv), that he cares not to be praised. And so, when a man looks upon little things as though they were great, nothing hinders this from being contrary to magnanimity, as well as to other virtues. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod inanis gloriae cupidus, secundum rei veritatem, deficit a magnanimo, quia videlicet gloriatur in his quae magnanimus parva aestimat, ut dictum est. Sed considerando aestimationem eius, opponitur magnanimo per excessum, quia videlicet gloriam quam appetit, reputat aliquid magnum, et ad eam tendit supra suam dignitatem. | Reply to Objection 2. He that is desirous of vainglory does in truth fall short of being magnanimous, because he glories in what the magnanimous man thinks little of, as stated in the preceding Reply. But if we consider his estimate, he is opposed to the magnanimous man by way of excess, because the glory which he seeks is something great in his estimation, and he tends thereto in excess of his deserts. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, oppositio vitiorum non attenditur secundum effectum. Et tamen hoc ipsum magnitudini animi opponitur, quod aliquis contentionem intendat, nullus enim contendit nisi pro re quam aestimat magnam. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnanimus non est contentiosus, qui nihil aestimat magnum. | Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (127, 2, ad 2), the opposition of vices does not depend on their effects. Nevertheless contention, if done intentionally, is opposed to magnanimity: since no one contends save for what he deems great. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the magnanimous man is not contentious, because nothing is great in his estimation. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod inanis gloria sit peccatum mortale. Nihil enim excludit mercedem aeternam nisi peccatum mortale. Sed inanis gloria excludit mercedem aeternam, dicitur enim Matth. VI, attendite ne iustitiam vestram faciatis coram hominibus, ut videamini ab eis. Ergo inanis gloria est peccatum mortale. | Objection 1. It seems that vainglory is a mortal sin. For nothing precludes the eternal reward except a mortal sin. Now vainglory precludes the eternal reward: for it is written (Matthew 6:1): "Take heed, that you do not give justice before men, to be seen by them: otherwise you shall not have a reward of your Father Who is in heaven." Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, quicumque subripit sibi quod est Dei proprium, mortaliter peccat. Sed per appetitum inanis gloriae aliquis sibi attribuit quod est proprium Dei, dicitur enim Isaiae XLII, gloriam meam alteri non dabo; et I ad Tim. I, soli Deo honor et gloria. Ergo inanis gloria est peccatum mortale. | Objection 2. Further, whoever appropriates to himself that which is proper to God, sins mortally. Now by desiring vainglory, a man appropriates to himself that which is proper to God. For it is written (Isaiah 42:8): "I will not give My glory to another," and (1 Timothy 1:17): "To . . . the only God be honor and glory." Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud peccatum quod est maxime periculosum et nocivum, videtur esse mortale. Sed peccatum inanis gloriae est huiusmodi, quia super illud I ad Thess. II, Deo qui probat corda nostra, dicit Glossa Augustini, quas vires nocendi habeat humanae gloriae amor, non sentit nisi qui ei bellum indixerit, quia etsi cuiquam facile est laudem non cupere dum negatur, difficile tamen est ea non delectari cum offertur. Chrysostomus etiam dicit, Matth. VI, quod inanis gloria occulte ingreditur, et omnia quae intus sunt insensibiliter aufert. Ergo inanis gloria est peccatum mortale. | Objection 3. Further, apparently a sin is mortal if it be most dangerous and harmful. Now vainglory is a sin of this kind, because a gloss of Augustine on 1 Thessalonians 2:4, "God, Who proveth our hearts," says: "Unless a man war against the love of human glory he does not perceive its baneful power, for though it be easy for anyone not to desire praise as long as one does not get it, it is difficult not to take pleasure in it, when it is given." Chrysostom also says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that "vainglory enters secretly, and robs us insensibly of all our inward possessions." Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., quod cum cetera vitia locum habeant in servis Diaboli, inanis gloria locum habet etiam in servis Christi. In quibus tamen nullum est peccatum mortale. Ergo inanis gloria non est peccatum mortale. | On the contrary, Chrysostom says [Hom. xiii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "while other vices find their abode in the servants of the devil, vainglory finds a place even in the servants of Christ." Yet in the latter there is no mortal sin. Therefore vainglory is not a mortal sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ex hoc aliquod peccatum est mortale quod caritati contrariatur. Peccatum autem inanis gloriae, secundum se consideratum, non videtur contrariari caritati quantum ad dilectionem proximi. Quantum autem ad dilectionem Dei, potest contrariari caritati dupliciter. Uno modo, ratione materiae de qua quis gloriatur. Puta cum quis gloriatur de aliquo falso quod contrariatur divinae reverentiae, secundum illud Ezech. XXVIII, elevatum est cor tuum, et dixisti, Deus ego sum; et I ad Cor. IV, quid habes quod non accepisti? Si autem accepisti, quare gloriaris quasi non acceperis? Vel etiam cum quis bonum temporale de quo gloriatur, praefert Deo, quod prohibetur Ierem. IX, non glorietur sapiens in sapientia sua, nec fortis in fortitudine sua, nec dives in divitiis suis, sed in hoc glorietur qui gloriatur, scire et nosse me. Aut etiam cum quis praefert testimonium hominum testimonio Dei, sicut contra quosdam dicitur Ioan. XII, qui dilexerunt magis gloriam hominum quam Dei. Alio modo, ex parte ipsius gloriantis, qui intentionem suam refert ad gloriam tanquam ad ultimum finem, ad quem scilicet ordinet etiam virtutis opera, et pro quo consequendo non praetermittat facere etiam ea quae sunt contra Deum. Et sic est peccatum mortale. Unde Augustinus dicit, in V de Civ. Dei, quod hoc vitium, scilicet amor humanae laudis, tam inimicum est piae fidei, si maior in corde sit cupiditas gloriae quam Dei timor vel amor, ut dominus diceret (Ioan. V), quomodo potestis credere, gloriam ab invicem expectantes, et gloriam quae a solo Deo est non quaerentes? Si autem amor humanae gloriae, quamvis sit inanis, non tamen repugnet caritati, neque quantum ad id de quo est gloria, neque quantum ad intentionem gloriam quaerentis, non est peccatum mortale, sed veniale. | I answer that, As stated above (24, 12; 110, 4; 112, 2), a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity. Now the sin of vainglory, considered in itself, does not seem to be contrary to charity as regards the love of one's neighbor: yet as regards the love of God it may be contrary to charity in two ways. On one way, by reason of the matter about which one glories: for instance when one glories in something false that is opposed to the reverence we owe God, according to Ezekiel 28:2, "Thy heart is lifted up, and Thou hast said: I am God," and 1 Corinthians 4:7, "What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?" Or again when a man prefers to God the temporal good in which he glories: for this is forbidden (Jeremiah 9:23-24): "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, and let not the strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man glory in his riches. But let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me." Or again when a man prefers the testimony of man to God's; thus it is written in reproval of certain people (John 12:43): "For they loved the glory of men more than the glory of God." In another way vainglory may be contrary to charity, on the part of the one who glories, in that he refers his intention to glory as his last end: so that he directs even virtuous deeds thereto, and, in order to obtain it, forbears not from doing even that which is against God. On this way it is a mortal sin. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 14) that "this vice," namely the love of human praise, "is so hostile to a godly faith, if the heart desires glory more than it fears or loves God, that our Lord said (John 5:44): How can you believe, who receive glory one from another, and the glory which is from God alone, you do not seek?" If, however, the love of human glory, though it be vain, be not inconsistent with charity, neither as regards the matter gloried in, nor as to the intention of him that seeks glory, it is not a mortal but a venial sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nullus peccando meretur vitam aeternam. Unde opus virtuosum amittit vim merendi vitam aeternam si propter inanem gloriam fiat, etiam si illa inanis gloria non sit peccatum mortale. Sed quando aliquis simpliciter amittit aeternam mercedem propter inanem gloriam, et non solum quantum ad unum actum, tunc inanis gloria est peccatum mortale. | Reply to Objection 1. No man, by sinning, merits eternal life: wherefore a virtuous deed loses its power to merit eternal life, if it be done for the sake of vainglory, even though that vainglory be not a mortal sin. On the other hand when a man loses the eternal reward simply through vainglory, and not merely in respect of one act, vainglory is a mortal sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod non omnis qui est inanis gloriae cupidus, appetit sibi illam excellentiam quae competit soli Deo. Alia enim est gloria quae debetur soli Deo, et alia quae debetur homini virtuoso vel diviti. | Reply to Objection 2. Not every man that is desirous of vainglory, desires the excellence which belongs to God alone. For the glory due to God alone differs from the glory due to a virtuous or rich man. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod inanis gloria dicitur esse periculosum peccatum non tam propter gravitatem sui, quam etiam propter hoc quod est dispositio ad gravia peccata, inquantum scilicet per inanem gloriam redditur homo praesumptuosus et nimis de se ipso confidens. Et sic etiam paulatim disponit ad hoc quod homo privetur interioribus bonis. | Reply to Objection 3. Vainglory is stated to be a dangerous sin, not only on account of its gravity, but also because it is a disposition to grave sins, in so far as it renders man presumptuous and too self-confident: and so it gradually disposes a man to lose his inward goods. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inanis gloria non sit vitium capitale. Vitium enim quod semper ex altero oritur, non videtur esse capitale. Sed inanis gloria semper ex superbia nascitur. Ergo inanis gloria non est vitium capitale. | Objection 1. It seems that vainglory is not a capital vice. For a vice that always arises from another vice is seemingly not capital. But vainglory always arises from pride. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, honor videtur esse aliquid principalius quam gloria, quae est eius effectus. Sed ambitio, quae est inordinatus appetitus honoris, non est vitium capitale. Ergo etiam neque appetitus inanis gloriae. | Objection 2. Further, honor would seem to take precedence of glory, for this is its effect. Now ambition which is inordinate desire of honor is not a capital vice. Neither therefore is the desire of vainglory. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, vitium capitale habet aliquam principalitatem. Sed inanis gloria non videtur habere aliquam principalitatem, neque quantum ad rationem peccati, quia non semper est peccatum mortale; neque etiam quantum ad rationem boni appetibilis, quia gloria humana videtur esse quiddam fragile et extra hominem existens. Ergo inanis gloria non est vitium capitale. | Objection 3. Further, a capital vice has a certain prominence. But vainglory seems to have no prominence, neither as a sin, because it is not always a mortal sin, nor considered as an appetible good, since human glory is apparently a frail thing, and is something outside man himself. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., numerat inanem gloriam inter septem vitia capitalia. | On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers vainglory among the seven capital vices. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod de vitiis capitalibus dupliciter aliqui loquuntur. Quidam enim ponunt superbiam unum de vitiis capitalibus. Et hi non ponunt inanem gloriam inter vitia capitalia. Gregorius autem, in XXXI Moral., superbiam ponit reginam omnium vitiorum, et inanem gloriam, quae immediate ab ipsa oritur, ponit vitium capitale. Et hoc rationabiliter. Superbia enim, ut infra dicetur, importat inordinatum appetitum excellentiae. Ex omni autem bono quod quis appetit, quandam perfectionem et excellentiam consequitur. Et ideo fines omnium vitiorum ordinantur in finem superbiae. Et propter hoc videtur quod habeat quandam generalem causalitatem super alia vitia, et non debeat computari inter specialia vitiorum principia, quae sunt vitia capitalia. Inter bona autem per quae excellentiam homo consequitur, praecipue ad hoc operari videtur gloria, inquantum importat manifestationem bonitatis alicuius, nam bonum naturaliter amatur et honoratur ab omnibus. Et ideo sicut per gloriam quae est apud Deum, consequitur homo excellentiam in rebus divinis; ita etiam per gloriam hominum consequitur homo excellentiam in rebus humanis. Et ideo, propter propinquitatem ad excellentiam, quam homines maxime desiderant, consequens est quod sit multum appetibilis, et quod ex eius inordinato appetitu multa vitia oriantur. Et ita inanis gloria est vitium capitale. | I answer that, The capital vices are enumerated in two ways. For some reckon pride as one of their number: and these do not place vainglory among the capital vices. Gregory, however (Moral. xxxi), reckons pride to be the queen of all the vices, and vainglory, which is the immediate offspring of pride, he reckons to be a capital vice: and not without reason. For pride, as we shall state farther on (152, 1 and 2), denotes inordinate desire of excellence. But whatever good one may desire, one desires a certain perfection and excellence therefrom: wherefore the end of every vice is directed to the end of pride, so that this vice seems to exercise a kind of causality over the other vices, and ought not to be reckoned among the special sources of vice, known as the capital vices. Now among the goods that are the means whereby man acquires honor, glory seems to be the most conducive to that effect, inasmuch as it denotes the manifestation of a man's goodness: since good is naturally loved and honored by all. Wherefore, just as by the glory which is in God's sight man acquires honor in Divine things, so too by the glory which is in the sight of man he acquires excellence in human things. Hence on account of its close connection with excellence, which men desire above all, it follows that it is most desirable. And since many vices arise from the inordinate desire thereof, it follows that vainglory is a capital vice. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquod vitium oriri ex superbia non repugnat ei quod est esse vitium capitale, eo quod, sicut supra dictum est, superbia est regina et mater omnium vitiorum. | Reply to Objection 1. It is not impossible for a capital vice to arise from pride, since as stated above (in the body of the Article and I-II, 84, 2) pride is the queen and mother of all the vices. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod laus et honor comparantur ad gloriam, ut supra dictum est, sicut causae ex quibus gloria sequitur. Unde gloria comparatur ad ea sicut finis, propter hoc enim aliquis amat honorari et laudari, inquantum per hoc aliquis aestimat se in aliorum notitia fore praeclarum. | Reply to Objection 2. Praise and honor, as stated above (Article 2), stand in relation to glory as the causes from which it proceeds, so that glory is compared to them as their end. For the reason why a man loves to be honored and praised is that he thinks thereby to acquire a certain renown in the knowledge of others. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod inanis gloria habet principalem rationem appetibilis, ratione iam dicta, et hoc sufficit ad rationem vitii capitalis. Non autem requiritur quod vitium capitale semper sit peccatum mortale, quia etiam ex veniali peccato potest mortale oriri, inquantum scilicet veniale disponit ad mortale. | Reply to Objection 3. Vainglory stands prominent under the aspect of desirability, for the reason given above, and this suffices for it to be reckoned a capital vice. Nor is it always necessary for a capital vice to be a mortal sin; for mortal sin can arise from venial sin, inasmuch as venial sin can dispose man thereto. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter dicantur filiae inanis gloriae esse inobedientia, iactantia, hypocrisis, contentio, pertinacia, discordia, novitatum praesumptio. Iactantia enim, secundum Gregorium, XXIII Moral., ponitur inter species superbiae. Superbia autem non oritur ex inani gloria, sed potius e converso, ut Gregorius dicit, XXXI Moral. Ergo iactantia non debet poni filia inanis gloriae. | Objection 1. It seems that the daughters of vainglory are unsuitably reckoned to be "disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and eccentricity [Praesumptio novitatum, literally 'presumption of novelties']." For according to Gregory (Moral. xxiii) boastfulness is numbered among the species of pride. Now pride does not arise from vainglory, rather is it the other way about, as Gregory says (Moral. xxxi). Therefore boastfulness should not be reckoned among the daughters of vainglory. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, contentiones et discordiae videntur ex ira maxime provenire. Sed ira est capitale vitium inani gloriae condivisum. Ergo videtur quod non sint filiae inanis gloriae. | Objection 2. Further, contention and discord seem to be the outcome chiefly of anger. But anger is a capital vice condivided with vainglory. Therefore it seems that they are not the daughters of vainglory. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., quod ubique vana gloria malum est, sed maxime in philanthropia, idest in misericordia. Quae tamen non est aliquid novum, sed in consuetudine hominum existit. Ergo praesumptio novitatum non debet specialiter poni filia inanis gloriae. | Objection 3. Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that vainglory is always evil, but especially in philanthropy, i.e. mercy. And yet this is nothing new, for it is an established custom among men. Therefore eccentricity should not be specially reckoned as a daughter of vainglory. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est auctoritas Gregorii, in XXXI Moral., ubi praedictas filias inani gloriae assignat. | On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi), who there assigns the above daughters to vainglory. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, illa vitia quae de se nata sunt ordinari ad finem alicuius vitii capitalis, dicuntur filiae eius. Finis autem inanis gloriae est manifestatio propriae excellentiae, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ad quod potest homo tendere dupliciter. Uno modo, directe, sive per verba, et sic est iactantia; sive per facta, et sic, si sint vera, habentia aliquam admirationem, est praesumptio novitatum, quas homines solent magis admirari; si autem per ficta sit, sic est hypocrisis. Alio autem modo nititur aliquis manifestare suam excellentiam indirecte, ostendendo se non esse alio minorem. Et hoc quadrupliciter. Primo quidem, quantum ad intellectum, et sic est pertinacia, per quam homo nimis innititur suae sententiae, nolens credere sententiae meliori. Secundo, quantum ad voluntatem, et sic est discordia, dum non vult a propria voluntate discedere ut aliis concordet. Tertio, quantum ad locutionem, et sic est contentio, dum aliquis verbis clamose contra alium litigat. Quarto, quantum ad factum, et sic est inobedientia, dum scilicet aliquis non vult exequi superioris praeceptum. | I answer that, As stated above (34, 5; 35, 4; I-II, 84, A3,4), the vices which by their very nature are such as to be directed to the end of a certain capital vice, are called its daughters. Now the end of vainglory is the manifestation of one's own excellence, as stated above (A1,4): and to this end a man may tend in two ways. On one way directly, either by words, and this is boasting, or by deeds, and then if they be true and call for astonishment, it is love of novelties which men are wont to wonder at most; but if they be false, it is hypocrisy. On another way a man strives to make known his excellence by showing that he is not inferior to another, and this in four ways. First, as regards the intellect, and thus we have "obstinacy," by which a man is too much attached to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe one that is better. Secondly, as regards the will, and then we have "discord," whereby a man is unwilling to give up his own will, and agree with others. Thirdly, as regards "speech," and then we have "contention," whereby a man quarrels noisily with another. Fourthly as regards deeds, and this is "disobedience," whereby a man refuses to carry out the command of his superiors. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, iactantia ponitur species superbiae quantum ad interiorem causam eius, quae est arrogantia. Ipsa autem iactantia exterior. Ut dicitur in IV Ethic., ordinatur quandoque quidem ad lucrum, sed frequentius ad gloriam vel honorem. Et sic oritur ex inani gloria. | Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (112, 1, ad 2), boasting is reckoned a kind of pride, as regards its interior cause, which is arrogance: but outward boasting, according to Ethic. iv, is directed sometimes to gain, but more often to glory and honor, and thus it is the result of vainglory. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ira non causat discordiam et contentionem nisi cum adiunctione inanis gloriae, per hoc scilicet quod aliquis sibi gloriosum reputat quod non cedat voluntati vel verbis aliorum. | Reply to Objection 2. Anger is not the cause of discord and contention, except in conjunction with vainglory, in that a man thinks it a glorious thing for him not to yield to the will and words of others. |
| IIª-IIae q. 132 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod inanis gloria vituperatur circa eleemosynam propter defectum caritatis, qui videtur esse in eo qui praefert inanem gloriam utilitati proximi, dum hoc propter illud facit. Non autem vituperatur aliquis ex hoc quod praesumat eleemosynam facere quasi aliquid novum. | Reply to Objection 3. Vainglory is reproved in connection with almsdeeds on account of the lack of charity apparent in one who prefers vainglory to the good of his neighbor, seeing that he does the latter for the sake of the former. But a man is not reproved for presuming to give alms as though this were something novel. |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 pr. Deinde considerandum est de pusillanimitate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum pusillanimitas sit peccatum. Secundo, cui virtuti opponatur. | Question 133. Pusillanimity 1. Is pusillanimity a sin? 2. To what virtue is it opposed? |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pusillanimitas non sit peccatum. Ex omni enim peccato aliquis efficitur malus, sicut ex omni virtute aliquis efficitur bonus. Sed pusillanimus non est malus, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Ergo pusillanimitas non est peccatum. | Objection 1. It seems that pusillanimity is not a sin. For every sin makes a man evil, just as every virtue makes a man good. But a fainthearted man is not evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, ibidem, quod maxime videtur pusillanimus esse qui magnis bonis dignus existit, et tamen his non dignificat seipsum. Sed nullus est dignus magnis bonis nisi virtuosus, quia, ut ibidem philosophus dicit, secundum veritatem solus bonus est honorandus. Ergo pusillanimus est virtuosus. Non ergo pusillanimitas est peccatum. | Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a fainthearted man is especially one who is worthy of great goods, yet does not deem himself worthy of them." Now no one is worthy of great goods except the virtuous, since as the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), "none but the virtuous are truly worthy of honor." Therefore the fainthearted are virtuous: and consequently pusillanimity is not a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, initium omnis peccati est superbia, ut dicitur Eccli. X. Sed pusillanimitas non procedit ex superbia, quia superbus extollit se supra id quod est; pusillanimus autem subtrahit se ab his quibus est dignus. Ergo pusillanimitas non est peccatum. | Objection 3. Further, "Pride is the beginning of all sin" (Sirach 10:15). But pusillanimity does not proceed from pride, since the proud man sets himself above what he is, while the fainthearted man withdraws from the things he is worthy of. Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod qui dignificat se minoribus quam sit dignus, dicitur pusillanimus. Sed quandoque sancti viri dignificant seipsos minoribus quam sint digni, sicut patet de Moyse et Ieremia, qui digni erant officio ad quod assumebantur a Deo, quod tamen uterque eorum humiliter recusabat, ut habetur Exod. III et Ierem. I. Non ergo pusillanimitas est peccatum. | Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he who deems himself less worthy than he is, is said to be fainthearted." Now sometimes holy men deem themselves less worthy than they are; for instance, Moses and Jeremias, who were worthy of the office God chose them for, which they both humbly declined (Exodus 3:11; Jeremiah 1:6). Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, nihil in moribus hominum est vitandum nisi peccatum. Sed pusillanimitas est vitanda, dicitur enim ad Coloss. III, patres, nolite ad indignationem provocare filios vestros, ut non pusillo animo fiant. Ergo pusillanimitas est peccatum. | On the contrary, Nothing in human conduct is to be avoided save sin. Now pusillanimity is to be avoided: for it is written (Colossians 3:21): "Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be discouraged." Therefore pusillanimity is a sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod omne illud quod contrariatur naturali inclinationi est peccatum, quia contrariatur legi naturae. Inest autem unicuique rei naturalis inclinatio ad exequendam actionem commensuratam suae potentiae, ut patet in omnibus rebus naturalibus, tam animatis quam inanimatis. Sicut autem per praesumptionem aliquis excedit proportionem suae potentiae, dum nititur ad maiora quam possit; ita etiam pusillanimus deficit a proportione suae potentiae, dum recusat in id tendere quod est suae potentiae commensuratum. Et ideo, sicut praesumptio est peccatum, ita et pusillanimitas. Et inde est quod servus qui acceptam pecuniam domini sui fodit in terram, nec est operatus ex ea, propter quendam pusillanimitatis timorem, punitur a domino, ut habetur Matth. XXV et Luc. XIX. | I answer that, Whatever is contrary to a natural inclination is a sin, because it is contrary to a law of nature. Now everything has a natural inclination to accomplish an action that is commensurate with its power: as is evident in all natural things, whether animate or inanimate. Now just as presumption makes a man exceed what is proportionate to his power, by striving to do more than he can, so pusillanimity makes a man fall short of what is proportionate to his power, by refusing to tend to that which is commensurate thereto. Wherefore as presumption is a sin, so is pusillanimity. Hence it is that the servant who buried in the earth the money he had received from his master, and did not trade with it through fainthearted fear, was punished by his master (Matthew 25; Luke 19). |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus illos nominat malos qui proximis inferunt nocumenta. Et secundum hoc, pusillanimus dicitur non esse malus, quia nulli infert nocumentum, nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet deficit ab operationibus quibus posset alios iuvare. Dicit enim Gregorius, in pastorali, quod illi qui prodesse utilitati proximorum in praedicatione refugiunt, si districte iudicentur, ex tantis rei sunt ex quantis venientes ad publicum prodesse potuerunt. | Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher calls those evil who injure their neighbor: and accordingly the fainthearted is said not to be evil, because he injures no one, save accidentally, by omitting to do what might be profitable to others. For Gregory says (Pastoral. i) that if "they who demur to do good to their neighbor in preaching be judged strictly, without doubt their guilt is proportionate to the good they might have done had they been less retiring." |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquem habentem habitum virtutis peccare, venialiter quidem, etiam ipso habitu remanente; mortaliter autem, cum corruptione ipsius habitus virtutis gratuitae. Et ideo potest contingere quod aliquis ex virtute quam habet sit dignus ad aliqua magna facienda, quae sunt digna magno honore; et tamen, per hoc quod ipse non attentat sua virtute uti, peccat, quandoque quidem venialiter, quandoque autem mortaliter. Vel potest dici quod pusillanimus est dignus magnis secundum habilitatem ad virtutem quae inest ei, vel ex bona dispositione naturae, vel ex scientia, vel ex exteriori fortuna, quibus dum recusat uti ad virtutem, pusillanimus redditur. | Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders a person who has a virtuous habit from sinning venially and without losing the habit, or mortally and with loss of the habit of gratuitous virtue. Hence it is possible for a man, by reason of the virtue which he has, to be worthy of doing certain great things that are worthy of great honor, and yet through not trying to make use of his virtue, he sins sometimes venially, sometimes mortally. Again it may be replied that the fainthearted is worthy of great things in proportion to his ability for virtue, ability which he derives either from a good natural disposition, or from science, or from external fortune, and if he fails to use those things for virtue, he becomes guilty of pusillanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam pusillanimitas aliquo modo ex superbia potest oriri, dum scilicet aliquis nimis proprio sensui innititur, quo reputat se insufficientem ad ea respectu quorum sufficientiam habet. Unde dicitur Prov. XXVI, sapientior sibi piger videtur septem viris loquentibus sententias. Nihil enim prohibet quod se quantum ad aliqua deiiciat, et quantum ad alia se in sublime extollat. Unde Gregorius, in pastorali, de Moyse dicit quod superbus fortasse esset si ducatum plebis suae sine trepidatione susciperet, et rursum superbus existeret si auctoris imperio obedire recusaret. | Reply to Objection 3. Even pusillanimity may in some way be the result of pride: when, to wit, a man clings too much to his own opinion, whereby he thinks himself incompetent for those things for which he is competent. Hence it is written (Proverbs 26:16): "The sluggard is wiser in his own conceit than seven men that speak sentences." For nothing hinders him from depreciating himself in some things, and having a high opinion of himself in others. Wherefore Gregory says (Pastoral. i) of Moses that "perchance he would have been proud, had he undertaken the leadership of a numerous people without misgiving: and again he would have been proud, had he refused to obey the command of his Creator." |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod Moyses et Ieremias digni erant officio ad quod divinitus eligebantur, ex divina gratia. Sed ipsi considerantes propriae infirmitatis insufficientiam, recusabant, non tamen pertinaciter, ne in superbiam laberentur. | Reply to Objection 4. Moses and Jeremias were worthy of the office to which they were appointed by God, but their worthiness was of Divine grace: yet they, considering the insufficiency of their own weakness, demurred; though not obstinately lest they should fall into pride. |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pusillanimitas non opponatur magnanimitati. Dicit enim philosophus, in IV Ethic., quod pusillanimus ignorat seipsum, appeteret enim bona quibus dignus est, si se cognosceret. Sed ignorantia sui videtur opponi prudentiae. Ergo pusillanimitas opponitur prudentiae. | Objection 1. It seems that pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity. For the Philosopher says (Ethic., 3) that "the fainthearted man knows not himself: for he would desire the good things, of which he is worthy, if he knew himself." Now ignorance of self seems opposed to prudence. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to prudence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, Matth. XXV, servum qui propter pusillanimitatem pecunia uti recusavit, vocat dominus malum et pigrum. Philosophus etiam dicit, in IV Ethic., quod pusillanimi videntur pigri. Sed pigritia opponitur sollicitudini, quae est actus prudentiae, ut supra habitum est. Ergo pusillanimitas non opponitur magnanimitati. | Objection 2. Further our Lord calls the servant wicked and slothful who through pusillanimity refused to make use of the money. Moreover the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the fainthearted seem to be slothful. Now sloth is opposed to solicitude, which is an act of prudence, as stated above (Question 47, Article 09). Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, pusillanimitas videtur ex inordinato timore procedere, unde dicitur Isaiae XXXV, dicite, pusillanimes, confortamini et nolite timere. Videtur etiam procedere ex inordinata ira, secundum illud Coloss. III, patres, nolite ad indignationem provocare filios vestros, ut non pusillo animo fiant. Sed inordinatio timoris opponitur fortitudini, inordinatio autem irae mansuetudini. Ergo pusillanimitas non opponitur magnanimitati. | Objection 3. Further, pusillanimity seems to proceed from inordinate fear: hence it is written (Isaiah 35:4): "Say to the fainthearted: Take courage and fear not." It also seems to proceed from inordinate anger, according to Colossians 3:21, "Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be discouraged." Now inordinate fear is opposed to fortitude, and inordinate anger to meekness. Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, vitium quod opponitur alicui virtuti, tanto gravius est quanto magis est virtuti dissimile. Sed pusillanimitas magis est dissimilis magnanimitati quam praesumptio. Ergo, si pusillanimitas opponeretur magnanimitati, sequeretur quod esset gravius peccatum quam praesumptio. Quod est contra id quod dicitur Eccli. XXXVII, o praesumptio nequissima, unde creata es? Non ergo pusillanimitas magnanimitati opponitur. | Objection 4. Further, the vice that is in opposition to a particular virtue is the more grievous according as it is more unlike that virtue. Now pusillanimity is more unlike magnanimity than presumption is. Therefore if pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity, it follows that it is a more grievous sin than presumption: yet this is contrary to the saying of Sirach 37:3, "O wicked presumption, whence camest thou?" Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod pusillanimitas et magnanimitas differunt secundum magnitudinem et parvitatem animi, ut ex ipsis nominibus apparet. Sed magnum et parvum sunt opposita. Ergo pusillanimitas opponitur magnanimitati. | On the contrary, Pusillanimity and magnanimity differ as greatness and littleness of soul, as their very names denote. Now great and little are opposites. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod pusillanimitas potest tripliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum seipsam. Et sic manifestum est quod secundum propriam rationem opponitur magnanimitati, a qua differt secundum differentiam magnitudinis et parvitatis circa idem, nam sicut magnanimus ex animi magnitudine tendit ad magna, ita pusillanimus ex animi parvitate se retrahit a magnis. Alio modo potest considerari ex parte suae causae, quae ex parte intellectus, est ignorantia propriae conditionis; ex parte autem appetitus, est timor deficiendi in his quae falso aestimat excedere suam facultatem. Tertio modo potest considerari quantum ad effectum, qui est retrahere se a magnis quibus est dignus. Sed sicut supra dictum est, oppositio vitii ad virtutem attenditur magis secundum propriam speciem quam secundum causam vel effectum. Et ideo pusillanimitas directe magnanimitati opponitur. | I answer that, Pusillanimity may be considered in three ways. First, in itself; and thus it is evident that by its very nature it is opposed to magnanimity, from which it differs as great and little differ in connection with the same subject. For just as the magnanimous man tends to great things out of greatness of soul, so the pusillanimous man shrinks from great things out of littleness of soul. Secondly, it may be considered in reference to its cause, which on the part of the intellect is ignorance of one's own qualification, and on the part of the appetite is the fear of failure in what one falsely deems to exceed one's ability. Thirdly, it may be considered in reference to its effect, which is to shrink from the great things of which one is worthy. But, as stated above (132, 2, ad 3), opposition between vice and virtue depends rather on their respective species than on their cause or effect. Hence pusillanimity is directly opposed to magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de pusillanimitate ex parte causae quam habet in intellectu. Et tamen non proprie potest dici quod opponatur prudentiae etiam secundum causam suam, quia talis ignorantia non procedit ex insipientia, sed magis ex pigritia considerandi suam facultatem, ut dicitur in IV Ethic., vel exequendi quod suae subiacet potestati. | Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers pusillanimity as proceeding from a cause in the intellect. Yet it cannot be said properly that it is opposed to prudence, even in respect of its cause: because ignorance of this kind does not proceed from indiscretion but from laziness in considering one's own ability, according to Ethic. iv, 3, or in accomplishing what is within one's power. |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de pusillanimitate ex parte effectus. | Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers pusillanimity from the point of view of its effect. |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ex parte causae. Nec tamen timor causans pusillanimitatem semper est timor periculorum mortis. Unde etiam ex hac parte non oportet quod opponatur fortitudini. Ira autem, secundum rationem proprii motus, quo quis extollitur in vindictam, non causat pusillanimitatem, quae deiicit animum, sed magis tollit eam. Inducit autem ad pusillanimitatem ratione causarum irae, quae sunt iniuriae illatae, ex quibus deiicitur animus patientis. | Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the point of view of cause. Nor is the fear that causes pusillanimity always a fear of the dangers of death: wherefore it does not follow from this standpoint that pusillanimity is opposed to fortitude. As regards anger, if we consider it under the aspect of its proper movement, whereby a man is roused to take vengeance, it does not cause pusillanimity, which disheartens the soul; on the contrary, it takes it away. If, however, we consider the causes of anger, which are injuries inflicted whereby the soul of the man who suffers them is disheartened, it conduces to pusillanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 133 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod pusillanimitas est gravius peccatum, secundum propriam speciem, quam praesumptio, quia per ipsam recedit homo a bonis, quod est pessimum, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Sed praesumptio dicitur esse nequissima ratione superbiae, ex qua procedit. | Reply to Objection 4. According to its proper species pusillanimity is a graver sin than presumption, since thereby a man withdraws from good things, which is a very great evil according to Ethic. iv. Presumption, however, is stated to be "wicked" on account of pride whence it proceeds. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 pr. Deinde considerandum est de magnificentia et vitiis oppositis. Circa magnificentiam autem quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum magnificentia sit virtus. Secundo, utrum sit virtus specialis. Tertio, quae sit materia eius. Quarto, utrum sit pars fortitudinis. | Question 134. Magnificence 1. Is magnificence a virtue? 2. Is it a special virtue? 3. What is its matter? 4. Is it a part of fortitude? |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnificentia non sit virtus. Qui enim habet unam virtutem, habet omnes, ut supra habitum est. Sed aliquis potest habere alias virtutes sine magnificentia, dicit enim philosophus, in IV Ethic., quod non omnis liberalis est magnificus. Ergo magnificentia non est virtus. | Objection 1. It seems that magnificence is not a virtue. For whoever has one virtue has all the virtues, as stated above (I-II, 65, 1). But one may have the other virtues without having magnificence: because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "not every liberal man is magnificent." Therefore magnificence is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, virtus moralis consistit in medio, ut in II Ethic. dicitur. Sed magnificentia non videtur consistere in medio. Superexcellit enim liberalitatem magnitudine. Magnum autem opponitur parvo sicut extremum, quorum medium est aequale, ut dicitur X Metaphys. Et sic magnificentia non est in medio, sed in extremo. Ergo non est virtus. | Objection 2. Further, moral virtue observes the mean, according to Ethic. ii, 6. But magnificence does not seemingly observe the mean, for it exceeds liberality in greatness. Now "great" and "little" are opposed to one another as extremes, the mean of which is "equal," as stated in Metaph. x. Hence magnificence observes not the mean, but the extreme. Therefore it is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, nulla virtus contrariatur inclinationi naturali, sed magis perficit ipsam, ut supra habitum est. Sed sicut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., magnificus non est sumptuosus in seipsum, quod est contra inclinationem naturalem, per quam aliquis maxime providet sibi. Ergo magnificentia non est virtus. | Objection 3. Further, no virtue is opposed to a natural inclination, but on the contrary perfects it, as stated above (108, 2;117, 1, Objection 1). Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2) the "magnificent man is not lavish towards himself": and this is opposed to the natural inclination one has to look after oneself. Therefore magnificence is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in VI Ethic., ars est recta ratio factibilium. Sed magnificentia est circa factibilia, ut ex ipso nomine apparet. Ergo magis est ars quam virtus. | Objection 4. Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 4) "act is right reason about things to be made." Now magnificence is about things to be made, as its very name denotes [Magnificence= magna facere--i.e. to make great things]. Therefore it is an act rather than a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, virtus humana est participatio quaedam virtutis divinae. Sed magnificentia pertinet ad virtutem divinam, secundum illud Psalmi, magnificentia eius et virtus eius in nubibus. Ergo magnificentia est virtus. | On the contrary, Human virtue is a participation of Divine power. But magnificence [virtutis] belongs to Divine power, according to Psalm 47:35: "His magnificence and His power is in the clouds." Therefore magnificence is a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in I de caelo, virtus dicitur per comparationem ad ultimum in quod potentia potest, non quidem ad ultimum ex parte defectus; sed ex parte excessus, cuius ratio consistit in magnitudine. Et ideo operari aliquid magnum, ex quo sumitur nomen magnificentiae, proprie pertinet ad rationem virtutis. Unde magnificentia nominat virtutem. | I answer that, According to De Coelo i, 16, "we speak of virtue in relation to the extreme limit of a thing's power," not as regards the limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit of excess, the very nature of which denotes something great. Wherefore to do something great, whence magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to the very notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non omnis liberalis est magnificus quantum ad actum, quia desunt sibi ea quibus uti necesse est ad actum magnificum. Tamen omnis liberalis habet habitum magnificentiae, vel actu vel in propinqua dispositione, ut supra dictum est, cum de connexione virtutum ageretur. | Reply to Objection 1. Not every liberal man is magnificent as regards his actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to perform magnificent deeds. Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of magnificence, either actually or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as explained above (129, 3, ad 2), as also (I-II, 65, 1) when we were treating of the connection of virtues. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod magnificentia consistit quidem in extremo, considerata quantitate eius quod facit. Sed tamen in medio consistit, considerata regula rationis, a qua non deficit nec eam excedit, sicut et de magnanimitate dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2. It is true that magnificence observes the extreme, if we consider the quantity of the thing done: yet it observes the mean, if we consider the rule of reason, which it neither falls short of nor exceeds, as we have also said of magnanimity (129, 3, ad 1). |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ad magnificentiam pertinet facere aliquid magnum. Quod autem pertinet ad personam uniuscuiusque, est aliquid parvum in comparatione ad id quod convenit rebus divinis vel rebus communibus. Et ideo magnificus non principaliter intendit sumptus facere in his quae pertinent ad personam propriam, non quia bonum suum non quaerat, sed quia non est magnum. Si quid tamen in his quae ad ipsum pertinent magnitudinem habeat, hoc etiam magnifice magnificus prosequitur, sicut ea quae semel fiunt, ut nuptiae vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi; vel etiam ea quae permanentia sunt, sicut ad magnificum pertinet praeparare convenientem habitationem, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. | Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to magnificence to do something great. But that which regards a man's person is little in comparison with that which regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the community at large. Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend principally to be lavish towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good, but because to do so is not something great. Yet if anything regarding himself admits of greatness, the magnificent man accomplishes it magnificently: for instance, things that are done once, such as a wedding, or the like; or things that are of a lasting nature; thus it belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with a suitable dwelling, as stated in Ethic. iv. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., oportet artis esse quandam virtutem, scilicet moralem, per quam scilicet appetitus inclinetur ad recte utendum ratione artis. Et hoc pertinet ad magnificentiam. Unde non est ars, sed virtus. | Reply to Objection 4. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) "there must needs be a virtue of act," i.e. a moral virtue, whereby the appetite is inclined to make good use of the rule of act: and this is what magnificence does. Hence it is not an act but a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnificentia non sit specialis virtus. Ad magnificentiam enim videtur pertinere facere aliquid magnum. Sed facere aliquid magnum potest convenire cuilibet virtuti, si sit magna, sicut qui habet magnam virtutem temperantiae, facit magnum temperantiae opus. Ergo magnificentia non est aliqua specialis virtus, sed significat statum perfectum cuiuslibet virtutis. | Objection 1. It seems that magnificence is not a special virtue. For magnificence would seem to consist in doing something great. But it may belong to any virtue to do something great, if the virtue be great: as in the case of one who has a great virtue of temperance, for he does a great work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is not a special virtue, but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, eiusdem videtur facere aliquid et tendere in illud. Sed tendere in aliquid magnum pertinet ad magnanimitatem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo et facere aliquid magnum pertinet ad magnanimitatem. Non ergo magnificentia est virtus distincta a magnanimitate. | Objection 2. Further, seemingly that which tends to a thing is the same as that which does it. But it belongs to magnanimity to tend to something great, as stated above (129, 1 and 2). Therefore it belongs to magnanimity likewise to do something great. Therefore magnificence is not a special virtue distinct from magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, magnificentia videtur ad sanctitatem pertinere, dicitur enim Exod. XV, magnificus in sanctitate; et in Psalmo, sanctitas et magnificentia in sanctificatione eius. Sed sanctitas idem est religioni, ut supra habitum est. Ergo magnificentia videtur esse idem religioni. Non ergo est virtus specialis ab aliis distincta. | Objection 3. Further, magnificence seems to belong to holiness, for it is written (Exodus 15:11): "Magnificent [Douay: 'glorious'] in holiness," and (Psalm 95:6): "Holiness and magnificence [Douay: 'Majesty'] in His sanctuary." Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated above (Question 81, Article 8). Therefore magnificence is apparently the same as religion. Therefore it is not a special virtue, distinct from the others. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus connumerat eam aliis virtutibus specialibus. | On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons it with other special virtues (Ethic. ii, 7; iv 2). |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ad magnificentiam pertinet facere aliquid magnum, sicut ex ipso nomine apparet. Facere autem dupliciter potest accipi, uno modo, proprie; alio modo, communiter. Proprie autem facere dicitur operari aliquid in exteriori materia, sicut facere domum vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi. Communiter autem dicitur facere pro quacumque actione, sive transeat in exteriorem materiam, sicut urere et secare; sive maneat in ipso agente, sicut intelligere et velle. Si igitur magnificentia accipiatur secundum quod importat factionem alicuius magni prout factio proprie dicitur, sic magnificentia est specialis virtus. Opus enim factibile producitur ab arte. In cuius quidem usu potest attendi una specialis ratio bonitatis quod ipsum opus factum per artem sit magnum, scilicet in quantitate, pretiositate vel dignitate, quod facit magnificentia. Et secundum hoc magnificentia est specialis virtus. Si vero nomen magnificentiae accipiatur ab eo quod est facere magnum secundum quod facere communiter sumitur, sic magnificentia non est specialis virtus. | I answer that, It belongs to magnificence to do [facere] something great, as its name implies [magnificence= magna facere--i.e. to make great things]. Now "facere" may be taken in two ways, in a strict sense, and in a broad sense. Strictly "facere" means to work something in external matter, for instance to make a house, or something of the kind; in a broad sense "facere" is employed to denote any action, whether it passes into external matter, as to burn or cut, or remain in the agent, as to understand or will. Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing of something great, the doing [factio] being understood in the strict sense, it is then a special virtue. For the work done is produced by act: in the use of which it is possible to consider a special aspect of goodness, namely that the work produced [factum] by the act is something great, namely in quantity, value, or dignity, and this is what magnificence does. On this way magnificence is a special virtue. If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from doing something great, the doing [facere] being understood in a broad sense, it is not a special virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad quamlibet virtutem perfectam pertinet magnum facere in suo genere, secundum quod facere communiter sumitur, non autem secundum quod sumitur proprie, sed hoc est proprium magnificentiae. | Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to every perfect virtue to do something great in the genus of that virtue, if "doing" [facere] be taken in the broad sense, but not if it be taken strictly, for this is proper to magnificence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ad magnanimitatem pertinet non solum tendere in magnum, sed etiam in omnibus virtutibus magnum operari, vel faciendo vel qualitercumque agendo, ut dicitur in IV Ethic., ita tamen quod magnanimitas circa hoc respicit solam rationem magni. Aliae autem virtutes, quae, si sint perfectae, magnum operantur, non principaliter dirigunt intentionem suam ad magnum, sed ad id quod est proprium unicuique virtuti, magnitudo autem consequitur ex quantitate virtutis. Ad magnificentiam vero pertinet non solum facere magnum secundum quod facere proprie sumitur, sed etiam ad magnum faciendum tendere animo, unde Tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod magnificentia est rerum magnarum et excelsarum, cum animi quadam ampla et splendida propositione, cogitatio atque administratio; ut cogitatio referatur ad interiorem intentionem, administratio ad exteriorem executionem. Unde oportet quod sicut magnanimitas intendit aliquod magnum in omni materia, ita magnificentia in aliquo opere factibili. | Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend to something great, but also to do great works in all the virtues, either by making [faciendo], or by any kind of action, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3: yet so that magnanimity, in this respect, regards the sole aspect of great, while the other virtues which, if they be perfect, do something great, direct their principal intention, not to something great, but to that which is proper to each virtue: and the greatness of the thing done is sometimes consequent upon the greatness of the virtue. On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to do something great, "doing" [facere] being taken in the strict sense, but also to tend with the mind to the doing of great things. Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "magnificence is the discussing and administering of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind, discussion" referring to the inward intention, and "administration" to the outward accomplishment. Wherefore just as magnanimity intends something great in every matter, it follows that magnificence does the same in every work that can be produced in external matter [factibili]. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod magnificentia intendit opus magnum facere. Opera autem ab hominibus facta ad aliquem finem ordinantur. Nullus autem finis humanorum operum est adeo magnus sicut honor Dei. Et ideo magnificentia praecipue magnum opus facit in ordine ad honorem Dei. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod honorabiles sumptus sunt maxime qui pertinent ad divina sacrificia, et circa hoc maxime studet magnificus. Et ideo magnificentia coniungitur sanctitati, quia praecipue eius effectus ad religionem, sive ad sanctitatem, ordinatur. | Reply to Objection 3. The intention of magnificence is the production of a great work. Now works done by men are directed to an end: and no end of human works is so great as the honor of God: wherefore magnificence does a great work especially in reference to the Divine honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the most commendable expenditure is that which is directed to Divine sacrifices": and this is the chief object of magnificence. For this reason magnificence is connected with holiness, since its chief effect is directed to religion or holiness. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod materia magnificentiae non sint sumptus magni. Circa eandem enim materiam non sunt duae virtutes. Sed circa sumptus est liberalitas, ut supra habitum est. Ergo magnificentia non est circa sumptus. | Objection 1. It seems that the matter of magnificence is not great expenditure. For there are not two virtues about the same matter. But liberality is about expenditure, as stated above (Question 117, Article 2). Therefore magnificence is not about expenditure. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, omnis magnificus est liberalis, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Sed liberalitas magis est circa dona quam circa sumptus. Ergo etiam magnificentia non praecipue est circa sumptus, sed magis circa dona. | Objection 2. Further, "every magnificent man is liberal" (Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure. Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure, but about gifts. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad magnificentiam pertinet aliquod opus exterius facere. Non autem quibuslibet sumptibus fit aliquod exterius opus, etiam si sint sumptus magni, puta cum aliquis multa expendit in exenniis mittendis. Ergo sumptus non sunt propria materia magnificentiae. | Objection 3. Further, it belongs to magnificence to produce an external work. But not even great expenditure is always the means of producing an external work, for instance when one spends much in sending presents. Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of magnificence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, magnos sumptus non possunt facere nisi divites. Sed omnes virtutes possunt habere etiam pauperes, quia virtutes non ex necessitate indigent exteriori fortuna, sed sibi ipsis sufficiunt, ut Seneca dicit, in libro de ira. Ergo magnificentia non est circa magnos sumptus. | Objection 4. Further, only the rich are capable of great expenditure. But the poor are able to possess all the virtues, since "the virtues do not necessarily require external fortune, but are sufficient for themselves," as Seneca says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi). Therefore magnificence is not about great expenditure. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnificentia non extenditur circa omnes operationes quae sunt in pecuniis, sicut liberalitas, sed circa sumptuosas solum, in quibus excellit liberalitatem magnitudine. Ergo est solum circa magnos sumptus. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "magnificence does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions in money, but only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality in scale." Therefore it is only about great expenditure. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ad magnificentiam, sicut dictum est, pertinet intendere ad aliquod magnum opus faciendum. Ad hoc autem quod aliquod magnum opus convenienter fiat, requiruntur proportionati sumptus, non enim possunt magna opera fieri nisi cum magnis expensis. Unde ad magnificentiam pertinet magnos sumptus facere ad hoc quod opus magnum convenienter fiat, unde et philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnificus ab aequali, idest proportionato, sumptu, opus faciet magis magnificum. Sumptus autem est quaedam pecuniae emissio, a qua potest aliquis prohiberi per superfluum amorem pecuniae. Et ideo materia magnificentiae possunt dici et ipsi sumptus, quibus utitur magnificus ad opus magnum faciendum; et ipsa pecunia, qua utitur ad sumptus magnos faciendos; et amor pecuniae, quem moderatur magnificus, ne sumptus magni impediantur. | I answer that, As stated above (Article 2), it belongs to magnificence to intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a great work, proportionate expenditure is necessary, for great works cannot be produced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence to spend much in order that some great work may be accomplished in becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work with equal," i.e. proportionate, "expenditure." Now expenditure is the outlay of a sum of money; and a man may be hindered from making that outlay if he love money too much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to be both this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man uses to produce a great work, and also the very money which he employs in going to great expense, and as well as the love of money, which love the magnificent man moderates, lest he be hindered from spending much. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes illae quae sunt circa res exteriores habent aliquam difficultatem ex ipso genere rei circa quam est virtus, et aliam difficultatem ex magnitudine ipsius rei. Et ideo oportet circa pecuniam et usum eius esse duas virtutes, scilicet liberalitatem, quae respicit communiter usum pecuniae; et magnificentiam, quae respicit magnum in pecuniae usu. | Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (Question 129, Article 2), those virtues that are about external things experience a certain difficulty arising from the genus itself of the thing about which the virtue is concerned, and another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of that same thing. Hence the need for two virtues, concerned about money and its use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in general, and magnificence, which regards that which is great in the use of money. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod usus pecuniae aliter pertinet ad liberalem, et aliter ad magnificum. Ad liberalem enim pertinet secundum quod procedit ex ordinato affectu circa pecunias. Et ideo omnis usus debitus pecuniae, cuius impedimentum tollit moderatio amoris pecuniae, pertinet ad liberalitatem, scilicet et dona et sumptus. Sed usus pecuniae pertinet ad magnificum in ordine ad aliquod opus magnum quod faciendum est. Et talis usus non potest esse nisi sumptus sive expensa. | Reply to Objection 2. The use of money regards the liberal man in one way and the magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man, inasmuch as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of money; wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and expenditure), the obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love of money, belongs to liberality. But the use of money regards the magnificent man in relation to some great work which has to be produced, and this use is impossible without expenditure or outlay. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod magnificus etiam dat dona vel exennia, ut dicitur in IV Ethic., non tamen sub ratione doni, sed potius sub ratione sumptus ordinati ad aliquod opus faciendum, puta ad honorandum aliquem, vel ad faciendum aliquid unde proveniat honor toti civitati, sicut cum facit aliquid ad quod tota civitas studet. | Reply to Objection 3. The magnificent man also makes gifts of presents, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2, but not under the aspect of gift, but rather under the aspect of expenditure directed to the production of some work, for instance in order to honor someone, or in order to do something which will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he brings to effect what the whole state is striving for. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod principalis actus virtutis est interior electio, quam virtus potest habere absque exteriori fortuna. Et sic etiam pauper potest esse magnificus. Sed ad exteriores actus virtutum requiruntur bona fortunae sicut quaedam instrumenta. Et secundum hoc, pauper non potest actum magnificentiae exteriorem exercere in his quae sunt magna simpliciter, sed forte in his quae sunt magna per comparationem ad aliquod opus quod, etsi in se sit parvum, tamen potest magnifice fieri secundum proportionem illius generis; nam parvum et magnum dicuntur relative, ut philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis. | Reply to Objection 4. The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and a virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are great by comparison to some particular work; which, though little in itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its genus: for little and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher says (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.). |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnificentia non sit pars fortitudinis. Magnificentia enim convenit in materia cum liberalitate, ut dictum est. Sed liberalitas non est pars fortitudinis, sed iustitiae. Ergo magnificentia non est pars fortitudinis. | Objection 1. It seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude. For magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above (Article 3). But liberality is a part, not of fortitude, but of justice. Therefore magnificence is not a part of fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, fortitudo est circa timores et audacias. Magnificentia autem in nullo videtur respicere timorem, sed solum sumptus, qui sunt operationes quaedam. Ergo magnificentia magis videtur pertinere ad iustitiam, quae est circa operationes, quam ad fortitudinem. | Objection 2. Further, fortitude is about fear and darings. But magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with expenditure, which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems to pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnificus scienti assimilatur. Sed scientia magis convenit cum prudentia quam cum fortitudine. Ergo magnificentia non debet poni pars fortitudinis. | Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the magnificent man is like the man of science." Now science has more in common with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Tullius et Macrobius et Andronicus magnificentiam partem fortitudinis ponunt. | On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod magnificentia, secundum quod est specialis virtus, non potest poni pars subiectiva fortitudinis, quia non convenit cum ea in materia, sed ponitur pars eius inquantum adiungitur ei sicut virtus secundaria principali. Ad hoc autem quod aliqua virtus adiungatur alicui principali, duo requiruntur, ut supra dictum est, quorum unum est ut secundaria conveniat cum principali; aliud autem est ut in aliquo excedatur ab ea. Magnificentia autem convenit cum fortitudine in hoc quod, sicut fortitudo tendit in aliquod arduum et difficile, ita etiam et magnificentia, unde etiam videtur esse in irascibili, sicut et fortitudo. Sed magnificentia deficit a fortitudine in hoc quod illud arduum in quod tendit fortitudo, habet difficultatem propter periculum quod imminet personae, arduum autem in quod tendit magnificentia, habet difficultatem propter dispendium rerum; quod est multo minus quam periculum personae. Et ideo magnificentia ponitur pars fortitudinis. | I answer that, Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue, cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not agree with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a part thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to principal virtue. In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things are necessary, as stated above (Article 80). The one is that the secondary virtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in some respect it be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with fortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous and difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is seated, like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls short of fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude tends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person, whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its difficulty from the dispossession of one's property, which is of much less account than danger to one's person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted a part of fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iustitia respicit operationes secundum se, prout in eis consideratur ratio debiti. Sed liberalitas et magnificentia considerant operationes sumptuum secundum quod comparantur ad passiones animae, diversimode tamen. Nam liberalitas respicit sumptus per comparationem ad amorem et concupiscentiam pecuniarum, quae sunt passiones concupiscibilis, quibus non impeditur liberalis a dationibus et sumptibus faciendis, unde est in concupiscibili. Sed magnificentia respicit sumptus per comparationem ad spem, attingendo ad aliquid arduum, non simpliciter, sicut magnanimitas, sed in determinata materia, scilicet in sumptibus. Unde magnificentia videtur esse in irascibili, sicut et magnanimitas. | Reply to Objection 1. Justice regards operations in themselves, as viewed under the aspect of something due: but liberality and magnificence regard sumptuary operations as related to the passions of the soul, albeit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure in reference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving and spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On the other hand, magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope, by attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as magnanimity does, but in a determinate matter, namely expenditure: wherefore magnificence, like magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible part. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod magnificentia, etsi non conveniat cum fortitudine in materia, convenit tamen cum ea in conditione materiae, inquantum scilicet tendit in aliquid arduum circa sumptus, sicut fortitudo in aliquid arduum circa timores. | Reply to Objection 2. Although magnificence does not agree with fortitude in matter, it agrees with it as the condition of its matter: since it tends to something difficult in the matter of expenditure, even as fortitude tends to something difficult in the matter of fear. |
| IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod magnificentia ordinat usum artis ad aliquid magnum, ut dictum est. Ars autem est in ratione. Et ideo ad magnificum pertinet bene uti ratione in attendendo proportionem sumptus ad opus quod faciendum est. Et hoc praecipue necessarium est propter magnitudinem utriusque, quia nisi diligens consideratio adhiberetur, immineret periculum magni damni. | Reply to Objection 3. Magnificence directs the use of art to something great, as stated above and in the preceding Article. Now art is in the reason. Wherefore it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason by observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in hand. This is especially necessary on account of the greatness of both those things, since if he did not take careful thought, he would incur the risk of a great loss. |
| IIª-IIae q. 135 pr. Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis magnificentiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum parvificentia sit vitium. Secundo, de vitio ei opposito. | Question 135. Meanness 1. Is meanness a vice? 2. The vice opposed to it |
| IIª-IIae q. 135 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod parvificentia non sit vitium. Virtus enim, sicut est moderativa magnorum, ita etiam est moderativa parvorum, unde et liberales et magnifici aliqua parva faciunt. Sed magnificentia est virtus. Ergo similiter parvificentia magis est virtus quam vitium. | Objection 1. It seems that meanness is not a vice. For just as vice moderates great things, so does it moderate little things: wherefore both the liberal and the magnificent do little things. But magnificence is a virtue. Therefore likewise meanness is a virtue rather than a vice. |
| IIª-IIae q. 135 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod diligentia ratiocinii est parvifica. Sed diligentia ratiocinii videtur esse laudabilis, quia bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo parvificentia non est vitium. | Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "careful reckoning is mean." But careful reckoning is apparently praiseworthy, since man's good is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice. |
| IIª-IIae q. 135 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod parvificus consumit pecuniam tristatus. Sed hoc pertinet ad avaritiam, sive ad illiberalitatem. Ergo parvificentia non est vitium ab aliis distinctum. | Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a mean man is loth to spend money." But this belongs to covetousness or illiberality. Therefore meanness is not a distinct vice from the others. |
| IIª-IIae q. 135 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II et IV Ethic., ponit parvificentiam speciale vitium magnificentiae oppositum. | On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts meanness a special vice opposed to magnificence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 135 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, moralia speciem a fine sortiuntur. Unde et a fine ut pluries nominantur. Ex hoc ergo dicitur aliquis parvificus quod intendit ad aliquid parvum faciendum. Parvum autem et magnum, secundum philosophum, in praedicamentis, relative dicuntur. Unde cum dicitur quod parvificus intendit aliquid parvum faciendum, facere parvum intelligendum est in comparatione ad genus operis quod facit. In quo quidem parvum et magnum potest attendi dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte operis fiendi; alio modo, ex parte sumptus. Magnificus igitur principaliter intendit magnitudinem operis, secundario intendit magnitudinem sumptus, quam non vitat, ut faciat magnum opus, unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnificus ab aequali sumptu opus facit magis magnificum. Parvificus autem e converso principaliter quidem intendit parvitatem sumptus, unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod intendit qualiter minimum consumat, ex consequenti autem intendit parvitatem operis, quam scilicet non recusat, dummodo parvum sumptum faciat. Unde philosophus dicit, ibidem, quod parvificus, maxima consumens in parvo, quod scilicet non vult expendere, bonum perdit, scilicet magnifici operis. Sic ergo patet quod parvificus deficit a proportione quae debet esse secundum rationem inter sumptum et opus. Defectus autem ab eo quod est secundum rationem, causat rationem vitii. Unde manifestum est quod parvificentia vitium est. | I answer that, As stated above (I-II, 01, 3; I-II, 18, 6), moral acts take their species from their end, wherefore in many cases they are denominated from that end. Accordingly a man is said to be mean [parvificus] because he intends to do something little [parvum]. Now according to the Philosopher (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.) great and little are relative terms: and when we say that a mean man intends to do something little, this must be understood in relation to the kind of work he does. This may be little or great in two ways: in one way as regards the work itself to be done, in another as regards the expense. Accordingly the magnificent man intends principally the greatness of his work, and secondarily he intends the greatness of the expense, which he does not shirk, so that he may produce a great work. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 4) that "the magnificent man with equal expenditure will produce a more magnificent result." On the other hand, the mean man intends principally to spend little, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "he seeks how he may spend least." As a result of this he intends to produce a little work, that is, he does not shrink from producing a little work, so long as he spends little. Wherefore the Philosopher says that "the mean man after going to great expense forfeits the good" of the magnificent work, "for the trifle" that he is unwilling to spend. Therefore it is evident that the mean man fails to observe the proportion that reason demands between expenditure and work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in failing to do what is in accordance with reason. Hence it is manifest that meanness is a vice. |
| IIª-IIae q. 135 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus moderatur parva secundum regulam rationis, a qua deficit parvificus, ut dictum est. Non enim dicitur parvificus qui parva moderatur, sed qui in moderando magna vel parva deficit a regula rationis. Et ideo habet vitii rationem. | Reply to Objection 1. Virtue moderates little things, according to the rule of reason: from which rule the mean man declines, as stated in the Article. For he is called mean, not for moderating little things, but for declining from the rule of reason in moderating great or little things: hence meanness is a vice. |
| IIª-IIae q. 135 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit philosophus, in II Rhet., timor facit consiliativos. Et ideo parvificus diligenter ratiociniis intendit, quia inordinate timet bonorum suorum consumptionem, etiam in minimis. Unde hoc non est laudabile, sed vitiosum et vituperabile, quia non dirigit affectum suum secundum rationem, sed potius rationis usum applicat ad inordinationem sui affectus. | Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes us take counsel": wherefore a mean man is careful in his reckonings, because he has an inordinate fear of spending his goods, even in things of the least account. Hence this is not praiseworthy, but sinful and reprehensible, because then a man does not regulate his affections according to reason, but, on the contrary, makes use of his reason in pursuance of his inordinate affections. |
| IIª-IIae q. 135 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut magnificus convenit cum liberali in hoc quod prompte et delectabiliter pecunias emittit, ita etiam parvificus convenit cum illiberali sive avaro in hoc quod cum tristitia et tarditate expensas facit. Differt autem in hoc quod illiberalitas attenditur circa communes sumptus, parvificentia autem circa magnos sumptus, quos difficilius est facere. Et ideo minus vitium est parvificentia quam illiberalitas. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod quamvis parvificentia et oppositum vitium sint malitiae, non tamen opprobria inferunt, quia neque sunt nociva proximo, neque sunt valde turpes. | Reply to Objection 3. Just as the magnificent man has this in common with the liberal man, that he spends his money readily and with pleasure, so too the mean man in common with the illiberal or covetous man is loth and slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that illiberality regards ordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great expenditure, which is a more difficult accomplishment: wherefore meanness is less sinful than illiberality. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "although meanness and its contrary vice are sinful, they do not bring shame on a man, since neither do they harm one's neighbor, nor are they very disgraceful." |
| IIª-IIae q. 135 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod parvificentiae nullum vitium opponatur. Parvo enim opponitur magnum. Sed magnificentia non est vitium, sed virtus. Ergo parvificentiae non opponitur vitium. | Objection 1. It seems that there is no vice opposed to meanness. For great is opposed to little. Now, magnificence is not a vice, but a virtue. Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness. |
| IIª-IIae q. 135 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, cum parvificentia sit vitium ex defectu, ut dictum est, videtur quod, si aliquod vitium esset parvificentiae oppositum, quod consisteret solum in superabundanti consumptione. Sed illi qui consumunt multa ubi pauca oporteret consumere, consumunt pauca ubi multa oporteret consumere, ut dicitur in IV Ethic., et sic habent aliquid de parvificentia. Non ergo est aliquod vitium parvificentiae oppositum. | Objection 2. Further, since meanness is a vice by deficiency, as stated above (Article 1), it seems that if any vice is opposed to meanness, it would merely consist in excessive spending. But those who spend much, where they ought to spend little, spend little where they ought to spend much, according to Ethic. iv, 2, and thus they have something of meanness. Therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness. |
| IIª-IIae q. 135 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, moralia sortiuntur speciem ex fine, ut dictum est. Sed illi qui superflue consumunt, hoc faciunt causa ostentationis divitiarum, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Hoc autem pertinet ad inanem gloriam, quae opponitur magnanimitati, ut dictum est. Ergo nullum vitium parvificentiae opponitur. | Objection 3. Further, moral acts take their species from their end, as stated above (Article 1). Now those who spend excessively, do so in order to make a show of their wealth, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2. But this belongs to vainglory, which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated above (Question 131, Article 2). Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness. |
| IIª-IIae q. 135 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est auctoritas philosophi, qui, in II et IV Ethic., ponit magnificentiam medium duorum oppositorum vitiorum. | On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philosopher who (Ethic. ii, 8; iv, 2) places magnificence as a mean between two opposite vices. |
| IIª-IIae q. 135 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod parvo opponitur magnum. Parvum autem et magnum, ut dictum est, relative dicuntur. Sicut autem contingit sumptum esse parvum per comparationem ad opus, ita etiam contingit sumptum esse magnum in comparatione ad opus, ut scilicet excedat proportionem quae esse debet sumptus ad opus secundum regulam rationis. Unde manifestum est quod vitio parvificentiae, qua aliquis deficit a proportione debita expensarum ad opus, intendens minus expendere quam dignitas operis requirat, opponitur vitium quo aliquis dictam proportionem excedit, ut scilicet plus expendat quam sit operi proportionatum. Et hoc vitium Graece quidem dicitur banausia, a furno dicta, quia videlicet ad modum ignis qui est in furno, omnia consumit, vel dicitur apirocalia, idest sine bono igne, quia ad modum ignis consumit non propter bonum. Unde Latine hoc vitium nominari potest consumptio. | I answer that, Great is opposed to little. Also little and great are relative terms, as stated above (Article 1). Now just as expenditure may be little in comparison with the work, so may it be great in comparison with the work in that it exceeds the proportion which reason requires to exist between expenditure and work. Hence it is manifest that the vice of meanness, whereby a man intends to spend less than his work is worth, and thus fails to observe due proportion between his expenditure and his work, has a vice opposed to it, whereby a man exceeds this same proportion, by spending more than is proportionate to his work. This vice is called in Greek banausia, so called from the Greek baunos, because, like the fire in the furnace, it consumes everything. It is also called apyrokalia, i.e. lacking good fire, since like fire it consumes all, but not for a good purpose. Hence in Latin it may be called "consumptio" [waste]. |
| IIª-IIae q. 135 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod magnificentia dicitur esse eo quod facit magnum opus, non autem ex eo quod in sumptu excedat proportionem operis. Hoc enim pertinet ad vitium quod opponitur parvificentiae. | Reply to Objection 1. Magnificence is so called from the great work done, but not from the expenditure being in excess of the work: for this belongs to the vice which is opposed to meanness. |
| IIª-IIae q. 135 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod idem vitium contrariatur virtuti quae est in medio, et contrario vitio. Sic igitur vitium consumptionis opponitur parvificentiae in eo quod excedit in sumptu operis dignitatem, expendens multa ubi pauca oporteret expendere. Opponitur autem magnificentiae ex parte operis magni, quod praecipue intendit magnificus, inquantum scilicet, ubi oportet multa expendere, nihil aut parum expendit. | Reply to Objection 2. To the one same vice there is opposed the virtue which observes the mean, and a contrary vice. Accordingly, then, the vice of waste is opposed to meanness in that it exceeds in expenditure the value of the work, by spending much where it behooved to spend little. But it is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great work, which the magnificent man intends principally, in so far as when it behooves to spend much, it spends little or nothing. |
| IIª-IIae q. 135 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod consumptor ex ipsa specie actus opponitur parvifico, inquantum transcendit regulam rationis, a qua parvificus deficit. Nihil tamen prohibet quin hoc ad finem alterius vitii ordinetur, puta inanis gloria, vel cuiuscumque alterius. | Reply to Objection 3. Wastefulness is opposed to meanness by the very species of its act, since it exceeds the rule of reason, whereas meanness falls short of it. Yet nothing hinders this from being directed to the end of another vice, such as vainglory or any other. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 pr. Deinde considerandum est de patientia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum patientia sit virtus. Secundo, utrum sit maxima virtutum. Tertio, utrum possit haberi sine gratia. Quarto, utrum sit pars fortitudinis. Quinto, utrum sit idem cum longanimitate. | Question 136. Patience 1. Is patience a virtue? 2. Is it the greatest of the virtues? 3. Can it be had without grace? 4. Is it a part of fortitude? 5. Is it the same as longanimity? |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod patientia non sit virtus. Virtutes enim perfectissime sunt in patria, ut dicit Augustinus, XIV de Trin. Sed ibi non est patientia, quia nulla sunt ibi mala toleranda, secundum illud Isaiae XLIX et Apocalyps. XXI, non esurient neque sitient, et non percutiet eos aestus neque sol. Ergo patientia non est virtus. | Objection 1. It seems that patience is not a virtue. For the virtues are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv). Yet patience is not there, since no evils have to be borne there, according to Isaiah 49:10 and Apocalypse 7:16, "They shall not hunger nor thirst, neither shall the heat nor the sun strike them." Therefore patience is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, nulla virtus in malis potest inveniri, quia virtus est quae bonum facit habentem. Sed patientia quandoque in malis hominibus invenitur, sicut patet in avaris, qui multa mala patienter tolerant ut pecunias congregent, secundum illud Eccle. V cunctis diebus vitae suae comedit in tenebris, et in curis multis, et in aerumna atque tristitia. Ergo patientia non est virtus. | Objection 2. Further, no virtue can be found in the wicked, since virtue it is "that makes its possessor good." Yet patience is sometimes found in wicked men; for instance, in the covetous, who bear many evils patiently that they may amass money, according to Ecclesiastes 5:16, "All the days of his life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares, and in misery and in sorrow." Therefore patience is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, fructus a virtutibus differunt, ut supra habitum est. Sed patientia ponitur inter fructus, ut patet Galat. V. Ergo patientia non est virtus. | Objection 3. Further, the fruits differ from the virtues, as stated above (I-II, 70, 1, ad 3). But patience is reckoned among the fruits (Galatians 5:22). Therefore patience is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de patientia, virtus animi quae patientia dicitur, tam magnum Dei donum est ut etiam ipsius qui nobis eam largitur patientia praedicetur. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Patientia i): "The virtue of the soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of God, that we even preach the patience of Him who bestows it upon us." |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est supra, virtutes morales ordinantur ad bonum inquantum conservant bonum rationis contra impetus passionum. Inter alias autem passiones, tristitia efficax est ad impediendum bonum rationis, secundum illud II ad Cor. VII, saeculi tristitia mortem operatur; et Eccli. XXX, multos occidit tristitia, et non est utilitas in illa. Unde necesse est habere aliquam virtutem per quam bonum rationis conservetur contra tristitiam, ne scilicet ratio tristitiae succumbat. Hoc autem facit patientia. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de patientia, quod patientia hominis est qua mala aequo animo toleramus, idest sine perturbatione tristitiae, ne animo iniquo bona deseramus per quae ad meliora perveniamus. Unde manifestum est patientiam esse virtutem. | I answer that, As stated above (Question 123, Article 1), the moral virtues are directed to the good, inasmuch as they safeguard the good of reason against the impulse of the passions. Now among the passions sorrow is strong to hinder the good of reason, according to 2 Corinthians 7:10, "The sorrow of the world worketh death," and Sirach 30:25, "Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it." Hence the necessity for a virtue to safeguard the good of reason against sorrow, lest reason give way to sorrow: and this patience does. Wherefore Augustine says (De Patientia ii): "A man's patience it is whereby he bears evil with an equal mind," i.e. without being disturbed by sorrow, "lest he abandon with an unequal mind the goods whereby he may advance to better things." It is therefore evident that patience is a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutes morales non remanent secundum eundem actum in patria quem habent in via, scilicet per comparationem ad bona praesentis vitae, quae non remanebunt in patria, sed per comparationem ad finem, qui erit in patria. Sicut iustitia non erit in patria circa emptiones et venditiones, et alia quae pertinent ad vitam praesentem, sed in hoc quod est subditum esse Deo. Similiter actus patientiae in patria non erit in sustinendo aliqua, sed in fruitione bonorum in quae pervenire volebamus patiendo. Unde Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod in patria non erit ipsa patientia, quae necessaria non est nisi ubi toleranda sunt mala, sed aeternum erit id quo per patientiam pervenitur. | Reply to Objection 1. The moral virtues do not remain in heaven as regards the same act that they have on the way, in relation, namely, to the goods of the present life, which will not remain in heaven: but they will remain in their relation to the end, which will be in heaven. Thus justice will not be in heaven in relation to buying and selling and other matters pertaining to the present life, but it will remain in the point of being subject to God. On like manner the act of patience, in heaven, will not consist in bearing things, but in enjoying the goods to which we had aspired by suffering. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv) that "patience itself will not be in heaven, since there is no need for it except where evils have to be borne: yet that which we shall obtain by patience will be eternal." |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de patientia, patientes proprie dicuntur qui mala malunt non committendo ferre, quam non ferendo committere. In illis autem qui mala sustinent ut mala faciant, nec miranda nec laudanda est patientia, quae nulla est, sed miranda duritia, neganda patientia. | Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Patientia ii; v) "properly speaking those are patient who would rather bear evils without inflicting them, than inflict them without bearing them. As for those who bear evils that they may inflict evil, their patience is neither marvelous nor praiseworthy, for it is no patience at all: we may marvel at their hardness of heart, but we must refuse to call them patient." |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, fructus in sui ratione importat quandam delectationem. Sunt autem operationes virtutum delectabiles secundum seipsas, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Consuetum est autem ut nomine virtutum etiam virtutum actus significentur. Et ideo patientia, quantum ad habitum, ponitur virtus quantum autem ad delectationem quam habet in actu, ponitur fructus et praecipue quantum ad hoc quod per patientiam animus praeservatur ne obruatur tristitia. | Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (I-II, 11, 1), the very notion of fruit denotes pleasure. And works of virtue afford pleasure in themselves, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. Now the names of the virtues are wont to be applied to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit is a virtue. but as to the pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned a fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the mind from being overcome by sorrow. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod patientia sit potissima virtutum. Id enim quod est perfectum est potissimum in unoquoque genere. Sed patentia habet opus perfectum, ut dicitur Iac. I. Ergo patientia est potissima virtutum. | Objection 1. It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues. For in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now "patience hath a perfect work" (James 1:4). Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, omnes virtutes ad bonum animae ordinantur. Sed hoc praecipue videtur pertinere ad patientiam, dicitur enim Luc. XXI, in patientia vestra possidebitis animas vestras. Ergo patientia est maxima virtutum. | Objection 2. Further, all the virtues are directed to the good of the soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written (Luke 21:19): "In your patience you shall possess your souls." Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud quod est conservativum et causa aliorum, videtur potius esse. Sed sicut Gregorius dicit, in quadam homilia, patientia est radix et custos omnium virtutum. Ergo patientia est maxima virtutum. | Objection 3. Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause of other things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory (Hom. xxxv in Evang.) "patience is the root and safeguard of all the virtues." Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod non enumeratur inter quatuor virtutes quas Gregorius, XXII Moral., et Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccle., vocat principales. | On the contrary, It is not reckoned among the four virtues which Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call principal. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod virtutes secundum suam rationem ordinantur ad bonum, est enim virtus quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Unde oportet quod tanto principalior sit virtus et potior, quanto magis et directius ordinat in bonum. Directius autem ad bonum ordinant hominem virtutes quae sunt constitutivae boni, quam illae quae sunt impeditivae eorum quae abducunt a bono. Et sicut inter illas quae sunt constitutivae boni tanto aliqua potior est quanto in maiori bono statuit hominem, sicut fides, spes et caritas quam prudentia et iustitia; ita etiam inter illas quae sunt impeditivae retrahentium a bono, tanto aliqua est potior quanto id quod ab ea impeditur magis a bono retrahit. Plus autem a bono retrahunt pericula mortis, circa quae est fortitudo, vel delectationes tactus, circa quae est temperantia, quam quaevis adversa, circa quae est patientia. Et ideo patientia non est potissima virtutum, sed deficit non solum a virtutibus theologicis et prudentia et iustitia, quae directe statuunt hominem in bono; sed etiam a fortitudine et temperantia, quae retrahunt a maioribus impedimentis. | I answer that, Virtues by their very nature are directed to good. For it is virtue that "makes its possessor good, and renders the latter's work good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue's superiority and preponderance over other virtues is the greater according as it inclines man to good more effectively and directly. Now those virtues which are effective of good, incline a man more directly to good than those which are a check on the things which lead man away from good: and just as among those that are effective of good, the greater is that which establishes man in a greater good (thus faith, hope, and charity are greater than prudence and justice); so too among those that are a check on things that withdraw man from good, the greater virtue is the one which is a check on a greater obstacle to good. But dangers of death, about which is fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned, withdraw man from good more than any kind of hardship, which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not the greatest of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the theological virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly establish man in good, but also of fortitude and temperance which withdraw him from greater obstacles to good. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod patientia dicitur habere opus perfectum in adversis tolerandis, ex quibus primo procedit tristitia, quam moderatur patientia; secundo ira, quam moderatur mansuetudo; tertio odium, quod tollit caritas; quarto iniustum nocumentum, quod prohibet iustitia. Tollere enim principium uniuscuiusque est perfectius. Nec tamen sequitur, si in hoc patientia est perfectior, quod sit perfectior simpliciter. | Reply to Objection 1. Patience is said to have a perfect work in bearing hardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is moderated by patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by meekness; thirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to unjust injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the principle is the most perfect. Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect, that it is more perfect simply. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod possessio importat quietum dominium. Et ideo per patientiam dicitur homo suam animam possidere, inquantum radicitus evellit passiones adversitatum, quibus anima inquietatur. | Reply to Objection 2. Possession denotes undisturbed ownership; wherefore man is said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it removes by the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and disturb the soul. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod patientia dicitur esse radix et custos omnium virtutum, non quasi directe eas causando et conservando, sed solum removendo prohibens. | Reply to Objection 3. Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of all the virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly, but merely because it removes their obstacles. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod patientia possit haberi sine gratia. Illud enim ad quod ratio magis inclinat, magis potest implere rationalis creatura. Sed magis est rationabile quod aliquis patiatur mala propter bonum quam propter malum. Aliqui autem patiuntur mala propter malum ex propria virtute, sine auxilio gratiae, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de patientia, quod multa in laboribus et doloribus sustinent homines propter ea quae vitiose diligunt. Ergo multo magis homo potest mala sustinere propter bonum, quod est vere patientem esse, praeter auxilium gratiae. | Objection 1. It seems that it is possible to have patience without grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it possible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for the sake of evil. Yet some suffer evil for evil's sake, by their own virtue and without the help of grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii) that "men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they love sinfully." Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without the help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this is to be truly patient. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, aliqui non existentes in statu gratiae magis abhorrent mala vitiorum quam corporalia mala, unde quidam gentilium leguntur multa mala tolerasse ne patriam proderent, aut aliquid aliud inhonestum committerent. Sed hoc est vere patientem esse. Ergo videtur quod patientia possit haberi absque auxilio gratiae. | Objection 2. Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some heathens are related to have endured many hardships rather than betray their country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient. Therefore it seems that it is possible to have patience without the help of grace. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, manifeste apparet quod aliqui propter sanitatem corporis recuperandam gravia quaedam et amara patiuntur. Salus autem animae non est minus appetibilis quam sanitas corporis. Ergo, pari ratione, pro salute animae potest aliquis multa mala sustinere, quod est vere patientem esse, absque auxilio gratiae. | Objection 3. Further, it is quite evident that some go through much trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the health of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health. Therefore in like manner one may, without the help of grace, endure many evils for the health of the soul, and this is to be truly patient. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo, ab ipso, scilicet Deo, patientia mea. | On the contrary, It is written (Psalm 61:6): "From Him," i.e. from God, "is my patience." |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de patientia, vis desideriorum facit tolerantiam laborum et dolorum, et nemo nisi pro eo quod delectat, sponte suscipit ferre quod cruciat. Et huius ratio est quia tristitiam et dolorem secundum se abhorret animus, unde nunquam eligeret eam pati propter se, sed solum propter finem. Ergo oportet quod illud bonum propter quod aliquis vult pati mala, sit magis volitum et amatum quam illud bonum cuius privatio ingerit dolorem quem patienter toleramus. Quod autem aliquis praeferat bonum gratiae omnibus naturalibus bonis ex quorum amissione potest dolor causari, pertinet ad caritatem, quae diligit Deum super omnia. Unde manifestum est quod patientia, secundum quod est virtus, a caritate causatur, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, caritas patiens est. Manifestum est autem quod caritas non potest haberi nisi per gratiam, secundum illud Rom. V, caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis. Unde patet quod patientia non potest haberi sine auxilio gratiae. | I answer that, As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), "the strength of desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly undertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which gives pleasure." The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose to suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake of an end. Hence it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing to endure evils, is more desired and loved than the good the privation of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the fact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the loss of which may cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which loves God above all things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a virtue, is caused by charity, according to 1 Corinthians 13:4, "Charity is patient." But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through grace, according to Romans 5:5, "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is clearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in natura humana, si esset integra, praevaleret inclinatio rationis, sed in natura corrupta praevalet inclinatio concupiscentiae, quae in homine dominatur. Et ideo pronior est homo ad sustinendum mala in quibus concupiscentia delectatur praesentialiter, quam tolerare mala propter bona futura quae secundum rationem appetuntur, quod tamen pertinet ad veram patientiam. | Reply to Objection 1. The inclination of reason would prevail in human nature in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination of concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is more prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the sake of goods to come, which are desired in accordance with reason: and yet it is this that pertains to true patience. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum politicae virtutis est commensuratum naturae humanae. Et ideo absque auxilio gratiae gratum facientis potest voluntas humana in illud tendere, licet non absque auxilio Dei. Sed bonum gratiae est supernaturale. Unde in illud non potest tendere homo per virtutem suae naturae. Et ideo non est similis ratio. | Reply to Objection 2. The good of a social virtue [Cf. I-II, 61, 5] is commensurate with human nature; and consequently the human will can tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet not without the help of God's grace [Cf. I-II, 109, 2]. On the other hand, the good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend thereto by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod tolerantia etiam malorum quae quis sustinet propter corporis sanitatem, procedit ex amore quo homo naturaliter diligit suam carnem. Et ideo non est similis ratio de patientia, quae procedit ex amore supernaturali. | Reply to Objection 3. Even the endurance of those evils which a man bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man naturally has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod patientia non sit pars fortitudinis. Idem enim non est pars sui ipsius. Sed patientia videtur idem esse fortitudini, quia sicut supra dictum est, proprius actus fortitudinis est sustinere; et hoc etiam pertinet ad patientiam, dicitur enim in libro sententiarum prosperi quod patientia consistit in alienis malis tolerandis. Ergo patientia non est pars fortitudinis. | Objection 1. It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a thing is not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same as fortitude: because, as stated above (Question 123, Article 6), the proper act of fortitude is to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For it is stated in the Liber Sententiarum Prosperi [The quotation is from St. Gregory, Hom. xxxv in Evang.] that "patience consists in enduring evils inflicted by others." Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, fortitudo est circa timores et audacias, ut supra habitum est, et ita est in irascibili. Sed patientia videtur esse circa tristitias, et ita videtur esse in concupiscibili. Ergo patientia non est pars fortitudinis, sed magis temperantiae. | Objection 2. Further, fortitude is about fear and daring, as stated above (Question 123, Article 3), and thus it is in the irascible. But patience seems to be about sorrow, and consequently would seem to be in the concupiscible. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of temperance. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, totum non potest esse sine parte. Si ergo patientia sit pars fortitudinis, fortitudo nunquam posset esse sine patientia, cum tamen fortis quandoque non toleret patienter mala, sed etiam aggrediatur eum qui mala facit. Ergo patientia non est pars fortitudinis. | Objection 3. Further, the whole cannot be without its part. Therefore if patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no fortitude without patience. Yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently, but even attacks the person who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Tullius, in sua rhetorica, ponit eam fortitudinis partem. | On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod patientia est pars fortitudinis quasi potentialis, quia adiungitur fortitudini sicut virtus secundaria principali. Ad patientiam enim pertinet aliena mala aequanimiter perpeti, ut Gregorius dicit, in quadam homilia. In malis autem quae ab aliis inferuntur, praecipua sunt, et difficillima ad sustinendum, illa quae pertinent ad pericula mortis, circa quae est fortitudo. Unde patet quod in ista materia principalitatem tenet fortitudo, quasi vindicans sibi id quod principalius est in hac materia. Et ideo patientia adiungitur ei sicut secundaria virtus principali. | I answer that, Patience is a quasi-potential part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal virtue. For it belongs to patience "to suffer with an equal mind the evils inflicted by others," as Gregory says in a homily (xxxv in Evang.). Now of those evils that are inflicted by others, foremost and most difficult to endure are those that are connected with the danger of death, and about these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is clear that in this matter fortitude has the principal place, and that it lays claim to that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore patience is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue, for which reason Prosper calls patience brave (Sent. 811). |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad fortitudinem pertinet non qualiacumque sustinere, sed illud quod est summe difficile in sustinendo, scilicet sustinere pericula mortis. Ad patientiam autem pertinere potest sustinentia quorumcumque malorum. | Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to fortitude to endure, not anything indeed, but that which is most difficult to endure, namely dangers of death: whereas it may pertain to patience to endure any kind of evil. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod actus fortitudinis non solum consistit in hoc quod aliquis in bono persistat contra timores futurorum periculorum, sed etiam ut non deficiat propter praesentium tristitiam sive dolorem, et ex hac parte habet affinitatem cum fortitudine patientia. Et tamen fortitudo est principaliter circa timores, ad quorum rationem pertinet fugere, quod vitat fortitudo. Patientia vero principalius est circa tristitias, nam patiens aliquis dicitur non ex hoc quod non fugit, sed ex hoc quod laudabiliter se habet in patiendo quae praesentialiter nocent, ut scilicet non inordinate ex eis tristetur. Et ideo fortitudo proprie est in irascibili, patientia autem in concupiscibili. Nec hoc impedit quin patientia sit pars fortitudinis, quia adiunctio virtutis ad virtutem non attenditur secundum subiectum, sed secundum materiam vel formam. Nec tamen patientia ponitur pars temperantiae, quamvis utraque sit in concupiscibili. Quia temperantia est solum circa tristitias quae opponuntur delectationibus tactus, puta quae sunt ex abstinentia ciborum vel venereorum, sed patientia praecipue est circa tristitias quae ab aliis inferuntur. Et iterum ad temperantiam pertinet refrenare huiusmodi tristitias, sicut et delectationes contrarias, ad patientiam autem pertinet ut propter huiusmodi tristitias, quantaecumque sint, homo non recedat a bono virtutis. | Reply to Objection 2. The act of fortitude consists not only in holding fast to good against the fear of future dangers, but also in not failing through sorrow or pain occasioned by things present; and it is in the latter respect that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude is chiefly about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude avoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to be patient, not because he does not fly, but because he behaves in a praiseworthy manner by suffering [patiendo] things which hurt him here and now, in such a way as not to be inordinately saddened by them. Hence fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is in the concupiscible faculty. Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of fortitude, because the annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the subject, but the matter or the form. Nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a part of temperance, although both are in the concupiscible, because temperance is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures of touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures of food and sex: whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other persons. Moreover it belongs to temperance to control these sorrows besides their contrary pleasures: whereas it belongs to patience that a man forsake not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows, however great they be. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod patientia potest, quantum ad aliquid sui, poni pars integralis fortitudinis, de qua parte obiectio procedit, prout scilicet aliquis patienter sustinet mala quae pertinent ad pericula mortis. Nec est contra rationem patientiae quod aliquis, quando opus fuerit, insiliat in eum qui mala facit, quia, ut Chrysostomus dicit, super illud Matth., vade Satanas, in iniuriis propriis patientem esse laudabile est, iniurias autem Dei patienter sustinere nimis est impium. Et Augustinus dicit, in quadam epistola contra Marcellinum, quod praecepta patientiae non contrariantur bono reipublicae, pro quo conservando contra inimicos compugnatur. Secundum vero quod patientia se habet circa quaecumque alia mala, adiungitur fortitudini ut virtus secundaria principali. | Reply to Objection 3. It may be granted that patience in a certain respect is an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a man may patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death; and it is from this point of view that the objection argues. Nor is it inconsistent with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up against the man who inflicts evils on him; for Chrysostom [Homily v. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says on Matthew 4:10, "Begone Satan," that "it is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most wicked": and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii) that "the precepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight against our enemies." But in so far as patience regards all kinds of evils, it is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod patientia sit idem quod longanimitas. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de patientia, quod patientia Dei praedicatur non in hoc quod aliquod malum patiatur, sed in hoc quod expectat malos ut convertantur, unde Eccli. V dicitur, altissimus patiens redditor est. Ergo videtur quod patientia sit idem quod longanimitas. | Objection 1. It seems that patience is the same as longanimity. For Augustine says (De Patientia i) that "we speak of patience in God, not as though any evil made Him suffer, but because He awaits the wicked, that they may be converted." Wherefore it is written (Sirach 5:4): "The Most High is a patient rewarder." Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, idem non est oppositum duobus. Sed impatientia opponitur longanimitati, per quam aliquis moram expectat, dicitur enim aliquis impatiens morae, sicut et aliorum malorum. Ergo videtur quod patientia sit idem longanimitati. | Objection 2. Further, the same thing is not contrary to two things. But impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby one awaits a delay: for one is said to be impatient of delay, as of other evils. Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut tempus est quaedam circumstantia malorum quae sustinentur, ita etiam locus. Sed ex parte loci non sumitur aliqua virtus quae distinguatur a patientia. Ergo similiter nec longanimitas, quae sumitur ex parte temporis, inquantum scilicet aliquis diu expectat, distinguitur a patientia. | Objection 3. Further, just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured, so is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience on the score of place. Therefore in like manner longanimity which takes count of time, in so far as a person waits for a long time, is not distinct from patience. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Rom. II, super illud, an divitias bonitatis eius et patientiae et longanimitatis contemnis, dicit Glossa, videtur longanimitas a patientia differre, quia qui infirmitate magis quam proposito delinquunt, sustentari per longanimitatem dicuntur, qui vero pertinaci mente exultant in delictis suis, ferri patienter dicendi sunt. | Objection 4.On the contrary, a gloss [Origen, Comment. in Ep. ad Rom. ii] on Romans 2:4, "Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and patience, and longsuffering?" says: "It seems that longanimity differs from patience, because those who offend from weakness rather than of set purpose are said to be borne with longanimity: while those who take a deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be borne patiently." |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod sicut magnanimitas dicitur per quam aliquis habet animum tendendi in magna, ita etiam longanimitas dicitur per quam aliquis habet animum tendendi in aliquid quod in longinquum distat. Et ideo sicut magnanimitas magis respicit spem tendentem in bonum, quam audaciam vel timorem sive tristitiam quae respiciunt malum, ita etiam et longanimitas. Unde longanimitas maiorem convenientiam videtur habere cum magnanimitate quam cum patientia. Potest tamen convenire cum patientia duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia patientia, sicut et fortitudo, sustinet aliqua mala propter aliquod bonum. Quod si ex propinquo expectetur, facilius est sustinere, si autem in longinquum differatur, mala autem oporteat in praesenti sustinere, difficilius est. Secundo, quia hoc ipsum quod est differri bonum speratum, natum est causare tristitiam, secundum illud Prov. XIII, spes quae differtur affligit animam. Unde et in sustinendo huiusmodi afflictionem potest esse patientia, sicut et in sustinendo quascumque alias tristitias. Sic igitur secundum quod sub ratione mali contristantis potest comprehendi et dilatio boni sperati, quae pertinet ad longanimitatem; et labor quem homo sustinet in continuata executione boni operis, quod pertinet ad constantiam; tam longanimitas quam etiam constantia sub patientia comprehenduntur. Unde et Tullius, definiens patientiam, dicit quod patientia est, honestatis ac utilitatis causa, voluntaria ac diuturna perpessio rerum arduarum ac difficilium. Quod dicit arduarum, pertinet ad constantiam in bono; quod dicit difficilium, pertinet ad gravitatem mali, quam proprie respicit patientia; quod vero addit ac diuturna, pertinet ad longanimitatem secundum quod convenit cum patientia. | I answer that, Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to great things, so by longanimity a man has a mind to tend to something a long way off. Wherefore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to good, rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their object, so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in common with magnanimity than with patience. Nevertheless it may have something in common with patience, for two reasons. First, because patience, like fortitude, endures certain evils for the sake of good, and if this good is awaited shortly, endurance is easier: whereas if it be delayed a long time, it is more difficult. Secondly, because the very delay of the good we hope for, is of a nature to cause sorrow, according to Proverbs 13:12, "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Hence there may be patience in bearing this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows. Accordingly longanimity and constancy are both comprised under patience, in so far as both the delay of the hoped for good (which regards longanimity) and the toil which man endures in persistently accomplishing a good work (which regards constancy) may be considered under the one aspect of grievous evil. For this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defining patience, says that "patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." By saying "arduous" he refers to constancy in good; when he says "difficult" he refers to the grievousness of evil, which is the proper object of patience; and by adding "continued" or "long lasting," he refers to longanimity, in so far as it has something in common with patience. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 5 ad 1 Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum et secundum. | This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second Objections. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod illud quod est longinquum loco, quamvis sit remotum a nobis, tamen non est similiter remotum a natura rerum sicut illud quod est longinquum tempore. Et ideo non est similis ratio. Et praeterea quod est longinquum loco non affert difficultatem nisi ratione temporis, quia quod est longinquum loco a nobis tardius tempore ad nos potest pervenire. | Reply to Objection 3. That which is a long way off as to place, though distant from us, is not simply distant from things in nature, as that which is a long way off in point of time: hence the comparison fails. Moreover, what is remote as to place offers no difficulty save in the point of time, since what is placed a long way from us is a long time coming to us. |
| IIª-IIae q. 136 a. 5 ad 4 Quartum concedimus. Tamen consideranda est ratio illius differentiae quam Glossa assignat. Quia in his qui ex infirmitate peccant hoc solum videtur importabile, quod diu perseverant in malo, et ideo dicitur quod ex longanimitate supportantur. Sed hoc ipsum quod aliquis ex superbia peccat, importabile videtur, et ideo per patientiam dicuntur sustineri illi qui ex superbia peccant. | We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, however, that the reason for the difference assigned by this gloss is that it is hard to bear with those who sin through weakness, merely because they persist a long time in evil, wherefore it is said that they are borne with longanimity: whereas the very fact of sinning through pride seems to be unendurable; for which reason those who sin through pride are stated to be borne with patience. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 pr. Deinde considerandum est de perseverantia, et de vitiis oppositis. Circa perseverantiam autem quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum perseverantia sit virtus. Secundo, utrum sit pars fortitudinis. Tertio, quomodo se habet ad constantiam. Quarto, utrum indigeat auxilio gratiae. | Question 137. Perseverance 1. Is perseverance a virtue? 2. Is it a part of fortitude? 3. Its relation to constancy 4. Does it need the help of grace? |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod perseverantia non sit virtus. Quia, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., continentia est potior quam perseverantia. Sed continentia non est virtus, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo perseverantia non est virtus. | Objection 1. It seems that perseverance is not a virtue. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), continency is greater than perseverance. But continency is not a virtue, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, virtus est qua recte vivitur, secundum Augustinum, in libro de Lib. Arbit. Sed sicut ipse dicit in libro de perseverantia, nullus potest dici perseverantiam habere quandiu vivit, nisi perseveret usque ad mortem. Ergo perseverantia non est virtus. | Objection 2. Further, "by virtue man lives aright," according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Now according to the same authority (De Persever. i), no one can be said to have perseverance while living, unless he persevere until death. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, immobiliter persistere in opere virtutis requiritur ad omnem virtutem, ut patet in II Ethic. Sed hoc pertinet ad rationem perseverantiae, dicit enim Tullius, in sua rhetorica, quod perseverantia est in ratione bene considerata stabilis et perpetua permansio. Ergo perseverantia non est specialis virtus, sed conditio omnis virtutis. | Objection 3. Further, it is requisite of every virtue that one should persist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4. But this is what we understand by perseverance: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "perseverance is the fixed and continued persistence in a well-considered purpose." Therefore perseverance is not a special virtue, but a condition of every virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Andronicus dicit, quod perseverantia est habitus eorum quibus immanendum est et non immanendum, et neutrorum. Sed habitus ordinans nos ad bene faciendum aliquid vel omittendum est virtus. Ergo perseverantia est virtus. | On the contrary, Andronicus [Chrysippus: in De Affect.] says that "perseverance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to stand, and those to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that are indifferent." Now a habit that directs us to do something well, or to omit something, is a virtue. Therefore perseverance is a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in II Ethic., virtus est circa difficile et bonum. Et ideo ubi occurrit specialis ratio difficultatis vel boni, ibi est specialis virtus. Opus autem virtutis potest habere bonitatem et difficultatem ex duobus. Uno quidem modo, ex specie ipsa actus, quae accipitur secundum rationem proprii obiecti. Alio modo, ex ipsa diuturnitate temporis, nam hoc ipsum quod est diu insistere alicui difficili, specialem difficultatem habet. Et ideo diu persistere in aliquo bono usque ad consummationem pertinet ad specialem virtutem. Sicut ergo temperantia et fortitudo sunt speciales virtutes eo quod altera earum moderatur delectationes tactus, quod de se difficultatem habet, altera autem moderatur timores et audacias circa pericula mortis, quod etiam secundum se difficile est; ita etiam perseverantia est quaedam specialis virtus ad quam pertinet in his vel in aliis virtuosis operibus diuturnitatem sustinere prout necesse est. | I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3), "virtue is about the difficult and the good"; and so where there is a special kind of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue. Now a virtuous deed may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts. First, from the act's very species, which is considered in respect of the proper object of that act: secondly, from the length of time, since to persist long in something difficult involves a special difficulty. Hence to persist long in something good until it is accomplished belongs to a special virtue. Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for the reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch (which is of itself a difficult thing), while the other moderates fear and daring in connection with dangers of death (which also is something difficult in itself), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it consists in enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so far as necessity requires. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus accipit ibi perseverantiam secundum quod aliquis perseverat in his in quibus difficillimum est diu sustinere. Non est autem difficile sustinere bona, sed mala. Mala autem quae sunt pericula mortis, ut plurimum non diu sustinentur, quia ut frequentius cito transeunt. Unde respectu illorum non est praecipua laus perseverantiae. Inter alia autem mala, praecipua sunt illa quae opponuntur delectationibus tactus, quia huiusmodi mala attenduntur circa necessaria vitae, puta circa defectum ciborum et aliorum huiusmodi, quae quandoque imminent diu sustinenda. Non est autem difficile hoc diu sustinere illi qui circa hoc non multum tristatur, nec in oppositis bonis multum delectatur, sicut patet in temperato, in quo huiusmodi passiones non sunt vehementes. Sed maxime hoc difficile est in eo qui circa hoc vehementer afficitur, utpote non habens perfectam virtutem modificantem has passiones. Et ideo, si accipiatur hoc modo perseverantia, non est virtus perfecta, sed est quoddam imperfectum in genere virtutis. Si autem accipiamus perseverantiam secundum quod aliquis in quocumque bono difficili diu persistit, hoc potest convenire etiam habenti perfectam virtutem. Cui etiam si persistere sit minus difficile, persistit tamen in bono magis perfecto. Unde talis perseverantia potest esse virtus, quia perfectio virtutis magis attenditur secundum rationem boni quam secundum rationem difficilis. | Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is taking perseverance there, as it is found in one who bears those things which are most difficult to endure long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And evils that involve danger of death, for the most part are not endured for a long time, because often they soon pass away: wherefore it is not on this account that perseverance has its chief title to praise. Among other evils foremost are those which are opposed to pleasures of touch, because evils of this kind affect the necessaries of life: such are the lack of food and the like, which at times call for long endurance. Now it is not difficult to endure these things for a long time for one who grieves not much at them, nor delights much in the contrary goods; as in the case of the temperate man, in whom these passions are not violent. But they are most difficult to bear for one who is strongly affected by such things, through lacking the perfect virtue that moderates these passions. Wherefore if perseverance be taken in this sense it is not a perfect virtue, but something imperfect in the genus of virtue. On the other hand, if we take perseverance as denoting long persistence in any kind of difficult good, it is consistent in one who has even perfect virtue: for even if it is less difficult for him to persist, yet he persists in the more perfect good. Wherefore such like perseverance may be a virtue, because virtue derives perfection from the aspect of good rather than from the aspect of difficulty. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod eodem nomine quandoque nominatur et virtus, et actus virtutis, sicut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., fides est credere quod non vides. Potest tamen contingere quod aliquis habet habitum virtutis qui tamen non exercet actum, sicut aliquis pauper habet habitum magnificentiae, cum tamen actum non exerceat. Quandoque vero aliquis habens habitum incipit quidem exercere actum, sed non perficit, puta si aedificator incipiat aedificare et non compleat domum. Sic ergo dicendum est quod nomen perseverantiae quandoque sumitur pro habitu quo quis eligit perseverare, quandoque autem pro actu quo quis perseverat. Et quandoque quidem habens habitum perseverantiae eligit quidem perseverare, et incipit exequi aliquandiu persistendo; non tamen complet actum, quia non persistit usque in finem. Est autem duplex finis, unus quidem qui est finis operis; alius autem qui est finis humanae vitae. Per se autem ad perseverantiam pertinet ut aliquis perseveret usque ad terminum virtuosi operis, sicut quod miles perseveret usque ad finem certaminis, et magnificus usque ad consummationem operis. Sunt autem quaedam virtutes quarum actus per totam vitam debet durare, sicut fidei, spei et caritatis, quia respiciunt ultimum finem totius vitae humanae. Et ideo respectu harum virtutum, quae sunt principales, non consummatur actus perseverantiae usque ad finem vitae. Et secundum hoc, Augustinus accipit perseverantiam pro actu perseverantiae consummato. | Reply to Objection 2. Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the same name: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. lxxix): "Faith is to believe without seeing." Yet it is possible to have a habit of virtue without performing the act: thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence without exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the habit, begins to perform the act, yet does not accomplish it, for instance a builder begins to build a house, but does not complete it. Accordingly we must reply that the term "perseverance" is sometimes used to denote the habit whereby one chooses to persevere, sometimes for the act of persevering: and sometimes one who has the habit of perseverance chooses to persevere and begins to carry out his choice by persisting for a time, yet completes not the act, through not persisting to the end. Now the end is twofold: one is the end of the work, the other is the end of human life. Properly speaking it belongs to perseverance to persevere to the end of the virtuous work, for instance that a soldier persevere to the end of the fight, and the magnificent man until his work be accomplished. There are, however, some virtues whose acts must endure throughout the whole of life, such as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last end of the entire life of man. Wherefore as regards these which are the principal virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished until the end of life. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of perseverance as denoting the consummate act of perseverance. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod virtuti potest aliquid convenire dupliciter. Uno modo, ex propria intentione finis. Et sic diu persistere usque ad finem in bono pertinet ad specialem virtutem quae dicitur perseverantia, quae hoc intendit sicut specialem finem. Alio modo, ex comparatione habitus ad subiectum. Et sic immobiliter persistere consequitur quamlibet virtutem, inquantum est qualitas difficile mobilis. | Reply to Objection 3. Unchangeable persistence may belong to a virtue in two ways. First, on account of the intended end that is proper to that virtue; and thus to persist in good for a long time until the end, belongs to a special virtue called perseverance, which intends this as its special end. Secondly, by reason of the relation of the habit to its subject: and thus unchangeable persistence is consequent upon every virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a "quality difficult to change." |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod perseverantia non sit pars fortitudinis. Quia, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., perseverantia est circa tristitias tactus. Sed huiusmodi pertinent ad temperantiam. Ergo perseverantia magis est pars temperantiae quam fortitudinis. | Objection 1. It seems that perseverance is not a part of fortitude. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 7), "perseverance is about pains of touch." But these belong to temperance. Therefore perseverance is a part of temperance rather than of fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, omnis pars virtutis moralis est circa aliquas passiones, quas virtus moralis moderatur. Sed perseverantia non importat moderantiam passionum, quia quanto vehementiores fuerint passiones, tanto aliquis secundum rationem perseverans laudabilior videtur. Ergo videtur quod perseverantia non sit pars alicuius virtutis moralis, sed magis prudentiae, quae perficit rationem. | Objection 2. Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply moderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason. Therefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue, but rather of prudence which perfects the reason. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de perseverantia, quod perseverantiam nullus potest amittere. Alias autem virtutes potest homo amittere. Ergo perseverantia est potior omnibus aliis virtutibus. Sed virtus principalis est potior quam pars eius. Ergo perseverantia non est pars alicuius virtutis, sed magis ipsa est virtus principalis. | Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no one can lose perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues. Therefore perseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a principal virtue is greater than its part. Therefore perseverance is not a part of a virtue, but is itself a principal virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Tullius ponit perseverantiam partem fortitudinis. | On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons perseverance as a part of fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtus principalis est cui principaliter adscribitur aliquid quod pertinet ad laudem virtutis, inquantum scilicet exercet illud circa propriam materiam in qua difficillimum et optimum est illud observare. Et secundum hoc dictum est quod fortitudo est principalis virtus, quia firmitatem servat in his in quibus difficillimum est firmiter persistere, scilicet in periculis mortis. Et ideo necesse est quod fortitudini adiungatur sicut secundaria virtus principali, omnis virtus cuius laus consistit in sustinendo firmiter aliquod difficile. Sustinere autem difficultatem quae provenit ex diuturnitate boni operis, dat laudem perseverantiae, nec hoc est ita difficile sicut sustinere pericula mortis. Et ideo perseverantia adiungitur fortitudini sicut virtus secundaria principali. | I answer that, As stated above (123, 2; I-II, 61, 3,4), a principal virtue is one to which is principally ascribed something that lays claim to the praise of virtue, inasmuch as it practices it in connection with its own matter, wherein it is most difficult of accomplishment. On accordance with this it has been stated (123, 2) that fortitude is a principal virtue, because it observes firmness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand firm, namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of necessity that every virtue which has a title to praise for the firm endurance of something difficult must be annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue. Now the endurance of difficulty arising from delay in accomplishing a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise: nor is this so difficult as to endure dangers of death. Therefore perseverance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to principal virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod annexio secundariae virtutis ad principalem non solum attenditur secundum materiam, sed magis secundum modum, quia forma in unoquoque potior est quam materia. Unde licet perseverantia magis videatur convenire in materia cum temperantia quam cum fortitudine, tamen in modo magis convenit cum fortitudine, inquantum firmitatem servat contra difficultatem diuturnitatis. | Reply to Objection 1. The annexing of secondary to principal virtues depends not only on the matter [Cf. 136, 4, ad 2], but also on the mode, because in everything form is of more account than matter. Wherefore although, as to matter, perseverance seems to have more in common with temperance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it has more in common with fortitude, in the point of standing firm against the difficulty arising from length of time. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illa perseverantia de qua philosophus loquitur, non moderatur aliquas passiones, sed consistit solum in quadam firmitate rationis et voluntatis. Sed perseverantia secundum quod ponitur virtus, moderatur aliquas passiones, scilicet timorem fatigationis aut defectus propter diuturnitatem. Unde haec virtus est in irascibili, sicut et fortitudo. | Reply to Objection 2. The perseverance of which the Philosopher speaks (Ethic. vii, 4,7) does not moderate any passions, but consists merely in a certain firmness of reason and will. But perseverance, considered as a virtue, moderates certain passions, namely fear of weariness or failure on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like fortitude, is in the irascible. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de perseverantia non secundum quod nominat habitum virtutis, sed secundum quod nominat actum virtutis continuatum usque in finem, secundum illud Matth. XXIV qui perseveraverit usque in finem, hic salvus erit. Et ideo contra rationem perseverantiae sic acceptae esset quod amitteretur, quia iam non duraret usque in finem. | Reply to Objection 3. Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as denoting, not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained to the end, according to Matthew 24:13, "He that shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved." Hence it is incompatible with such like perseverance for it to be lost, since it would no longer endure to the end. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod constantia non pertineat ad perseverantiam. Constantia enim pertinet ad patientiam, ut supra dictum est. Sed patientia differt a perseverantia. Ergo constantia non pertinet ad perseverantiam. | Objection 1. It seems that constancy does not pertain to perseverance. For constancy pertains to patience, as stated above (Question 137, Article 5): and patience differs from perseverance. Therefore constancy does not pertain to perseverance. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, virtus est circa difficile et bonum. Sed in parvis operibus constantem esse non videtur esse difficile, sed solum in operibus magnis, quae pertinent ad magnificentiam. Ergo constantia magis pertinet ad magnificentiam quam ad perseverantiam. | Objection 2. Further, "virtue is about the difficult and the good." Now it does not seem difficult to be constant in little works, but only in great deeds, which pertain to magnificence. Therefore constancy pertains to magnificence rather than to perseverance. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, si ad perseverantiam pertineret constantia, in nullo videretur a perseverantia differre, quia utrumque immobilitatem quandam importat. Differunt autem, nam Macrobius condividit constantiam firmitati, per quam intelligitur perseverantia, ut supra dictum est. Ergo constantia non pertinet ad perseverantiam. | Objection 3. Further, if constancy pertained to perseverance, it would seem nowise to differ from it, since both denote a kind of unchangeableness. Yet they differ: for Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) condivides constancy with firmness by which he indicates perseverance, as stated above (128, 6). Therefore constancy does not pertain to perseverance. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod aliquis dicitur esse constans ex eo quod in aliquo stat. Sed immanere aliquibus pertinet ad perseverantiam, ut patet ex definitione quam Andronicus ponit. Ergo constantia pertinet ad perseverantiam. | On the contrary, One is said to be constant because one stands to a thing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand to certain things, as appears from the definition given by Andronicus. Therefore constancy belongs to perseverance. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod perseverantia et constantia conveniunt quidem in fine, quia ad utramque pertinet firmiter persistere in aliquo bono, differunt autem secundum ea quae difficultatem afferunt ad persistendum in bono. Nam virtus perseverantiae proprie facit firmiter persistere hominem in bono contra difficultatem quae provenit ex ipsa diuturnitate actus, constantia autem facit firmiter persistere in bono contra difficultatem quae provenit ex quibuscumque aliis exterioribus impedimentis. Et ideo principalior pars fortitudinis est perseverantia quam constantia, quia difficultas quae est ex diuturnitate actus, est essentialior actui virtutis quam illa quae est ex exterioribus impedimentis. | I answer that, Perseverance and constancy agree as to end, since it belongs to both to persist firmly in some good: but they differ as to those things which make it difficult to persist in good. Because the virtue of perseverance properly makes man persist firmly in good, against the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the act: whereas constancy makes him persist firmly in good against difficulties arising from any other external hindrances. Hence perseverance takes precedence of constancy as a part of fortitude, because the difficulty arising from continuance of action is more intrinsic to the act of virtue than that which arises from external obstacles. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod exteriora impedimenta persistendi in bono praecipue sunt illa quae tristitiam inferunt. Circa tristitiam autem est patientia, ut dictum est. Et ideo constantia secundum finem convenit cum perseverantia, secundum autem ea quae difficultatem inferunt, convenit cum patientia. Finis autem potior est. Et ideo constantia magis pertinet ad perseverantiam quam ad patientiam. | Reply to Objection 1. External obstacles to persistence in good are especially those which cause sorrow. Now patience is about sorrow, as stated above (Question 136, Article 1). Hence constancy agrees with perseverance as to end: while it agrees with patience as to those things which occasion difficulty. Now the end is of most account: wherefore constancy pertains to perseverance rather than to patience. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in magnis operibus persistere difficilius est, sed in parvis vel mediocribus diu persistere habet difficultatem, etsi non ex magnitudine actus, quam respicit magnificentia, saltem ex ipsa diuturnitate, quam respicit perseverantia. Et ideo constantia potest ad utrumque pertinere. | Reply to Objection 2. It is more difficult to persist in great deeds: yet in little or ordinary deeds, it is difficult to persist for any length of time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed which magnificence considers, yet from its very continuance which perseverance regards. Hence constancy may pertain to both. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod constantia pertinet quidem ad perseverantiam, inquantum convenit cum ea, non tamen est idem ei inquantum differt ab ea ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3. Constancy pertains to perseverance in so far as it has something in common with it: but it is not the same thing in the point of their difference, as stated in the Article. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod perseverantia non indigeat auxilio gratiae. Perseverantia enim est quaedam virtus, ut dictum est. Sed virtus, ut Tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, agit in modum naturae. Ergo sola inclinatio virtutis sufficit ad perseverandum. Non ergo ad hoc requiritur aliud auxilium gratiae. | Objection 1. It seems that perseverance does not need the help of grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above (Article 1). Now according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) virtue acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the sole inclination of virtue suffices for perseverance. Therefore this does not need the help of grace. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, donum gratiae Christi est maius quam nocumentum quod Adam intulit, ut patet Rom. V. Sed ante peccatum homo sic conditus fuit ut posset perseverare per id quod acceperat, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Corrept. et gratia. Ergo multo magis homo per gratiam Christi reparatus, potest perseverare absque auxilio novae gratiae. | Objection 2. Further, the gift of Christ's grace is greater than the harm brought upon us by Adam, as appears from Romans 5:15, seqq. Now "before sin man was so framed that he could persevere by means of what he had received," as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi). Much more therefore can man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ, persevere without the help of a further grace. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, opera peccati quandoque sunt difficiliora quam opera virtutis, unde ex persona impiorum dicitur Sap. V, ambulavimus vias difficiles. Sed aliqui perseverant in operibus peccati absque alterius auxilio. Ergo etiam in operibus virtutum potest homo perseverare absque auxilio gratiae. | Objection 3. Further, sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult than deeds of virtue: hence it is said in the person of the wicked (Wisdom 5:7): "We . . . have walked through hard ways." Now some persevere in sinful deeds without the help of another. Therefore man can also persevere in deeds of virtue without the help of grace. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de perseverantia, asserimus donum Dei esse perseverantiam, qua usque in finem perseveratur in Christo. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. i): "We hold that perseverance is a gift of God, whereby we persevere unto the end, in Christ." |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, perseverantia dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, pro ipso habitu perseverantiae, secundum quod est virtus. Et hoc modo indiget dono habitualis gratiae, sicut et ceterae virtutes infusae. Alio modo potest accipi pro actu perseverantiae durante usque ad mortem. Et secundum hoc indiget non solum gratia habituali, sed etiam gratuito Dei auxilio conservantis hominem in bono usque ad finem vitae, sicut supra dictum est, cum de gratia ageretur. Quia cum liberum arbitrium de se sit vertibile, et hoc ei non tollatur per habitualem gratiam praesentis vitae; non subest potestati liberi arbitrii, etiam per gratiam reparati, ut se immobiliter in bono statuat, licet sit in potestate eius quod hoc eligat, plerumque enim cadit in potestate nostra electio, non autem executio. | I answer that, As stated above (1, ad 2; 2, ad 3), perseverance has a twofold signification. First, it denotes the habit of perseverance, considered as a virtue. On this way it needs the gift of habitual grace, even as the other infused virtues. Secondly, it may be taken to denote the act of perseverance enduring until death: and in this sense it needs not only habitual grace, but also the gratuitous help of God sustaining man in good until the end of life, as stated above (I-II, 109, 10), when we were treating of grace. Because, since the free-will is changeable by its very nature, which changeableness is not taken away from it by the habitual grace bestowed in the present life, it is not in the power of the free-will, albeit repaired by grace, to abide unchangeably in good, though it is in its power to choose this: for it is often in our power to choose yet not to accomplish. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus perseverantiae, quantum est de se, inclinat ad perseverandum. Quia tamen habitus est quo quis utitur cum voluerit, non est necessarium quod habens habitum virtutis immobiliter utatur eo usque ad mortem. | Reply to Objection 1. The virtue of perseverance, so far as it is concerned, inclines one to persevere: yet since it is a habit, and a habit is a thing one uses at will, it does not follow that a person who has the habit of virtue uses it unchangeably until death. |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Corrept. et gratia, primo homini datum est, non ut perseveraret, sed ut perseverare posset, per liberum arbitrium, quia nulla corruptio tunc erat in natura humana quae perseverandi difficultatem praeberet. Sed nunc praedestinatis per gratiam Christi non solum datur ut perseverare possint, sed ut perseverent. Unde primus homo, nullo terrente, contra Dei terrentis imperium libero usus arbitrio, non stetit in tanta felicitate, cum tanta non peccandi facilitate. Isti autem, saeviente mundo ne starent, steterunt in fide. | Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi), "it was given to the first man, not to persevere, but to be able to persevere of his free-will: because then no corruption was in human nature to make perseverance difficult. Now, however, by the grace of Christ, the predestined receive not only the possibility of persevering, but perseverance itself. Wherefore the first man whom no man threatened, of his own free-will rebelling against a threatening God, forfeited so great a happiness and so great a facility of avoiding sin: whereas these, although the world rage against their constancy, have persevered in faith." |
| IIª-IIae q. 137 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod homo per se potest cadere in peccatum, sed non potest per se resurgere a peccato sine auxilio gratiae. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod homo cadit in peccatum, inquantum est de se, facit se in peccato perseverantem, nisi gratia Dei liberetur. Non autem ex hoc quod facit bonum facit se perseverantem in bono, quia de se potens est peccare. Et ideo ad hoc indiget auxilio gratiae. | Reply to Objection 3. Man is able by himself to fall into sin, but he cannot by himself arise from sin without the help of grace. Hence by falling into sin, so far as he is concerned man makes himself to be persevering in sin, unless he be delivered by God's grace. On the other hand, by doing good he does not make himself to be persevering in good, because he is able, by himself, to sin: wherefore he needs the help of grace for that end. |
| IIª-IIae q. 138 pr. Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis perseverantiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, de mollitie. Secundo, de pertinacia. | Question 138. The vices opposed to perseverance 1. Effeminacy 2. Pertinacity Effeminacy: Mollities, literally 'softness' |
| IIª-IIae q. 138 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mollities non opponatur perseverantiae. Quia super illud I ad Cor. VI, neque adulteri neque molles neque masculorum concubitores, Glossa exponit molles, idest pathici, hoc est muliebria patientes. Sed hoc opponitur castitati. Ergo mollities non est vitium oppositum perseverantiae. | Objection 1. It seems that effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance. For a gloss on 1 Corinthians 6:9-10, "Nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with mankind," expounds the text thus: "Effeminate--i.e. obscene, given to unnatural vice." But this is opposed to chastity. Therefore effeminacy is not a vice opposed to perseverance. |
| IIª-IIae q. 138 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod delicia mollities quaedam est. Sed esse deliciosum videtur pertinere ad intemperantiam. Ergo mollities non opponitur perseverantiae, sed magis temperantiae. | Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "delicacy is a kind of effeminacy." But to be delicate seems akin to intemperance. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance but to temperance. |
| IIª-IIae q. 138 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, philosophus, ibidem, dicit quod lusivus est mollis. Sed esse immoderate lusivum opponitur eutrapeliae, quae est virtus circa delectationes ludorum, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo mollities non opponitur perseverantiae. | Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the man who is fond of amusement is effeminate." Now immoderate fondness of amusement is opposed to eutrapelia, which is the virtue about pleasures of play, as stated in Ethic. iv, 8. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance. |
| IIª-IIae q. 138 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod molli opponitur perseverativus. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the persevering man is opposed to the effeminate." |
| IIª-IIae q. 138 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, laus perseverantiae in hoc consistit quod aliquis non recedit a bono propter diuturnam tolerantiam difficilium et laboriosorum. Cui directe opponi videtur quod aliquis de facili recedat a bono propter aliqua difficilia, quae sustinere non potest. Et hoc pertinet ad rationem mollitiei, nam molle dicitur quod facile cedit tangenti. Non autem iudicatur aliquid molle ex hoc quod cedit fortiter impellenti, nam et parietes cedunt machinae percutienti. Et ideo non reputatur aliquis mollis si cedat aliquibus valde graviter impellentibus, unde philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod si quis a fortibus et superexcellentibus delectationibus vincitur vel tristitiis, non est admirabile, sed condonabile, si contra tendat. Manifestum est autem quod gravius impellit metus periculorum quam cupiditas delectationum, unde Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., non est consentaneum qui metu non frangatur, eum frangi cupiditate; nec qui invictum se a labore praestiterit, vinci a voluptate. Ipsa etiam voluptas fortius movet attrahendo quam tristitia de carentia voluptatis retrahendo, quia carentia voluptatis est purus defectus. Et ideo secundum philosophum, proprie mollis dicitur qui recedit a bono propter tristitias causatas ex defectu delectationum, quasi cedens debili moventi. | I answer that, As stated above (137, 1 and 2), perseverance is deserving of praise because thereby a man does not forsake a good on account of long endurance of difficulties and toils: and it is directly opposed to this, seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake a good on account of difficulties which he cannot endure. This is what we understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be "soft" if it readily yields to the touch. Now a thing is not declared to be soft through yielding to a heavy blow, for walls yield to the battering-ram. Wherefore a man is not said to be effeminate if he yields to heavy blows. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no wonder, if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he struggles against them." Now it is evident that fear of danger is more impelling than the desire of pleasure: wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading "True magnanimity consists of two things: It is inconsistent for one who is not cast down by fear, to be defeated by lust, or who has proved himself unbeaten by toil, to yield to pleasure." Moreover, pleasure itself is a stronger motive of attraction than sorrow, for the lack of pleasure is a motive of withdrawal, since lack of pleasure is a pure privation. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), properly speaking an effeminate man is one who withdraws from good on account of sorrow caused by lack of pleasure, yielding as it were to a weak motion. |
| IIª-IIae q. 138 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praedicta mollities causatur dupliciter. Uno modo, ex consuetudine, cum enim aliquis consuetus est voluptatibus frui, difficilius potest earum absentiam sustinere. Alio modo, ex naturali dispositione, quia videlicet habent animum minus constantem, propter fragilitatem complexionis. Et hoc modo comparantur feminae ad masculos, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic. Et ideo illi qui muliebria patiuntur molles dicuntur, quasi muliebres effecti. | Reply to Objection 1. This effeminacy is caused in two ways. On one way, by custom: for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is more difficult for him to endure the lack of them. On another way, by natural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering through the frailty of his temperament. This is how women are compared to men, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): wherefore those who are passively sodomitical are said to be effeminate, being womanish themselves, as it were. |
| IIª-IIae q. 138 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod voluptati corporali opponitur labor, et ideo res laboriosae tantum impediunt voluptates. Deliciosi autem dicuntur qui non possunt sustinere aliquos labores, nec aliquid quod voluptatem diminuat, unde dicitur Deut. XXVIII, tenera mulier et delicata, quae super terram ingredi non valebat, nec pedis vestigium figere, propter mollitiem. Et ideo delicia quaedam mollities est. Sed mollities proprie respicit defectum delectationum, deliciae autem causam impeditivam delectationis, puta laborem vel aliquid huiusmodi. | Reply to Objection 2. Toil is opposed to bodily pleasure: wherefore it is only toilsome things that are a hindrance to pleasures. Now the delicate are those who cannot endure toils, nor anything that diminishes pleasure. Hence it is written (Deuteronomy 28:56): "The tender and delicate woman, that could not go upon the ground, nor set down her foot for . . . softness [Douay: 'niceness']." Thus delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. But properly speaking effeminacy regards lack of pleasures, while delicacy regards the cause that hinders pleasure, for instance toil or the like. |
| IIª-IIae q. 138 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in ludo duo est considerare. Uno quidem modo, delectationem, et sic inordinate lusivus opponitur eutrapeliae. Alio modo in ludo consideratur quaedam remissio sive quies, quae opponitur labori. Et ideo sicut non posse sustinere laboriosa pertinet ad mollitiem, ita etiam nimis appetere remissionem ludi, vel quamcumque aliam quietem. | Reply to Objection 3. In play two things may be considered. On the first place there is the pleasure, and thus inordinate fondness of play is opposed to eutrapelia. Secondly, we may consider the relaxation or rest which is opposed to toil. Accordingly just as it belongs to effeminacy to be unable to endure toilsome things, so too it belongs thereto to desire play or any other relaxation inordinately. |
| IIª-IIae q. 138 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pertinacia non opponatur perseverantiae. Dicit enim Gregorius, XXXI Moral., quod pertinacia oritur ex inani gloria. Sed inanis gloria non opponitur perseverantiae, sed magis magnanimitati, ut supra dictum est. Ergo pertinacia non opponitur perseverantiae. | Objection 1. It seems that pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that pertinacity arises from vainglory. But vainglory is not opposed to perseverance but to magnanimity, as stated above (Question 132, Article 2). Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance. |
| IIª-IIae q. 138 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, si opponitur perseverantiae, aut opponitur ei per excessum, aut per defectum. Sed non opponitur ei per excessum, quia etiam pertinax cedit alicui delectationi et tristitiae; quia, ut dicit philosophus, in VII Ethic., gaudent vincentes, et tristantur si sententiae eorum infirmae appareant. Si autem per defectum, erit idem quod mollities, quod patet esse falsum. Nullo ergo modo pertinacia opponitur perseverantiae. | Objection 2. Further, if it is opposed to perseverance, this is so either by excess or by deficiency. Now it is not opposed by excess: because the pertinacious also yield to certain pleasure and sorrow, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) "they rejoice when they prevail, and grieve when their opinions are rejected." And if it be opposed by deficiency, it will be the same as effeminacy, which is clearly false. Therefore pertinacity is nowise opposed to perseverance. |
| IIª-IIae q. 138 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut perseverans persistit in bono contra tristitias, ita continens et temperatus contra delectationes, et fortis contra timores, et mansuetus contra iras. Sed pertinax dicitur aliquis ex eo quod nimis in aliquo persistit. Ergo pertinacia non magis opponitur perseverantiae quam aliis virtutibus. | Objection 3. Further, just as the persevering man persists in good against sorrow, so too do the continent and the temperate against pleasures, the brave against fear, and the meek against anger. But pertinacity is over-persistence in something. Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance more than to other virtues. |
| IIª-IIae q. 138 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod ita se habet pertinacia ad perseverantiam sicut superstitio ad religionem. Sed superstitio opponitur religioni, ut supra dictum est. Ergo et pertinacia perseverantiae. | On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that pertinacity is to perseverance as superstition is to religion. But superstition is opposed to religion, as stated above (Question 92, Article 1). Therefore pertinacity is opposed to perseverance. |
| IIª-IIae q. 138 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., pertinax dicitur aliquis qui est impudenter tenens, quasi omnia tenax. Et hic idem dicitur pervicax, eo quod in proposito suo ad victoriam perseverat, antiqui enim dicebant viciam quam nos victoriam. Et hos philosophus vocat, in VII Ethic., ischyrognomones, idest fortis sententiae, vel idiognomones, idest propriae sententiae, quia scilicet perseverant in propria sententia plus quam oportet; mollis autem minus quam oportet; perseverans autem secundum quod oportet. Unde patet quod perseverantia laudatur sicut in medio existens; pertinax autem vituperatur sicut secundum excessum medii mollis autem secundum defectum. | I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) "a person is said to be pertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly tenacious." "Pervicacious" has the same meaning, for it signifies that a man "perseveres in his purpose until he is victorious: for the ancients called 'vicia' what we call victory." These the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) calls ischyrognomones, that is "head-strong," or idiognomones, that is "self-opinionated," because they abide by their opinions more than they should; whereas the effeminate man does so less than he ought, and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence it is clear that perseverance is commended for observing the mean, while pertinacity is reproved for exceeding the mean, and effeminacy for falling short of it. |
| IIª-IIae q. 138 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ideo aliquis nimis persistit in propria sententia, quia per hoc vult suam excellentiam manifestare. Et ideo oritur ex inani gloria sicut ex causa. Dictum est autem supra quod oppositio vitiorum ad virtutes non attenditur secundum causam, sed secundum propriam speciem. | Reply to Objection 1. The reason why a man is too persistent in his own opinion, is that he wishes by this means to make a show of his own excellence: wherefore this is the result of vainglory as its cause. Now it has been stated above (127, 2, ad 1; 133, 2), that opposition of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause, but on their species. |
| IIª-IIae q. 138 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod pertinax excedit quidem in hoc quod inordinate persistit in aliquo contra multas difficultates, habet tamen aliquam delectationem in fine, sicut et fortis et etiam perseverans. Quia tamen illa delectatio est vitiosa, ex hoc quod nimis eam appetit et contrariam tristitiam fugit, assimilatur incontinenti vel molli. | Reply to Objection 2. The pertinacious man exceeds by persisting inordinately in something against many difficulties: yet he takes a certain pleasure in the end, just as the brave and the persevering man. Since, however, this pleasure is sinful, seeing that he desires it too much, and shuns the contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or effeminate man. |
| IIª-IIae q. 138 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod aliae virtutes, etsi persistant contra impetus passionum, non tamen proprie laus earum est ex persistendo, sicut laus perseverantiae. Laus vero continentiae magis videtur ex vincendo delectationes. Et ideo pertinacia directe opponitur perseverantiae. | Reply to Objection 3. Although the other virtues persist against the onslaught of the passions, they are not commended for persisting in the same way as perseverance is. As to continence, its claim to praise seems to lie rather in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity is directly opposed to perseverance. |
| IIª-IIae q. 139 pr. Deinde considerandum est de dono quod respondet fortitudini, quod est fortitudinis donum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum fortitudo sit donum. Secundo, quid respondeat ei in beatitudinibus et fructibus. | Question 139. The gift of fortitude 1. Is fortitude a gift? 2. Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it? |
| IIª-IIae q. 139 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fortitudo non sit donum. Virtutes enim a donis differunt. Sed fortitudo est virtus. Ergo non debet poni donum. | Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the virtues differ from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. Therefore it should not be reckoned a gift. |
| IIª-IIae q. 139 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, actus donorum manent in patria, ut supra habitum est. Sed actus fortitudinis non manent in patria, dicit enim Gregorius, in I Moral., quod fortitudo dat fiduciam trepidanti contra adversa; quae nulla erunt in patria. Ergo fortitudo non est donum. | Objection 2. Further, the acts of the gift remain in heaven, as stated above (I-II, 68, 6). But the act of fortitude does not remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "fortitude encourages the fainthearted against hardships, which will be altogether absent from heaven." Therefore fortitude is not a gift. |
| IIª-IIae q. 139 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in II de Doctr. Christ., quod fortitudinis est ab omni transeuntium mortifera iucunditate seipsum sequestrare. Sed circa noxias iucunditates seu delectationes magis consistit temperantia quam fortitudo. Ergo videtur quod fortitudo non sit donum respondens virtuti fortitudinis. | Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that "it is a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures of the passing show." Now noisome pleasures and delights are the concern of temperance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems that fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 139 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Isaiae XI fortitudo inter alia dona spiritus sancti computatur. | On the contrary, Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the Holy Ghost (Isaiah 11:2). |
| IIª-IIae q. 139 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod fortitudo importat quandam animi firmitatem, ut supra dictum est, et haec quidem firmitas animi requiritur et in bonis faciendis et in malis perferendis, et praecipue in arduis bonis vel malis. Homo autem secundum proprium et connaturalem sibi modum hanc firmitatem in utroque potest habere, ut non deficiat a bono propter difficultatem vel alicuius ardui operis implendi, vel alicuius gravis mali perferendi, et secundum hoc fortitudo ponitur virtus specialis vel generalis, ut supra dictum est. Sed ulterius a spiritu sancto movetur animus hominis ad hoc quod perveniat ad finem cuiuslibet operis inchoati, et evadat quaecumque pericula imminentia. Quod quidem excedit naturam humanam, quandoque enim non subest potestati hominis ut consequatur finem sui operis, vel evadat mala seu pericula, cum quandoque opprimatur ab eis in mortem. Sed hoc operatur spiritus sanctus in homine, dum perducit eum ad vitam aeternam, quae est finis omnium bonorum operum et evasio omnium periculorum. Et huius rei infundit quandam fiduciam menti spiritus sanctus, contrarium timorem excludens. Et secundum hoc fortitudo donum spiritus sancti ponitur, dictum est enim supra quod dona respiciunt motionem animae a spiritu sancto. | I answer that, Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as stated above (123, 2; I-II, 61, 3): and this firmness of mind is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially with regard to goods or evils that are difficult. Now man, according to his proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in both these respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of difficulties, whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or in enduring grievous evil. In this sense fortitude denotes a special or general virtue, as stated above (Question 123, Article 2). Yet furthermore man's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, in order that he may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid whatever perils may threaten. This surpasses human nature: for sometimes it is not in a man's power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the Holy Ghost works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting life, which is the end of all good deeds, and the release from all perils. A certain confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy Ghost Who expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that fortitude is reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has been stated above (I-II, 68, 1 and 2) that the gifts regard the motion of the mind by the Holy Ghost. |
| IIª-IIae q. 139 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fortitudo quae est virtus perficit animam ad sustinendum quaecumque pericula, sed non sufficit dare fiduciam evadendi quaecumque pericula, sed hoc pertinet ad fortitudinem quae est donum spiritus sancti. | Reply to Objection 1. Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind in the endurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go so far as to give confidence of overcoming all dangers: this belongs to the fortitude that is a gift of the Holy Ghost. |
| IIª-IIae q. 139 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod dona non habent eosdem actus in patria quos habent in via, sed ibi habent actus circa perfruitionem finis. Unde actus fortitudinis ibi est perfrui plena securitate a laboribus et malis. | Reply to Objection 2. The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on the way: for they exercise acts in connection with the enjoyment of the end. Hence the act of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from toil and evil. |
| IIª-IIae q. 139 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod donum fortitudinis respicit virtutem fortitudinis non solum secundum quod consistit in sustinendo pericula, sed etiam secundum quod consistit in quocumque arduo opere faciendo. Et ideo donum fortitudinis dirigitur a dono consilii, quod videtur praecipue esse de melioribus bonis. | Reply to Objection 3. The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of fortitude not only because it consists in enduring dangers, but also inasmuch as it consists in accomplishing any difficult work. Wherefore the gift of fortitude is directed by the gift of counsel, which seems to be concerned chiefly with the greater goods. |
| IIª-IIae q. 139 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod quarta beatitudo, scilicet beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt iustitiam, non respondeat dono fortitudinis. Donum enim fortitudinis non respondet virtuti iustitiae, sed potius donum pietatis. Sed esurire, et sitire iustitiam pertinet ad actum iustitiae. Ergo ista beatitudo magis pertinet ad donum pietatis quam ad donum fortitudinis. | Objection 1. It seems that the fourth beatitude, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," does not correspond to the gift of fortitude. For the gift of piety and not the gift of fortitude corresponds to the virtue of justice. Now hungering and thirsting after justice pertain to the act of justice. Therefore this beatitude corresponds to the gift of piety rather than to the gift of fortitude. |
| IIª-IIae q. 139 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, esuries et sitis iustitiae importat desiderium boni. Sed hoc proprie pertinet ad caritatem, cui non respondet donum fortitudinis, sed magis donum sapientiae, ut supra habitum est. Ergo ista beatitudo non respondet dono fortitudinis, sed dono sapientiae. | Objection 2. Further, hunger and thirst after justice imply a desire for good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the gift of wisdom, and not the gift of fortitude, corresponds, as stated above (Article 45). Therefore this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of fortitude, but to the gift of wisdom. |
| IIª-IIae q. 139 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, fructus consequuntur ad beatitudines, quia de ratione beatitudinis est delectatio, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed in fructibus non videtur aliquid poni quod pertineat ad fortitudinem. Ergo neque aliqua beatitudo ei respondet. | Objection 3. Further, the fruits are consequent upon the beatitudes, since delight is essential to beatitude, according to Ethic. i, 8. Now the fruits, apparently, include none pertaining to fortitude. Therefore neither does any beatitude correspond to it. |
| IIª-IIae q. 139 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, fortitudo congruit esurientibus, laborant enim, desiderantes gaudium de veris bonis, amorem a terrenis avertere cupientes. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Fortitude becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to enjoy true goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material things, must toil." |
| IIª-IIae q. 139 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Augustinus attribuit beatitudines donis secundum ordinem enumerationis, considerata tamen aliqua convenientia. Et ideo quartam beatitudinem, scilicet de esurie et siti iustitiae, attribuit quarto dono, scilicet dono fortitudinis. Est tamen ibi aliqua convenientia. Quia sicut dictum est, fortitudo in arduis consistit. Est autem valde arduum quod aliquis non solum opera virtuosa faciat, quae communiter dicuntur opera iustitiae; sed quod faciat ea cum insatiabili quodam desiderio, quod potest significari per famem et sitim iustitiae. | I answer that, As stated above (Question 121, Article 2), Augustine makes the beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to the order in which they are set forth, observing at the same time a certain fittingness between them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning the hunger and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely fortitude. Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated (1), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it is very difficult, not merely to do virtuous deeds, which receive the common designation of works of justice, but furthermore to do them with an unsatiable desire, which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice. |
| IIª-IIae q. 139 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., iustitia hic potest accipi non solum particularis, sed etiam universalis; quae se habet ad omnium virtutum opera, ut dicitur in V Ethic. In quibus arduum intendit fortitudo quae est donum. | Reply to Objection 1. As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), we may understand here not only particular, but also universal justice, which is related to all virtuous deeds according to Ethic. v, 1, wherein whatever is hard is the object of that fortitude which is a gift. |
| IIª-IIae q. 139 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod caritas est radix omnium donorum et virtutum, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo quidquid pertinet ad fortitudinem potest etiam ad caritatem pertinere. | Reply to Objection 2. Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts, as stated above (23, 8, ad 3; I-II, 68, 4, ad 3). Hence whatever pertains to fortitude may also be referred to charity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 139 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod inter fructus ponuntur duo quae sufficienter correspondent dono fortitudinis, scilicet patientia, quae respicit sustinentiam malorum; et longanimitas, quae respicere potest diuturnam expectationem et operationem bonorum. | Reply to Objection 3. There are two of the fruits which correspond sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which regards the enduring of evils: and longanimity, which may regard the long delay and accomplishment of goods. |
| IIª-IIae q. 140 pr. Deinde considerandum est de praeceptis fortitudinis. Et primo, de praeceptis ipsius fortitudinis. Secundo, de praeceptis partium eius. | Question 140. The precepts of fortitude 1. The precepts of fortitude itself 2. The precepts of its parts |
| IIª-IIae q. 140 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non convenienter in lege divina praecepta fortitudinis tradantur. Lex enim nova perfectior est veteri lege. Sed in veteri lege ponuntur aliqua praecepta fortitudinis, ut patet Deut. XX. Ergo et in nova lege aliqua praecepta fortitudinis danda fuerunt. | Objection 1. It seems that the precepts of fortitude are not suitably given in the Divine Law. For the New Law is more perfect than the Old Law. Yet the Old Law contains precepts of fortitude (Deuteronomy 20). Therefore precepts of fortitude should have been given in the New Law also. |
| IIª-IIae q. 140 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, praecepta affirmativa videntur esse potiora praeceptis negativis, quia affirmativa includunt negativa, sed non e converso. Inconvenienter igitur in lege divina ponuntur praecepta fortitudinis solum negativa, timorem prohibentia. | Objection 2. Further, affirmative precepts are of greater import than negative precepts, since the affirmative include the negative, but not vice versa. Therefore it is unsuitable for the Divine Law to contain none but negative precepts in prohibition of fear. |
| IIª-IIae q. 140 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, fortitudo est una de virtutibus principalibus, ut supra habitum est. Sed praecepta ordinantur ad virtutes sicut ad fines, unde debent eis proportionari. Ergo et praecepta fortitudinis debuerunt poni inter praecepta Decalogi, quae sunt principalia legis praecepta. | Objection 3. Further, fortitude is one of the principal virtues, as stated above (123, 2; I-II, 61, 2). Now the precepts are directed to the virtues as to their end: wherefore they should be proportionate to them. Therefore the precepts of fortitude should have been placed among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the chief precepts of the Law. |
| IIª-IIae q. 140 a. 1 s. c. Sed contrarium apparet ex traditione sacrae Scripturae. | On the contrary, stands Holy Writ which contains these precepts. |
| IIª-IIae q. 140 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod praecepta legis ordinantur ad intentionem legislatoris. Unde secundum diversos fines quos intendit legislator, oportet diversimode praecepta legis institui. Unde et in rebus humanis alia sunt praecepta democratica, alia regia, alia tyrannica. Finis autem legis divinae est ut homo inhaereat Deo. Et ideo praecepta legis divinae, tam de fortitudine quam de aliis virtutibus, dantur secundum quod convenit ordinationi mentis in Deum. Et propter hoc Deut. XX dicitur, non formidetis eos, quia dominus Deus vester in medio vestri est, et pro vobis contra adversarios dimicabit. Leges autem humanae ordinantur ad aliqua mundana bona. Secundum quorum conditionem praecepta fortitudinis in humanis legibus inveniuntur. | I answer that, Precepts of law are directed to the end intended by the lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must needs be framed in various ways according to the various ends intended by lawgivers, so that even in human affairs there are laws of democracies, others of kingdoms, and others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of the Divine Law is that man may adhere to God: wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts both of fortitude and of the other virtues, with a view to directing the mind to God. For this reason it is written (Deuteronomy 20:3-4): "Fear ye them not: because the Lord your God is in the midst of you, and will fight for you against your enemies." As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly goods, and among them we find precepts of fortitude according to the requirements of those goods. |
| IIª-IIae q. 140 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vetus testamentum habebat temporalia promissa, novum autem spiritualia et aeterna, ut Augustinus dicit, contra Faust. Et ideo necessarium fuit ut in veteri lege populus instrueretur qualiter pugnare deberet etiam corporaliter, pro terrena possessione acquirenda. In novo autem instruendi fuerunt homines qualiter, spiritualiter certando, ad possessionem vitae aeternae pervenirent, secundum illud Matth. XI, regnum caelorum vim patitur, et violenti diripiunt illud. Unde et Petrus praecipit, I Pet. ult., adversarius vester Diabolus tanquam leo rugiens circuit, quaerens quem devoret, cui resistite fortes in fide; et Iac. IV, resistite Diabolo, et fugiet a vobis. Quia tamen homines ad spiritualia bona tendentes ab eis retrahi possent per corporalia pericula, fuerunt etiam in lege divina danda fortitudinis praecepta ad sustinenda fortiter temporalia mala, secundum illud Matth. X, nolite timere eos qui occidunt corpus. | Reply to Objection 1. The Old Testament contained temporal promises, while the promises of the New Testament are spiritual and eternal, according to Augustine (Contra Faust. iv). Hence in the Old Law there was need for the people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily contest, in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in the New Testament men were to be taught how to come to the possession of eternal life by fighting spiritually, according to Matthew 11:12, "The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away." Hence Peter commands (1 Peter 5:8-9): "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist ye, strong in faith," as also James 4:7: "Resist the devil, and he will fly from you." Since, however, men while tending to spiritual goods may be withdrawn from them by corporal dangers, precepts of fortitude had to be given even in the New Law, that they might bravely endure temporal evils, according to Matthew 10:28, "Fear ye not them that kill the body." |
| IIª-IIae q. 140 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod lex suis praeceptis habet communem instructionem. Ea vero quae sunt agenda in periculis non possunt ad aliquid commune reduci, sicut ea quae sunt vitanda. Et ideo praecepta fortitudinis magis dantur negative quam affirmative. | Reply to Objection 2. The law gives general directions in its precepts. But the things that have to be done in cases of danger are not, like the things to be avoided, reducible to some common thing. Hence the precepts of fortitude are negative rather than affirmative. |
| IIª-IIae q. 140 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, praecepta Decalogi ponuntur in lege sicut prima principia, quae statim debent esse omnibus nota. Et ideo praecepta Decalogi debuerunt esse principaliter de actibus iustitiae, in quibus manifeste invenitur ratio debiti, non autem de actibus fortitudinis, quia non ita manifeste videtur esse debitum quod aliquis mortis pericula non reformidet. | Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (Question 122, Article 1), the precepts of the decalogue are placed in the Law, as first principles, which need to be known to all from the outset. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue had to be chiefly about those acts of justice in which the notion of duty is manifest, and not about acts of fortitude, because it is not so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear dangers of death. |
| IIª-IIae q. 140 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter tradantur praecepta in lege divina de partibus fortitudinis. Sicut enim patientia et perseverantia sunt partes fortitudinis, ita etiam magnificentia et magnanimitas sive fiducia, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed de patientia inveniuntur aliqua praecepta tradita in lege divina, similiter autem et de perseverantia. Ergo, pari ratione, de magnificentia et magnanimitate aliqua praecepta tradi debuerunt. | Objection 1. It seems that the precept of the parts of fortitude are unsuitably given in the Divine Law. For just as patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, so also are magnificence, magnanimity, and confidence, as stated above (128). Now we find precepts of patience in the Divine Law, as also of perseverance. Therefore there should also have been precepts of magnificence and magnanimity. |
| IIª-IIae q. 140 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, patientia est virtus maxime necessaria, cum sit custos aliarum virtutum, ut Gregorius dicit. Sed de aliis virtutibus dantur praecepta absolute. Non ergo de patientia fuerunt danda praecepta quae intelligantur solum secundum praeparationem animi, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro Serm. Dom. in monte. | Objection 2. Further, patience is a very necessary virtue, since it is the guardian of the other virtues, as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxv). Now the other virtues are commanded absolutely. Therefore patience should not have been commanded merely, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i), as to the preparedness of the mind. |
| IIª-IIae q. 140 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, patientia et perseverantia sunt partes fortitudinis, ut dictum est. Sed de fortitudine non dantur praecepta affirmativa, sed solum negativa, ut supra habitum est. Ergo etiam neque de patientia et perseverantia fuerunt danda praecepta affirmativa, sed solum negativa. | Objection 3. Further, patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, as stated above (128; 136, 4; 137, 2). Now the precepts of fortitude are not affirmative but only negative, as stated above (1, ad 2). Therefore the precepts of patience and perseverance should have been negative and not affirmative. |
| IIª-IIae q. 140 a. 2 s. c. Sed contrarium habetur ex traditione sacrae Scripturae. | The contrary, however, follows from the way in which they are given by Holy Writ. |
| IIª-IIae q. 140 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod lex divina perfecte informat hominem de his quae sunt necessaria ad recte vivendum. Indiget autem homo ad recte vivendum non solum virtutibus principalibus, sed etiam virtutibus secundariis et adiunctis. Et ideo in lege divina, sicut dantur convenientia praecepta de actibus virtutum principalium, ita etiam dantur convenientia praecepta de actibus secundariarum virtutum et adiunctarum. | I answer that, The Divine Law instructs man perfectly about such things as are necessary for right living. Now in order to live aright man needs not only the principal virtues, but also the secondary and annexed virtues. Wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts not only about the acts of the principal virtues, but also about the acts of the secondary and annexed virtues. |
| IIª-IIae q. 140 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod magnificentia et magnanimitas non pertinent ad genus fortitudinis nisi secundum quandam magnitudinis excellentiam quam circa propriam materiam considerant. Ea autem quae pertinent ad excellentiam magis cadunt sub consiliis perfectionis quam sub praeceptis necessitatis. Et ideo de magnificentia et magnanimitate non fuerunt danda praecepta, sed magis consilia. Afflictiones autem et labores praesentis vitae pertinent ad patientiam et perseverantiam non ratione alicuius magnitudinis in eis consideratae, sed ratione ipsius generis. Et ideo de patientia et perseverantia fuerunt danda praecepta. | Reply to Objection 1. Magnificence and magnanimity do not belong to the genus of fortitude, except by reason of a certain excellence of greatness which they regard in their respective matters. Now things pertaining to excellence come under the counsels of perfection rather than under precepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need of counsels, rather than of precepts about magnificence and magnanimity. On the other hand, the hardships and toils of the present life pertain to patience and perseverance, not by reason of any greatness observable in them, but on account of the very nature of those virtues. Hence the need of precepts of patience and perseverance. |
| IIª-IIae q. 140 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praecepta affirmativa, etsi semper obligent, non tamen obligant ad semper, sed pro loco et tempore. Et ideo sicut praecepta affirmativa quae de patientia dantur, sunt accipienda secundum praeparationem animi, ut scilicet homo sit paratus ea adimplere cum opus fuerit, ita etiam et praecepta patientiae. | Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (Question 3, Article 2), although affirmative precepts are always binding, they are not binding for always, but according to place and time. Wherefore just as the affirmative precepts about the other virtues are to be understood as to the preparedness of the mind, in the sense that man be prepared to fulfil them when necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be understood in the same way. |
| IIª-IIae q. 140 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod fortitudo, secundum quod distinguitur a patientia et perseverantia, est circa maxima pericula, in quibus cautius est agendum, nec oportet aliquid determinari in particulari quid sit faciendum. Sed patientia et perseverantia sunt circa minores afflictiones et labores. Et ideo magis sine periculo potest in eis determinari quid sit agendum, maxime in universali. | Reply to Objection 3. Fortitude, as distinct from patience and perseverance, is about the greatest dangers wherein one must proceed with caution; nor is it necessary to determine what is to be done in particular. On the other hand, patience and perseverance are about minor hardships and toils, wherefore there is less danger in determining, especially in general, what is to be done in such cases. |