| IIIª pr. Quia salvator noster dominus Iesus Christus, teste Angelo, populum suum salvum faciens a peccatis eorum, viam veritatis nobis in seipso demonstravit, per quam ad beatitudinem immortalis vitae resurgendo pervenire possimus, necesse est ut, ad consummationem totius theologici negotii, post considerationem ultimi finis humanae vitae et virtutum ac vitiorum, de ipso omnium salvatore ac beneficiis eius humano generi praestitis nostra consideratio subsequatur. Circa quam, primo considerandum occurrit de ipso salvatore; secundo, de sacramentis eius, quibus salutem consequimur; tertio, de fine immortalis vitae, ad quem per ipsum resurgendo pervenimus. Circa primum duplex consideratio occurrit, prima est de ipso incarnationis mysterio, secundum quod Deus pro nostra salute factus est homo; secunda de his quae per ipsum salvatorem nostrum, idest Deum incarnatum, sunt acta et passa. | Question 1. The fitness of the Incarnation 1. Is it fitting for God to become incarnate? 2. Was it necessary for the restoration of the human race? 3. If there had been no sin, would God have become incarnate? 4. Did He become incarnate to take away original sin rather than actual? 5. Was it fitting for God to become incarnate from the beginning of the world? 6. Should His Incarnation have been deferred to the end of the world? |
| IIIª q. 1 pr. Circa primum tria consideranda occurrunt, primo quidem, de convenientia incarnationis ipsius; secundo, de modo unionis verbi incarnati; tertio, de his quae consequuntur ad hanc unionem. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum conveniens fuerit Deum incarnari. Secundo, utrum fuerit necessarium ad reparationem humani generis. Tertio, utrum, si non fuisset peccatum, Deus incarnatus fuisset. Quarto, utrum principalius sit incarnatus ad tollendum originale peccatum quam actuale. Quinto, utrum conveniens fuerit Deum incarnari a principio mundi. Sexto, utrum eius incarnatio differri debuerit usque in finem mundi. | |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Deum incarnari. Cum enim Deus ab aeterno sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, sic optimum est ipsum esse sicut ab aeterno fuit. Sed Deus ab aeterno fuit absque omni carne. Ergo convenientissimum est ipsum non esse carni unitum. Non ergo fuit conveniens Deum incarnari. | Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting for God to become incarnate. Since God from all eternity is the very essence of goodness, it was best for Him to be as He had been from all eternity. But from all eternity He had been without flesh. Therefore it was most fitting for Him not to be united to flesh. Therefore it was not fitting for God to become incarnate. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, quae sunt in infinitum distantia, inconvenienter iunguntur, sicut inconveniens esset iunctura si quis pingeret imaginem in qua humano capiti cervix iungeretur equina. Sed Deus et caro in infinitum distant, cum Deus sit simplicissimus caro autem composita, et praecipue humana. Ergo inconveniens fuit quod Deus carni uniretur humanae. | Objection 2. Further, it is not fitting to unite things that are infinitely apart, even as it would not be a fitting union if one were "to paint a figure in which the neck of a horse was joined to the head of a man" [Horace, Ars. Poet., line 1]. But God and flesh are infinitely apart; since God is most simple, and flesh is most composite--especially human flesh. Therefore it was not fitting that God should be united to human flesh. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, sic distat corpus a summo spiritu sicut malitia a summa bonitate. Sed omnino esset inconveniens quod Deus, qui est summa bonitas, malitiam assumeret. Ergo non est conveniens quod summus spiritus increatus corpus assumeret. | Objection 3. Further, a body is as distant from the highest spirit as evil is from the highest good. But it was wholly unfitting that God, Who is the highest good, should assume evil. Therefore it was not fitting that the highest uncreated spirit should assume a body. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, inconveniens est ut qui excedit magna, contineatur in minimo; et cui imminet cura magnorum, ad parva se transferat. Sed Deum, qui totius mundi curam gerit, tota universitas capere non sufficit. Ergo videtur inconveniens quod intra corpusculum vagientis infantiae lateat cui parum putatur universitas; et tandiu a sedibus suis absit ille regnator, atque ad unum corpusculum totius mundi cura transferatur; ut Volusianus scribit ad Augustinum. | Objection 4. Further, it is not becoming that He Who surpassed the greatest things should be contained in the least, and He upon Whom rests the care of great things should leave them for lesser things. But God--Who takes care of the whole world--the whole universe of things cannot contain. Therefore it would seem unfitting that "He should be hid under the frail body of a babe in swathing bands, in comparison with Whom the whole universe is accounted as little; and that this Prince should quit His throne for so long, and transfer the government of the whole world to so frail a body," as Volusianus writes to Augustine (Ep. cxxxv). |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, illud videtur esse convenientissimum ut per visibilia monstrentur invisibilia Dei, ad hoc enim totus mundus est factus, ut patet per illud apostoli, Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur. Sed sicut Damascenus dicit, in principio III libri, per incarnationis mysterium monstratur simul bonitas et sapientia et iustitia et potentia Dei vel virtus, bonitas quidem, quoniam non despexit proprii plasmatis infirmitatem; iustitia vero, quoniam non alium facit vincere tyrannum, neque vi eripit ex morte hominem; sapientia vero, quoniam invenit difficillimi decentissimam solutionem; potentia vero, sive virtus, infinita, quia nihil est maius quam Deum fieri hominem. Ergo conveniens fuit Deum incarnari. | On the contrary, It would seem most fitting that by visible things the invisible things of God should be made known; for to this end was the whole world made, as is clear from the word of the Apostle (Romans 1:20): "For the invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." But, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 1), by the mystery of Incarnation are made known at once the goodness, the wisdom, the justice, and the power or might of God--"His goodness, for He did not despise the weakness of His own handiwork; His justice, since, on man's defeat, He caused the tyrant to be overcome by none other than man, and yet He did not snatch men forcibly from death; His wisdom, for He found a suitable discharge for a most heavy debt; His power, or infinite might, for there is nothing greater than for God to become incarnate . . ." |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod unicuique rei conveniens est illud quod competit sibi secundum rationem propriae naturae, sicut homini conveniens est ratiocinari quia hoc convenit sibi inquantum est rationalis secundum suam naturam. Ipsa autem natura Dei est bonitas, ut patet per Dionysium, I cap. de Div. Nom. Unde quidquid pertinet ad rationem boni, conveniens est Deo. Pertinet autem ad rationem boni ut se aliis communicet, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Unde ad rationem summi boni pertinet quod summo modo se creaturae communicet. Quod quidem maxime fit per hoc quod naturam creatam sic sibi coniungit ut una persona fiat ex tribus, verbo, anima et carne, sicut dicit Augustinus, XIII de Trin. Unde manifestum est quod conveniens fuit Deum incarnari. | I answer that, To each things, that is befitting which belongs to it by reason of its very nature; thus, to reason befits man, since this belongs to him because he is of a rational nature. But the very nature of God is goodness, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Hence, what belongs to the essence of goodness befits God. But it belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others, as is plain from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it belongs to the essence of the highest good to communicate itself in the highest manner to the creature, and this is brought about chiefly by "His so joining created nature to Himself that one Person is made up of these three--the Word, a soul and flesh," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii). Hence it is manifest that it was fitting that God should become incarnate. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod incarnationis mysterium non est impletum per hoc quod Deus sit aliquo modo a suo statu immutatus in quo ab aeterno non fuit, sed per hoc quod novo modo creaturae se univit, vel potius eam sibi. Est autem conveniens ut creatura, quae secundum rationem sui mutabilis est, non semper eodem modo se habeat. Et ideo, sicut creatura, cum prius non esset, in esse producta est, convenienter, cum prius non esset unita Deo, postmodum fuit ei unita. | Reply to Objection 1. The mystery of Incarnation was not completed through God being changed in any way from the state in which He had been from eternity, but through His having united Himself to the creature in a new way, or rather through having united it to Himself. But it is fitting that a creature which by nature is mutable, should not always be in one way. And therefore, as the creature began to be, although it had not been before, so likewise, not having been previously united to God in Person, it was afterwards united to Him. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod uniri Deo in unitate personae non fuit conveniens carni humanae secundum conditionem suae naturae, quia hoc erat supra dignitatem ipsius. Conveniens tamen fuit Deo, secundum infinitam excellentiam bonitatis eius, ut sibi eam uniret pro salute humana. | Reply to Objection 2. To be united to God in unity of person was not fitting to human flesh, according to its natural endowments, since it was above its dignity; nevertheless, it was fitting that God, by reason of His infinite goodness, should unite it to Himself for man's salvation. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quaelibet alia conditio secundum quam quaecumque creatura differt a creatore, a Dei sapientia est instituta, et ad Dei bonitatem ordinata, Deus enim propter suam bonitatem, cum sit increatus, immobilis, incorporeus, produxit creaturas mobiles et corporeas; et similiter malum poenae a Dei iustitia est introductum propter gloriam Dei. Malum vero culpae committitur per recessum ab arte divinae sapientiae et ab ordine divinae bonitatis. Et ideo conveniens esse potuit assumere naturam creatam, mutabilem, corpoream et poenalitati subiectam, non autem fuit conveniens ei assumere malum culpae. | Reply to Objection 3. Every mode of being wherein any creature whatsoever differs from the Creator has been established by God's wisdom, and is ordained to God's goodness. For God, Who is uncreated, immutable, and incorporeal, produced mutable and corporeal creatures for His own goodness. And so also the evil of punishment was established by God's justice for God's glory. But evil of fault is committed by withdrawing from the art of the Divine wisdom and from the order of the Divine goodness. And therefore it could be fitting to God to assume a nature created, mutable, corporeal, and subject to penalty, but it did not become Him to assume the evil of fault. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus respondet, in epistola ad Volusianum, non habet hoc Christiana doctrina, quod ita sit Deus infusus carni humanae ut curam gubernandae universitatis vel deseruerit vel amiserit, vel ad illud corpusculum quasi contractam transtulerit, hominum est iste sensus nihil nisi corpus valentium cogitare. Deus autem non mole, sed virtute magnus est, unde magnitudo virtutis eius nullas in angusto sentit angustias. Non est ergo incredibile, ut verbum hominis transiens simul auditur a multis et a singulis totum, quod verbum Dei permanens simul ubique sit totum. Unde nullum inconveniens sequitur, Deo incarnato. | Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine replies (Ep. ad Volusian. 137): "The Christian doctrine nowhere holds that God was so joined to human flesh as either to desert or lose, or to transfer and as it were, contract within this frail body, the care of governing the universe. This is the thought of men unable to see anything but corporeal things . . . God is great not in mass, but in might. Hence the greatness of His might feels no straits in narrow surroundings. Nor, if the passing word of a man is heard at once by many, and wholly by each, is it incredible that the abiding Word of God should be everywhere at once?" Hence nothing unfitting arises from God becoming incarnate. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit necessarium ad reparationem humani generis verbum Dei incarnari. Verbo enim Dei, cum sit Deus perfectus, ut in primo habitum est, nihil virtutis per carnem assumptam accrevit. Si ergo verbum Dei incarnatum naturam reparavit, etiam absque carnis assumptione eam potuit reparare. | Objection 1. It would seem that it was not necessary for the reparation of the human race that the Word of God should become incarnate. For since the Word of God is perfect God, as has been said (I, 4, 1; I, 4, 2), no power was added to Him by the assumption of flesh. Therefore, if the incarnate Word of God restored human nature. He could also have restored it without assuming flesh. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad reparationem humanae naturae, quae per peccatum collapsa erat, nihil aliud requiri videbatur quam quod homo satisfaceret pro peccato. Non enim Deus ab homine requirere plus debet quam possit, et, cum pronior sit ad miserendum quam ad puniendum, sicut homini imputat actum peccati, ita etiam videtur quod ei imputet ad deletionem peccati actum contrarium. Non ergo fuit necessarium ad reparationem humanae naturae verbum Dei incarnari. | Objection 2. Further, for the restoration of human nature, which had fallen through sin, nothing more is required than that man should satisfy for sin. Now man can satisfy, as it would seem, for sin; for God cannot require from man more than man can do, and since He is more inclined to be merciful than to punish, as He lays the act of sin to man's charge, so He ought to credit him with the contrary act. Therefore it was not necessary for the restoration of human nature that the Word of God should become incarnate. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad salutem hominis praecipue pertinet ut Deum revereatur, unde dicitur Malach. I, si ego dominus, ubi timor meus? Si pater, ubi honor meus? Sed ex hoc ipso homines Deum magis reverentur quod eum considerant super omnia elevatum, et ab hominum sensibus remotum, unde in Psalmo dicitur, excelsus super omnes gentes dominus, et super caelos gloria eius; et postea subditur, quis sicut dominus Deus noster? Quod ad reverentiam pertinet. Ergo videtur non convenire humanae saluti quod Deus nobis similis fieret per carnis assumptionem. | Objection 3. Further, to revere God pertains especially to man's salvation; hence it is written (Malachi 1:6): "If, then, I be a father, where is my honor? and if I be a master, where is my fear?" But men revere God the more by considering Him as elevated above all, and far beyond man's senses, hence (Psalm 112:4) it is written: "The Lord is high above all nations, and His glory above the heavens"; and farther on: "Who is as the Lord our God?" which pertains to reverence. Therefore it would seem unfitting to man's salvation that God should be made like unto us by assuming flesh. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, illud per quod humanum genus liberatur a perditione, est necessarium ad humanam salutem. Sed mysterium divinae incarnationis est huiusmodi, secundum illud Ioan. III, sic Deus dilexit mundum ut filium suum unigenitum daret, ut omnis qui credit in ipsum non pereat, sed habeat vitam aeternam. Ergo necesse fuit ad humanam salutem Deum incarnari. | On the contrary, What frees the human race from perdition is necessary for the salvation of man. But the mystery of Incarnation is such; according to John 3:16: "God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting." Therefore it was necessary for man's salvation that God should become incarnate. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ad finem aliquem dicitur aliquid esse necessarium dupliciter, uno modo, sine quo aliquid esse non potest, sicut cibus est necessarius ad conservationem humanae vitae; alio modo, per quod melius et convenientius pervenitur ad finem, sicut equus necessarius est ad iter. Primo modo Deum incarnari non fuit necessarium ad reparationem humanae naturae, Deus enim per suam omnipotentem virtutem poterat humanam naturam multis aliis modis reparare. Secundo autem modo necessarium fuit Deum incarnari ad humanae naturae reparationem. Unde dicit Augustinus, XIII de Trin., ostendamus non alium modum possibilem Deo defuisse, cuius potestati omnia aequaliter subiacent, sed sanandae miseriae nostrae convenientiorem alium modum non fuisse. Et hoc quidem considerari potest quantum ad promotionem hominis in bono. Primo quidem, quantum ad fidem, quae magis certificatur ex hoc quod ipsi Deo loquenti credit. Unde Augustinus dicit, XI de Civ. Dei, ut homo fidentius ambularet ad veritatem, ipsa veritas, Dei filius, homine assumpto, constituit atque fundavit fidem. Secundo, quantum ad spem, quae per hoc maxime erigitur. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., nihil tam necessarium fuit ad erigendam spem nostram quam ut demonstraretur nobis quantum diligeret nos Deus. Quid vero huius rei isto indicio manifestius, quam ut Dei filius naturae nostrae dignatus est inire consortium? Tertio, quantum ad caritatem, quae maxime per hoc excitatur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de catechizandis rudibus, quae maior causa est adventus domini, nisi ut ostenderet Deus dilectionem suam in nobis? Et postea subdit, si amare pigebat, saltem reamare non pigeat. Quarto, quantum ad rectam operationem, in qua nobis exemplum se praebuit. Unde Augustinus dicit, in quodam sermone de nativitate domini, homo sequendus non erat, qui videri poterat, Deus sequendus erat, qui videri non poterat. Ut ergo exhiberetur homini et qui ab homine videretur, et quem homo sequeretur, Deus factus est homo. Quinto, quantum ad plenam participationem divinitatis, quae vere est hominis beatitudo, et finis humanae vitae. Et hoc collatum est nobis per Christi humanitatem, dicit enim Augustinus, in quodam sermone de Nativ. domini, factus est Deus homo, ut homo fieret Deus. Similiter etiam hoc utile fuit ad remotionem mali. Primo enim per hoc homo instruitur ne sibi Diabolum praeferat, et eum veneretur, qui est auctor peccati. Unde dicit Augustinus, XIII de Trin., quando sic Deo coniungi potuit humana natura ut fieret una persona, superbi illi maligni spiritus non ideo se audeant homini praeponere quia non habent carnem. Secundo, quia per hoc instruimur quanta sit dignitas humanae naturae, ne eam inquinemus peccando. Unde dicit Augustinus, in libro de vera religione, demonstravit nobis Deus quam excelsum locum inter creaturas habeat humana natura, in hoc quod hominibus in vero homine apparuit. Et Leo Papa dicit, in sermone de nativitate, agnosce, o Christiane, dignitatem tuam, et divinae consors factus naturae, noli in veterem vilitatem degeneri conversatione redire. Tertio quia, ad praesumptionem hominis tollendam, gratia Dei, nullis meritis praecedentibus, in homine Christo nobis commendatur, ut dicitur XIII de Trinitate. Quarto, quia superbia hominis, quae maximum impedimentum est ne inhaereatur Deo per tantam Dei humilitatem redargui potest atque sanari, ut Augustinus dicit ibidem. Quinto, ad liberandum hominem a servitute. Quod quidem, ut Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., fieri debuit sic ut Diabolus iustitia hominis Iesu Christi superaretur, quod factum est Christo satisfaciente pro nobis. Homo autem purus satisfacere non poterat pro toto humano genere; Deus autem satisfacere non debebat; unde oportebat Deum et hominem esse Iesum Christum. Unde et Leo Papa dicit, in sermone de Nativ., suscipitur a virtute infirmitas, a maiestate humilitas, ut, quod nostris remediis congruebat, unus atque idem Dei et hominum mediator et mori ex uno, et resurgere posset ex altero. Nisi enim esset verus Deus, non afferret remedium, nisi esset homo verus, non praeberet exemplum. Sunt autem et aliae plurimae utilitates quae consecutae sunt, supra comprehensionem sensus humani. | I answer that, A thing is said to be necessary for a certain end in two ways. First, when the end cannot be without it; as food is necessary for the preservation of human life. Secondly, when the end is attained better and more conveniently, as a horse is necessary for a journey. In the first way it was not necessary that God should become incarnate for the restoration of human nature. For God with His omnipotent power could have restored human nature in many other ways. But in the second way it was necessary that God should become incarnate for the restoration of human nature. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 10): "We shall also show that other ways were not wanting to God, to Whose power all things are equally subject; but that there was not a more fitting way of healing our misery." Now this may be viewed with respect to our "furtherance in good." First, with regard to faith, which is made more certain by believing God Himself Who speaks; hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 2): "In order that man might journey more trustfully toward the truth, the Truth itself, the Son of God, having assumed human nature, established and founded faith." Secondly, with regard to hope, which is thereby greatly strengthened; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "Nothing was so necessary for raising our hope as to show us how deeply God loved us. And what could afford us a stronger proof of this than that the Son of God should become a partner with us of human nature?" Thirdly, with regard to charity, which is greatly enkindled by this; hence Augustine says (De Catech. Rudib. iv): "What greater cause is there of the Lord's coming than to show God's love for us?" And he afterwards adds: "If we have been slow to love, at least let us hasten to love in return." Fourthly, with regard to well-doing, in which He set us an example; hence Augustine says in a sermon (xxii de Temp.): "Man who might be seen was not to be followed; but God was to be followed, Who could not be seen. And therefore God was made man, that He Who might be seen by man, and Whom man might follow, might be shown to man." Fifthly, with regard to the full participation of the Divinity, which is the true bliss of man and end of human life; and this is bestowed upon us by Christ's humanity; for Augustine says in a sermon (xiii de Temp.): "God was made man, that man might be made God." So also was this useful for our "withdrawal from evil." First, because man is taught by it not to prefer the devil to himself, nor to honor him who is the author of sin; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): "Since human nature is so united to God as to become one person, let not these proud spirits dare to prefer themselves to man, because they have no bodies." Secondly, because we are thereby taught how great is man's dignity, lest we should sully it with sin; hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xvi): "God has proved to us how high a place human nature holds amongst creatures, inasmuch as He appeared to men as a true man." And Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Nativity (xxi): "Learn, O Christian, thy worth; and being made a partner of the Divine nature, refuse to return by evil deeds to your former worthlessness." Thirdly, because, "in order to do away with man's presumption, the grace of God is commended in Jesus Christ, though no merits of ours went before," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17). Fourthly, because "man's pride, which is the greatest stumbling-block to our clinging to God, can be convinced and cured by humility so great," as Augustine says in the same place. Fifthly, in order to free man from the thraldom of sin, which, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 13), "ought to be done in such a way that the devil should be overcome by the justice of the man Jesus Christ," and this was done by Christ satisfying for us. Now a mere man could not have satisfied for the whole human race, and God was not bound to satisfy; hence it behooved Jesus Christ to be both God and man. Hence Pope Leo says in the same sermon: "Weakness is assumed by strength, lowliness by majesty, mortality by eternity, in order that one and the same Mediator of God and men might die in one and rise in the other--for this was our fitting remedy. Unless He was God, He would not have brought a remedy; and unless He was man, He would not have set an example." And there are very many other advantages which accrued, above man's apprehension. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit secundum primum modum necessarii, sine quo ad finem perveniri non potest. | Reply to Objection 1. This reason has to do with the first kind of necessity, without which we cannot attain to the end. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod aliqua satisfactio potest dici sufficiens dupliciter. Uno modo, perfecte, quia est condigna per quandam adaequationem ad recompensationem commissae culpae. Et sic hominis puri satisfactio sufficiens esse non potuit, quia tota natura humana erat per peccatum corrupta; nec bonum alicuius personae, vel etiam plurium, poterat per aequiparantiam totius naturae detrimentum recompensare. Tum etiam quia peccatum contra Deum commissum quandam infinitatem habet ex infinitate divinae maiestatis, tanto enim offensa est gravior, quanto maior est ille in quem delinquitur. Unde oportuit, ad condignam satisfactionem, ut actio satisfacientis haberet efficaciam infinitam, ut puta Dei et hominis existens. Alio modo potest dici satisfactio sufficiens imperfecte, scilicet secundum acceptationem eius qui est ea contentus, quamvis non sit condigna. Et hoc modo satisfactio puri hominis est sufficiens. Et quia omne imperfectum praesupponit aliquid perfectum, a quo sustentetur, inde est quod omnis puri hominis satisfactio efficaciam habet a satisfactione Christi. | Reply to Objection 2. Satisfaction may be said to be sufficient in two ways--first, perfectly, inasmuch as it is condign, being adequate to make good the fault committed, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man cannot be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of human nature has been corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of any person or persons could not be made up adequately for the harm done to the whole of the nature; and also because a sin committed against God has a kind of infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, because the greater the person we offend, the more grievous the offense. Hence for condign satisfaction it was necessary that the act of the one satisfying should have an infinite efficiency, as being of God and man. Secondly, man's satisfaction may be termed sufficient, imperfectly--i.e. in the acceptation of him who is content with it, even though it is not condign, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man is sufficient. And forasmuch as every imperfect presupposes some perfect thing, by which it is sustained, hence it is that satisfaction of every mere man has its efficiency from the satisfaction of Christ. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus, assumendo carnem, suam maiestatem non minuit, et per consequens non minuitur ratio reverentiae ad ipsum. Quae augetur per augmentum cognitionis ipsius. Ex hoc autem quod nobis appropinquare voluit per carnis assumptionem, magis nos ad se cognoscendum attraxit. | Reply to Objection 3. By taking flesh, God did not lessen His majesty; and in consequence did not lessen the reason for reverencing Him, which is increased by the increase of knowledge of Him. But, on the contrary, inasmuch as He wished to draw nigh to us by taking flesh, He greatly drew us to know Him. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod, si homo non peccasset, nihilominus Deus incarnatus fuisset. Manente enim causa, manet effectus. Sed sicut Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., alia multa sunt cogitanda in Christi incarnatione praeter absolutionem a peccato, de quibus dictum est. Ergo, etiam si homo non peccasset, Deus incarnatus fuisset. | Objection 1. It would seem that if man had not sinned, God would still have become incarnate. For the cause remaining, the effect also remains. But as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): "Many other things are to be considered in Incarnation of Christ besides absolution from sin"; and these were discussed above (Article 2). Therefore if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad omnipotentiam divinae virtutis pertinet ut opera sua perficiat, et se manifestet per aliquem infinitum effectum. Sed nulla pura creatura potest dici infinitus effectus, cum sit finita per suam essentiam. In solo autem opere incarnationis videtur praecipue manifestari infinitus effectus divinae potentiae, per hoc quod in infinitum distantia coniunguntur, inquantum factum est quod homo esset Deus. In quo etiam opere maxime videtur perfici universum, per hoc quod ultima creatura, scilicet homo, primo principio coniungitur, scilicet Deo. Ergo, etiam si homo non peccasset, Deus incarnatus fuisset. | Objection 2. Further, it belongs to the omnipotence of the Divine power to perfect His works, and to manifest Himself by some infinite effect. But no mere creature can be called an infinite effect, since it is finite of its very essence. Now, seemingly, in the work of Incarnation alone is an infinite effect of the Divine power manifested in a special manner by which power things infinitely distant are united, inasmuch as it has been brought about that man is God. And in this work especially the universe would seem to be perfected, inasmuch as the last creature--viz. man--is united to the first principle--viz. God. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, humana natura per peccatum non est facta capacior gratiae. Sed post peccatum capax est gratiae unionis, quae est maxima gratia. Ergo, si homo non peccasset, humana natura huius gratiae capax fuisset. Nec Deus subtraxisset naturae humanae bonum cuius capax erat. Ergo, si homo non peccasset, Deus incarnatus fuisset. | Objection 3. Further, human nature has not been made more capable of grace by sin. But after sin it is capable of the grace of union, which is the greatest grace. Therefore, if man had not sinned, human nature would have been capable of this grace; nor would God have withheld from human nature any good it was capable of. Therefore, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, praedestinatio Dei est aeterna. Sed dicitur, Rom. I, de Christo, quod praedestinatus est filius Dei in virtute. Ergo etiam ante peccatum necessarium erat filium Dei incarnari, ad hoc quod Dei praedestinatio impleretur. | Objection 4. Further, God's predestination is eternal. But it is said of Christ (Romans 1:4): "Who was predestined the Son of God in power." Therefore, even before sin, it was necessary that the Son of God should become incarnate, in order to fulfil God's predestination. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 3 arg. 5 Praeterea, incarnationis mysterium est primo homini revelatum, ut patet per hoc quod dixit, hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis, etc., quod apostolus dicit esse magnum sacramentum in Christo et Ecclesia, ut patet Ephes. V. Sed homo non potuit esse praescius sui casus, eadem ratione qua nec Angelus, ut Augustinus probat, super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo, etiam si homo non peccasset, Deus incarnatus fuisset. | Objection 5. Further, the mystery of Incarnation was revealed to the first man, as is plain from Genesis 2:23. "This now is bone of my bones," etc. which the Apostle says is "a great sacrament . . . in Christ and in the Church," as is plain from Ephesians 5:32. But man could not be fore-conscious of his fall, for the same reason that the angels could not, as Augustine proves (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18). Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis Dom., exponens illud quod habetur Luc. XIX, venit filius hominis quaerere et salvum facere quod perierat, si homo non peccasset, filius hominis non venisset. Et I ad Tim. I, super illud verbum, Christus venit in hunc mundum ut peccatores salvos faceret, dicit Glossa, nulla causa veniendi fuit Christo domino, nisi peccatores salvos facere. Tolle morbos, tolle vulnera, et nulla medicinae est causa. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. viii, 2), expounding what is set down in Luke 19:10, "For the Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which was lost"; "Therefore, if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would not have come." And on 1 Timothy 1:15, "Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners," a gloss says, "There was no cause of Christ's coming into the world, except to save sinners. Take away diseases, take away wounds, and there is no need of medicine." |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliqui circa hoc diversimode opinantur. Quidam enim dicunt quod, etiam si homo non peccasset, Dei filius fuisset incarnatus. Alii vero contrarium asserunt. Quorum assertioni magis assentiendum videtur. Ea enim quae ex sola Dei voluntate proveniunt, supra omne debitum creaturae, nobis innotescere non possunt nisi quatenus in sacra Scriptura traduntur, per quam divina voluntas innotescit. Unde, cum in sacra Scriptura ubique incarnationis ratio ex peccato primi hominis assignetur, convenientius dicitur incarnationis opus ordinatum esse a Deo in remedium peccati, ita quod, peccato non existente, incarnatio non fuisset. Quamvis potentia Dei ad hoc non limitetur, potuisset enim, etiam peccato non existente, Deus incarnari. | I answer that, There are different opinions about this question. For some say that even if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would have become incarnate. Others assert the contrary, and seemingly our assent ought rather to be given to this opinion. For such things as spring from God's will, and beyond the creature's due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in the Sacred Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us. Hence, since everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned as the reason of Incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to say that the work of Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy for sin; so that, had sin not existed, Incarnation would not have been. And yet the power of God is not limited to this; even had sin not existed, God could have become incarnate. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes aliae causae quae sunt assignatae, pertinent ad remedium peccati. Si enim homo non peccasset, perfusus fuisset lumine divinae sapientiae, et iustitiae rectitudine perfectus a Deo, ad omnia necessaria cognoscenda. Sed quia homo, deserto Deo, ad corporalia collapsus erat, conveniens fuit ut Deus, carne assumpta, etiam per corporalia ei salutis remedium exhiberet. Unde dicit Augustinus, super illud Ioan. I cap., verbum caro factum est, caro te obcaecaverat, caro te sanat, quoniam sic venit Christus ut de carne vitia carnis exstingueret. | Reply to Objection 1. All the other causes which are assigned in the preceding article have to do with a remedy for sin. For if man had not sinned, he would have been endowed with the light of Divine wisdom, and would have been perfected by God with the righteousness of justice in order to know and carry out everything needful. But because man, on deserting God, had stooped to corporeal things, it was necessary that God should take flesh, and by corporeal things should afford him the remedy of salvation. Hence, on John 1:14, "And the Word was made flesh," St. Augustine says (Tract. ii): "Flesh had blinded thee, flesh heals thee; for Christ came and overthrew the vices of the flesh." |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in ipso modo productionis rerum ex nihilo divina virtus infinita ostenditur. Ad perfectionem etiam universi sufficit quod naturali modo creatura ordinetur sic in Deum sicut in finem. Hoc autem excedit limites perfectionis naturae, ut creatura uniatur Deo in persona. | Reply to Objection 2. The infinity of Divine power is shown in the mode of production of things from nothing. Again, it suffices for the perfection of the universe that the creature be ordained in a natural manner to God as to an end. But that a creature should be united to God in person exceeds the limits of the perfection of nature. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex capacitas attendi potest in humana natura. Una quidem secundum ordinem potentiae naturalis. Quae a Deo semper impletur, qui dat unicuique rei secundum suam capacitatem naturalem. Alia vero secundum ordinem divinae potentiae, cui omnis creatura obedit ad nutum. Et ad hoc pertinet ista capacitas. Non autem Deus omnem talem capacitatem naturae replet, alioquin, Deus non posset facere in creatura nisi quod facit; quod falsum est, ut in primo habitum est. Nihil autem prohibet ad aliquid maius humanam naturam productam esse post peccatum, Deus enim permittit mala fieri ut inde aliquid melius eliciat. Unde dicitur Rom. V, ubi abundavit iniquitas, superabundavit et gratia. Unde et in benedictione cerei paschalis dicitur, o felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere redemptorem. | Reply to Objection 3. A double capability may be remarked in human nature: one, in respect of the order of natural power, and this is always fulfilled by God, Who apportions to each according to its natural capability; the other in respect to the order of the Divine power, which all creatures implicitly obey; and the capability we speak of pertains to this. But God does not fulfil all such capabilities, otherwise God could do only what He has done in creatures, and this is false, as stated above (I, 105, 6). But there is no reason why human nature should not have been raised to something greater after sin. For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good therefrom; hence it is written (Romans 5:20): "Where sin abounded, grace did more abound." Hence, too, in the blessing of the Paschal candle, we say: "O happy fault, that merited such and so great a Redeemer!" |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod praedestinatio praesupponit praescientiam futurorum. Et ideo, sicut Deus praedestinat salutem alicuius hominis per orationem aliorum implendam, ita etiam praedestinavit opus incarnationis in remedium humani peccati. | Reply to Objection 4. Predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of future things; and hence, as God predestines the salvation of anyone to be brought about by the prayers of others, so also He predestined the work of Incarnation to be the remedy of human sin. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 3 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod nihil prohibet alicui revelari effectus cui non revelatur causa. Potuit ergo primo homini revelari incarnationis mysterium sine hoc quod esset praescius sui casus, non enim quicumque cognoscit effectum, cognoscit et causam. | Reply to Objection 5. Nothing prevents an effect from being revealed to one to whom the cause is not revealed. Hence, the mystery of Incarnation could be revealed to the first man without his being fore-conscious of his fall. For not everyone who knows the effect knows the cause. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus principalius incarnatus fuerit in remedium actualium peccatorum quam in remedium originalis peccati. Quanto enim peccatum est gravius, tanto magis humanae saluti adversatur, propter quam Deus est incarnatus. Sed peccatum actuale est gravius quam originale peccatum, minima enim poena debetur originali peccato, ut Augustinus dicit, contra Iulianum. Ergo principalius incarnatio Christi ordinatur ad deletionem actualium peccatorum. | Objection 1. It would seem that God became incarnate as a remedy for actual sins rather than for original sin. For the more grievous the sin, the more it runs counter to man's salvation, for which God became incarnate. But actual sin is more grievous than original sin; for the lightest punishment is due to original sin, as Augustine says (Contra Julian. v, 11). Therefore Incarnation of Christ is chiefly directed to taking away actual sins. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, peccato originali non debetur poena sensus, sed solum poena damni, ut in secundo habitum est. Sed Christus venit pro satisfactione peccatorum poenam sensus pati in cruce, non autem poenam damni, quia nullum defectum habuit divinae visionis aut fruitionis. Ergo principalius venit ad deletionem peccati actualis quam originalis. | Objection 2. Further, pain of sense is not due to original sin, but merely pain of loss, as has been shown (I-II, 87, 5). But Christ came to suffer the pain of sense on the Cross in satisfaction for sins--and not the pain of loss, for He had no defect of either the beatific vision or fruition. Therefore He came in order to take away actual sin rather than original sin. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, in II de compunctione cordis, hic est affectus servi fidelis, ut beneficia domini sui quae communiter omnibus data sunt, quasi sibi soli praestita reputet, quasi enim de se solo loquens Paulus ita scribit, ad Galat. II, dilexit me, et tradidit semetipsum pro me. Sed propria peccata nostra sunt actualia, originale enim est commune peccatum. Ergo hunc affectum debemus habere, ut aestimemus eum principaliter propter actualia peccata venisse. | Objection 3. Further, as Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii, 3): "This must be the mind of the faithful servant, to account the benefits of his Lord, which have been bestowed on all alike, as though they were bestowed on himself alone. For as if speaking of himself alone, Paul writes to the Galatians (2:20): 'Christ . . . loved me and delivered Himself for me.'" But our individual sins are actual sins; for original sin is the common sin. Therefore we ought to have this conviction, so as to believe that He has come chiefly for actual sins. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Ioan. I dicitur, ecce agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccata mundi. | On the contrary, It is written (John 1:29): "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sins [Vulgate: 'sin'] of the world." |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod certum est Christum venisse in hunc mundum non solum ad delendum illud peccatum quod traductum est originaliter in posteros, sed etiam ad deletionem omnium peccatorum quae postmodum superaddita sunt, non quod omnia deleantur (quod est propter defectum hominum, qui Christo non inhaerent, secundum illud Ioan. III, venit lux in mundum, et dilexerunt homines magis tenebras quam lucem), sed quia ipse exhibuit quod sufficiens fuit ad omnem deletionem. Unde dicitur Rom. V, non sicut delictum, sic et donum, nam iudicium ex uno in condemnationem, gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem. Tanto autem principalius ad alicuius peccati deletionem Christus venit, quanto illud peccatum maius est. Dicitur autem maius aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, intensive, sicut est maior albedo quae est intensior. Et per hunc modum maius est peccatum actuale quam originale, quia plus habet de ratione voluntarii, ut in secundo dictum est. Alio modo dicitur aliquid maius extensive, sicut dicitur maior albedo quae est in maiori superficie. Et hoc modo peccatum originale, per quod totum genus humanum inficitur, est maius quolibet peccato actuali, quod est proprium singularis personae. Et quantum ad hoc, Christus principalius venit ad tollendum originale peccatum, inquantum bonum gentis divinius est quam bonum unius, ut dicitur in I Ethic. | I answer that, It is certain that Christ came into this world not only to take away that sin which is handed on originally to posterity, but also in order to take away all sins subsequently added to it; not that all are taken away (and this is from men's fault, inasmuch as they do not adhere to Christ, according to John 3:19: "The light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than the light"), but because He offered what was sufficient for blotting out all sins. Hence it is written (Romans 5:15-16): "But not as the offense, so also the gift . . . For judgment indeed was by one unto condemnation, but grace is of many offenses unto justification." Moreover, the more grievous the sin, the more particularly did Christ come to blot it out. But "greater" is said in two ways: in one way "intensively," as a more intense whiteness is said to be greater, and in this way actual sin is greater than original sin; for it has more of the nature of voluntary, as has been shown (I-II, 81, 1). In another way a thing is said to be greater "extensively," as whiteness on a greater superficies is said to be greater; and in this way original sin, whereby the whole human race is infected, is greater than any actual sin, which is proper to one person. And in this respect Christ came principally to take away original sin, inasmuch as "the good of the race is a more Divine thing than the good of an individual," as is said Ethic. i, 2. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de intensiva magnitudine peccati. | Reply to Objection 1. This reason looks to the intensive greatness of sin. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod peccato originali in futura retributione non debetur poena sensus, poenalitates tamen quas sensibiliter in hac vita patimur, sicut famem, sitim, mortem et alia huiusmodi, ex peccato originali procedunt. Et ideo Christus, ut plene pro peccato originali satisfaceret, voluit sensibilem dolorem pati, ut mortem et alia huiusmodi in seipso consummaret. | Reply to Objection 2. In the future award the pain of sense will not be meted out to original sin. Yet the penalties, such as hunger, thirst, death, and the like, which we suffer sensibly in this life flow from original sin. And hence Christ, in order to satisfy fully for original sin, wished to suffer sensible pain, that He might consume death and the like in Himself. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus ibidem inducit, verba illa dicebat apostolus, non quasi diminuere volens amplissima et per orbem terrarum diffusa Christi munera, sed ut pro omnibus se solum indicaret obnoxium. Quid enim interest si et aliis praestitit, cum quae tibi sunt praestita ita integra sunt et ita perfecta quasi nulli alii ex his aliquid fuerit praestitum? Ex hoc ergo quod aliquis debet sibi reputare beneficia Christi praestita esse, non debet existimare quod non sint praestita aliis. Et ideo non excluditur quin principalius venerit abolere peccatum totius naturae quam peccatum unius personae. Sed illud peccatum commune ita perfecte curatum est in unoquoque ac si in eo solo esset curatum. Et praeterea, propter unionem caritatis, totum quod omnibus est impensum, unusquisque debet sibi adscribere. | Reply to Objection 3. Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii, 6): "The Apostle used these words, not as if wishing to diminish Christ's gifts, ample as they are, and spreading throughout the whole world, but that he might account himself alone the occasion of them. For what does it matter that they are given to others, if what are given to you are as complete and perfect as if none of them were given to another than yourself?" And hence, although a man ought to account Christ's gifts as given to himself, yet he ought not to consider them not to be given to others. And thus we do not exclude that He came to wipe away the sin of the whole nature rather than the sin of one person. But the sin of the nature is as perfectly healed in each one as if it were healed in him alone. Hence, on account of the union of charity, what is vouchsafed to all ought to be accounted his own by each one. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod conveniens fuisset Deum incarnari a principio humani generis. Incarnationis enim opus ex immensitate divinae caritatis processit, secundum illud Ephes. II, Deus, qui dives est in misericordia, propter nimiam caritatem suam qua dilexit nos, cum essemus mortui peccatis, convivificavit nos in Christo. Sed caritas non tardat subvenire amico necessitatem patienti, secundum illud Prov. III, ne dicas amico tuo, vade et revertere, cras dabo tibi; cum statim possis dare. Ergo Deus incarnationis opus differre non debuit, sed statim a principio per suam incarnationem humano generi subvenire. | Objection 1. It would seem that it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of the human race. For the work of the Incarnation sprang from the immensity of Divine charity, according to Ephesians 2:4-5: "But God (Who is rich in mercy), for His exceeding charity wherewith He loved us . . . even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ." But charity does not tarry in bringing assistance to a friend who is suffering need, according to Proverbs 3:28: "Say not to thy friend: Go, and come again, and tomorrow I will give to thee, when thou canst give at present." Therefore God ought not to have put off the work of Incarnation, but ought thereby to have brought relief to the human race from the beginning. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, I Tim. I dicitur, Christus venit in hunc mundum peccatores salvos facere. Sed plures salvati fuissent si a principio humani generis Deus incarnatus fuisset, plurimi enim, ignorantes Deum, in suo peccato perierunt in diversis saeculis. Ergo convenientius fuisset quod a principio humani generis Deus incarnatus fuisset. | Objection 2. Further, it is written (1 Timothy 1:15): "Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners." But more would have been saved had God become incarnate at the beginning of the human race; for in the various centuries very many, through not knowing God, perished in their sin. Therefore it was fitting that God should become incarnate at the beginning of the human race. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, opus gratiae non est minus ordinatum quam opus naturae. Sed natura initium sumit a perfectis, ut dicit Boetius, in libro de consolatione. Ergo opus gratiae debuit a principio esse perfectum. Sed in opere incarnationis consideratur perfectio gratiae, secundum illud, verbum caro factum est, et postea subditur, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Ergo Christus a principio humani generis debuit incarnari. | Objection 3. Further, the work of grace is not less orderly than the work of nature. But nature takes its rise with the more perfect, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii). Therefore the work of Christ ought to have been perfect from the beginning. But in the work of Incarnation we see the perfection of grace, according to John 1:14: "The Word was made flesh"; and afterwards it is added: "Full of grace and truth." Therefore Christ ought to have become incarnate at the beginning of the human race. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Galat. IV, at ubi venit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus filium suum, factum ex muliere, ubi dicit Glossa quod plenitudo temporis est quod praefinitum fuit a Deo patre quando mitteret filium suum. Sed Deus sua sapientia omnia definivit. Ergo convenientissimo tempore Deus est incarnatus. Et sic non fuit conveniens quod a principio humani generis Deus incarnaretur. | On the contrary, It is written (Galatians 4:4): "But when the fulness of the time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the law": upon which a gloss says that "the fulness of the time is when it was decreed by God the Father to send His Son." But God decreed everything by His wisdom. Therefore God became incarnate at the most fitting time; and it was not fitting that God should become incarnate at the beginning of the human race. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum opus incarnationis principaliter ordinetur ad reparationem naturae humanae per peccati abolitionem manifestum est quod non fuit conveniens a principio humani generis, ante peccatum, Deum incarnatum fuisse, non enim datur medicina nisi iam infirmis. Unde ipse dominus dicit, Matth. IX, non est opus valentibus medicus, sed male habentibus, non enim veni vocare iustos, sed peccatores. Sed non etiam statim post peccatum conveniens fuit Deum incarnari. Primo quidem, propter conditionem humani peccati, quod ex superbia provenerat, unde eo modo erat homo liberandus ut, humiliatus, recognosceret se liberatore indigere. Unde super illud Galat. III, ordinata per Angelos in manu mediatoris, dicit Glossa, magno consilio factum est ut, post hominis casum, non illico Dei filius mitteretur. Reliquit enim Deus prius hominem in libertate arbitrii, in lege naturali, ut sic vires naturae suae cognosceret. Ubi cum deficeret, legem accepit. Qua data, invaluit morbus, non legis, sed naturae vitio, ut ita, cognita sua infirmitate, clamaret ad medicum, et gratiae quaereret auxilium. Secundo, propter ordinem promotionis in bonum, secundum quem ab imperfecto ad perfectum proceditur. Unde apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XV, non prius quod spirituale est, sed quod animale, deinde quod spirituale. Primus homo de terra, terrenus, secundus homo de caelo, caelestis. Tertio, propter dignitatem ipsius verbi incarnati. Quia super illud Galat. IV, ubi venit plenitudo temporis, dicit Glossa, quanto maior iudex veniebat, tanto praeconum series longior praecedere debebat. Quarto, ne fervor fidei temporis prolixitate tepesceret. Quia circa finem mundi refrigescet caritas multorum, et Luc. XVIII dicitur, cum filius hominis veniet, putasne inveniet fidem super terram? | I answer that, Since the work of Incarnation is principally ordained to the restoration of the human race by blotting out sin, it is manifest that it was not fitting for God to become incarnate at the beginning of the human race before sin. For medicine is given only to the sick. Hence our Lord Himself says (Matthew 9:12-13): "They that are in health need not a physician, but they that are ill . . . For I am not come to call the just, but sinners." Nor was it fitting that God should become incarnate immediately after sin. First, on account of the manner of man's sin, which had come of pride; hence man was to be liberated in such a manner that he might be humbled, and see how he stood in need of a deliverer. Hence on the words in Galatians 3:19, "Being ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator," a gloss says: "With great wisdom was it so ordered that the Son of Man should not be sent immediately after man's fall. For first of all God left man under the natural law, with the freedom of his will, in order that he might know his natural strength; and when he failed in it, he received the law; whereupon, by the fault, not of the law, but of his nature, the disease gained strength; so that having recognized his infirmity he might cry out for a physician, and beseech the aid of grace." Secondly, on account of the order of furtherance in good, whereby we proceed from imperfection to perfection. Hence the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 15:46-47): "Yet that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; afterwards that which is spiritual . . . The first man was of the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly." Thirdly, on account of the dignity of the incarnate Word, for on the words (Galatians 4:4), "But when the fulness of the time was come," a gloss says: "The greater the judge who was coming, the more numerous was the band of heralds who ought to have preceded him." Fourthly, lest the fervor of faith should cool by the length of time, for the charity of many will grow cold at the end of the world. Hence (Luke 18:8) it is written: "But yet the Son of Man, when He cometh, shall He find think you, faith on earth?" |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caritas non differt amico subvenire, salva tamen negotiorum opportunitate et personarum conditione. Si enim medicus statim a principio aegritudinis medicinam daret infirmo, minus proficeret, vel magis laederet quam iuvaret. Et ideo etiam dominus non statim incarnationis remedium humano generi exhibuit, ne illud contemneret ex superbia, si prius suam infirmitatem non cognosceret. | Reply to Objection 1. Charity does not put off bringing assistance to a friend: always bearing in mind the circumstances as well as the state of the persons. For if the physician were to give the medicine at the very outset of the ailment, it would do less good, and would hurt rather than benefit. And hence the Lord did not bestow upon the human race the remedy of Incarnation in the beginning, lest they should despise it through pride, if they did not already recognize their disease. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus ad hoc respondet, in libro de sex quaestionibus Paganorum, dicens, qu. II, quod tunc voluit Christus hominibus apparere, et apud eos praedicari suam doctrinam, quando et ubi sciebat esse qui in eum fuerant credituri. His enim temporibus, et his in locis, tales homines in eius praedicatione futuros esse sciebat quales, non quidem omnes, sed tamen multi in eius corporali praesentia fuerunt, qui nec in eum, suscitatis mortuis, credere voluerunt. Sed hanc responsionem reprobans idem Augustinus dicit, in libro de perseverantia, nunquid possumus dicere Tyrios aut Sidonios, talibus apud se virtutibus factis, credere noluisse, aut credituros non fuisse si fierent, cum ipse dominus eis attestetur quod acturi essent magnae humilitatis poenitentiam, si in eis facta essent divinarum illa signa virtutum? Proinde, ut ipse solvens subdit, sicut apostolus ait, non est volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis Dei, qui his quos praevidit, si apud eos facta essent, suis miraculis credituros, quibus voluit subvenit, aliis autem non subvenit, de quibus in sua praedestinatione, occulte quidem sed iuste, aliud iudicavit. Ita misericordiam eius in his qui liberantur, et veritatem in his qui puniuntur sine dubitatione credamus. | Reply to Objection 2. Augustine replies to this (De Sex Quest. Pagan., Ep. cii), saying (2) that "Christ wished to appear to man and to have His doctrine preached to them when and where He knew those were who would believe in Him. But in such times and places as His Gospel was not preached He foresaw that not all, indeed, but many would so bear themselves towards His preaching as not to believe in His corporeal presence, even were He to raise the dead." But the same Augustine, taking exception to this reply in his book (De Perseverantia ix), says: "How can we say the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon would not believe when such great wonders were wrought in their midst, or would not have believed had they been wrought, when God Himself bears witness that they would have done penance with great humility if these signs of Divine power had been wrought in their midst?" And he adds in answer (De Perseverantia xi): "Hence, as the Apostle says (Romans 9:16), 'it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy'; Who (succors whom He will of) those who, as He foresaw, would believe in His miracles if wrought amongst them, (while others) He succors not, having judged them in His predestination secretly yet justly. Therefore let us unshrinkingly believe His mercy to be with those who are set free, and His truth with those who are condemned." [The words in brackets are not in the text of St. Augustine]. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod perfectum est prius imperfecto, in diversis quidem, tempore et natura, oportet enim quod perfectum sit quod alia ad perfectionem adducit, sed in uno et eodem imperfectum est prius tempore, etsi sit posterius natura. Sic ergo imperfectionem naturae humanae duratione praecedit aeterna Dei perfectio, sed sequitur ipsam consummata perfectio in unione ad Deum. | Reply to Objection 3. Perfection is prior to imperfection, both in time and nature, in things that are different (for what brings others to perfection must itself be perfect); but in one and the same, imperfection is prior in time though posterior in nature. And thus the eternal perfection of God precedes in duration the imperfection of human nature; but the latter's ultimate perfection in union with God follows. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod incarnationis opus differri debuerit usque in finem mundi. Dicitur enim in Psalmo, senectus mea in misericordia uberi, idest, in novissimo, ut Glossa dicit. Sed tempus incarnationis est maxime tempus misericordiae, secundum illud Psalmi, quoniam venit tempus miserendi eius. Ergo incarnatio debuit differri usque in finem mundi. | Objection 1. It would seem that the work of Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world. For it is written (Psalm 91:11): "My old age in plentiful mercy"--i.e. "in the last days," as a gloss says. But the time of Incarnation is especially the time of mercy, according to Psalm 101:14: "For it is time to have mercy on it." Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut dictum est, perfectum, in eodem, tempore est posterius imperfecto. Ergo id quod est maxime perfectum, debet esse ultimo in tempore. Sed summa perfectio humanae naturae est in unione ad verbum, quia in Christo complacuit omnem plenitudinem divinitatis inhabitare, ut apostolus dicit, Coloss. I. Ergo incarnatio debuit differri usque in finem mundi. | Objection 2. Further, as has been said (5, ad 3), in the same subject, perfection is subsequent in time to imperfection. Therefore, what is most perfect ought to be the very last in time. But the highest perfection of human nature is in the union with the Word, because "in Christ it hath pleased the Father that all the fulness of the Godhead should dwell," as the Apostle says (Colossians 1:19, and 2:9). Therefore Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, non est conveniens fieri per duo quod per unum fieri potest. Sed unus Christi adventus sufficere poterat ad salutem humanae naturae, qui erit in fine mundi. Ergo non oportuit quod antea veniret per incarnationem. Et ita incarnatio differri debuit usque in finem mundi. | Objection 3. Further, what can be done by one ought not to be done by two. But the one coming of Christ at the end of the world was sufficient for the salvation of human nature. Therefore it was not necessary for Him to come beforehand in His Incarnation; and hence Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Habacuc III, in medio annorum notum facies. Non ergo debuit incarnationis mysterium, per quod mundo innotuit, usque in finem mundi differri. | On the contrary, It is written (Habakkuk 3:2): "In the midst of the years Thou shalt make it known." Therefore the mystery of Incarnation which was made known to the world ought not to have been put off till the end of the world. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut non fuit conveniens Deum incarnari a principio mundi, ita non fuit conveniens quod incarnatio differretur usque in finem mundi. Quod quidem apparet, primo, ex unione divinae et humanae naturae. Sicut enim dictum est, perfectum uno modo tempore praecedit imperfectum, in eo enim quod de imperfecto fit perfectum, imperfectum tempore praecedit perfectum; in eo vero quod est perfectionis causa efficiens, perfectum tempore praecedit imperfectum. In opere autem incarnationis utrumque concurrit. Quia natura humana in ipsa incarnatione est perducta ad summam perfectionem, et ideo non decuit quod a principio humani generis incarnatio facta fuisset. Sed ipsum verbum incarnatum est perfectionis humanae causa efficiens, secundum illud Ioan. I, de plenitudine eius omnes accepimus, et ideo non debuit incarnationis opus usque in finem mundi differri. Sed perfectio gloriae, ad quam perducenda est ultimo natura humana per verbum incarnatum, erit in fine mundi. Secundo, ex effectu humanae salutis. Ut enim dicitur in libro de quaest. Nov. et Vet. Test., in potestate dantis est quando vel quantum velit misereri. Venit ergo quando et subveniri debere scivit, et gratum futurum beneficium. Cum enim languore quodam humani generis obsolescere coepisset cognitio Dei inter homines et mores immutarentur, eligere dignatus est Abraham, in quo forma esset renovatae notitiae Dei et morum. Et cum adhuc reverentia segnior esset, postea per Moysen legem litteris dedit. Et quia eam gentes spreverunt non se subiicientes ei, neque hi qui acceperunt servaverunt, motus misericordia dominus misit filium suum, qui, data omnibus remissione peccatorum, Deo patri illos iustificatos offerret. Si autem hoc remedium differretur usque in finem mundi, totaliter Dei notitia et reverentia et morum honestas abolita fuisset in terris. Tertio apparet quod hoc non fuisset conveniens ad manifestationem divinae virtutis, quae pluribus modis homines salvavit, non solum per fidem futuri, sed etiam per fidem praesentis et praeteriti. | I answer that, As it was not fitting that God should become incarnate at the beginning of the world, so also it was not fitting that the Incarnation should be put off till the end of the world. And this is shown first from the union of the Divine and human nature. For, as it has been said (5, ad 3), perfection precedes imperfection in time in one way, and contrariwise in another way imperfection precedes perfection. For in that which is made perfect from being imperfect, imperfection precedes perfection in time, whereas in that which is the efficient cause of perfection, perfection precedes imperfection in time. Now in the work of Incarnation both concur; for by Incarnation human nature is raised to its highest perfection; and in this way it was not becoming that Incarnation should take place at the beginning of the human race. And the Word incarnate is the efficient cause of the perfection of human nature, according to John 1:16: "Of His fulness we have all received"; and hence the work of Incarnation ought not to have been put off till the end of the world. But the perfection of glory to which human nature is to be finally raised by the Word Incarnate will be at the end of the world. Secondly, from the effect of man's salvation; for, as is said Qq. Vet et Nov. Test., qu. 83, "it is in the power of the Giver to have pity when, or as much as, He wills. Hence He came when He knew it was fitting to succor, and when His boons would be welcome. For when by the feebleness of the human race men's knowledge of God began to grow dim and their morals lax, He was pleased to choose Abraham as a standard of the restored knowledge of God and of holy living; and later on when reverence grew weaker, He gave the law to Moses in writing; and because the gentiles despised it and would not take it upon themselves, and they who received it would not keep it, being touched with pity, God sent His Son, to grant to all remission of their sin and to offer them, justified, to God the Father." But if this remedy had been put off till the end of the world, all knowledge and reverence of God and all uprightness of morals would have been swept away from the earth. Thirdly, this appears fitting to the manifestation of the Divine power, which has saved men in several ways--not only by faith in some future thing, but also by faith in something present and past. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Glossa illa exponit de misericordia perducente ad gloriam. Si tamen referatur ad misericordiam exhibitam humano generi per incarnationem Christi, sciendum est quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro Retractationum, tempus incarnationis potest comparari iuventuti humani generis, propter vigorem fervoremque fidei, quae per dilectionem operatur, senectuti autem, quae est sexta aetas, propter numerum temporum, quia Christus venit in sexta aetate. Et quamvis in corpore non possit esse simul iuventus et senectus, potest tamen simul esse in anima, illa propter alacritatem, ista propter gravitatem. Et ideo in libro octogintatrium quaest., alicubi dixit Augustinus quod non oportuit divinitus venire magistrum, cuius imitatione humanum genus in mores optimos formaretur, nisi tempore iuventutis alibi autem dixit Christum in sexta aetate humani generis, tanquam in senectute, venisse. | Reply to Objection 1. This gloss has in view the mercy of God, which leads us to glory. Nevertheless, if it is referred to the mercy shown the human race by Incarnation of Christ, we must reflect that, as Augustine says (Retract. i), the time of Incarnation may be compared to the youth of the human race, "on account of the strength and fervor of faith, which works by charity"; and to old age--i.e. the sixth age--on account of the number of centuries, for Christ came in the sixth age. And although youth and old age cannot be together in a body, yet they can be together in a soul, the former on account of quickness, the latter on account of gravity. And hence Augustine says elsewhere (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 44) that "it was not becoming that the Master by Whose imitation the human race was to be formed to the highest virtue should come from heaven, save in the time of youth." But in another work (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 23) he says: that Christ came in the sixth age--i.e. in the old age--of the human race. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod opus incarnationis non solum est considerandum ut terminus motus de imperfecto ad perfectum, sed ut principium perfectionis in humana natura, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2. The work of Incarnation is to be viewed not as merely the terminus of a movement from imperfection to perfection, but also as a principle of perfection to human nature, as has been said. |
| IIIª q. 1 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super illud Ioan., non misit Deus filium suum in mundum ut iudicet mundum, duo sunt Christi adventus, primus quidem, ut remittat peccata; secundus, ut iudicet. Si enim hoc non fecisset, universi simul perditi essent, omnes enim peccaverunt, et egent gloria Dei. Unde patet quod non debuit adventum misericordiae differre usque in finem mundi. | Reply to Objection 3. As Chrysostom says on John 3:11, "For God sent not His Son into the world to judge the world" (Hom. xxviii): "There are two comings of Christ: the first, for the remission of sins; the second, to judge the world. For if He had not done so, all would have perished together, since all have sinned and need the glory of God." Hence it is plain that He ought not to have put off the coming in mercy till the end of the world. |
| IIIª q. 2 pr. Deinde considerandum est de modo unionis verbi incarnati. Et primo quantum ad ipsam unionem; secundo, quantum ad personam assumentem; tertio, quantum ad naturam assumptam. Circa primum quaeruntur duodecim. Primo, utrum unio verbi incarnati sit facta in natura. Secundo, utrum sit facta in persona. Tertio, utrum sit facta in supposito vel hypostasi. Quarto, utrum persona vel hypostasis Christi post incarnationem sit composita. Quinto, utrum sit facta aliqua unio animae et corporis in Christo. Sexto, utrum natura humana fuerit unita verbo accidentaliter. Septimo, utrum ipsa unio sit aliquid creatum. Octavo, utrum sit idem quod assumptio. Nono, utrum sit maxima unionum. Decimo, utrum unio duarum naturarum in Christo fuerit facta per gratiam. Undecimo, utrum eam aliqua merita praecesserint. Duodecimo, utrum aliqua gratia fuerit homini Christo naturalis. | Question 2. The mode of union of the Word incarnate 1. Did the union of the Word Incarnate take place in the nature? 2. Did it take place in the Person? 3. Did it take place in the suppositum or hypostasis? 4. Is the Person or hypostasis of Christ composite after the Incarnation? 5. Did any union of body and soul take place in Christ? 6. Was the human nature united to the Word accidentally? 7. Is the union itself something created? 8. Is it the same as assumption? 9. Is the union of the two natures the greatest union? 10. Was the union of the two natures in Christ brought about by grace? 11. Did any merits precede it? 12. Was the grace of union natural to the man Christ? |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio verbi incarnati sit facta in una natura. Dicit enim Cyrillus, et inducitur in gestis Concilii Chalcedonensis, non oportet intelligere duas naturas, sed unam naturam Dei verbi incarnatam. Quod quidem non fieret nisi unio esset in natura. Ergo unio verbi incarnati facta est in natura. | Objection 1. It would seem that the Union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature. For Cyril says (he is quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part ii, act. 1): "We must understand not two natures, but one incarnate nature of the Word of God"; and this could not be unless the union took place in the nature. Therefore the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Athanasius dicit, sicut anima rationalis et caro conveniunt in constitutione humanae naturae, sic Deus et homo conveniunt in constitutione alicuius unius naturae. Ergo facta est unio in natura. | Objection 2. Further, Athanasius says that, as the rational soul and the flesh together form the human nature, so God and man together form a certain one nature; therefore the union took place in the nature. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, duarum naturarum una non denominatur ex altera nisi aliquo modo in invicem transmutentur. Sed divina natura et humana in Christo ab invicem denominantur, dicit enim Cyrillus divinam naturam esse incarnatam; et Gregorius Nazianzenus dicit naturam humanam esse deificatam; ut patet per Damascenum. Ergo ex duabus naturis videtur esse facta una natura. | Objection 3. Further, of two natures one is not denominated by the other unless they are to some extent mutually transmuted. But the Divine and human natures in Christ are denominated one by the other; for Cyril says (quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part ii, act. 1) that the Divine nature "is incarnate"; and Gregory Nazianzen says (Ep. i ad Cledon.) that the human nature is "deified," as appears from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 6,11). Therefore from two natures one seems to have resulted. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in determinatione Concilii Chalcedonensis, confitemur in novissimis diebus filium Dei unigenitum inconfuse, immutabiliter, indivise, inseparabiliter agnoscendum, nusquam sublata differentia naturarum propter unionem. Ergo unio non est facta in natura. | On the contrary, It is said in the declaration of the Council of Chalcedon: "We confess that in these latter times the only-begotten Son of God appeared in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation--the distinction of natures not having been taken away by the union." Therefore the union did not take place in the nature. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ad huius quaestionis evidentiam, oportet considerare quid sit natura. Sciendum est igitur quod nomen naturae a nascendo est dictum vel sumptum. Unde primo est impositum hoc nomen ad significandum generationem viventium, quae nativitas vel pullulatio dicitur, ut dicatur natura quasi nascitura. Deinde translatum est nomen naturae ad significandum principium huius generationis. Et quia principium generationis in rebus viventibus est intrinsecum, ulterius derivatum est nomen naturae ad significandum quodlibet principium intrinsecum motus, secundum quod philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod natura est principium motus in eo in quo est per se et non secundum accidens. Hoc autem principium vel forma est, vel materia. Unde quandoque natura dicitur forma, quandoque vero materia. Et quia finis generationis naturalis est, in eo quod generatur, essentia speciei, quam significat definitio, inde est quod huiusmodi essentia speciei vocatur etiam natura. Et hoc modo Boetius naturam definit, in libro de duabus naturis, dicens, natura est unamquamque rem informans specifica differentia, quae scilicet complet definitionem speciei. Sic ergo nunc loquimur de natura, secundum quod natura significat essentiam, vel quod quid est, sive quidditatem speciei. Hoc autem modo accipiendo naturam, impossibile est unionem verbi incarnati esse factam in natura. Tripliciter enim aliquid unum ex duobus vel pluribus constituitur. Uno modo, ex duobus perfectis integris remanentibus. Quod quidem fieri non potest nisi in his quorum forma est compositio, vel ordo, vel figura, sicut ex multis lapidibus absque aliquo ordine adunatis per solam compositionem fit acervus; ex lapidibus autem et lignis secundum aliquem ordinem dispositis, et etiam ad aliquam figuram redactis, fit domus. Et secundum hoc, posuerunt aliqui unionem esse per modum confusionis, quae scilicet est sine ordine; vel commensurationis, quae est cum ordine. Sed hoc non potest esse. Primo quidem, quia compositio, ordo vel figura non est forma substantialis, sed accidentalis. Et sic sequeretur quod unio incarnationis non esset per se, sed per accidens, quod infra improbabitur. Secundo, quia ex huiusmodi non fit unum simpliciter, sed secundum quid, remanent enim plura actu. Tertio, quia forma talium non est natura, sed magis ars, sicut forma domus. Et sic non constitueretur una natura in Christo, ut ipsi volunt. Alio modo fit aliquid ex perfectis, sed transmutatis, sicut ex elementis fit mixtum. Et sic aliqui dixerunt unionem incarnationis esse factam per modum complexionis. Sed hoc non potest esse. Primo quidem, quia natura divina est omnino immutabilis, ut in prima parte dictum est. Unde nec ipsa potest converti in aliud, cum sit incorruptibilis, nec aliud in ipsam, cum ipsa sit ingenerabilis. Secundo, quia id quod est commixtum, nulli miscibilium est idem specie, differt enim caro a quolibet elementorum specie. Et sic Christus nec esset eiusdem naturae cum patre, nec cum matre. Tertio, quia ex his quae plurimum distant non potest fieri commixtio, solvitur enim species unius eorum, puta si quis guttam aquae amphorae vini apponat. Et secundum hoc, cum natura divina in infinitum excedat humanam, non potest esse mixtio, sed remanebit sola natura divina. Tertio modo fit aliquid ex aliquibus non permutatis, sed imperfectis, sicut ex anima et corpore fit homo; et similiter ex diversis membris. Sed hoc dici non potest de incarnationis mysterio. Primo quidem, quia utraque natura est secundum suam rationem perfecta, divina scilicet et humana. Secundo, quia divina et humana natura non possunt constituere aliquid per modum partium quantitativarum, sicut membra constituunt corpus, quia natura divina est incorporea. Neque per modum formae et materiae, quia divina natura non potest esse forma alicuius, praesertim corporei. Sequeretur etiam quod species resultans esset communicabilis pluribus, et ita essent plures Christi. Tertio, quia Christus neque esset humanae naturae, neque divinae, differentia enim addita variat speciem, sicut unitas in numeris, sicut dicitur in VIII Metaphys. | I answer that, To make this question clear we must consider what is "nature." Now it is to be observed that the word "nature" comes from nativity. Hence this word was used first of all to signify the begetting of living beings, which is called "birth" or "sprouting forth," the word "natura" meaning, as it were, "nascitura." Afterwards this word "nature" was taken to signify the principle of this begetting; and because in living things the principle of generation is an intrinsic principle, this word "nature" was further employed to signify any intrinsic principle of motion: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "nature is the principle of motion in that in which it is essentially and not accidentally." Now this principle is either form or matter. Hence sometimes form is called nature, and sometimes matter. And because the end of natural generation, in that which is generated, is the essence of the species, which the definition signifies, this essence of the species is called the "nature." And thus Boethius defines nature (De Duab. Nat.): "Nature is what informs a thing with its specific difference,"--i.e. which perfects the specific definition. But we are now speaking of nature as it signifies the essence, or the "what-it-is," or the quiddity of the species. Now, if we take nature in this way, it is impossible that the union of Incarnate Word took place in the nature. For one thing is made of two or more in three ways. First, from two complete things which remain in their perfection. This can only happen to those whose form is composition, order, or figure, as a heap is made up of many stones brought together without any order, but solely with juxtaposition; and a house is made of stones and beams arranged in order, and fashioned to a figure. And in this way some said the union was by manner of confusion (which is without order) or by manner of commensuration (which is with order). But this cannot be. First, because neither composition nor order nor figure is a substantial form, but accidental; and hence it would follow that the union of Incarnation was not essential, but accidental, which will be disproved later on (6). Secondly, because thereby we should not have an absolute unity, but relative only, for there remain several things actually. Thirdly, because the form of such is not a nature, but an art, as the form of a house; and thus one nature would not be constituted in Christ, as they wish. Secondly, one thing is made up of several things, perfect but changed, as a mixture is made up of its elements; and in this way some have said that the union of Incarnation was brought about by manner of combination. But this cannot be. First, because the Divine Nature is altogether immutable, as has been said (I, 9, 1; I, 9, 2), hence neither can it be changed into something else, since it is incorruptible; nor can anything else be changed into it, for it cannot be generated. Secondly, because what is mixed is of the same species with none of the elements; for flesh differs in species from any of its elements. And thus Christ would be of the same nature neither with His Father nor with His Mother. Thirdly, because there can be no mingling of things widely apart; for the species of one of them is absorbed, e.g. if we were to put a drop of water in a flagon of wine. And hence, since the Divine Nature infinitely exceeds the human nature, there could be no mixture, but the Divine Nature alone would remain. Thirdly, a thing is made up of things not mixed nor changed, but imperfect; as man is made up of soul and body, and likewise of divers members. But this cannot be said of the mystery of Incarnation. First, because each nature, i.e. the Divine and the human, has its specific perfection. Secondly, because the Divine and human natures cannot constitute anything after the manner of quantitative parts, as the members make up the body; for the Divine Nature is incorporeal; nor after the manner of form and matter, for the Divine Nature cannot be the form of anything, especially of anything corporeal, since it would follow that the species resulting therefrom would be communicable to several, and thus there would be several Christs. Thirdly, because Christ would exist neither in human nature nor in the Divine Nature: since any difference varies the species, as unity varies number, as is said (Metaph. viii, text. 10). |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa auctoritas Cyrilli exponitur in quinta synodo sic, si quis, unam naturam Dei verbi incarnatam dicens, non sic accipit sicut patres docuerunt, quia ex divina natura et humana unione secundum subsistentiam facta, sed ex talibus vocibus naturam unam sive substantiam divinitatis et carnis Christi introducere conatur, talis anathema sit. Non ergo sensus est quod in incarnatione ex duabus naturis sit una natura constituta, sed quia una natura Dei verbi carnem univit in persona. | Reply to Objection 1. This authority of Cyril is expounded in the Fifth Synod (i.e. Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 8) thus: "If anyone proclaiming one nature of the Word of God to be incarnate does not receive it as the Fathers taught, viz. that from the Divine and human natures (a union in subsistence having taken place) one Christ results, but endeavors from these words to introduce one nature or substance of the Divinity and flesh of Christ, let such a one be anathema." Hence the sense is not that from two natures one results; but that the Nature of the Word of God united flesh to Itself in Person. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ex anima et corpore constituitur in unoquoque nostrum duplex unitas, naturae, et personae. Naturae quidem, secundum quod anima unitur corpori, formaliter perficiens ipsum, ut ex duabus fiat una natura, sicut ex actu et potentia, vel materia et forma. Et quantum ad hoc non attenditur similitudo, quia natura divina non potest esse corporis forma, ut in primo probatum est. Unitas vero personae constituitur ex eis inquantum est unus aliquis subsistens in carne et anima. Et quantum ad hoc attenditur similitudo, unus enim Christus subsistit in divina natura et humana. | Reply to Objection 2. From the soul and body a double unity, viz. of nature and person--results in each individual--of nature inasmuch as the soul is united to the body, and formally perfects it, so that one nature springs from the two as from act and potentiality or from matter and form. But the comparison is not in this sense, for the Divine Nature cannot be the form of a body, as was proved (I, 3, 8). Unity of person results from them, however, inasmuch as there is an individual subsisting in flesh and soul; and herein lies the likeness, for the one Christ subsists in the Divine and human natures. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Damascenus dicit, natura divina dicitur incarnata, quia est unita carni personaliter non quod sit in naturam carnis conversa. Similiter etiam caro dicitur deificata, ut ipse dicit, non per conversionem, sed per unionem ad verbum, salvis suis proprietatibus, ut intelligatur caro deificata quia facta est Dei verbi caro, non quia facta sit Deus. | Reply to Objection 3. As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6,11), the Divine Nature is said to be incarnate because It is united to flesh personally, and not that It is changed into flesh. So likewise the flesh is said to be deified, as he also says (De Fide Orth. 15,17), not by change, but by union with the Word, its natural properties still remaining, and hence it may be considered as deified, inasmuch as it becomes the flesh of the Word of God, but not that it becomes God. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio verbi incarnati non sit facta in persona. Persona enim Dei non est aliud a natura ipsius, ut habitum est in primo. Si ergo unio non est in natura, sequitur quod non sit facta in persona. | Objection 1. It would seem that the union of Incarnate Word did not take place in the person. For the Person of God is not distinct from His Nature, as we said (I, 39, 1). If, therefore, the union did not take place in the nature, it follows that it did not take place in the person. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, natura humana non est minoris dignitatis in Christo quam in nobis. Personalitas autem ad dignitatem pertinet, ut in primo habitum est. Cum ergo natura humana in nobis propriam personalitatem habeat, multo magis habuit propriam personalitatem in Christo. | Objection 2. Further, Christ's human nature has no less dignity than ours. But personality belongs to dignity, as was stated above (I, 29, 3, ad 2). Hence, since our human nature has its proper personality, much more reason was there that Christ's should have its proper personality. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut Boetius dicit, in libro de duabus naturis, persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia. Sed verbum Dei assumpsit naturam humanam individuam, natura enim universalis non sistit secundum se, sed in nuda contemplatione consideratur, ut Damascenus dicit. Ergo humana natura habet suam personalitatem. Non ergo videtur quod sit facta unio in persona. | Objection 3. Further, as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), a person is an individual substance of rational nature. But the Word of God assumed an individual human nature, for "universal human nature does not exist of itself, but is the object of pure thought," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the human nature of Christ has its personality. Hence it does not seem that the union took place in the person. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod in Chalcedonensi synodo legitur, non in duas personas partitum aut divisum, sed unum et eundem filium unigenitum dominum nostrum Iesum Christum confitemur. Ergo facta est unio verbi in persona. | On the contrary, We read in the Synod of Chalcedon (Part ii, act. 5): "We confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is not parted or divided into two persons, but is one and the same only-Begotten Son and Word of God." Therefore the union took place in the person. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod persona aliud significat quam natura. Natura enim significat essentiam speciei, quam significat definitio. Et si quidem his quae ad rationem speciei pertinent nihil aliud adiunctum inveniri posset, nulla necessitas esset distinguendi naturam a supposito naturae, quod est individuum subsistens in natura illa, quia unumquodque individuum subsistens in natura aliqua esset omnino idem cum sua natura. Contingit autem in quibusdam rebus subsistentibus inveniri aliquid quod non pertinet ad rationem speciei, scilicet accidentia et principia individuantia, sicut maxime apparet in his quae sunt ex materia et forma composita. Et ideo in talibus etiam secundum rem differt natura et suppositum, non quasi omnino aliqua separata, sed quia in supposito includitur ipsa natura speciei, et superadduntur quaedam alia quae sunt praeter rationem speciei. Unde suppositum significatur ut totum, habens naturam sicut partem formalem et perfectivam sui. Et propter hoc in compositis ex materia et forma natura non praedicatur de supposito, non enim dicimus quod hic homo sit sua humanitas. Si qua vero res est in qua omnino nihil est aliud praeter rationem speciei vel naturae suae, sicut est in Deo, ibi non est aliud secundum rem suppositum et natura, sed solum secundum rationem intelligendi, quia natura dicitur secundum quod est essentia quaedam; eadem vero dicitur suppositum secundum quod est subsistens. Et quod est dictum de supposito, intelligendum est de persona in creatura rationali vel intellectuali, quia nihil aliud est persona quam rationalis naturae individua substantia, secundum Boetium. Omne igitur quod inest alicui personae, sive pertineat ad naturam eius sive non, unitur ei in persona. Si ergo humana natura verbo Dei non unitur in persona, nullo modo ei unitur. Et sic totaliter tollitur incarnationis fides, quod est subruere totam fidem Christianam. Quia igitur verbum habet naturam humanam sibi unitam, non autem ad suam naturam divinam pertinentem consequens est quod unio sit facta in persona verbi, non autem in natura. | I answer that, Person has a different meaning from "nature." For nature, as has been said (1), designates the specific essence which is signified by the definition. And if nothing was found to be added to what belongs to the notion of the species, there would be no need to distinguish the nature from the suppositum of the nature (which is the individual subsisting in this nature), because every individual subsisting in a nature would be altogether one with its nature. Now in certain subsisting things we happen to find what does not belong to the notion of the species, viz. accidents and individuating principles, which appears chiefly in such as are composed of matter and form. Hence in such as these the nature and the suppositum really differ; not indeed as if they were wholly separate, but because the suppositum includes the nature, and in addition certain other things outside the notion of the species. Hence the suppositum is taken to be a whole which has the nature as its formal part to perfect it; and consequently in such as are composed of matter and form the nature is not predicated of the suppositum, for we do not say that this man is his manhood. But if there is a thing in which there is nothing outside the species or its nature (as in God), the suppositum and the nature are not really distinct in it, but only in our way of thinking, inasmuch it is called "nature" as it is an essence, and a "suppositum" as it is subsisting. And what is said of a suppositum is to be applied to a person in rational or intellectual creatures; for a person is nothing else than "an individual substance of rational nature," according to Boethius. Therefore, whatever adheres to a person is united to it in person, whether it belongs to its nature or not. Hence, if the human nature is not united to God the Word in person, it is nowise united to Him; and thus belief in Incarnation is altogether done away with, and Christian faith wholly overturned. Therefore, inasmuch as the Word has a human nature united to Him, which does not belong to His Divine Nature, it follows that the union took place in the Person of the Word, and not in the nature. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet in Deo non sit aliud secundum rem natura et persona, differt tamen secundum modum significandi, sicut dictum est, quia persona significat per modum subsistentis. Et quia natura humana sic unitur verbo ut verbum in ea subsistat, non autem ut aliquid addatur ei ad rationem suae naturae, vel ut eius natura in aliquid transmutetur, ideo unio facta est in persona, non in natura. | Reply to Objection 1. Although in God Nature and Person are not really distinct, yet they have distinct meanings, as was said above, inasmuch as person signifies after the manner of something subsisting. And because human nature is united to the Word, so that the Word subsists in it, and not so that His Nature receives therefrom any addition or change, it follows that the union of human nature to the Word of God took place in the person, and not in the nature. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod personalitas necessario intantum pertinet ad dignitatem alicuius rei et perfectionem, inquantum ad dignitatem et perfectionem eius pertinet quod per se existat, quod in nomine personae intelligitur. Dignius autem est alicui quod existat in aliquo se digniori, quam quod existat per se. Et ideo ex hoc ipso humana natura dignior est in Christo quam in nobis, quia in nobis, quasi per se existens, propriam personalitatem habet in Christo autem existit in persona verbi. Sicut etiam esse completivum speciei pertinet ad dignitatem formae, tamen sensitivum nobilius est in homine, propter coniunctionem ad nobiliorem formam completivam, quam sit in bruto animali, in quo est forma completiva. | Reply to Objection 2. Personality pertains of necessity to the dignity of a thing, and to its perfection so far as it pertains to the dignity and perfection of that thing to exist by itself (which is understood by the word "person"). Now it is a greater dignity to exist in something nobler than oneself than to exist by oneself. Hence the human nature of Christ has a greater dignity than ours, from this very fact that in us, being existent by itself, it has its own personality, but in Christ it exists in the Person of the Word. Thus to perfect the species belongs to the dignity of a form, yet the sensitive part in man, on account of its union with the nobler form which perfects the species, is more noble than in brutes, where it is itself the form which perfects. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Dei verbum non assumpsit naturam humanam in universali, sed in atomo, idest in individuo, sicut Damascenus dicit, alioquin oporteret quod cuilibet homini conveniret esse Dei verbum, sicut convenit Christo. Sciendum est tamen quod non quodlibet individuum in genere substantiae, etiam in rationali natura, habet rationem personae, sed solum illud quod per se existit, non autem illud quod existit in alio perfectiori. Unde manus Socratis, quamvis sit quoddam individuum, non est tamen persona, quia non per se existit, sed in quodam perfectiori, scilicet in suo toto. Et hoc etiam potest significari in hoc quod persona dicitur substantia individua, non enim manus est substantia completa, sed pars substantiae. Licet igitur humana natura sit individuum quoddam in genere substantiae, quia tamen non per se separatim existit, sed in quodam perfectiori, scilicet in persona Dei verbi, consequens est quod non habeat personalitatem propriam. Et ideo facta est unio in persona. | Reply to Objection 3. The Word of God "did not assume human nature in general, but 'in atomo'"--that is, in an individual--as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) otherwise every man would be the Word of God, even as Christ was. Yet we must bear in mind that not every individual in the genus of substance, even in rational nature, is a person, but that alone which exists by itself, and not that which exists in some more perfect thing. Hence the hand of Socrates, although it is a kind of individual, is not a person, because it does not exist by itself, but in something more perfect, viz. in the whole. And hence, too, this is signified by a "person" being defined as "an individual substance," for the hand is not a complete substance, but part of a substance. Therefore, although this human nature is a kind of individual in the genus of substance, it has not its own personality, because it does not exist separately, but in something more perfect, viz. in the Person of the Word. Therefore the union took place in the person. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio verbi incarnati non sit facta in supposito, sive in hypostasi. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Enchirid., divina substantia et humana utrumque est unus Dei filius, sed aliud propter verbum, et aliud propter hominem. Leo Papa etiam dicit, in epistola ad Flavianum, unum horum coruscat miraculis, et aliud succumbit iniuriis. Sed omne quod est aliud et aliud, differt supposito. Ergo unio verbi incarnati non est facta in supposito. | Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum or hypostasis. For Augustine says (Enchiridion xxxv, xxxviii): "Both the Divine and human substance are one Son of God, but they are one thing [aliud] by reason of the Word and another thing [aliud] by reason of the man." And Pope Leo says in his letter to Flavian (Ep. xxviii): "One of these is glorious with miracles, the other succumbs under injuries." But "one" [aliud] and "the other" [aliud] differ in suppositum. Therefore the union of the Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, hypostasis nihil est aliud quam substantia particularis, ut Boetius dicit, in libro de duabus naturis. Manifestum est autem quod in Christo est quaedam alia substantia particularis praeter hypostasim verbi, scilicet corpus et anima et compositum ex eis. Ergo in Christo est alia hypostasis praeter hypostasim verbi Dei. | Objection 2. Further, hypostasis is nothing more than a "particular substance," as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.). But it is plain that in Christ there is another particular substance beyond the hypostasis of the Word, viz. the body and the soul and the resultant of these. Therefore there is another hypostasis in Him besides the hypostasis of the Word. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, hypostasis verbi non continetur in aliquo genere, neque sub specie, ut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt. Sed Christus, secundum quod est factus homo, continetur sub specie humana, dicit enim Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom., intra nostram factus est naturam qui omnem ordinem secundum omnem naturam supersubstantialiter excedit. Non autem continetur sub specie humana nisi sit hypostasis quaedam humanae speciei. Ergo in Christo est alia hypostasis praeter hypostasim verbi Dei. Et sic idem quod prius. | Objection 3. Further, the hypostasis of the Word is not included in any genus or species, as is plain from [I, 3, 5]. But Christ, inasmuch as He is made man, is contained under the species of man; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "Within the limits of our nature He came, Who far surpasses the whole order of nature supersubstantially." Now nothing is contained under the human species unless it be a hypostasis of the human species. Therefore in Christ there is another hypostasis besides the hypostasis of the Word of God; and hence the same conclusion follows as above. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, in domino nostro Iesu Christo duas naturas cognoscimus, unam autem hypostasim. | On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4,5): "In our Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures and one hypostasis." |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam, ignorantes habitudinem hypostasis ad personam, licet concederent in Christo unam solam personam, posuerunt tamen aliam hypostasim Dei et aliam hominis, ac si unio sit facta in persona, non in hypostasi. Quod quidem apparet erroneum tripliciter. Primo, ex hoc quod persona supra hypostasim non addit nisi determinatam naturam, scilicet rationalem; secundum quod Boetius dicit, in libro de duabus naturis, quod persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia. Et ideo idem est attribuere propriam hypostasim humanae naturae in Christo, et propriam personam. Quod intelligentes sancti patres, utrumque in Concilio quinto, apud Constantinopolim celebrato, damnaverunt, dicentes, si quis introducere conetur in mysterio Christi duas subsistentias seu duas personas, talis anathema sit, nec enim adiectionem personae vel subsistentiae suscepit sancta Trinitas, incarnato uno de sancta Trinitate, Deo verbo. Subsistentia autem idem est quod res subsistens, quod est proprium hypostasis, ut patet per Boetium, in libro de duabus naturis. Secundo quia, si detur quod persona aliquid addat supra hypostasim in quo possit fieri unio, hoc nihil est aliud quam proprietas ad dignitatem pertinens, secundum quod a quibusdam dicitur quod persona est hypostasis proprietate distincta ad dignitatem pertinente. Si ergo facta sit unio in persona et non in hypostasi, consequens erit quod non sit facta unio nisi secundum dignitatem quandam. Et hoc est, approbante synodo Ephesina, damnatum a Cyrillo sub his verbis, si quis in uno Christo dividit subsistentias post adunationem, sola copulans eas coniunctione quae secundum dignitatem vel auctoritatem est vel secundum potentiam, et non magis concursu secundum adunationem naturalem, anathema sit. Tertio, quia tantum hypostasis est cui attribuuntur operationes et proprietates naturae, et ea etiam quae ad naturae rationem pertinent in concreto, dicimus enim quod hic homo ratiocinatur, et est risibilis, et est animal rationale. Et hac ratione hic homo dicitur esse suppositum, quia scilicet supponitur his quae ad hominem pertinent, eorum praedicationem recipiens. Si ergo sit alia hypostasis in Christo praeter hypostasim verbi, sequetur quod de aliquo alio quam de verbo verificentur ea quae sunt hominis, puta esse natum de virgine, passum, crucifixum et sepultum. Et hoc etiam damnatum est, approbante Concilio Ephesino, sub his verbis, si quis personis duabus vel subsistentiis eas quae sunt in evangelicis et apostolicis Scripturis impartitur voces, aut de Christo a sanctis dictas, aut ab ipso de se; et quasdam quidem velut homini praeter illud ex Deo verbum specialiter intellecto applicat, quasdam vero, velut Deo decibiles, soli ex Deo patre verbo, anathema sit. Sic igitur patet esse haeresim ab olim damnatam dicere quod in Christo sunt duae hypostases vel duo supposita, sive quod unio non sit facta in hypostasi vel supposito. Unde in eadem synodo legitur, si quis non confitetur carni secundum subsistentiam unitum ex Deo patre verbum, unumque esse Christum cum sua carne, eundem scilicet Deum et hominem, anathema sit. | I answer that, Some who did not know the relation of hypostasis to person, although granting that there is but one person in Christ, held, nevertheless, that there is one hypostasis of God and another of man, and hence that the union took place in the person and not in the hypostasis. Now this, for three reasons, is clearly erroneous. First, because person only adds to hypostasis a determinate nature, viz. rational, according to what Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), "a person is an individual substance of rational nature"; and hence it is the same to attribute to the human nature in Christ a proper hypostasis and a proper person. And the holy Fathers, seeing this, condemned both in the Fifth Council held at Constantinople, saying: "If anyone seeks to introduce into the mystery of Incarnation two subsistences or two persons, let him be anathema. For by the incarnation of one of the Holy Trinity, God the Word, the Holy Trinity received no augment of person or subsistence." Now "subsistence" is the same as the subsisting thing, which is proper to hypostasis, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab. Nat.). Secondly, because if it is granted that person adds to hypostasis something in which the union can take place, this something is nothing else than a property pertaining to dignity; according as it is said by some that a person is a "hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity." If, therefore, the union took place in the person and not in the hypostasis, it follows that the union only took place in regard to some dignity. And this is what Cyril, with the approval of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 3), condemned in these terms: "If anyone after the uniting divides the subsistences in the one Christ, only joining them in a union of dignity or authority or power, and not rather in a concourse of natural union, let him be anathema." Thirdly, because to the hypostasis alone are attributed the operations and the natural properties, and whatever belongs to the nature in the concrete; for we say that this man reasons, and is risible, and is a rational animal. So likewise this man is said to be a suppositum, because he underlies [supponitur] whatever belongs to man and receives its predication. Therefore, if there is any hypostasis in Christ besides the hypostasis of the Word, it follows that whatever pertains to man is verified of some other than the Word, e.g. that He was born of a Virgin, suffered, was crucified, was buried. And this, too, was condemned with the approval of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 4) in these words: "If anyone ascribes to two persons or subsistences such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the saints, or by Himself of Himself, and, moreover, applies some of them to the man, taken as distinct from the Word of God, and some of them (as if they could be used of God alone) only to the Word of God the Father, let him be anathema." Therefore it is plainly a heresy condemned long since by the Church to say that in Christ there are two hypostases, or two supposita, or that the union did not take place in the hypostasis or suppositum. Hence in the same Synod (can. 2) it is said: "If anyone does not confess that the Word was united to flesh in subsistence, and that Christ with His flesh is both--to wit, God and man--let him be anathema." |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut accidentalis differentia facit alterum, ita differentia essentialis facit aliud. Manifestum est autem quod alteritas, quae provenit ex differentia accidentali, potest ad eandem hypostasim vel suppositum in rebus creatis pertinere, eo quod idem numero potest diversis accidentibus subesse, non autem contingit in rebus creatis quod idem numero subsistere possit diversis essentiis vel naturis. Unde sicut quod dicitur alterum et alterum in creaturis, non significat diversitatem suppositi, sed solum diversitatem formarum accidentalium; ita quod Christus dicitur aliud et aliud, non importat diversitatem suppositi sive hypostasis, sed diversitatem naturarum. Unde Gregorius Nazianzenus dicit, in epistola ad Chelidonium, aliud et aliud sunt ea ex quibus salvator est, non alius autem et alius. Dico vero aliud et aliud e contrario quam in Trinitate habet. Ibi enim alius et alius dicimus, ut non subsistentias confundamus, non aliud autem et aliud. | Reply to Objection 1. As accidental difference makes a thing "other" [alterum, so essential difference makes "another thing" [aliud]. Now it is plain that the "otherness" which springs from accidental difference may pertain to the same hypostasis or suppositum in created things, since the same thing numerically can underlie different accidents. But it does not happen in created things that the same numerically can subsist in divers essences or natures. Hence just as when we speak of "otherness" in regard to creatures we do not signify diversity of suppositum, but only diversity of accidental forms, so likewise when Christ is said to be one thing or another thing, we do not imply diversity of suppositum or hypostasis, but diversity of nature. Hence Gregory Nazianzen says in a letter to Chelidonius (Ep. ci): "In the Saviour we may find one thing and another, yet He is not one person and another. And I say 'one thing and another'; whereas, on the contrary, in the Trinity we say one Person and another (so as not to confuse the subsistences), but not one thing and another." |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod hypostasis significat substantiam particularem non quocumque modo, sed prout est in suo complemento. Secundum vero quod venit in unionem alicuius magis completi, non dicitur hypostasis, sicut manus aut pes. Et similiter humana natura in Christo, quamvis sit substantia particularis, quia tamen venit in unionem cuiusdam completi, scilicet totius Christi prout est Deus et homo, non potest dici hypostasis vel suppositum, sed illud completum ad quod concurrit, dicitur esse hypostasis vel suppositum. | Reply to Objection 2. Hypostasis signifies a particular substance, not in every way, but as it is in its complement. Yet as it is in union with something more complete, it is not said to be a hypostasis, as a hand or a foot. So likewise the human nature in Christ, although it is a particular substance, nevertheless cannot be called a hypostasis or suppositum, seeing that it is in union with a completed thing, viz. the whole Christ, as He is God and man. But the complete being with which it concurs is said to be a hypostasis or suppositum. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam in rebus creatis res aliqua singularis non ponitur in genere vel specie ratione eius quod pertinet ad eius individuationem, sed ratione naturae, quae secundum formam determinatur, cum individuatio magis sit secundum materiam in rebus compositis. Sic igitur dicendum est quod Christus est in specie humana ratione naturae assumptae, non ratione ipsius hypostasis. | Reply to Objection 3. In created things a singular thing is placed in a genus or species, not on account of what belongs to its individuation, but on account of its nature, which springs from its form, and in composite things individuation is taken more from matter. Hence we say that Christ is in the human species by reason of the nature assumed, and not by reason of the hypostasis. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod persona Christi non sit composita. Persona enim Christi non est aliud quam persona vel hypostasis verbi, ut ex dictis patet. Sed in verbo non est aliud persona et natura, ut patet ex his quae dicta sunt in prima parte. Cum ergo natura verbi sit simplex, ut in primo ostensum est, impossibile est quod persona Christi sit composita. | Objection 1. It would seem that the Person of Christ is not composite. For the Person of Christ is naught else than the Person or hypostasis of the Word, as appears from what has been said (2). But in the Word, Person and Nature do not differ, as appears from I, 39, 1]. Therefore since the Nature of the Word is simple, as was shown above (I, 3, 7), it is impossible that the Person of Christ be composite. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, omnis compositio videtur esse ex partibus. Sed divina natura non potest habere rationem partis, quia omnis pars habet rationem imperfecti. Ergo impossibile est quod persona Christi sit composita ex duabus naturis. | Objection 2. Further, all composition requires parts. But the Divine Nature is incompatible with the notion of a part, for every part implicates the notion of imperfection. Therefore it is impossible that the Person of Christ be composed of two natures. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, quod componitur ex aliquibus, videtur esse homogeneum eis, sicut ex corporibus non componitur nisi corpus. Si igitur ex duabus naturis aliquid sit in Christo compositum, consequens erit quod illud non erit persona, sed natura. Et sic in Christo erit facta unio in natura. Quod est contra praedicta. | Objection 3. Further, what is composed of others would seem to be homogeneous with them, as from bodies only a body can be composed. Therefore if there is anything in Christ composed of the two natures, it follows that this will not be a person but a nature; and hence the union in Christ will take place in the nature, which is contrary to 2]. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, III libro, in domino Iesu Christo duas naturas cognoscimus, unam autem hypostasim, ex utrisque compositam. | On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4,5), "In the Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures, but one hypostasis composed from both." |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod persona sive hypostasis Christi dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum id quod est in se. Et sic est omnino simplex, sicut et natura verbi. Alio modo, secundum rationem personae vel hypostasis, ad quam pertinet subsistere in aliqua natura. Et secundum hoc, persona Christi subsistit in duabus naturis. Unde, licet sit ibi unum subsistens, est tamen ibi alia et alia ratio subsistendi. Et sic dicitur persona composita, inquantum unum duobus subsistit. | I answer that, The Person or hypostasis of Christ may be viewed in two ways. First as it is in itself, and thus it is altogether simple, even as the Nature of the Word. Secondly, in the aspect of person or hypostasis to which it belongs to subsist in a nature; and thus the Person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of subsistence, and hence He is said to be a composite person, insomuch as one being subsists in two. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 4 ad 1 Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. | And thereby the solution to the first is clear. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illa compositio personae ex naturis non dicitur esse ratione partium, sed potius ratione numeri, sicut omne illud in quo duo conveniunt, potest dici ex eis compositum. | Reply to Objection 2. This composition of a person from natures is not so called on account of parts, but by reason of number, even as that in which two things concur may be said to be composed of them. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod non in omni compositione hoc verificatur quod illud quod componitur sit homogeneum componentibus, sed solum in partibus continui; nam continuum non componitur nisi ex continuis. Animal vero componitur ex anima et corpore, quorum neutrum est animal. | Reply to Objection 3. It is not verified in every composition, that the thing composed is homogeneous with its component parts, but only in the parts of a continuous thing; for the continuous is composed solely of continuous [parts]. But an animal is composed of soul and body, and neither of these is an animal. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit unio animae et corporis. Ex unione enim animae et corporis in nobis causatur persona vel hypostasis hominis. Si ergo anima et corpus fuerunt in Christo unita, sequitur quod fuerit ex unione eorum aliqua hypostasis constituta. Non autem hypostasis verbi Dei, quae est aeterna. Ergo in Christo erit aliqua persona vel hypostasis praeter hypostasim verbi. Quod est contra praedicta. | Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was no union of soul and body. For from the union of soul and body in us a person or a human hypostasis is caused. Hence if the soul and body were united in Christ, it follows that a hypostasis resulted from their union. But this was not the hypostasis of God the Word, for It is eternal. Therefore in Christ there would be a person or hypostasis besides the hypostasis of the Word, which is contrary to 2,3. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, ex unione animae et corporis constituitur natura humanae speciei. Damascenus autem dicit, in III libro, quod in domino nostro Iesu Christo non est communem speciem accipere. Ergo in eo non est facta compositio animae et corporis. | Objection 2. Further, from the union of soul and body results the nature of the human species. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3), that "we must not conceive a common species in the Lord Jesus Christ." Therefore there was no union of soul and body in Him. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, anima non coniungitur corpori nisi ut vivificet ipsum. Sed corpus Christi poterat vivificari ab ipso verbo Dei, quod est fons et principium vitae. Ergo in Christo non fuit unio animae et corporis. | Objection 3. Further, the soul is united to the body for the sole purpose of quickening it. But the body of Christ could be quickened by the Word of God Himself, seeing He is the fount and principle of life. Therefore in Christ there was no union of soul and body. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod corpus non dicitur animatum nisi ex unione animae. Sed corpus Christi dicitur animatum, secundum illud quod Ecclesia cantat, animatum corpus assumens, de virgine nasci dignatus est. Ergo in Christo fuit unio animae et corporis. | On the contrary, The body is not said to be animated save from its union with the soul. Now the body of Christ is said to be animated, as the Church chants: "Taking an animate body, He deigned to be born of a Virgin" [Feast of the Circumcision, Ant. ii, Lauds]. Therefore in Christ there was a union of soul and body. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Christus dicitur homo univoce cum hominibus aliis, utpote eiusdem speciei existens, secundum illud apostoli, Philipp. II, in similitudinem hominum factus. Pertinet autem ad rationem speciei humanae quod anima corpori uniatur, non enim forma constituit speciem nisi per hoc quod sit actus materiae; et hoc est ad quod generatio terminatur, per quam natura speciem intendit. Unde necesse est dicere quod in Christo fuerit anima unita corpori, et contrarium est haereticum, utpote derogans veritati humanitatis Christi. | I answer that, Christ is called a man univocally with other men, as being of the same species, according to the Apostle (Philippians 2:7), "being made in the likeness of a man." Now it belongs essentially to the human species that the soul be united to the body, for the form does not constitute the species, except inasmuch as it becomes the act of matter, and this is the terminus of generation through which nature intends the species. Hence it must be said that in Christ the soul was united to the body; and the contrary is heretical, since it destroys the truth of Christ's humanity. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex hac ratione moti fuerunt illi qui negaverunt unionem animae et corporis in Christo, ne per hoc scilicet cogerentur personam novam aut hypostasim in Christo inducere; quia videbant quod in puris hominibus ex unione animae ad corpus constituitur persona. Sed hoc ideo in puris hominibus accidit quia anima et corpus sic in eis coniunguntur ut per se existant. Sed in Christo uniuntur ad invicem ut adiuncta alteri principaliori quod subsistit in natura ex eis composita. Et propter hoc ex unione animae et corporis in Christo non constituitur nova hypostasis seu persona, sed advenit ipsum coniunctum personae seu hypostasi praeexistenti. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod sit minoris efficaciae unio animae et corporis in Christo quam in nobis. Quia ipsa coniunctio ad nobilius non adimit virtutem aut dignitatem, sed auget, sicut anima sensitiva in animalibus constituit speciem, quia consideratur ut ultima forma; non autem in hominibus, quamvis in eis sit nobilior et virtuosior; et hoc per adiunctionem ulterioris et nobilioris perfectionis animae rationalis, ut etiam supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1. This would seem to be the reason which was of weight with such as denied the union of the soul and body in Christ, viz. lest they should thereby be forced to admit a second person or hypostasis in Christ, since they saw that the union of soul and body in mere men resulted in a person. But this happens in mere men because the soul and body are so united in them as to exist by themselves. But in Christ they are united together, so as to be united to something higher, which subsists in the nature composed of them. And hence from the union of the soul and body in Christ a new hypostasis or person does not result, but what is composed of them is united to the already existing hypostasis or Person. Nor does it therefore follow that the union of the soul and body in Christ is of less effect than in us, for its union with something nobler does not lessen but increases its virtue and worth; just as the sensitive soul in animals constitutes the species, as being considered the ultimate form, yet it does not do so in man, although it is of greater effect and dignity, and this because of its union with a further and nobler perfection, viz. the rational soul, as has been said above (2, ad 2). |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum Damasceni potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ut referatur ad humanam naturam. Quae quidem non habet rationem communis speciei secundum quod est in uno solo individuo, sed secundum quod est abstracta ab omni individuo, prout in nuda contemplatione consideratur; vel secundum quod est in omnibus individuis. Filius autem Dei non assumpsit humanam naturam prout est in sola consideratione intellectus, quia sic non assumpsisset ipsam rem humanae naturae. Nisi forte diceretur quod humana natura esset quaedam idea separata, sicut Platonici posuerunt hominem sine materia. Sed tunc filius Dei non assumpsisset carnem, contra id quod dicitur Luc. ult., spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere. Similiter etiam non potest dici quod filius Dei assumpsit humanam naturam prout est in omnibus individuis eiusdem speciei, quia sic omnes homines assumpsisset. Relinquitur ergo, ut Damascenus postea dicit in eodem libro, quod assumpserit naturam humanam in atomo, idest in individuo, non quidem in alio individuo, quod sit suppositum vel hypostasis illius naturae, quam in persona filii Dei. Alio modo potest intelligi dictum Damasceni ut non referatur ad naturam humanam, quasi ex unione animae et corporis non resultet una communis natura, quae est humana, sed est referendum ad unionem duarum naturarum, divinae scilicet et humanae, ex quibus non componitur aliquid tertium, quod sit quaedam natura communis; quia sic illud esset natum praedicari de pluribus. Et hoc ibi intendit. Unde subdit, neque enim generatus est, neque unquam generabitur alius Christus, ex deitate et humanitate, in deitate et humanitate, Deus perfectus, idem et homo perfectus. | Reply to Objection 2. This saying of Damascene may be taken in two ways: First, as referring to human nature, which, as it is in one individual alone, has not the nature of a common species, but only inasmuch as either it is abstracted from every individual, and considered in itself by the mind, or according as it is in all individuals. Now the Son of God did not assume human nature as it exists in the pure thought of the intellect, since in this way He would not have assumed human nature in reality, unless it be said that human nature is a separate idea, just as the Platonists conceived of man without matter. But in this way the Son of God would not have assumed flesh, contrary to what is written (Luke 24:39), "A spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have." Neither can it be said that the Son of God assumed human nature as it is in all the individuals of the same species, otherwise He would have assumed all men. Therefore it remains, as Damascene says further on (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that He assumed human nature "in atomo," i.e. in an individual; not, indeed, in another individual which is a suppositum or a person of that nature, but in the Person of the Son of God.Secondly, this saying of Damascene may be taken not as referring to human nature, as if from the union of soul and body one common nature (viz. human) did not result, but as referring to the union of the two natures Divine and human: which do not combine so as to form a third something that becomes a common nature, for in this way it would become predicable of many, and this is what he is aiming at, since he adds: "For there was not generated, neither will there ever be generated, another Christ, Who from the Godhead and manhood, and in the Godhead and manhood, is perfect God and perfect man." |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex est principium vitae corporalis. Unum quidem effectivum. Et hoc modo verbum Dei est principium omnis vitae. Alio modo est aliquid principium vitae formaliter. Cum enim vivere viventibus sit esse, ut dicit philosophus, in II de anima; sicut unumquodque formaliter est per suam formam, ita corpus vivit per animam. Et hoc modo non potuit corpus vivere per verbum, quod non potest esse corporis forma. | Reply to Objection 3. There are two principles of corporeal life: one the effective principle, and in this way the Word of God is the principle of all life; the other, the formal principle of life, for since "in living things to be is to live," as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), just as everything is formally by its form, so likewise the body lives by the soul: in this way a body could not live by the Word, Which cannot be the form of a body. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod humana natura fuerit unita verbo Dei accidentaliter. Dicit enim apostolus, Philipp. II, de filio Dei, quod habitu inventus est ut homo. Sed habitus accidentaliter advenit ei cuius est, sive accipiatur habitus prout est unum de decem generibus; sive prout est species qualitatis. Ergo humana natura accidentaliter unita est filio Dei. | Objection 1. It would seem that the human nature was united to the Word of God accidentally. For the Apostle says (Philippians 2:7) of the Son of God, that He was "in habit found as a man." But habit is accidentally associated with that to which it pertains, whether habit be taken for one of the ten predicaments or as a species of quality. Therefore human nature is accidentally united to the Son of God. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, omne quod advenit alicui post esse completum, advenit ei accidentaliter, hoc enim dicimus accidens quod potest alicui et adesse et abesse praeter subiecti corruptionem. Sed natura humana advenit ex tempore filio Dei habenti esse perfectum ab aeterno. Ergo advenit ei accidentaliter. | Objection 2. Further, whatever comes to a thing that is complete in being comes to it accidentally, for an accident is said to be what can come or go without the subject being corrupted. But human nature came to Christ in time, Who had perfect being from eternity. Therefore it came to Him accidentally. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, quidquid non pertinet ad naturam seu essentiam alicuius rei, est accidens eius, quia omne quod est vel est substantia, vel est accidens. Sed humana natura non pertinet ad essentiam vel naturam filii Dei divinam, quia non est facta unio in natura, ut supra dictum est. Ergo oportet quod natura humana accidentaliter filio Dei advenerit. | Objection 3. Further, whatever does not pertain to the nature or the essence of a thing is its accident, for whatever is, is either a substance or an accident. But human nature does not pertain to the Divine Essence or Nature of the Son of God, for the union did not take place in the nature, as was said above (Article 1). Hence the human nature must have accrued accidentally to the Son of God. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 6 arg. 4 Praeterea, instrumentum accidentaliter advenit. Sed natura humana in Christo fuit divinitatis instrumentum, dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, quod caro Christi instrumentum divinitatis existit. Ergo videtur quod humana natura fuerit filio Dei unita accidentaliter. | Objection 4. Further, an instrument accrues accidentally. But the human nature was the instrument of the Godhead in Christ, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15), that "the flesh of Christ is the instrument of the Godhead." Therefore it seems that the human nature was united to the Son of God accidentally. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod illud quod accidentaliter praedicatur, non praedicat aliquid, sed quantum vel quale vel aliquo modo se habens si igitur humana natura accidentaliter adveniret, cum dicitur Christus esse homo, non praedicaretur aliquid, sed quale aut quantum aut aliquo modo se habens. Quod est contra decretalem Alexandri Papae dicentis, cum Christus sit perfectus Deus et perfectus homo, qua temeritate audent quidam dicere quod Christus, secundum quod est homo, non est aliquid? | On the contrary, Whatever is predicated accidentally, predicates, not substance, but quantity, or quality, or some other mode of being. If therefore the human nature accrues accidentally, when we say Christ is man, we do not predicate substance, but quality or quantity, or some other mode of being, which is contrary to the Decretal of Pope Alexander III, who says (Conc. Later. iii): "Since Christ is perfect God and perfect man, what foolhardiness have some to dare to affirm that Christ as man is not a substance?" |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, ad huius quaestionis evidentiam, sciendum est quod circa mysterium unionis duarum naturarum in Christo, duplex haeresis insurrexit. Una quidem confundentium naturas, sicut Eutychetis et Dioscori, qui posuerunt quod ex duabus naturis est constituta una natura; ita quod confitentur Christum esse ex duabus naturis, quasi ante unionem distinctis; non autem in duabus naturis, quasi post unionem naturarum distinctione cessante. Alia vero fuit haeresis Nestorii et Theodori Mopsuesteni separantium personas. Posuerunt enim aliam esse personam filii Dei, et filii hominis. Quas dicebant sibi invicem esse unitas, primo quidem, secundum inhabitationem, inquantum scilicet verbum Dei habitavit in illo homine sicut in templo. Secundo, secundum unitatem affectus, inquantum scilicet voluntas illius hominis est semper conformis voluntati Dei. Tertio modo, secundum operationem, prout scilicet dicebant hominem illum esse Dei verbi instrumentum. Quarto, secundum dignitatem honoris, prout omnis honor qui exhibetur filio Dei, exhibetur filio hominis, propter coniunctionem ad filium Dei. Quinto, secundum aequivocationem, idest secundum communicationem nominum, prout scilicet dicimus illum hominem esse Deum et filium Dei. Manifestum est autem omnes istos modos accidentalem unionem importare. Quidam autem posteriores magistri, putantes se has haereses declinare, in eas per ignorantiam inciderunt. Quidam enim eorum concesserunt unam Christi personam, sed posuerunt duas hypostases, sive duo supposita; dicentes hominem quendam, compositum ex anima et corpore, a principio suae conceptionis esse assumptum a Dei verbo. Et haec est prima opinio quam Magister ponit in sexta distinctione tertii libri sententiarum. Alii vero, volentes servare unitatem personae, posuerunt Christi animam non esse corpori unitam, sed haec duo, separata ab invicem, esse unita verbo accidentaliter, ut sic non cresceret numerus personarum. Et haec est tertia opinio quam Magister ibidem ponit. Utraque autem harum opinionum incidit in haeresim Nestorii. Prima quidem, quia idem est ponere duas hypostases vel duo supposita in Christo, quod ponere duas personas, ut supra dictum est. Et si fiat vis in nomine personae, considerandum est quod etiam Nestorius utebatur unitate personae, propter unitatem dignitatis et honoris. Unde et quinta synodus definit anathema eum qui dicit unam personam secundum dignitatem, honorem et adorationem, sicut Theodorus et Nestorius insanientes conscripserunt. Alia vero opinio incidit in errorem Nestorii quantum ad hoc, quod posuit unionem accidentalem. Non enim differt dicere quod verbum Dei unitum est homini Christo secundum inhabitationem sicut in templo suo, sicut dicebat Nestorius; et dicere quod unitum fuit verbum homini secundum induitionem sicut vestimento, sicut dicit tertia opinio. Quae etiam dicit peius aliquid quam Nestorius, quod anima et corpus non sunt unita. Fides autem Catholica, medium tenens inter praedictas positiones, neque dicit esse unionem factam Dei et hominis secundum essentiam vel naturam; neque etiam secundum accidens; sed medio modo, secundum subsistentiam seu hypostasim. Unde in quinta synodo legitur, cum multis modis unitas intelligatur, qui iniquitatem Apollinarii et Eutychetis sequuntur, interemptionem eorum quae convenerunt colentes, (idest, interimentes utramque naturam), unionem secundum confusionem dicunt; Theodori autem et Nestorii sequaces, divisione gaudentes, affectualem unitatem introducunt, sancta vero Dei Ecclesia, utriusque perfidiae impietatem reiiciens unionem Dei verbi ad carnem secundum compositionem confitetur, quod est secundum subsistentiam. Sic igitur patet quod secunda trium opinionum quas Magister ponit, quae asserit unam hypostasim Dei et hominis, non est dicenda opinio, sed sententia Catholicae fidei. Similiter etiam prima opinio, quae ponit duas hypostases; et tertia, quae ponit unionem accidentalem; non sunt dicendae opiniones, sed haereses in Conciliis ab Ecclesia damnatae. | I answer that, In evidence of this question we must know that two heresies have arisen with regard to the mystery of the union of the two natures in Christ. The first confused the natures, as Eutyches and Dioscorus, who held that from the two natures one nature resulted, so that they confessed Christ to be "from" two natures (which were distinct before the union), but not "in" two natures (the distinction of nature coming to an end after the union). The second was the heresy of Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia, who separated the persons. For they held the Person of the Son of God to be distinct from the Person of the Son of man, and said these were mutually united: first, "by indwelling," inasmuch as the Word of God dwelt in the man, as in a temple; secondly, "by unity of intention," inasmuch as the will of the man was always in agreement with the will of the Word of God; thirdly, "by operation," inasmuch as they said the man was the instrument of the Word of God; fourthly, "by greatness of honor," inasmuch as all honor shown to the Son of God was equally shown to the Son of man, on account of His union with the Son of God; fifthly, "by equivocation," i.e. communication of names, inasmuch as we say that this man is God and the Son of God. Now it is plain that these modes imply an accidental union. But some more recent masters, thinking to avoid these heresies, through ignorance fell into them. For some conceded one person in Christ, but maintained two hypostases, or two supposita, saying that a man, composed of body and soul, was from the beginning of his conception assumed by the Word of God. And this is the first opinion set down by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6). But others desirous of keeping the unity of person, held that the soul of Christ was not united to the body, but that these two were mutually separate, and were united to the Word accidentally, so that the number of persons might not be increased. And this is the third opinion which the Master sets down (Sent. iii, D, 6). But both of these opinions fall into the heresy of Nestorius; the first, indeed, because to maintain two hypostases or supposita in Christ is the same as to maintain two persons, as was shown above (Article 3). And if stress is laid on the word "person," we must have in mind that even Nestorius spoke of unity of person on account of the unity of dignity and honor. Hence the fifth Council (Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 5) directs an anathema against such a one as holds "one person in dignity, honor and adoration, as Theodore and Nestorius foolishly wrote." But the other opinion falls into the error of Nestorius by maintaining an accidental union. For there is no difference in saying that the Word of God is united to the Man Christ by indwelling, as in His temple (as Nestorius said), or by putting on man, as a garment, which is the third opinion; rather it says something worse than Nestorius--to wit, that the soul and body are not united. Now the Catholic faith, holding the mean between the aforesaid positions, does not affirm that the union of God and man took place in the essence or nature, nor yet in something accidental, but midway, in a subsistence or hypostasis. Hence in the fifth Council (Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 5) we read: "Since the unity may be understood in many ways, those who follow the impiety of Apollinaris and Eutyches, professing the destruction of what came together" (i.e. destroying both natures), "confess a union by mingling; but the followers of Theodore and Nestorius, maintaining division, introduce a union of purpose. But the Holy Church of God, rejecting the impiety of both these treasons, confesses a union of the Word of God with flesh, by composition, which is in subsistence." Therefore it is plain that the second of the three opinions, mentioned by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6), which holds one hypostasis of God and man, is not to be called an opinion, but an article of Catholic faith. So likewise the first opinion which holds two hypostases, and the third which holds an accidental union, are not to be styled opinions, but heresies condemned by the Church in Councils. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, non necesse autem omnifariam et indefective assimilari exempla, quod enim in omnibus simile, idem utique erit, et non exemplum. Et maxime in divinis, impossibile enim simile exemplum invenire et in theologia, idest in deitate personarum, et in dispensatione, idest in mysterio incarnationis. Humana igitur natura in Christo assimilatur habitui, idest vestimento, non quidem quantum ad accidentalem unionem, sed quantum ad hoc, quod verbum videtur per humanam naturam, sicut homo per vestimentum. Et etiam quantum ad hoc, quod vestimentum mutatur, quia scilicet formatur secundum figuram eius qui induit ipsum, qui a sua forma non mutatur propter vestimentum, et similiter humana natura assumpta a verbo Dei est meliorata, ipsum autem verbum Dei non est mutatum; ut exponit Augustinus, in libro octogintatrium quaestionum. | Reply to Objection 1. As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26): "Examples need not be wholly and at all points similar, for what is wholly similar is the same, and not an example, and especially in Divine things, for it is impossible to find a wholly similar example in the Theology," i.e. in the Godhead of Persons, "and in the Dispensation," i.e. the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence the human nature in Christ is likened to a habit, i.e. a garment, not indeed in regard to accidental union, but inasmuch as the Word is seen by the human nature, as a man by his garment, and also inasmuch as the garment is changed, for it is shaped according to the figure of him who puts it on, and yet he is not changed from his form on account of the garment. So likewise the human nature assumed by the Word of God is ennobled, but the Word of God is not changed, as Augustine says (Qq. 83, qu. 73). |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod advenit post esse completum, accidentaliter advenit, nisi trahatur in communionem illius esse completi. Sicut in resurrectione corpus adveniet animae praeexistenti, non tamen accidentaliter, quia ad idem esse assumetur, ut scilicet corpus habeat esse vitale per animam. Non est autem sic de albedine, quia aliud est esse albi, et aliud esse hominis cui advenit albedo. Verbum autem Dei ab aeterno esse completum habuit secundum hypostasim sive personam, ex tempore autem advenit ei natura humana, non quasi assumpta ad unum esse prout est naturae, sicut corpus assumitur ad esse animae; sed ad unum esse prout est hypostasis vel personae. Et ideo humana natura non unitur accidentaliter filio Dei. | Reply to Objection 2. Whatever accrues after the completion of the being comes accidentally, unless it be taken into communion with the complete being, just as in the resurrection the body comes to the soul which pre-exists, yet not accidentally, because it is assumed unto the same being, so that the body has vital being through the soul; but it is not so with whiteness, for the being of whiteness is other than the being of man to which whiteness comes. But the Word of God from all eternity had complete being in hypostasis or person; while in time the human nature accrued to it, not as if it were assumed unto one being inasmuch as this is of the nature (even as the body is assumed to the being of the soul), but to one being inasmuch as this is of the hypostasis or person. Hence the human nature is not accidentally united to the Son of God. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod accidens dividitur contra substantiam. Substantia autem, ut patet V Metaphys., dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, essentia sive natura; alio modo, pro supposito sive hypostasi. Unde sufficit ad hoc quod non sit unio accidentalis, quod sit facta unio secundum hypostasim, licet non sit facta unio secundum naturam. | Reply to Objection 3. Accident is divided against substance. Now substance, as is plain from Metaph. v, 25, is taken in two ways: first, for essence or nature; secondly, for suppositum or hypostasis--hence the union having taken place in the hypostasis, is enough to show that it is not an accidental union, although the union did not take place in the nature. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 6 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod non omne quod assumitur ut instrumentum, pertinet ad hypostasim assumentis, sicut patet de securi et gladio nihil tamen prohibet illud quod assumitur ad unitatem hypostasis, se habere ut instrumentum, sicut corpus hominis vel membra eius. Nestorius igitur posuit quod natura humana est assumpta a verbo solum per modum instrumenti, non autem ad unitatem hypostasis. Et ideo non concedebat quod homo ille vere esset filius Dei, sed instrumentum eius. Unde Cyrillus dicit, in epistola ad monachos Aegypti, hunc Emanuelem, idest Christum, non tanquam instrumenti officio sumptum dicit Scriptura, sed tanquam Deum vere humanatum, idest hominem factum. Damascenus autem posuit naturam humanam in Christo esse sicut instrumentum ad unitatem hypostasis pertinens. | Reply to Objection 4. Not everything that is assumed as an instrument pertains to the hypostasis of the one who assumes, as is plain in the case of a saw or a sword; yet nothing prevents what is assumed into the unity of the hypostasis from being as an instrument, even as the body of man or his members. Hence Nestorius held that the human nature was assumed by the Word merely as an instrument, and not into the unity of the hypostasis. And therefore he did not concede that the man was really the Son of God, but His instrument. Hence Cyril says (Epist. ad Monach. Aegyptii): "The Scripture does not affirm that this Emmanuel," i.e. Christ, "was assumed for the office of an instrument, but as God truly humanized," i.e. made man. But Damascene held that the human nature in Christ is an instrument belonging to the unity of the hypostasis. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio divinae et humanae naturae non sit aliquid creatum. Nihil enim in Deo creatum potest esse, quia quidquid est in Deo, Deus est. Sed unio est in Deo, quia ipse Deus est humanae naturae unitus. Ergo videtur quod unio non sit aliquid creatum. | Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the Divine and human natures is not anything created. For there can be nothing created in God, because whatever is in God is God. But the union is in God, for God Himself is united to human nature. Therefore it seems that the union is not anything created. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, finis est potissimum in unoquoque. Sed finis unionis est divina hypostasis sive persona, ad quam terminata est unio. Ergo videtur quod huiusmodi unio maxime debeat iudicari secundum conditionem divinae hypostasis. Quae non est aliquid creatum. Ergo nec ipsa unio est aliquid creatum. | Objection 2. Further, the end holds first place in everything. But the end of the union is the Divine hypostasis or Person in which the union is terminated. Therefore it seems that this union ought chiefly to be judged with reference to the dignity of the Divine hypostasis, which is not anything created. Therefore the union is nothing created. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis. Sed homo dicitur esse creator propter unionem. Ergo multo magis ipsa unio non est aliquid creatum, sed creator. | Objection 3. Further, "That which is the cause of a thing being such is still more so" (Poster. i). But man is said to be the Creator on account of the union. Therefore much more is the union itself nothing created, but the Creator. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est, quod incipit esse ex tempore, est creatum. Sed unio illa non fuit ab aeterno, sed incoepit esse ex tempore. Ergo unio est aliquid creatum. | On the contrary, Whatever has a beginning in time is created. Now this union was not from eternity, but began in time. Therefore the union is something created. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod unio de qua loquimur est relatio quaedam quae consideratur inter divinam naturam et humanam, secundum quod conveniunt in una persona filii Dei. Sicut autem in prima parte dictum est, omnis relatio quae consideratur inter Deum et creaturam, realiter quidem est in creatura, per cuius mutationem talis relatio innascitur, non autem est realiter in Deo, sed secundum rationem tantum, quia non nascitur secundum mutationem Dei. Sic igitur dicendum est quod haec unio de qua loquimur, non est in Deo realiter, sed secundum rationem tantum in humana autem natura, quae creatura quaedam est, est realiter. Et ideo oportet dicere quod sit quoddam creatum. | I answer that, The union of which we are speaking is a relation which we consider between the Divine and the human nature, inasmuch as they come together in one Person of the Son of God. Now, as was said above (I, 13, 7), every relation which we consider between God and the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking, since it does not arise from any change in God. And hence we must say that the union of which we are speaking is not really in God, except only in our way of thinking; but in the human nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must say it is something created. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod haec unio non est in Deo realiter sed solum secundum rationem tantum, dicitur enim Deus unitus creaturae ex hoc quod creatura unita est ei, absque Dei mutatione. | Reply to Objection 1. This union is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking, for God is said to be united to a creature inasmuch as the creature is really united to God without any change in Him. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio relationis, sicut et motus dependet ex fine vel termino, sed esse eius dependet ex subiecto. Et quia unio talis non habet esse reale nisi in natura creata, ut dictum est, consequens est quod habeat esse creatum. | Reply to Objection 2. The specific nature of a relation, as of motion, depends on the subject. And since this union has its being nowhere save in a created nature, as was said above, it follows that it has a created being. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod homo dicitur et est Deus propter unionem inquantum terminatur ad hypostasim divinam. Non tamen sequitur quod ipsa unio sit creator vel Deus, quia quod aliquid dicatur creatum, hoc magis respicit esse ipsius quam relationem. | Reply to Objection 3. A man is called Creator and is God because of the union, inasmuch as it is terminated in the Divine hypostasis; yet it does not follow that the union itself is the Creator or God, because that a thing is said to be created regards its being rather than its relation. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod idem sit unio quod assumptio. Relationes enim, sicut et motus, specificantur secundum terminum. Sed idem est terminus assumptionis et unionis, scilicet divina hypostasis. Ergo videtur quod non differant unio et assumptio. | Objection 1. It would seem that union is the same as assumption. For relations, as motions, are specified by their termini. Now the term of assumption and union is one and the same, viz. the Divine hypostasis. Therefore it seems that union and assumption are not different. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, in mysterio incarnationis idem videtur esse uniens et assumens, unitum et assumptum. Sed unio et assumptio videntur sequi actionem et passionem unientis et uniti, vel assumentis et assumpti. Ergo videtur idem esse unio quod assumptio. | Objection 2. Further, in the mystery of Incarnation the same thing seems to be what unites and what assumes, and what is united and what is assumed. But union and assumption seem to follow the action and passion of the thing uniting and the united, of the thing assuming and the assumed. Therefore union seems to be the same as assumption. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in III libro, aliud est unio, aliud incarnatio. Nam unio solam demonstrat copulationem, ad quid autem facta est, non adhuc. Incarnatio autem et humanatio determinant ad quem sit facta copulatio. Sed similiter assumptio non determinat ad quem facta sit copulatio. Ergo videtur idem esse unio et assumptio. | Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "Union is one thing, incarnation is another; for union demands mere copulation, and leaves unsaid the end of the copulation; but incarnation and humanation determine the end of copulation." But likewise assumption does not determine the end of copulation. Therefore it seems that union is the same as assumption. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod divina natura dicitur unita, non autem assumpta. | On the contrary, The Divine Nature is said to be united, not assumed. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, unio importat relationem divinae naturae et humanae secundum quod conveniunt in una persona. Omnis autem relatio quae incipit esse ex tempore, ex aliqua mutatione causatur. Mutatio autem consistit in actione et passione. Sic igitur dicendum est quod prima et principalis differentia inter unionem et assumptionem est quod unio importat ipsam relationem, assumptio autem actionem secundum quam dicitur aliquis assumens, vel passionem secundum quam dicitur aliquid assumptum. Ex hac autem differentia accipitur secundo alia differentia. Nam assumptio dicitur sicut in fieri, unio autem sicut in facto esse. Et ideo uniens dicitur esse unitum, assumens autem non dicitur esse assumptum. Natura enim humana significatur ut in termino assumptionis ad hypostasim divinam per hoc quod dicitur homo, unde vere dicimus quod filius Dei, qui est uniens sibi humanam naturam, est homo. Sed humana natura in se considerata, idest in abstracto, significatur ut assumpta, non autem dicimus quod filius Dei sit humana natura. Ex eodem etiam sequitur tertia differentia, quod relatio, praecipue aequiparantiae, non magis se habet ad unum extremum quam ad aliud; actio autem et passio diversimode se habent ad agens et patiens, et ad diversos terminos. Et ideo assumptio determinat terminum et a quo et ad quem, dicitur enim assumptio quasi ab alio ad se sumptio, unio autem nihil horum determinat. Unde indifferenter dicitur quod humana natura est unita divinae, et e converso. Non autem dicitur divina natura assumpta ab humana, sed e converso, quia humana natura adiuncta est ad personalitatem divinam, ut scilicet persona divina in humana natura subsistat. | I answer that, As was stated above (Article 7), union implies a certain relation of the Divine Nature and the human, according as they come together in one Person. Now all relations which begin in time are brought about by some change; and change consists in action and passion. Hence the "first" and principal difference between assumption and union must be said to be that union implies the relation: whereas assumption implies the action, whereby someone is said to assume, or the passion, whereby something is said to be assumed. Now from this difference another "second" difference arises, for assumption implies "becoming," whereas union implies "having become," and therefore the thing uniting is said to be united, but the thing assuming is not said to be assumed. For the human nature is taken to be in the terminus of assumption unto the Divine hypostasis when man is spoken of; and hence we can truly say that the Son of God, Who assumes human nature unto Himself, is man. But human nature, considered in itself, i.e. in the abstract, is viewed as assumed; and we do not say the Son of God is human nature. From this same follows a "third" difference, which is that a relation, especially one of equiparance, is no more to one extreme than to the other, whereas action and passion bear themselves differently to the agent and the patient, and to different termini. And hence assumption determines the term whence and the term whither; for assumption means a taking to oneself from another. But union determines none of these things. hence it may be said indifferently that the human nature is united with the Divine, or conversely. But the Divine Nature is not said to be assumed by the human, but conversely, because the human nature is joined to the Divine personality, so that the Divine Person subsists in human nature. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unio et assumptio non eodem modo se habent ad terminum, sed diversimode, sicut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1. Union and assumption have not the same relation to the term, but a different relation, as was said above. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod uniens et assumens non omnino sunt idem. Nam omnis persona assumens est uniens, non autem e converso. Nam persona patris univit naturam humanam filio, non autem sibi et ideo dicitur uniens, non assumens. Et similiter non est idem unitum et assumptum. Nam divina natura dicitur unita, non assumpta. | Reply to Objection 2. What unites and what assumes are not the same. For whatsoever Person assumes unites, and not conversely. For the Person of the Father united the human nature to the Son, but not to Himself; and hence He is said to unite and not to assume. So likewise the united and the assumed are not identical, for the Divine Nature is said to be united, but not assumed. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod assumptio determinat cui facta est copulatio ex parte assumentis, inquantum assumptio dicitur quasi ad se sumptio. Sed incarnatio et humanatio ex parte assumpti, quod est caro, vel natura humana. Et ideo assumptio differt ratione et ab unione, et ab incarnatione seu humanatione. | Reply to Objection 3. Assumption determines with whom the union is made on the part of the one assuming, inasmuch as assumption means taking unto oneself [ad se sumere, whereas incarnation and humanation (determine with whom the union is made) on the part of the thing assumed, which is flesh or human nature. And thus assumption differs logically both from union and from incarnation or humanation. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio duarum naturarum non sit maxima unionum. Unitum enim deficit in ratione unitatis ab eo quod est unum, eo quod unitum dicitur per participationem, unum autem per essentiam. Sed in rebus creatis aliquid dicitur esse simpliciter unum, sicut praecipue patet de ipsa unitate quae est principium numeri. Ergo huiusmodi unio de qua loquimur, non importat maximam unitatem. | Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the two natures in Christ is not the greatest of all unions. For what is united falls short of the unity of what is one, since what is united is by participation, but one is by essence. Now in created things there are some that are simply one, as is shown especially in unity itself, which is the principle of number. Therefore the union of which we are speaking does not imply the greatest of all unions. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, quanto ea quae uniuntur magis distant, tanto minor est unio. Sed ea quae secundum hanc unionem uniuntur, maxime distant, scilicet natura divina et humana, distant enim in infinitum. Ergo huiusmodi est minima unio. | Objection 2. Further, the greater the distance between things united, the less the union. Now, the things united by this union are most distant--namely, the Divine and human natures; for they are infinitely apart. Therefore their union is the least of all. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, per unionem aliquid fit unum. Sed ex unione animae et corporis in nobis fit aliquid unum in persona et natura, ex unione autem divinae et humanae naturae fit aliquid unum solum in persona. Ergo maior est unio animae ad corpus quam divinae naturae ad humanam. Et sic unio de qua loquimur, non importat maximam unitatem. | Objection 3. Further, from union there results one. But from the union of soul and body in us there arises what is one in person and nature; whereas from the union of the Divine and human nature there results what is one in person only. Therefore the union of soul and body is greater than that of the Divine and human natures; and hence the union of which we speak does not imply the greatest unity. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 9 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., quod homo potius est in filio quam filius in patre. Filius autem est in patre per unitatem essentiae, homo autem est in filio per unionem incarnationis. Ergo maior est unio incarnationis quam unitas divinae essentiae. Quae tamen est maxima unitatum. Et sic, per consequens, unio incarnationis importat maximam unitatem. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 10) that "man is in the Son of God, more than the Son in the Father." But the Son is in the Father by unity of essence, and man is in the Son by the union of Incarnation. Therefore the union of Incarnation is greater than the unity of the Divine Essence, which nevertheless is the greatest union; and thus the union of Incarnation implies the greatest unity. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 9 co. Respondeo dicendum quod unio importat coniunctionem aliquorum in aliquo uno. Potest ergo unio incarnationis dupliciter accipi, uno modo, ex parte eorum quae coniunguntur; et alio modo, ex parte eius in quo coniunguntur. Et ex hac parte huiusmodi unio habet praeeminentiam inter alias uniones, nam unitas personae divinae, in qua uniuntur duae naturae, est maxima. Non autem habet praeeminentiam ex parte eorum quae coniunguntur. | I answer that, Union implies the joining of several in some one thing. Therefore the union of Incarnation may be taken in two ways: first, in regard to the things united; secondly, in regard to that in which they are united. And in this regard this union has a pre-eminence over other unions; for the unity of the Divine Person, in which the two natures are united, is the greatest. But it has no pre-eminence in regard to the things united. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 9 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unitas personae divinae est maior quam unitas numeralis, quae scilicet est principium numeri. Nam unitas divinae personae est unitas per se subsistens, non recepta in aliquo per participationem, est etiam in se completa, habens in se quidquid pertinet ad rationem unitatis. Et ideo non competit sibi ratio partis, sicut unitati numerali, quae est pars numeri, et quae participatur in rebus numeratis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc unio incarnationis praeeminet unitati numerali, ratione scilicet unitatis personae. Non autem ratione naturae humanae, quae non est ipsa unitas personae divinae, sed est ei unita. | Reply to Objection 1. The unity of the Divine Person is greater than numerical unity, which is the principle of number. For the unity of a Divine Person is an uncreated and self-subsisting unity, not received into another by participation. Also, it is complete in itself, having in itself whatever pertains to the nature of unity; and therefore it is not compatible with the nature of a part, as in numerical unity, which is a part of number, and which is shared in by the things numbered. And hence in this respect the union of Incarnation is higher than numerical unity by reason of the unity of the Divine Person, and not by reason of the human nature, which is not the unity of the Divine Person, but is united to it. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 9 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ex parte coniunctorum, non autem ex parte personae in qua est facta unio. | Reply to Objection 2. This reason regards the things united, and not the Person in Whom the union takes place. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 9 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod unitas divinae personae est maior unitas quam unitas et personae et naturae in nobis. Et ideo unio incarnationis est maior quam unio animae et corporis in nobis. | Reply to Objection 3. The unity of the Divine Person is greater than the unity of person and nature in us; and hence the union of Incarnation is greater than the union of soul and body in us. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 9 ad 4 Quia vero id quod in contrarium obiicitur falsum supponit, scilicet quod maior sit unio incarnationis quam unitas personarum divinarum in essentia, dicendum est ad auctoritatem Augustini quod humana natura non est magis in filio Dei quam filius Dei in patre sed multo minus, sed ipse homo, quantum ad aliquid, est magis in filio quam filius in patre; inquantum scilicet idem supponitur in hoc quod dico homo, prout sumitur pro Christo, et in hoc quod dico, filius Dei; non autem idem est suppositum patris et filii. | And because what is urged in the argument "on the contrary" rests upon what is untrue--namely, that the union of Incarnation is greater than the unity of the Divine Persons in Essence--we must say to the authority of Augustine that the human nature is not more in the Son of God than the Son of God in the Father, but much less. But the man in some respects is more in the Son than the Son in the Father--namely, inasmuch as the same suppositum is signified when I say "man," meaning Christ, and when I say "Son of God"; whereas it is not the same suppositum of Father and Son. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 10 arg. 1 Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio incarnationis non sit per gratiam. Gratia enim est accidens quoddam, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Sed unio humanae naturae ad divinam non est facta per accidens, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo videtur quod unio incarnationis non sit facta per gratiam. | Objection 1. It would seem that the union of Incarnation did not take place by grace. For grace is an accident, as was shown above (I-II, 110, 2). But the union of the human nature to the Divine did not take place accidentally, as was shown above (Article 6). Therefore it seems that the union of Incarnation did not take place by grace. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 10 arg. 2 Praeterea, gratiae subiectum est anima. Sed sicut dicitur Coloss. II, in Christo habitavit plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter. Ergo videtur quod illa unio non sit facta per gratiam. | Objection 2. Further, the subject of grace is the soul. But it is written (Colossians 2:9): "In Christ [Vulgate: 'Him'] dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporeally." Therefore it seems that this union did not take place by grace. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 10 arg. 3 Praeterea, quilibet sanctus Deo unitur per gratiam. Si igitur unio incarnationis fuit per gratiam, videtur quod non aliter dicatur Christus esse Deus quam alii sancti homines. | Objection 3. Further, every saint is united to God by grace. If, therefore, the union of Incarnation was by grace, it would seem that Christ is said to be God no more than other holy men. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 10 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. sanctorum, ea gratia fit ab initio fidei suae homo quicumque Christianus, qua gratia homo ille ab initio suo factus est Christus. Sed homo ille factus est Christus per unionem ad divinam naturam. Ergo unio illa fuit per gratiam. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. xv): "By the same grace every man is made a Christian, from the beginning of his faith, as this man from His beginning was made Christ." But this man became Christ by union with the Divine Nature. Therefore this union was by grace. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 10 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in secunda parte dictum est, gratia dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, ipsa voluntas Dei gratis aliquid dantis; alio modo, ipsum gratuitum donum Dei. Indiget autem humana natura gratuita Dei voluntate ad hoc quod elevetur in Deum, cum hoc sit supra facultatem naturae suae. Elevatur autem humana natura in Deum dupliciter. Uno modo, per operationem, qua scilicet sancti cognoscunt et amant Deum. Alio modo, per esse personale, qui quidem modus est singularis Christo, in quo humana natura assumpta est ad hoc quod sit personae filii Dei. Manifestum est autem quod ad perfectionem operationis requiritur quod potentia sit perfecta per habitum, sed quod natura habeat esse in supposito suo, non fit mediante aliquo habitu. Sic igitur dicendum est quod, si gratia accipiatur ipsa Dei voluntas gratis aliquid faciens, vel gratum seu acceptum aliquem habens, unio incarnationis facta est per gratiam, sicut et unio sanctorum ad Deum per cognitionem et amorem. Si vero gratia dicatur ipsum gratuitum Dei donum, sic ipsum quod est humanam naturam esse unitam personae divinae, potest dici quaedam gratia, inquantum nullis praecedentibus meritis hoc est factum, non autem ita quod sit aliqua gratia habitualis qua mediante talis unio fiat. | I answer that, As was said above (I-II, 110, 1), grace is taken in two ways:--first, as the will of God gratuitously bestowing something; secondly, as the free gift of God. Now human nature stands in need of the gratuitous will of God in order to be lifted up to God, since this is above its natural capability. Moreover, human nature is lifted up to God in two ways: first, by operation, as the saints know and love God; secondly, by personal being, and this mode belongs exclusively to Christ, in Whom human nature is assumed so as to be in the Person of the Son of God. But it is plain that for the perfection of operation the power needs to be perfected by a habit, whereas that a nature has being in its own suppositum does not take place by means of a habit. And hence we must say that if grace be understood as the will of God gratuitously doing something or reputing anything as well-pleasing or acceptable to Him, the union of Incarnation took place by grace, even as the union of the saints with God by knowledge and love. But if grace be taken as the free gift of God, then the fact that the human nature is united to the Divine Person may be called a grace, inasmuch as it took place without being preceded by any merits--but not as though there were an habitual grace, by means of which the union took place. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 10 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gratia quae est accidens, est quaedam similitudo divinitatis participata in homine. Per incarnationem autem humana natura non dicitur participasse similitudinem aliquam divinae naturae, sed dicitur esse coniuncta ipsi naturae divinae in persona filii. Maius autem est ipsa res quam similitudo eius participata. | Reply to Objection 1. The grace which is an accident is a certain likeness of the Divinity participated by man. But by Incarnation human nature is not said to have participated a likeness of the Divine nature, but is said to be united to the Divine Nature itself in the Person of the Son. Now the thing itself is greater than a participated likeness of it. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 10 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod gratia habitualis est solum in anima, sed gratia, idest gratuitum Dei donum quod est uniri divinae personae, pertinet ad totam naturam humanam, quae componitur ex anima et corpore. Et per hunc modum dicitur plenitudo divinitatis in Christo corporaliter habitasse, quia est unita divina natura non solum animae, sed etiam corpori. Quamvis etiam possit dici quod dicitur habitasse in Christo corporaliter, idest non umbraliter, sicut habitavit in sacramentis veteris legis, de quibus ibidem subditur quod sunt umbra futurorum, corpus autem est Christus, prout scilicet corpus contra umbram dividitur. Dicunt etiam quidam quod divinitas dicitur in Christo habitasse corporaliter, scilicet tribus modis, sicut corpus habet tres dimensiones, uno modo, per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam, sicut in ceteris creaturis; alio modo, per gratiam gratum facientem, sicut in sanctis tertio modo, per unionem personalem, quod est proprium sibi. | Reply to Objection 2. Habitual grace is only in the soul; but the grace, i.e. the free gift of God, of being united to the Divine Person belongs to the whole human nature, which is composed of soul and body. And hence it is said that the fulness of the Godhead dwelt corporeally in Christ because the Divine Nature is united not merely to the soul, but to the body also. Although it may also be said that it dwelt in Christ corporeally, i.e. not as in a shadow, as it dwelt in the sacraments of the old law, of which it is said in the same place (Colossians 2:17) that they are the "shadow of things to come but the body is Christ" [Vulgate: 'Christ's', inasmuch as the body is opposed to the shadow. And some say that the Godhead is said to have dwelt in Christ corporeally, i.e. in three ways, just as a body has three dimensions: first, by essence, presence, and power, as in other creatures; secondly, by sanctifying grace, as in the saints; thirdly, by personal union, which is proper to Christ. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 10 ad 3 Unde patet responsio ad tertium, quia scilicet unio incarnationis non est facta solum per gratiam habitualem, sicut alii sancti uniuntur Deo; sed secundum subsistentiam, sive personam. | Hence the reply to the third is manifest, viz. because the union of the Incarnation did not take place by habitual grace alone, but in subsistence or person. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 11 arg. 1 Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio incarnationis fuerit aliqua merita subsecuta. Quia super illud Psalmi, fiat misericordia tua, domine, super nos, quemadmodum speravimus in te, dicit Glossa, hic insinuatur desiderium prophetae de incarnatione, et meritum impletionis. Ergo incarnatio cadit sub merito. | Objection 1. It would seem that the union of Incarnation followed upon certain merits, because upon Psalm 32:22, "Let Thy mercy, o Lord, be upon us, as," etc. a gloss says: "Here the prophet's desire for the Incarnation and its merited fulfilment are hinted at." Therefore the Incarnation falls under merit. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 11 arg. 2 Praeterea, quicumque meretur aliquid, meretur illud sine quo illud haberi non potest. Sed antiqui patres merebantur vitam aeternam, ad quam pervenire non poterant nisi per incarnationem, dicit enim Gregorius, in libro Moral., hi qui ante Christi adventum in hunc mundum venerunt, quantamlibet iustitiae virtutem haberent, ex corporibus educti in sinum caelestis patriae statim recipi nullo modo poterant, quia nondum ille venerat qui iustorum animas in perpetua sede collocaret. Ergo videtur quod meruerint incarnationem. | Objection 2. Further, whoever merits anything merits that without which it cannot be. But the ancient Fathers merited eternal life, to which they were able to attain only by Incarnation; for Gregory says (Moral. xiii): "Those who came into this world before Christ's coming, whatsoever eminency of righteousness they may have had, could not, on being divested of the body, at once be admitted into the bosom of the heavenly country, seeing that He had not as yet come Who, by His own descending, should place the souls of the righteous in their everlasting seat." Therefore it would seem that they merited Incarnation. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 11 arg. 3 Praeterea, de beata virgine cantatur quod dominum omnium meruit portare, quod quidem factum est per incarnationem. Ergo incarnatio cadit sub merito. | Objection 3. Further, of the Blessed Virgin it is sung that "she merited to bear the Lord of all" [Little Office of B.V.M., Dominican Rite, Ant. at Benedictus], and this took place through Incarnation. Therefore Incarnation falls under merit. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 11 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. sanctorum, quisquis in capite nostro praecedentia merita singularis illius generationis invenerit, ipse in nobis, membris eius, praecedentia merita multiplicatae regenerationis inquirat. Sed nulla merita praecesserunt regenerationem nostram secundum illud Tit. III, non ex operibus iustitiae quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit per lavacrum regenerationis. Ergo nec illam Christi generationem aliqua merita praecesserunt. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. xv): "Whoever can find merits preceding the singular generation of our Head, may also find merits preceding the repeated regeneration of us His members." But no merits preceded our regeneration, according to Titus 3:5: "Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us, by the laver of regeneration." Therefore no merits preceded the generation of Christ. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 11 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, quantum ad ipsum Christum, manifestum est ex praemissis quod nulla eius merita potuerunt praecedere unionem. Non enim ponimus quod ante fuerit purus homo, et postea per meritum bonae vitae obtinuerit esse filius Dei, sicut posuit Photinus, sed ponimus quod a principio suae conceptionis ille homo vere fuerit filius Dei, utpote non habens aliam hypostasim quam filium Dei, secundum illud Luc. I, quod ex te nascetur sanctum, vocabitur filius Dei. Et ideo omnis operatio illius hominis subsecuta est unionem. Unde nulla eius operatio potuit esse meritum unionis. Sed neque etiam opera cuiuscumque alterius hominis potuerunt esse meritoria huius unionis ex condigno. Primo quidem, quia opera meritoria hominis proprie ordinantur ad beatitudinem, quae est virtutis praemium, et consistit in plena Dei fruitione. Unio autem incarnationis, cum sit in esse personali, transcendit unionem mentis beatae ad Deum, quae est per actum fruentis. Et ita non potest cadere sub merito. Secundo, quia gratia non potest cadere sub merito, quia est merendi principium. Unde multo minus incarnatio cadit sub merito, quae est principium gratiae, secundum illud Ioan. I, gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est. Tertio, quia incarnatio Christi est reformativa totius humanae naturae. Et ideo non cadit sub merito alicuius hominis singularis, quia bonum alicuius puri hominis non potest esse causa boni totius naturae. Ex congruo tamen meruerunt sancti patres incarnationem, desiderando et petendo. Congruum enim erat ut Deus exaudiret eos qui ei obediebant. | I answer that, With regard to Christ Himself, it is clear from the above (Article 10) that no merits of His could have preceded the union. For we do not hold that He was first of all a mere man, and that afterwards by the merits of a good life it was granted Him to become the Son of God, as Photinus held; but we hold that from the beginning of His conception this man was truly the Son of God, seeing that He had no other hypostasis but that of the Son of God, according to Luke 1:35: "The Holy which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God." And hence every operation of this man followed the union. Therefore no operation of His could have been meritorious of the union. Neither could the needs of any other man whatsoever have merited this union condignly: first, because the meritorious works of man are properly ordained to beatitude, which is the reward of virtue, and consists in the full enjoyment of God. Whereas the union of the Incarnation, inasmuch as it is in the personal being, transcends the union of the beatified mind with God, which is by the act of the soul in fruition; and therefore it cannot fall under merit. Secondly, because grace cannot fall under merit, for the principle of merit does not fall under merit; and therefore neither does grace, for it is the principle of merit. Hence, still less does Incarnation fall under merit, since it is the principle of grace, according to John 1:17: "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Thirdly, because Incarnation is for the reformation of the entire human nature, and therefore it does not fall under the merit of any individual man, since the goodness of a mere man cannot be the cause of the good of the entire nature. Yet the holy Fathers merited Incarnation congruously by desiring and beseeching; for it was becoming that God should harken to those who obeyed Him. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 11 ad 1 Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. | And thereby the reply to the First Objection is manifest. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 11 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum hoc esse falsum, quod sub merito cadat omne illud sine quo praemium esse non potest. Quaedam enim sunt quae non solum requiruntur ad praemium, sed etiam praeexiguntur ad meritum, sicut divina bonitas et eius gratia, et ipsa hominis natura. Et similiter incarnationis mysterium est principium merendi, quia de plenitudine Christi omnes accepimus, ut dicitur Ioan. I. | Reply to Objection 2. It is false that under merit falls everything without which there can be no reward. For there is something pre-required not merely for reward, but also for merit, as the Divine goodness and grace and the very nature of man. And again, the mystery of Incarnation is the principle of merit, because "of His fulness we all have received" (John 1:16). |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 11 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod beata virgo dicitur meruisse portare dominum Iesum Christum, non quia meruit Deum incarnari, sed quia meruit, ex gratia sibi data, illum puritatis et sanctitatis gradum ut congrue posset esse mater Dei. | Reply to Objection 3. The Blessed Virgin is said to have merited to bear the Lord of all; not that she merited His Incarnation, but because by the grace bestowed upon her she merited that grade of purity and holiness, which fitted her to be the Mother of God. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 12 arg. 1 Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia unionis non fuerit Christo homini naturalis. Unio enim incarnationis non est facta in natura, sed in persona, ut supra dictum est. Sed unumquodque denominatur a termino. Ergo gratia illa magis debet dici personalis quam naturalis. | Objection 1. It would seem that the grace of union was not natural to the man Christ. For the union of Incarnation did not take place in the nature, but in the Person, as was said above (Article 2). Now a thing is denominated from its terminus. Therefore this grace ought rather to be called personal than natural. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 12 arg. 2 Praeterea, gratia dividitur contra naturam, sicut gratuita, quae sunt a Deo, distinguuntur contra naturalia, quae sunt a principio intrinseco. Sed eorum quae ex opposito dividuntur, unum non denominatur ab alio. Ergo gratia Christi non est ei naturalis. | Objection 2. Further, grace is divided against nature, even as gratuitous things, which are from God, are distinguished from natural things, which are from an intrinsic principle. But if things are divided in opposition to one another, one is not denominated by the other. Therefore the grace of Christ was not natural to Him. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 12 arg. 3 Praeterea, naturale dicitur quod est secundum naturam. Sed gratia unionis non est naturalis Christo secundum naturam divinam, quia sic conveniret etiam aliis personis. Neque etiam naturalis est ei secundum naturam humanam, quia sic conveniret omnibus hominibus qui sunt eiusdem naturae cum ipso. Ergo videtur quod nullo modo gratia unionis sit Christo naturalis. | Objection 3. Further, natural is that which is according to nature. But the grace of union is not natural to Christ in regard to the Divine Nature, otherwise it would belong to the other Persons; nor is it natural to Him according to the human nature, otherwise it would belong to all men, since they are of the same nature as He. Therefore it would seem that the grace of union is nowise natural to Christ. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 12 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., in naturae humanae susceptione fit quodammodo ipsa gratia illi homini naturalis, qua nullum possit admittere peccatum. | On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): "In the assumption of human nature, grace itself became somewhat natural to that man, so as to leave no room for sin in Him." |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 12 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in V Metaphys., natura uno modo dicitur ipsa nativitas, alio modo essentia rei. Unde naturale potest aliquid dici dupliciter. Uno modo, quod est tantum ex principiis essentialibus rei, sicut igni naturale est sursum ferri. Alio modo dicitur esse homini naturale quod ab ipsa nativitate habet, secundum illud Ephes. II, eramus natura filii irae; et Sap. XII, nequam est natio eorum, et naturalis malitia ipsorum. Gratia igitur Christi, sive unionis sive habitualis, non potest dici naturalis quasi causata ex principiis naturae humanae in ipso, quamvis possit dici naturalis quasi proveniens in naturam humanam Christi causante divina natura ipsius. Dicitur autem naturalis utraque gratia in Christo inquantum eam a nativitate habuit, quia ab initio conceptionis fuit natura humana divinae personae unita, et anima eius fuit munere gratiae repleta. | I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), nature designates, in one way, nativity; in another, the essence of a thing. Hence natural may be taken in two ways: first, for what is only from the essential principles of a thing, as it is natural to fire to mount; secondly, we call natural to man what he has had from his birth, according to Ephesians 2:3: "We were by nature children of wrath"; and Wisdom 12:10: "They were a wicked generation, and their malice natural." Therefore the grace of Christ, whether of union or habitual, cannot be called natural as if caused by the principles of the human nature of Christ, although it may be called natural, as if coming to the human nature of Christ by the causality of His Divine Nature. But these two kinds of grace are said to be natural to Christ, inasmuch as He had them from His nativity, since from the beginning of His conception the human nature was united to the Divine Person, and His soul was filled with the gift of grace. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 12 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet unio non sit facta in natura, est tamen causata ex virtute divinae naturae, quae est vere natura Christi. Et etiam convenit Christo a principio nativitatis. | Reply to Objection 1. Although the union did not take place in the nature, yet it was caused by the power of the Divine Nature, which is truly the nature of Christ, and it, moreover, belonged to Christ from the beginning of His nativity. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 12 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod non secundum idem dicitur gratia, et naturalis. Sed gratia quidem dicitur inquantum non est ex merito, naturalis autem dicitur inquantum est ex virtute divinae naturae in humanitate Christi ab eius nativitate. | Reply to Objection 2. The union is not said to be grace and natural in the same respect; for it is called grace inasmuch as it is not from merit; and it is said to be natural inasmuch as by the power of the Divine Nature it was in the humanity of Christ from His nativity. |
| IIIª q. 2 a. 12 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod gratia unionis non est naturalis Christo secundum humanam naturam, quasi ex principiis humanae naturae causata. Et ideo non oportet quod conveniat omnibus hominibus. Est tamen naturalis ei secundum humanam naturam, propter proprietatem nativitatis ipsius, prout sic conceptus est ex spiritu sancto ut esset idem naturalis filius Dei et hominis. Secundum vero divinam naturam est ei naturalis, inquantum divina natura est principium activum huius gratiae. Et hoc convenit toti Trinitati, scilicet huius gratiae esse activum principium. | Reply to Objection 3. The grace of union is not natural to Christ according to His human nature, as if it were caused by the principles of the human nature, and hence it need not belong to all men. Nevertheless, it is natural to Him in regard to the human nature on account of the "property" of His birth, seeing that He was conceived by the Holy Ghost, so that He might be the natural Son of God and of man. But it is natural to Him in regard to the Divine Nature, inasmuch as the Divine Nature is the active principle of this grace; and this belongs to the whole Trinity--to wit, to be the active principle of this grace. |
| IIIª q. 3 pr. Deinde considerandum est de unione ex parte personae assumentis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum assumere conveniat personae divinae. Secundo, utrum conveniat naturae divinae. Tertio, utrum natura possit assumere, abstracta personalitate. Quarto, utrum una persona possit assumere sine alia. Quinto, utrum quaelibet persona possit assumere. Sexto, utrum plures personae possint assumere unam naturam numero. Septimo, utrum una persona possit assumere duas naturas numero. Octavo, utrum magis fuerit conveniens de persona filii quod assumpsit humanam naturam, quam de alia persona divina. | Question 3. The mode of union on the part of the person assuming 1. Is it befitting to a Divine Person to assume? 2. Is it befitting to the Divine nature? 3. Can the nature abstracted from the Personality assume? 4. Can one Person assume without another? 5. Can each Person assume? 6. Can several Persons assume one individual nature? 7. Can one Person assume two individual natures? 8. Was it more fitting for the Person of the Son of God to assume human nature than for another Divine Person? |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod personae divinae non conveniat assumere naturam creatam. Persona enim divina significat aliquid maxime perfectum. Perfectum autem est cui non potest fieri additio. Cum igitur assumere sit quasi ad se sumere, ita quod assumptum addatur assumenti, videtur quod personae divinae non conveniat assumere naturam creatam. | Objection 1. It would seem that it is not befitting to a Divine Person to assume a created nature. For a Divine Person signifies something most perfect. Now no addition can be made to what is perfect. Therefore, since to assume is to take to oneself, and consequently what is assumed is added to the one who assumes, it does not seem to be befitting to a Divine Person to assume a created nature. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud ad quod aliquid assumitur, communicatur quodammodo ei quod in ipsum assumitur, sicut dignitas communicatur ei qui in dignitatem assumitur. Sed de ratione personae est quod sit incommunicabilis, ut in prima parte dictum est. Ergo personae divinae non convenit assumere, quod est ad se sumere. | Objection 2. Further, that to which anything is assumed is communicated in some degree to what is assumed to it, just as dignity is communicated to whosoever is assumed to a dignity. But it is of the nature of a person to be incommunicable, as was said above (I, 29, 1). Therefore it is not befitting to a Divine Person to assume, i.e. to take to Himself. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, persona constituitur per naturam. Sed inconveniens est quod constitutum assumat constituens, quia effectus non agit in suam causam. Ergo personae non convenit assumere naturam. | Objection 3. Further, person is constituted by nature. But it is repugnant that the thing constituted should assume the constituent, since the effect does not act on its cause. Hence it is not befitting to a Person to assume a nature. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de fide ad Petrum, formam, idest naturam servi in suam accepit Deus ille, scilicet unigenitus, personam. Sed Deus unigenitus est persona. Ergo personae competit accipere naturam, quod est assumere. | On the contrary, Augustine [Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum ii): "This God, i.e. the only-Begotten one, took the form," i.e. the nature, "of a servant to His own Person." But the only-Begotten God is a Person. Therefore it is befitting to a Person to take, i.e. to assume a nature. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in verbo assumptionis duo importantur, videlicet principium actus, et terminus, dicitur enim assumere quasi ad se aliquid sumere. Huius autem assumptionis persona est et principium et terminus. Principium quidem, quia personae proprie competit agere, huiusmodi autem sumptio carnis per actionem divinam facta est. Similiter etiam persona est huius sumptionis terminus, quia, sicut supra dictum est, unio facta est in persona, non in natura. Et sic patet quod propriissime competit personae assumere naturam. | I answer that, In the word "assumption" are implied two things, viz. the principle and the term of the act, for to assume is to take something to oneself. Now of this assumption a Person is both the principle and the term. The principle--because it properly belongs to a person to act, and this assuming of flesh took place by the Divine action. Likewise a Person is the term of this assumption, because, as was said above (2, 1,2), the union took place in the Person, and not in the nature. Hence it is plain that to assume a nature is most properly befitting to a Person. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum persona divina sit infinita, non potest ei fieri additio. Unde Cyrillus dicit, in epistola synodali Ephesini Concilii, non secundum coappositionem coniunctionis intelligimus modum. Sicut etiam in unione hominis ad Deum quae est per gratiam adoptionis, non additur aliquid Deo, sed id quod divinum est apponitur homini. Unde non Deus, sed homo perficitur. | Reply to Objection 1. Since the Divine Person is infinite, no addition can be made to it: Hence Cyril says [Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 26]: "We do not conceive the mode of conjunction to be according to addition"; just as in the union of man with God, nothing is added to God by the grace of adoption, but what is Divine is united to man; hence, not God but man is perfected. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod persona dicitur incommunicabilis inquantum non potest de pluribus suppositis praedicari. Nihil tamen prohibet plura de persona praedicari. Unde non est contra rationem personae sic communicari ut subsistat in pluribus naturis. Quia etiam in personam creatam possunt plures naturae concurrere accidentaliter, sicut in persona unius hominis invenitur quantitas et qualitas. Hoc autem est proprium divinae personae, propter eius infinitatem, ut fiat in ea concursus naturarum, non quidem accidentaliter, sed secundum subsistentiam. | Reply to Objection 2. A Divine Person is said to be incommunicable inasmuch as It cannot be predicated of several supposita, but nothing prevents several things being predicated of the Person. Hence it is not contrary to the nature of person to be communicated so as to subsist in several natures, for even in a created person several natures may concur accidentally, as in the person of one man we find quantity and quality. But this is proper to a Divine Person, on account of its infinity, that there should be a concourse of natures in it, not accidentally, but in subsistence. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, natura humana non constituit personam divinam simpliciter, sed constituit eam secundum quod denominatur a tali natura. Non enim ex natura humana habet filius Dei quod sit simpliciter, cum fuerit ab aeterno, sed solum quod sit homo. Sed secundum naturam divinam constituitur persona divina simpliciter. Unde persona divina non dicitur assumere divinam naturam, sed humanam. | Reply to Objection 3. As was said above (Question 2, Article 1), the human nature constitutes a Divine Person, not simply, but forasmuch as the Person is denominated from such a nature. For human nature does not make the Son of Man to be simply, since He was from eternity, but only to be man. It is by the Divine Nature that a Divine Person is constituted simply. Hence the Divine Person is not said to assume the Divine Nature, but to assume the human nature. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod naturae divinae non conveniat assumere. Quia, sicut dictum est assumere dicitur quasi ad se sumere. Sed natura divina non sumpsit ad se humanam naturam, quia non est facta unio in natura, sed in persona, sicut supra dictum est. Ergo naturae divinae non competit assumere naturam humanam. | Objection 1. It would seem that it is not befitting to the Divine Nature to assume. Because, as was said above (Article 1), to assume is to take to oneself. But the Divine Nature did not take to Itself human nature, for the union did not take place in the nature, as was said above (2, 1,3). Hence it is not befitting to the Divine Nature to assume human nature. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, natura divina communis est tribus personis. Si igitur naturae convenit assumere, sequitur quod conveniat tribus personis et ita pater assumpsit humanam naturam, sicut et filius. Quod est erroneum. | Objection 2. Further, the Divine Nature is common to the three Persons. If, therefore, it is befitting to the Divine Nature to assume, it consequently is befitting to the three Persons; and thus the Father assumed human nature even as the Son, which is erroneous. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, assumere est agere. Agere autem convenit personae, non naturae, quae magis significatur ut principium quo agens agit. Ergo assumere non convenit naturae. | Objection 3. Further, to assume is to act. But to act befits a person, not a nature, which is rather taken to be the principle by which the agent acts. Therefore to assume is not befitting to the nature. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de fide ad Petrum, illa natura quae semper genita manet ex patre, idest, quae est per generationem aeternam accepta a patre, naturam nostram sine peccato suscepit. | On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius) says (De Fide ad Petrum ii): "That nature which remains eternally begotten of the Father" (i.e. which is received from the Father by eternal generation) "took our nature free of sin from His Mother." |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, in verbo assumptionis duo significantur, scilicet principium actionis, et terminus eius. Esse autem assumptionis principium convenit naturae divinae secundum seipsam, quia eius virtute assumptio facta est. Sed esse terminum assumptionis non convenit naturae divinae secundum seipsam, sed ratione personae in qua consideratur. Et ideo primo quidem et propriissime persona dicitur assumere, secundario autem potest dici quod etiam natura assumit naturam ad sui personam. Et secundum etiam hunc modum dicitur natura incarnata, non quasi sit in carnem conversa; sed quia naturam carnis assumpsit. Unde dicit Damascenus, dicimus naturam Dei incarnatam esse, secundum beatos Athanasium et Cyrillum. | I answer that, As was said above (Article 1), in the word assumption two things are signified--to wit, the principle and the term of the action. Now to be the principle of the assumption belongs to the Divine Nature in itself, because the assumption took place by Its power; but to be the term of the assumption does not belong to the Divine Nature in itself, but by reason of the Person in Whom It is considered to be. Hence a Person is primarily and more properly said to assume, but it may be said secondarily that the Nature assumed a nature to Its Person. And after the same manner the Nature is also said to be incarnate, not that it is changed to flesh, but that it assumed the nature of flesh. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6): "Following the blessed Athanasius and Cyril we say that the Nature of God is incarnate." |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ly se est reciprocum, et refert idem suppositum. Natura autem divina non differt supposito a persona verbi. Et ideo, inquantum natura divina sumit naturam humanam ad personam verbi, dicitur eam ad se sumere. Sed quamvis pater assumat naturam humanam ad personam verbi, non tamen propter hoc sumit eam ad se, quia non est idem suppositum patris et verbi. Et ideo non potest dici proprie quod pater assumat naturam humanam. | Reply to Objection 1. "Oneself" is reciprocal, and points to the same suppositum. But the Divine Nature is not a distinct suppositum from the Person of the Word. Hence, inasmuch as the Divine Nature took human nature to the Person of the Word, It is said to take it to Itself. But although the Father takes human nature to the Person of the Word, He did not thereby take it to Himself, for the suppositum of the Father and the Son is not one. and hence it cannot properly be said that the Father assumes human nature. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod id quod convenit divinae naturae secundum se, convenit tribus personis, sicut bonitas, sapientia et huiusmodi. Sed assumere convenit ei ratione personae verbi, sicut dictum est. Et ideo soli illi personae convenit. | Reply to Objection 2. What is befitting to the Divine Nature in Itself is befitting to the three Persons, as goodness, wisdom, and the like. But to assume belongs to It by reason of the Person of the Word, as was said above, and hence it is befitting to that Person alone. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut in Deo idem est quod est et quo est, ita etiam in eo idem est quod agit et quo agit, quia unumquodque agit inquantum est ens. Unde natura divina et est id quo Deus agit, et est ipse Deus agens. | Reply to Objection 3. As in God "what is" and "whereby it is" are the same, so likewise in Him "what acts" and "whereby it acts" are the same, since everything acts, inasmuch as it is a being. Hence the Divine Nature is both that whereby God acts, and the very God Who acts. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod, abstracta personalitate per intellectum, natura non possit assumere. Dictum est enim quod naturae convenit assumere ratione personae. Sed quod convenit alicui ratione alicuius, remoto eo, non potest ei convenire, sicut corpus, quod est visibile ratione coloris, sine colore videri non potest. Ergo, abstracta personalitate per intellectum, natura assumere non potest. | Objection 1. It would seem that if we abstract the Personality by our mind, the Nature cannot assume. For it was said above (Article 1) that it belongs to the Nature to assume by reason of the Person. But what belongs to one by reason of another cannot belong to it if the other is removed; as a body, which is visible by reason of color, without color cannot be seen. Hence if the Personality be mentally abstracted, the Nature cannot assume. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, assumptio importat terminum unionis, ut dictum est. Sed unio non potest fieri in natura, sed solum in persona. Ergo, abstracta personalitate, natura divina non potest assumere. | Objection 2. Further, assumption implies the term of union, as was said above (Article 1). But the union cannot take place in the nature, but only in the Person. Therefore, if the Personality be abstracted, the Divine Nature cannot assume. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, in prima parte dictum est quod in divinis, abstracta personalitate, nihil manet. Sed assumens est aliquid. Ergo, abstracta personalitate, non potest divina natura assumere. | Objection 3. Further, it has been said above (I, 40, 3) that in the Godhead if the Personality is abstracted, nothing remains. But the one who assumes is something. Therefore, if the Personality is abstracted, the Divine Nature cannot assume. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod in divinis personalitas dicitur proprietas personalis, quae est triplex, scilicet paternitas, processio et filiatio, ut in prima parte dictum est. Sed, remotis his per intellectum, adhuc remanet Dei omnipotentia, per quam est facta incarnatio, sicut Angelus dixit, Luc. I, non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum. Ergo videtur quod, etiam remota personalitate, natura divina possit assumere. | On the contrary, In the Godhead Personality signifies a personal property; and this is threefold, viz. Paternity, Filiation and Procession, as was said above (I, 30, 2). Now if we mentally abstract these, there still remains the omnipotence of God, by which the Incarnation was wrought, as the angel says (Luke 1:37): "No word shall be impossible with God." Therefore it seems that if the Personality be removed, the Divine Nature can still assume. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus dupliciter se habet ad divina uno modo, ut cognoscat Deum sicuti est. Et sic impossibile est quod circumscribatur per intellectum aliquid a Deo quod aliud remaneat, quia totum quod est in Deo est unum, salva distinctione personarum; quarum tamen una tollitur, sublata alia, quia distinguuntur solum relationibus, quas oportet esse simul. Alio modo se habet intellectus ad divina, non quidem quasi cognoscens Deum ut est, sed per modum suum, scilicet multipliciter et divisim id quod in Deo est unum. Et per hunc modum potest intellectus noster intelligere bonitatem et sapientiam divinam, et alia huiusmodi, quae dicuntur essentialia attributa, non intellecta paternitate vel filiatione, quae dicuntur personalitates. Et secundum hoc, abstracta personalitate per intellectum, possumus adhuc intelligere naturam assumentem. | I answer that, The intellect stands in two ways towards God. First, to know God as He is, and in this manner it is impossible for the intellect to circumscribe something in God and leave the rest, for all that is in God is one, except the distinction of Persons; and as regards these, if one is removed the other is taken away, since they are distinguished by relations only which must be together at the same time. Secondly, the intellect stands towards God, not indeed as knowing God as He is, but in its own way, i.e. understanding manifoldly and separately what in God is one: and in this way our intellect can understand the Divine goodness and wisdom, and the like, which are called essential attributes, without understanding Paternity or Filiation, which are called Personalities. And hence if we abstract Personality by our intellect, we may still understand the Nature assuming. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia in divinis idem est quo est et quod est, quidquid eorum quae attribuuntur Deo in abstracto secundum se consideretur, aliis circumscriptis, erit aliquid subsistens, et per consequens persona, cum sit in natura intellectuali. Sicut igitur nunc, positis proprietatibus personalibus in Deo, dicimus tres personas, ita, exclusis per intellectum proprietatibus personalibus, remanebit in consideratione nostra natura divina ut subsistens, et ut persona. Et per hunc modum potest intelligi quod assumat naturam humanam ratione suae subsistentiae vel personalitatis. | Reply to Objection 1. Because in God "what is," and "whereby it is," are one, if any one of the things which are attributed to God in the abstract is considered in itself, abstracted from all else, it will still be something subsisting, and consequently a Person, since it is an intellectual nature. Hence just as we now say three Persons, on account of holding three personal properties, so likewise if we mentally exclude the personal properties there will still remain in our thought the Divine Nature as subsisting and as a Person. And in this way It may be understood to assume human nature by reason of Its subsistence or Personality. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, etiam circumscriptis per intellectum personalitatibus trium personarum, remanebit in intellectu una personalitas Dei, ut Iudaei intelligunt, ad quam poterit terminari assumptio, sicut nunc dicimus eam terminari ad personam verbi. | Reply to Objection 2. Even if the personal properties of the three Persons are abstracted by our mind, nevertheless there will remain in our thoughts the one Personality of God, as the Jews consider. And the assumption can be terminated in It, as we now say it is terminated in the Person of the Word. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, abstracta personalitate per intellectum, dicitur nihil remanere per modum resolutionis, quasi aliud sit quod subiicitur relationi, et aliud ipsa relatio, quia quidquid consideratur in Deo, consideratur ut suppositum subsistens. Potest tamen aliquid eorum quae dicuntur de Deo intelligi sine alio, non per modum resolutionis, sed per modum iam dictum. | Reply to Objection 3. If we mentally abstract the Personality, it is said that nothing remains by way of resolution, i.e. as if the subject of the relation and the relation itself were distinct because all we can think of in God is considered as a subsisting suppositum. However, some of the things predicated of God can be understood without others, not by way of resolution, but by the way mentioned above. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod una persona non possit assumere naturam creatam, alia non assumente. Indivisa enim sunt opera Trinitatis, ut dicit Augustinus, in Enchirid., sicut enim trium personarum est una essentia, ita una operatio. Sed assumere est operatio quaedam. Ergo non potest convenire uni personae divinae quin conveniat alii. | Objection 1. It would seem that one Person cannot assume a created nature without another assuming it. For "the works of the Trinity are inseparable," as Augustine says (Enchiridion xxxviii). But as the three Persons have one essence, so likewise They have one operation. Now to assume is an operation. Therefore it cannot belong to one without belonging to another. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut dicimus personam filii incarnatam, ita et naturam, tota enim divina natura in una suarum hypostasum incarnata est, ut dicit Damascenus, in III libro. Sed natura communis est tribus personis. Ergo et assumptio. | Objection 2. Further, as we say the Person of the Son became incarnate, so also did the Nature; for "the whole Divine Nature became incarnate in one of Its hypostases," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6). But the Nature is common to the three Persons. Therefore the assumption is. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut humana natura in Christo assumpta est a Deo, ita etiam et homines per gratiam assumuntur ab ipso, secundum illud Rom. XIV, Deus illum assumpsit. Sed haec assumptio communiter pertinet ad omnes personas. Ergo et prima. | Objection 3. Further, as the human nature in Christ is assumed by God, so likewise are men assumed by Him through grace, according to Romans 14:3: "God hath taken him to Him." But this assumption pertains to all the Persons; therefore the first also. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius, II cap. de Div. Nom., incarnationis mysterium dicit pertinere ad discretam theologiam, secundum quam scilicet aliquid distinctum dicitur de divinis personis. | On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that the mystery of the Incarnation pertains to "discrete theology," i.e. according to which something "distinct" is said of the Divine Persons. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, assumptio duo importat, scilicet actum assumentis, et terminum assumptionis. Actus autem assumentis procedit ex divina virtute, quae communis est tribus personis, sed terminus assumptionis est persona, sicut dictum est. Et ideo id quod est actionis in assumptione, commune est tribus personis, sed id quod pertinet ad rationem termini, convenit ita uni personae quod non alii. Tres enim personae fecerunt ut humana natura uniretur uni personae filii. | I answer that, As was said above (Article 1), assumption implies two things, viz. the act of assuming and the term of assumption. Now the act of assumption proceeds from the Divine power, which is common to the three Persons, but the term of the assumption is a Person, as stated above (Article 2). Hence what has to do with action in the assumption is common to the three Persons; but what pertains to the nature of term belongs to one Person in such a manner as not to belong to another; for the three Persons caused the human nature to be united to the one Person of the Son. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ex parte operationis. Et sequeretur conclusio si solam illam operationem importaret absque termino, qui est persona. | Reply to Objection 1. This reason regards the operation, and the conclusion would follow if it implied this operation only, without the term, which is a Person. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod natura dicitur incarnata, sicut et assumens, ratione personae ad quam terminata est unio, sicut dictum est, non autem prout est communis tribus personis. Dicitur autem tota natura divina incarnata, non quia sit incarnata in omnibus personis, sed quia nihil deest de perfectione divinae naturae personae incarnatae. | Reply to Objection 2. The Nature is said to be incarnate, and to assume by reason of the Person in Whom the union is terminated, as stated above (1,2), and not as it is common to the three Persons. Now "the whole Divine Nature is" said to be "incarnate"; not that It is incarnate in all the Persons, but inasmuch as nothing is wanting to the perfection of the Divine Nature of the Person incarnate, as Damascene explains there. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod assumptio quae fit per gratiam adoptionis, terminatur ad quandam participationem divinae naturae secundum assimilationem ad bonitatem illius, secundum illud II Pet. I, ut divinae consortes naturae, et cetera. Et ideo huiusmodi assumptio communis est tribus personis et ex parte principii et ex parte termini. Sed assumptio quae est per gratiam unionis, est communis ex parte principii, non autem ex parte termini, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3. The assumption which takes place by the grace of adoption is terminated in a certain participation of the Divine Nature, by an assimilation to Its goodness, according to 2 Peter 1:4: "That you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature"; and hence this assumption is common to the three Persons, in regard to the principle and the term. But the assumption which is by the grace of union is common on the part of the principle, but not on the part of the term, as was said above. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla alia persona divina potuit humanam naturam assumere, praeter personam filii. Per huiusmodi enim assumptionem factum est quod Deus sit filius hominis. Sed inconveniens esset quod esse filium conveniret patri vel spiritui sancto, hoc enim vergeret in confusionem divinarum personarum. Ergo pater et spiritus sanctus carnem assumere non possent. | Objection 1. It would seem that no other Divine Person could have assumed human nature except the Person of the Son. For by this assumption it has been brought about that God is the Son of Man. But it was not becoming that either the Father or the Holy Ghost should be said to be a Son; for this would tend to the confusion of the Divine Persons. Therefore the Father and Holy Ghost could not have assumed flesh. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, per incarnationem divinam homines sunt assecuti adoptionem filiorum, secundum illud Rom. VIII, non accepistis spiritum servitutis iterum in timore, sed spiritum adoptionis filiorum. Sed filiatio adoptiva est participata similitudo filiationis naturalis, quae non convenit nec patri nec spiritui sancto, unde dicitur Rom. VIII, quos praescivit et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis filii sui. Ergo videtur quod nulla alia persona potuit incarnari praeter personam filii. | Objection 2. Further, by the Divine Incarnation men have come into possession of the adoption of sons, according to Romans 8:15: "For you have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but the spirit of adoption of sons." But sonship by adoption is a participated likeness of natural sonship which does not belong to the Father nor the Holy Ghost; hence it is said (Romans 8:29): "For whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son." Therefore it seems that no other Person except the Person of the Son could have become incarnate. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, filius dicitur missus, et genitus nativitate temporali, secundum quod incarnatus est. Sed patri non convenit mitti, qui est innascibilis, ut in prima parte habitum est. Ergo saltem persona patris non potuit incarnari. | Objection 3. Further, the Son is said to be sent and to be begotten by the temporal nativity, inasmuch as He became incarnate. But it does not belong to the Father to be sent, for He is innascible, as was said above (I, 32, 3; I, 43, 4). Therefore at least the Person of the Father cannot become incarnate. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra, quidquid potest filius, potest pater, alioquin, non esset eadem potentia trium. Sed filius potuit incarnari. Ergo similiter pater et spiritus sanctus. | On the contrary, Whatever the Son can do, so can the Father and the Holy Ghost, otherwise the power of the three Persons would not be one. But the Son was able to become incarnate. Therefore the Father and the Holy Ghost were able to become incarnate. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, assumptio duo importat, scilicet ipsum actum assumentis, et terminum assumptionis. Principium autem actus est virtus divina, terminus autem est persona. Virtus autem divina communiter et indifferenter se habet ad omnes personas. Eadem etiam est communis ratio personalitatis in tribus personis, licet proprietates personales sint differentes. Quandocumque autem virtus aliqua indifferenter se habet ad plura, potest ad quodlibet eorum suam actionem terminare, sicut patet in potentiis rationalibus, quae se habent ad opposita, quorum utrumque agere possunt. Sic ergo divina virtus potuit naturam humanam unire vel personae patris vel spiritus sancti, sicut univit eam personae filii. Et ideo dicendum est quod pater vel spiritus sanctus potuit carnem assumere, sicut et filius. | I answer that, As was said above (1,2,4), assumption implies two things, viz. the act of the one assuming and the term of the assumption. Now the principle of the act is the Divine power, and the term is a Person. But the Divine power is indifferently and commonly in all the Persons. Moreover, the nature of Personality is common to all the Persons, although the personal properties are different. Now whenever a power regards several things indifferently, it can terminate its action in any of them indifferently, as is plain in rational powers, which regard opposites, and can do either of them. Therefore the Divine power could have united human nature to the Person of the Father or of the Holy Ghost, as It united it to the Person of the Son. And hence we must say that the Father or the Holy Ghost could have assumed flesh even as the Son. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod filiatio temporalis, qua Christus dicitur filius hominis, non constituit personam ipsius, sicut filiatio aeterna, sed est quiddam consequens nativitatem temporalem. Unde, si per hunc modum nomen filiationis ad patrem vel spiritum sanctum transferretur, nulla sequeretur confusio divinarum personarum. | Reply to Objection 1. The temporal sonship, whereby Christ is said to be the Son of Man, does not constitute His Person, as does the eternal Sonship; but is something following upon the temporal nativity. Hence, if the name of son were transferred to the Father or the Holy Ghost in this manner, there would be no confusion of the Divine Persons. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod filiatio adoptiva est quaedam participata similitudo filiationis naturalis; sed fit in nobis appropriate a patre, qui est principium naturalis filiationis; et per donum spiritus sancti, qui est amor patris et filii; secundum illud Galat. IV, misit Deus spiritum filii sui in corda nostra, clamantem, abba, pater. Et ideo sicut, filio incarnato, adoptivam filiationem accipimus ad similitudinem naturalis filiationis eius; ita, patre incarnato, adoptivam filiationem reciperemus ab eo tanquam a principio naturalis filiationis; et a spiritu sancto, tanquam a nexu communi patris et filii. | Reply to Objection 2. Adoptive sonship is a certain participation of natural sonship; but it takes place in us, by appropriation, by the Father, Who is the principle of natural sonship, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and Son, according to Galatians 4:6: "God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts crying, Abba, Father." And therefore, even as by Incarnation of the Son we receive adoptive sonship in the likeness of His natural sonship, so likewise, had the Father become incarnate, we should have received adoptive sonship from Him, as from the principle of the natural sonship, and from the Holy Ghost as from the common bond of Father and Son. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod patri convenit esse innascibilem secundum nativitatem aeternam, quod non excluderet nativitas temporalis. Mitti autem dicitur filius secundum incarnationem, eo quod est ab illo, sine quo incarnatio non sufficeret ad rationem missionis. | Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to the Father to be innascible as to eternal birth, and the temporal birth would not destroy this. But the Son of God is said to be sent in regard to Incarnation, inasmuch as He is from another, without which Incarnation would not suffice for the nature of mission. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod duae personae divinae non possunt assumere unam et eandem numero naturam. Hoc enim supposito aut essent unus homo, vel plures. Sed non plures, sicut enim una natura divina in pluribus personis non patitur esse plures deos, ita una humana natura in pluribus personis non patitur esse plures homines. Similiter etiam non possent esse unus homo, quia unus homo est iste homo, qui demonstrat unam personam; et sic tolleretur distinctio trium personarum divinarum, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo duae aut tres personae possunt accipere unam naturam humanam. | Objection 1. It would seem that two Divine Persons cannot assume one and the same individual nature. For, this being granted, there would either be several men or one. But not several, for just as one Divine Nature in several Persons does not make several gods, so one human nature in several persons does not make several men. Nor would there be only one man, for one man is "this man," which signifies one person; and hence the distinction of three Divine Persons would be destroyed, which cannot be allowed. Therefore neither two nor three Persons can take one human nature. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, assumptio terminatur ad unitatem personae, ut dictum est. Sed non est una persona patris et filii et spiritus sancti. Ergo non possunt tres personae assumere unam naturam humanam. | Objection 2. Further, the assumption is terminated in the unity of Person, as has been said above (Article 2). But the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not one Person. Therefore the three Persons cannot assume one human nature. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in III libro, et Augustinus, in I de Trin., quod ex incarnatione filii Dei consequitur quod quidquid dicitur de filio Dei, dicitur de filio hominis, et e converso. Si ergo tres personae assumerent unam naturam humanam, sequitur quod quidquid dicitur de qualibet trium personarum, diceretur de illo homine, et e converso ea quae dicerentur de illo homine, possent dici de qualibet trium personarum. Sic ergo id quod est proprium patris, scilicet generare filium ab aeterno, diceretur de illo homine, et per consequens diceretur de filio Dei, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo est possibile quod tres personae divinae assumant unam naturam humanam. | Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4), and Augustine (De Trin. i, 11,12,13), that from Incarnation of God the Son it follows that whatever is said of the Son of God is said of the Son of Man, and conversely. Hence, if three Persons were to assume one human nature, it would follow that whatever is said of each of the three Persons would be said of the man; and conversely, what was said of the man could be said of each of the three Persons. Therefore what is proper to the Father, viz. to beget the Son, would be said of the man, and consequently would be said of the Son of God; and this could not be. Therefore it is impossible that the three Persons should assume one human nature. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra, persona incarnata subsistit in duabus naturis, divina scilicet et humana. Sed tres personae possunt subsistere in una natura divina. Ergo etiam possunt subsistere in una natura humana, ita scilicet quod sit una natura humana a tribus personis assumpta. | On the contrary, The Incarnate Person subsists in two natures. But the three Persons can subsist in one Divine Nature. Therefore they can also subsist in one human nature in such a way that the human nature be assumed by the three Persons. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ex unione animae et corporis in Christo non fit neque nova persona neque hypostasis, sed fit una natura assumpta in personam vel hypostasim divinam. Quod quidem non fit per potentiam naturae humanae, sed per potentiam personae divinae. Est autem talis divinarum personarum conditio quod una earum non excludit aliam a communione eiusdem naturae, sed solum a communione eiusdem personae. Quia igitur in mysterio incarnationis tota ratio facti est potentia facientis, ut Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Volusianum; magis est circa hoc iudicandum secundum conditionem personae assumentis quam secundum conditionem naturae humanae assumptae. Sic igitur non est impossibile divinis personis ut duae vel tres assumant unam naturam humanam. Esset tamen impossibile ut assumerent unam hypostasim vel unam personam humanam, sicut Anselmus dicit, in libro de conceptu virginali, quod plures personae non possunt assumere unum eundemque hominem. | I answer that, As was said above (2, 5, ad 1), by the union of the soul and body in Christ neither a new person is made nor a new hypostasis, but one human nature is assumed to the Divine Person or hypostasis, which, indeed, does not take place by the power of the human nature, but by the power of the Divine Person. Now such is the characteristic of the Divine Persons that one does not exclude another from communicating in the same nature, but only in the same Person. Hence, since in the mystery of Incarnation "the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer," as Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii), we must judge of it in regard to the quality of the Divine Person assuming, and not according to the quality of the human nature assumed. Therefore it is not impossible that two or three Divine Persons should assume one human nature, but it would be impossible for them to assume one human hypostasis or person; thus Anselm says in the book De Concep. Virg. (Cur Deus Homo ii, 9), that "several Persons cannot assume one and the same man to unity of Person." |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, hac positione facta, quod scilicet tres personae assumerent unam humanam naturam, verum esset dicere quod tres personae essent unus homo, propter unam humanam naturam, sicut nunc verum est dicere quod sunt unus Deus, propter unam divinam naturam. Nec ly unus importat unitatem personae, sed unitatem in natura humana. Non enim posset argui ex hoc quod tres personae sunt unus homo, quod essent unus simpliciter, nihil enim prohibet dicere quod homines qui sunt plures simpliciter, sint unus quantum ad aliquid, puta unus populus; sicut Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., diversum est natura spiritus hominis et spiritus Dei, sed inhaerendo fit unus spiritus, secundum illud I Cor. VI, qui adhaeret Deo, unus spiritus est. | Reply to Objection 1. In the hypothesis that three Persons assume one human nature, it would be true to say that the three Persons were one man, because of the one human nature. For just as it is now true to say the three Persons are one God on account of the one Divine Nature, so it would be true to say they are one man on account of the one human nature. Nor would "one" imply unity of person, but unity in human nature; for it could not be argued that because the three Persons were one man they were one simply. For nothing hinders our saying that men, who are many simply, are in some respect one, e.g. one people, and as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 3): "The Spirit of God and the spirit of man are by nature different, but by inherence one spirit results," according to 1 Corinthians 6:17: "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit." |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, illa positione facta, humana natura esset assumpta in unitate non unius personae, sed in unitate singularum personarum, ita scilicet quod, sicut divina natura habet naturalem unitatem cum singulis personis, ita natura humana haberet unitatem cum singulis per assumptionem. | Reply to Objection 2. In this supposition the human nature would be assumed to the unity, not indeed of one Person, but to the unity of each Person, so that even as the Divine Nature has a natural unity with each Person, so also the human nature would have a unity with each Person by assumption. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod circa mysterium incarnationis fuit communicatio proprietatum pertinentium ad naturam, quia quaecumque conveniunt naturae, possunt praedicari de persona subsistente in natura illa, cuiuscumque naturae nomine significetur. Praedicta ergo positione facta, de persona patris poterunt praedicari et ea quae sunt humanae naturae, et ea quae sunt divinae, et similiter de persona filii et spiritus sancti. Non autem illud quod conveniret personae patris ratione propriae personae, posset attribui personae filii aut spiritus sancti, propter distinctionem personarum, quae remaneret. Posset ergo dici quod, sicut pater est ingenitus, ita homo esset ingenitus, secundum quod ly homo supponeret pro persona patris. Si quis autem ulterius procederet, homo est ingenitus, filius est homo, ergo filius est ingenitus, esset fallacia figurae dictionis vel accidentis. Sicut et nunc dicimus Deum esse ingenitum, quia pater est ingenitus, nec tamen possumus concludere quod filius sit ingenitus, quamvis sit Deus. | Reply to Objection 3. In the mystery of Incarnation, there results a communication of the properties belonging to the nature, because whatever belongs to the nature can be predicated of the Person subsisting in that nature, no matter to which of the natures it may apply. Hence in this hypothesis, of the Person of the Father may be predicated what belongs to the human nature and what belongs to the Divine; and likewise of the Person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. But what belongs to the Person of the Father by reason of His own Person could not be attributed to the Person of the Son or Holy Ghost on account of the distinction of Persons which would still remain. Therefore it might be said that as the Father was unbegotten, so the man was unbegotten, inasmuch as "man" stood for the Person of the Father. But if one were to go on to say, "The man is unbegotten; the Son is man; therefore the Son is unbegotten," it would be the fallacy of figure of speech or of accident; even as we now say God is unbegotten, because the Father is unbegotten, yet we cannot conclude that the Son is unbegotten, although He is God. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod una persona divina non possit assumere duas naturas humanas. Natura enim assumpta in mysterio incarnationis non habet aliud suppositum praeter suppositum personae divinae, ut ex supra dictis patet. Si ergo ponatur esse una persona divina assumens duas humanas naturas, esset unum suppositum duarum naturarum eiusdem speciei. Quod videtur implicare contradictionem, non enim natura unius speciei multiplicatur nisi secundum distinctionem suppositorum. | Objection 1. It would seem that one Divine Person cannot assume two human natures. For the nature assumed in the mystery of Incarnation has no other suppositum than the suppositum of the Divine Person, as is plain from what has been stated above (2, 3,6). Therefore, if we suppose one Person to assume two human natures, there would be one suppositum of two natures of the same species; which would seem to imply a contradiction, for the nature of one species is only multiplied by distinct supposita. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, hac suppositione facta, non posset dici quod persona divina incarnata esset unus homo, quia non haberet unam naturam humanam. Similiter etiam non posset dici quod essent plures homines, quia plures homines sunt supposito distincti, et ibi esset unum tantum suppositum. Ergo praedicta positio esset omnino impossibilis. | Objection 2. Further, in this hypothesis it could not be said that the Divine Person incarnate was one man, seeing that He would not have one human nature; neither could it be said that there were several, for several men have distinct supposita, whereas in this case there would be only one suppositum. Therefore the aforesaid hypothesis is impossible. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, in incarnationis mysterio tota divina natura est unita toti naturae assumptae, idest cuilibet parti eius, est enim Christus perfectus Deus et perfectus homo, totus Deus et totus homo, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro. Sed duae humanae naturae non possent totaliter sibi invicem uniri, quia oporteret quod anima unius esset unita corpori alterius, et quod etiam duo corpora essent simul, quod etiam confusionem induceret naturarum. Non ergo est possibile quod persona divina duas humanas naturas assumeret. | Objection 3. Further, in the mystery of Incarnation the whole Divine Nature is united to the whole nature assumed, i.e. to every part of it, for Christ is "perfect God and perfect man, complete God and complete man," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 7). But two human natures cannot be wholly united together, inasmuch as the soul of one would be united to the body of the other; and, again, two bodies would be together, which would give rise to confusion of natures. Therefore it is not possibly for one Divine Person to assume two human natures. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod quidquid potest pater, potest filius. Sed pater post incarnationem filii, potest assumere naturam humanam aliam numero ab ea quam filius assumpsit, in nullo enim per incarnationem filii est diminuta potentia patris vel filii. Ergo videtur quod filius, post incarnationem, possit aliam humanam naturam assumere, praeter eam quam assumpsit. | On the contrary, Whatever the Father can do, that also can the Son do. But after Incarnation the Father can still assume a human nature distinct from that which the Son has assumed; for in nothing is the power of the Father or the Son lessened by Incarnation of the Son. Therefore it seems that after Incarnation the Son can assume another human nature distinct from the one He has assumed. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod id quod potest in unum et non in amplius, habet potentiam limitatam ad unum. Potentia autem divinae personae est infinita, nec potest limitari ad aliquid creatum. Unde non est dicendum quod persona divina ita assumpserit unam naturam humanam quod non potuerit assumere aliam. Videretur enim ex hoc sequi quod personalitas divinae naturae esset ita comprehensa per unam humanam naturam quod ad eius personalitatem alia assumi non possit. Quod est impossibile, non enim increatum a creato comprehendi potest. Patet ergo quod, sive consideremus personam divinam secundum virtutem, quae est principium unionis; sive secundum suam personalitatem, quae est terminus unionis, oportet dicere quod persona divina, praeter naturam humanam quam assumpsit possit aliam numero naturam humanam assumere. | I answer that, What has power for one thing, and no more, has a power limited to one. Now the power of a Divine Person is infinite, nor can it be limited by any created thing. Hence it may not be said that a Divine Person so assumed one human nature as to be unable to assume another. For it would seem to follow from this that the Personality of the Divine Nature was so comprehended by one human nature as to be unable to assume another to its Personality; and this is impossible, for the Uncreated cannot be comprehended by any creature. Hence it is plain that, whether we consider the Divine Person in regard to His power, which is the principle of the union, or in regard to His Personality, which is the term of the union, it has to be said that the Divine Person, over and beyond the human nature which He has assumed, can assume another distinct human nature. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod natura creata perficitur in sua ratione per formam, quae multiplicatur secundum divisionem materiae. Et ideo, si compositio formae et materiae constituat novum suppositum, consequens est quod natura multiplicetur secundum multiplicationem suppositorum. Sed in mysterio incarnationis unio formae et materiae, idest animae et corporis, non constituit novum suppositum, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo posset esse multitudo secundum numerum ex parte naturae, propter divisionem materiae, absque distinctione suppositorum. | Reply to Objection 1. A created nature is completed in its essentials by its form, which is multiplied according to the division of matter. And hence, if the composition of matter and form constitutes a new suppositum, the consequence is that the nature is multiplied by the multiplication of supposita. But in the mystery of Incarnation the union of form and matter, i.e. of soul and body, does not constitute a new suppositum, as was said above (Article 6). Hence there can be a numerical multitude on the part of the nature, on account of the division of matter, without distinction of supposita. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod posset videri quod, praedicta positione facta, consequeretur quod essent duo homines, propter duas naturas, absque hoc quod essent ibi duo supposita, sicut e converso tres personae dicerentur unus homo, propter unam naturam humanam assumptam, ut supra dictum est. Sed hoc non videtur esse verum. Quia nominibus est utendum secundum quod sunt ad significandum imposita. Quod quidem est ex consideratione eorum quae apud nos sunt. Et ideo oportet, circa modum significandi et consignificandi, considerare ea quae apud nos sunt. In quibus nunquam nomen ab aliqua forma impositum pluraliter dicitur nisi propter pluralitatem suppositorum, homo enim qui est duobus vestimentis indutus, non dicitur duo vestiti, sed unus vestitus duobus vestimentis; et qui habet duas qualitates, dicitur singulariter aliqualis secundum duas qualitates. Natura autem assumpta quantum ad aliquid se habet per modum indumenti, licet non sit similitudo quantum ad omnia, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo, si persona divina assumeret duas naturas humanas, propter unitatem suppositi diceretur unus homo habens duas naturas humanas. Contingit autem quod plures homines dicuntur unus populus, propter hoc quod conveniunt in aliquo uno, non autem propter unitatem suppositi. Et similiter, si duae personae divinae assumerent unam numero humanam naturam, dicerentur unus homo, ut supra dictum est, non propter unitatem suppositi, sed inquantum conveniunt in aliquo uno. | Reply to Objection 2. It might seem possible to reply that in such a hypothesis it would follow that there were two men by reason of the two natures, just as, on the contrary, the three Persons would be called one man, on account of the one nature assumed, as was said above (6, ad 1). But this does not seem to be true; because we must use words according to the purpose of their signification, which is in relation to our surroundings. Consequently, in order to judge of a word's signification or co-signification, we must consider the things which are around us, in which a word derived from some form is never used in the plural unless there are several supposita. For a man who has on two garments is not said to be "two persons clothed," but "one clothed with two garments"; and whoever has two qualities is designated in the singular as "such by reason of the two qualities." Now the assumed nature is, as it were, a garment, although this similitude does not fit at all points, as has been said above (2, 6, ad 1). And hence, if the Divine Person were to assume two human natures, He would be called, on account of the unity of suppositum, one man having two human natures. Now many men are said to be one people, inasmuch as they have some one thing in common, and not on account of the unity of suppositum. So likewise, if two Divine Persons were to assume one singular human nature, they would be said to be one man, as stated (6, ad 1), not from the unity of suppositum, but because they have some one thing in common. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod divina et humana natura non eodem ordine se habent ad unam divinam personam, sed per prius comparatur ad ipsam divina natura, utpote quae est unum cum ea ab aeterno; sed natura humana comparatur ad personam divinam per posterius, utpote assumpta ex tempore a divina persona, non quidem ad hoc quod natura sit ipsa persona, sed quod persona in natura subsistat filius enim Dei est sua deitas, sed non est sua humanitas. Et ideo ad hoc quod natura humana assumatur a divina persona, relinquitur quod divina natura unione personali uniatur toti naturae assumptae, idest secundum omnes partes eius. Sed duarum naturarum assumptarum esset uniformis habitudo ad personam divinam, nec una assumeret aliam. Unde non oporteret quod una earum totaliter alteri uniretur, idest, omnes partes unius omnibus partibus alterius. | Reply to Objection 3. The Divine and human natures do not bear the same relation to the one Divine Person, but the Divine Nature is related first of all thereto, inasmuch as It is one with It from eternity; and afterwards the human nature is related to the Divine Person, inasmuch as it is assumed by the Divine Person in time, not indeed that the nature is the Person, but that the Person of God subsists in human nature. For the Son of God is His Godhead, but is not His manhood. And hence, in order that the human nature may be assumed by the Divine Person, the Divine Nature must be united by a personal union with the whole nature assumed, i.e. in all its parts. Now in the two natures assumed there would be a uniform relation to the Divine Person, nor would one assume the other. Hence it would not be necessary for one of them to be altogether united to the other, i.e. all the parts of one with all the parts of the other. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit magis conveniens filium Dei incarnari quam patrem vel spiritum sanctum. Per mysterium enim incarnationis homines ad veram Dei cognitionem sunt perducti, secundum illud Ioan. XVIII, in hoc natus sum, et ad hoc veni in mundum, ut testimonium perhiberem veritati. Sed ex hoc quod persona filii Dei est incarnata, multi impediti fuerunt a vera Dei cognitione, ea quae dicuntur de filio secundum humanam naturam referentes ad ipsam filii personam, sicut Arius, qui posuit inaequalitatem personarum propter hoc quod dicitur Ioan. XIV, pater maior me est, qui quidem error non provenisset si persona patris incarnata fuisset; nullus enim existimasset patrem filio minorem. Magis ergo videtur conveniens fuisse quod persona patris incarnaretur quam persona filii. | Objection 1. It would seem that it was not more fitting that the Son of God should become incarnate than the Father or the Holy Ghost. For by the mystery of Incarnation men are led to the true knowledge of God, according to John 18:37: "For this was I born, and for this came I into the world, to give testimony to the truth." But by the Person of the Son of God becoming incarnate many have been kept back from the true knowledge of God, since they referred to the very Person of the Son what was said of the Son in His human nature, as Arius, who held an inequality of Persons, according to what is said (John 14:28): "The Father is greater than I." Now this error would not have arisen if the Person of the Father had become incarnate, for no one would have taken the Father to be less than the Son. Hence it seems fitting that the Person of the Father, rather than the Person of the Son, should have become incarnate. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, incarnationis effectus videtur esse recreatio quaedam humanae naturae, secundum illud Galat. ult., in Christo Iesu neque circumcisio aliquid valet neque praeputium, sed nova creatura. Sed potentia creandi appropriatur patri. Ergo magis decuisset patrem incarnari quam filium. | Objection 2. Further, the effect of Incarnation would seem to be, as it were, a second creation of human nature, according to Galatians 6:15: "For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature." But the power of creation is appropriated to the Father. Therefore it would have been more becoming to the Father than to the Son to become incarnate. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, incarnatio ordinatur ad remissionem peccatorum, secundum illud Matth. I, vocabis nomen eius Iesum, ipse enim salvum faciet populum suum a peccatis eorum. Remissio autem peccatorum attribuitur spiritui sancto, secundum illud Ioan. XX, accipite spiritum sanctum, quorum remiseritis peccata, remittentur eis. Ergo magis congruebat personam spiritus sancti incarnari quam personam filii. | Objection 3. Further, Incarnation is ordained to the remission of sins, according to Matthew 1:21: "Thou shalt call His name Jesus. For He shall save His people from their sins." Now the remission of sins is attributed to the Holy Ghost according to John 20:22-23: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them." Therefore it became the Person of the Holy Ghost rather than the Person of the Son to become incarnate. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, in mysterio incarnationis manifestata est sapientia et virtus Dei, sapientia quidem, quia invenit difficillimi solutionem pretii valde decentissimam; virtus autem, quia victum fecit rursus victorem. Sed virtus et sapientia appropriantur filio, secundum illud I Cor. I, Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam. Ergo conveniens fuit personam filii incarnari. | On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 1): "In the mystery of Incarnation the wisdom and power of God are made known: the wisdom, for He found a most suitable discharge for a most heavy debt; the power, for He made the conquered conquer." But power and wisdom are appropriated to the Son, according to 1 Corinthians 1:24: "Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God." Therefore it was fitting that the Person of the Son should become incarnate. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod convenientissimum fuit personam filii incarnari. Primo quidem, ex parte unionis. Convenienter enim ea quae sunt similia, uniuntur. Ipsius autem personae filii, qui est verbum Dei, attenditur, uno quidem modo, communis convenientia ad totam creaturam. Quia verbum artificis, idest conceptus eius, est similitudo exemplaris eorum quae ab artifice fiunt. Unde verbum Dei, quod est aeternus conceptus eius, est similitudo exemplaris totius creaturae. Et ideo, sicut per participationem huius similitudinis creaturae sunt in propriis speciebus institutae, sed mobiliter; ita per unionem verbi ad creaturam non participativam sed personalem, conveniens fuit reparari creaturam in ordine ad aeternam et immobilem perfectionem, nam et artifex per formam artis conceptam qua artificiatum condidit, ipsum, si collapsum fuerit, restaurat. Alio modo, habet convenientiam specialiter cum humana natura, ex eo quod verbum est conceptus aeternae sapientiae a qua omnis sapientia hominum derivatur. Et ideo homo per hoc in sapientia proficit, quae est propria eius perfectio prout est rationalis, quod participat verbum Dei, sicut discipulus instruitur per hoc quod recipit verbum magistri. Unde et Eccli. I dicitur, fons sapientiae verbum Dei in excelsis. Et ideo, ad consummatam hominis perfectionem, conveniens fuit ut ipsum verbum Dei humanae naturae personaliter uniretur. Secundo potest accipi ratio huius congruentiae ex fine unionis, qui est impletio praedestinationis, eorum scilicet qui praeordinati sunt ad hereditatem caelestem, quae non debetur nisi filiis, secundum illud Rom. VIII, filii et heredes. Et ideo congruum fuit ut per eum qui est filius naturalis, homines participarent similitudinem huius filiationis secundum adoptionem, sicut apostolus ibidem dicit, quos praescivit et praedestinavit conformes fieri imagini filii eius. Tertio potest accipi ratio huius congruentiae ex peccato primi parentis, cui per incarnationem remedium adhibetur. Peccavit enim primus homo appetendo scientiam, ut patet ex verbis serpentis promittentis homini scientiam boni et mali. Unde conveniens fuit ut per verbum verae sapientiae homo reduceretur in Deum, qui per inordinatum appetitum scientiae recesserat a Deo. | I answer that, It was most fitting that the Person of the Son should become incarnate. First, on the part of the union; for such as are similar are fittingly united. Now the Person of the Son, Who is the Word of God, has a certain common agreement with all creatures, because the word of the craftsman, i.e. his concept, is an exemplar likeness of whatever is made by him. Hence the Word of God, Who is His eternal concept, is the exemplar likeness of all creatures. And therefore as creatures are established in their proper species, though movably, by the participation of this likeness, so by the non-participated and personal union of the Word with a creature, it was fitting that the creature should be restored in order to its eternal and unchangeable perfection; for the craftsman by the intelligible form of his art, whereby he fashioned his handiwork, restores it when it has fallen into ruin. Moreover, He has a particular agreement with human nature, since the Word is a concept of the eternal Wisdom, from Whom all man's wisdom is derived. And hence man is perfected in wisdom (which is his proper perfection, as he is rational) by participating the Word of God, as the disciple is instructed by receiving the word of his master. Hence it is said (Sirach 1:5): "The Word of God on high is the fountain of wisdom." And hence for the consummate perfection of man it was fitting that the very Word of God should be personally united to human nature. Secondly, the reason of this fitness may be taken from the end of the union, which is the fulfilling of predestination, i.e. of such as are preordained to the heavenly inheritance, which is bestowed only on sons, according to Romans 8:17: "If sons, heirs also." Hence it was fitting that by Him Who is the natural Son, men should share this likeness of sonship by adoption, as the Apostle says in the same chapter (Romans 8:29): "For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son." Thirdly, the reason for this fitness may be taken from the sin of our first parent, for which Incarnation supplied the remedy. For the first man sinned by seeking knowledge, as is plain from the words of the serpent, promising to man the knowledge of good and evil. Hence it was fitting that by the Word of true knowledge man might be led back to God, having wandered from God through an inordinate thirst for knowledge. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil est quo humana malitia non posset abuti, quando etiam ipsa Dei bonitate abutitur, secundum illud Rom. II, an divitias bonitatis eius contemnis? Unde et, si persona patris fuisset incarnata, potuisset ex hoc homo alicuius erroris occasionem assumere, quasi filius sufficere non potuisset ad humanam naturam reparandam. | Reply to Objection 1. There is nothing which human malice cannot abuse, since it even abuses God's goodness, according to Romans 2:4: "Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness?" Hence, even if the Person of the Father had become incarnate, men would have been capable of finding an occasion of error, as though the Son were not able to restore human nature. |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod prima rerum creatio facta est a potentia Dei patris per verbum. Unde et recreatio per verbum fieri debuit a potentia Dei patris, ut recreatio creationi responderet, secundum illud II Cor. V, Deus erat in Christo mundum reconcilians sibi. | Reply to Objection 2. The first creation of things was made by the power of God the Father through the Word; hence the second creation ought to have been brought about through the Word, by the power of God the Father, in order that restoration should correspond to creation according to 2 Corinthians 5:19: "For God indeed was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself." |
| IIIª q. 3 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod spiritus sancti proprium est quod sit donum patris et filii. Remissio autem peccatorum fit per spiritum sanctum tanquam per donum Dei. Et ideo convenientius fuit ad iustificationem hominum quod incarnaretur filius, cuius spiritus sanctus est donum. | Reply to Objection 3. To be the gift of the Father and the Son is proper to the Holy Ghost. But the remission of sins is caused by the Holy Ghost, as by the gift of God. And hence it was more fitting to man's justification that the Son should become incarnate, Whose gift the Holy Ghost is. |
| IIIª q. 4 pr. Deinde considerandum est de unione ex parte assumpti. Circa quod primo considerandum occurrit de his quae sunt a verbo Dei assumpta; secundo, de coassumptis, quae sunt perfectiones et defectus. Assumpsit autem filius Dei humanam naturam, et partes eius. Unde circa primum triplex consideratio occurrit, prima est, quantum ad ipsam naturam humanam; secunda est, quantum ad partes ipsius; tertia, quantum ad ordinem assumptionis. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum humana natura fuerit magis assumptibilis a filio Dei quam aliqua alia natura. Secundo, utrum assumpserit personam. Tertio, utrum assumpserit hominem. Quarto, utrum fuisset conveniens quod assumpsisset humanam naturam a singularibus separatam. Quinto, utrum fuerit conveniens quod assumpsisset humanam naturam in omnibus singularibus. Sexto, utrum fuerit conveniens quod assumeret humanam naturam in aliquo homine ex stirpe Adae progenito. | Question 4. The mode of union of the part of the human nature 1. Was human nature more capable of being assumed than any other nature? 2. Did he assume a person? 3. Did he assume a man? 4. Was it becoming that He should assume human nature abstracted from all individuals? 5. Was it becoming that He should assume human nature in all its individuals? 6. Was it becoming that He should assume human nature in any man begotten of the stock of Adam? |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod humana natura non fuerit magis assumptibilis a filio Dei quam quaelibet alia natura. Dicit enim Augustinus, in epistola ad Volusianum, in rebus mirabiliter factis tota ratio facti est potentia facientis. Sed potentia Dei facientis incarnationem, quae est opus maxime mirabile, non limitatur ad unam naturam, cum potentia Dei sit infinita. Ergo natura humana non est magis assumptibilis a Deo quam aliqua alia creatura. | Objection 1. It would seem that human nature is not more capable of being assumed by the Son of God than any other nature. For Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii): "In deeds wrought miraculously the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer." Now the power of God Who wrought Incarnation, which is a most miraculous work, is not limited to one nature, since the power of God is infinite. Therefore human nature is not more capable of being assumed than any other creature. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, similitudo est ratio faciens ad congruitatem incarnationis divinae personae, ut supra dictum est. Sed sicut in natura rationali invenitur similitudo imaginis, ita in natura irrationali invenitur similitudo vestigii. Ergo creatura irrationalis assumptibilis fuit, sicut humana natura. | Objection 2. Further, likeness is the foundation of the fittingness of the Incarnation of the Divine Person, as above stated (3, 8). But as in rational creatures we find the likeness of image, so in irrational creatures we find the image of trace. Therefore the irrational creature was as capable of assumption as human nature. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, in natura angelica invenitur expressior Dei similitudo quam in natura humana, sicut Gregorius dicit, in homilia de centum ovibus, introducens illud Ezech. XXVIII, tu signaculum similitudinis. Invenitur etiam in Angelo peccatum, sicut in homine, secundum illud Iob IV, in Angelis suis reperit pravitatem. Ergo natura angelica fuit ita assumptibilis sicut natura hominis. | Objection 3. Further, in the angelic nature we find a more perfect likeness than in human nature, as Gregory says: (Hom. de Cent. Ovib.; xxxiv in Ev.), where he introduces Ezekiel 28:12: "Thou wast the seal of resemblance." And sin is found in angels, even as in man, according to Job 4:18: "And in His angels He found wickedness." Therefore the angelic nature was as capable of assumption as the nature of man. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, cum Deo competat summa perfectio, tanto magis est Deo aliquid simile, quanto est magis perfectum. Sed totum universum est magis perfectum quam partes eius, inter quas est humana natura. Ergo totum universum est magis assumptibile quam humana natura. | Objection 4. Further, since the highest perfection belongs to God, the more like to God a thing is, the more perfect it is. But the whole universe is more perfect than its parts, amongst which is human nature. Therefore the whole universe is more capable of being assumed than human nature. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. VIII, ex ore sapientiae genitae, deliciae meae esse cum filiis hominum. Et ita videtur esse quaedam congruentia unionis filii Dei ad humanam naturam. | On the contrary, It is said (Proverbs 8:31) by the mouth of Begotten Wisdom: "My delights were to be with the children of men"; and hence there would seem some fitness in the union of the Son of God with human nature. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid assumptibile dicitur quasi aptum assumi a divina persona. Quae quidem aptitudo non potest intelligi secundum potentiam passivam naturalem, quae non se extendit ad id quod transcendit ordinem naturalem, quem transcendit unio personalis creaturae ad Deum. Unde relinquitur quod assumptibile aliquid dicatur secundum congruentiam ad unionem praedictam. Quae quidem congruentia attenditur secundum duo in humana natura, scilicet secundum eius dignitatem; et necessitatem. Secundum dignitatem quidem, quia humana natura, inquantum est rationalis et intellectualis, nata est contingere aliqualiter ipsum verbum per suam operationem, cognoscendo scilicet et amando ipsum. Secundum necessitatem autem, quia indigebat reparatione, cum subiaceret originali peccato. Haec autem duo soli humanae naturae conveniunt, nam creaturae irrationali deest congruitas dignitatis; naturae autem angelicae deest congruitas praedictae necessitatis. Unde relinquitur quod sola natura humana sit assumptibilis. | I answer that, A thing is said to be assumable as being capable of being assumed by a Divine Person, and this capability cannot be taken with reference to the natural passive power, which does not extend to what transcends the natural order, as the personal union of a creature with God transcends it. Hence it follows that a thing is said to be assumable according to some fitness for such a union. Now this fitness in human nature may be taken from two things, viz. according to its dignity, and according to its need. According to its dignity, because human nature, as being rational and intellectual, was made for attaining to the Word to some extent by its operation, viz. by knowing and loving Him. According to its need--because it stood in need of restoration, having fallen under original sin. Now these two things belong to human nature alone. For in the irrational creature the fitness of dignity is wanting, and in the angelic nature the aforesaid fitness of need is wanting. Hence it follows that only human nature was assumable. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod creaturae denominantur aliquales ex eo quod competit eis secundum proprias causas, non autem ex eo quod convenit eis secundum primas causas et universales, sicut dicimus aliquem morbum esse incurabilem, non quia non potest curari a Deo, sed quia per propria principia subiecti curari non potest. Sic ergo dicitur aliqua creatura non esse assumptibilis, non ad subtrahendum aliquid divinae potentiae, sed ad ostendendum conditionem creaturae quae ad hoc aptitudinem non habet. | Reply to Objection 1. Creatures are said to be "such" with reference to their proper causes, not with reference to what belongs to them from their first and universal causes; thus we call a disease incurable, not that it cannot be cured by God, but that it cannot be cured by the proper principles of the subject. Therefore a creature is said to be not assumable, not as if we withdrew anything from the power of God, but in order to show the condition of the creature, which has no capability for this. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo imaginis attenditur in natura humana secundum quod est capax Dei, scilicet ipsum attingendo propria operatione cognitionis et amoris. Similitudo autem vestigii attenditur solum secundum repraesentationem aliquam ex impressione divina in creatura existentem, non autem ex eo quod creatura irrationalis, in qua est sola talis similitudo possit ad Deum attingere per solam suam operationem. Quod autem deficit a minori, non habet congruitatem ad id quod est maius, sicut corpus quod non est aptum perfici anima sensitiva, multo minus est aptum perfici anima intellectiva. Multo autem est maior et perfectior unio ad Deum secundum esse personale quam quae est secundum operationem. Et ideo creatura irrationalis, quae deficit ab unione ad Deum per operationem, non habet congruitatem ut uniatur ei secundum esse personale. | Reply to Objection 2. The likeness of image is found in human nature, forasmuch as it is capable of God, viz. by attaining to Him through its own operation of knowledge and love. But the likeness of trace regards only a representation by Divine impression, existing in the creature, and does not imply that the irrational creature, in which such a likeness is, can attain to God by its own operation alone. For what does not come up to the less, has no fitness for the greater; as a body which is not fitted to be perfected by a sensitive soul is much less fitted for an intellectual soul. Now much greater and more perfect is the union with God in personal being than the union by operation. And hence the irrational creature which falls short of the union with God by operation has no fitness to be united with Him in personal being. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quidam dicunt Angelum non esse assumptibilem, quia a principio suae creationis est in sua personalitate perfectus, cum non subiaceat generationi et corruptioni. Unde non potuisset in unitatem divinae personae assumi nisi eius personalitas destrueretur, quod neque convenit incorruptibilitati naturae eius; neque bonitati assumentis, ad quam non pertinet quod aliquid perfectionis in creatura assumpta corrumpat. Sed hoc non videtur totaliter excludere congruitatem assumptionis angelicae naturae. Potest enim Deus producendo novam angelicam naturam, copulare eam sibi in unitate personae, et sic nihil praeexistens ibi corrumperetur. Sed, sicut dictum est, deest congruitas ex parte necessitatis, quia, etsi natura angelica in aliquibus peccato subiaceat, est tamen eius peccatum irremediabile ut in prima parte habitum est. | Reply to Objection 3. Some say that angels are not assumable, since they are perfect in their personality from the beginning of their creation, inasmuch as they are not subject to generation and corruption; hence they cannot be assumed to the unity of a Divine Person, unless their personality be destroyed, and this does not befit the incorruptibility of their nature nor the goodness of the one assuming, to Whom it does not belong to corrupt any perfection in the creature assumed. But this would not seem totally to disprove the fitness of the angelic nature for being assumed. For God by producing a new angelic nature could join it to Himself in unity of Person, and in this way nothing pre-existing would be corrupted in it. But as was said above, there is wanting the fitness of need, because, although the angelic nature in some is the subject of sin, their sin is irremediable, as stated above (I, 64, 2). |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod perfectio universi non est perfectio unius personae vel suppositi, sed eius quod est unum sub positione vel ordine. Cuius plurimae partes non sunt assumptibiles, ut dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod solum natura humana sit assumptibilis. | Reply to Objection 4. The perfection of the universe is not the perfection of one person or suppositum, but of something which is one by position or order, whereof very many parts are not capable of assumption, as was said above. Hence it follows that only human nature is capable of being assumed. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei assumpserit personam. Dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, quod filius Dei assumpsit humanam naturam in atomo, idest, in individuo. Sed individuum rationalis naturae est persona, ut patet per Boetium, in libro de duabus naturis. Ergo filius Dei personam assumpsit. | Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God assumed a person. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the Son of God "assumed human nature 'in atomo,'" i.e. in an individual. But an individual in rational nature is a person, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab. Nat.). Therefore the Son of God assumed a person. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, Damascenus dicit quod filius Dei assumpsit ea quae in natura nostra plantavit. Plantavit autem ibi personalitatem. Ergo filius Dei assumpsit personam. | Objection 2. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that the Son of God "assumed what He had sown in our nature." But He sowed our personality there. Therefore the Son of God assumed a person. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, nihil consumitur nisi quod est. Sed Innocentius III dicit, in quadam decretali, quod persona Dei consumpsit personam hominis. Ergo videtur quod persona hominis fuit prius assumpta. | Objection 3. Further, nothing is absorbed unless it exist. But Innocent III [Paschas. Diac., De Spiritu Sanct. ii] says in a Decretal that "the Person of God absorbed the person of man." Therefore it would seem that the person of man existed previous to its being assumed. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de fide ad Petrum, quod Deus naturam hominis assumpsit, non personam. | On the contrary, Augustine [Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum ii) that "God assumed the nature, not the person, of man." |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur assumi ex eo quod ad aliquid sumitur. Unde illud quod assumitur oportet praeintelligi assumptioni, sicut id quod movetur localiter praeintelligitur ipsi motui. Persona autem non praeintelligitur in humana natura assumptioni, sed magis se habet ut terminus assumptionis, ut supra dictum est. Si enim praeintelligeretur, vel oporteret quod corrumperetur, et sic frustra esset assumpta. Vel quod remaneret post unionem, et sic essent duae personae, una assumens et alia assumpta; quod est erroneum, ut supra ostensum est. Unde relinquitur quod nullo modo filius Dei assumpsit humanam personam. | I answer that, A thing is said to be assumed inasmuch as it is taken into another. Hence, what is assumed must be presupposed to the assumption, as what is moved locally is presupposed to the motion. Now a person in human nature is not presupposed to assumption; rather, it is the term of the assumption, as was said (3, 1,2). For if it were presupposed, it must either have been corrupted--in which case it was useless; or it remains after the union--and thus there would be two persons, one assuming and the other assumed, which is false, as was shown above (Question 2, Article 6). Hence it follows that the Son of God nowise assumed a human person. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod naturam humanam assumpsit filius Dei in atomo, idest, in individuo quod non est aliud a supposito increato quod est persona filii Dei. Unde non sequitur quod persona sit assumpta. | Reply to Objection 1. The Son of God assumed human nature "in atomo," i.e. in an individual, which is no other than the uncreated suppositum, the Person of the Son of God. Hence it does not follow that a person was assumed. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod naturae assumptae non deest propria personalitas propter defectum alicuius quod ad perfectionem humanae naturae pertineat, sed propter additionem alicuius quod est supra humanam naturam, quod est unio ad divinam personam. | Reply to Objection 2. Its proper personality is not wanting to the nature assumed through the loss of anything pertaining to the perfection of the human nature but through the addition of something which is above human nature, viz. the union with a Divine Person. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod consumptio ibi non importat destructionem alicuius quod prius fuerat, sed impeditionem eius quod aliter esse posset. Si enim humana natura non esset assumpta a divina persona, natura humana propriam personalitatem haberet. Et pro tanto dicitur persona consumpsisse personam, licet improprie, quia persona divina sua unione impedivit ne humana natura propriam personalitatem haberet. | Reply to Objection 3. Absorption does not here imply the destruction of anything pre-existing, but the hindering what might otherwise have been. For if the human nature had not been assumed by a Divine Person, the human nature would have had its own personality; and in this way is it said, although improperly, that the Person "absorbed the person," inasmuch as the Divine Person by His union hindered the human nature from having its personality. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod persona divina assumpserit hominem. Dicitur enim in Psalmo, beatus quem elegisti et assumpsisti, quod Glossa exponit de Christo. Et Augustinus dicit, in libro de agone Christiano, filius Dei hominem assumpsit, et in illo humana perpessus est. | Objection 1. It would seem that the Divine Person assumed a man. For it is written (Psalm 64:5): "Blessed is he whom Thou hast chosen and taken to Thee," which a gloss expounds of Christ; and Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xi): "The Son of God assumed a man, and in him bore things human." |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, hoc nomen homo significat naturam humanam. Sed filius Dei assumpsit humanam naturam. Ergo assumpsit hominem. | Objection 2. Further, the word "man" signifies a human nature. But the Son of God assumed a human nature. Therefore He assumed a man. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, filius Dei est homo. Sed non est homo quem non assumpsit quia sic esset pari ratione Petrus, vel quilibet alius homo. Ergo est homo quem assumpsit. | Objection 3. Further, the Son of God is a man. But He is not one of the men He did not assume, for with equal reason He would be Peter or any other man. Therefore He is the man whom He assumed. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est auctoritas Felicis Papae et martyris, quae introducitur in Ephesina synodo, credimus in dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, de virgine Maria natum quia ipse est Dei sempiternus filius et verbum, et non homo a Deo assumptus, ut alter sit praeter illum. Neque enim hominem assumpsit Dei filius ut alter sit praeter ipsum. | On the contrary, Is the authority of Felix, Pope and Martyr, which is quoted by the Council of Ephesus: "We believe in our Lord Jesus Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, because He is the Eternal Son and Word of God, and not a man assumed by God, in such sort that there is another besides Him. For the Son of God did not assume a man, so that there be another besides Him." |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, id quod assumitur non est terminus assumptionis, sed assumptioni praeintelligitur. Dictum est autem quod individuum in quo assumitur natura humana, non est aliud quam divina persona, quae est terminus assumptionis. Hoc autem nomen homo significat humanam naturam prout est nata in supposito esse, quia, ut dicit Damascenus, sicut hoc nomen Deus significat eum qui habet divinam naturam, ita hoc nomen homo significat eum qui habet humanam naturam. Et ideo non est proprie dictum quod filius Dei assumpsit hominem, supponendo, sicut rei veritas se habet, quod in Christo sit unum suppositum et una hypostasis. Sed secundum illos qui ponunt in Christo duas hypostases vel duo supposita, convenienter et proprie dici posset quod filius Dei hominem assumpsisset. Unde et prima opinio quae ponitur sexta distinctione tertii libri sententiarum concedit hominem esse assumptum. Sed illa opinio erronea est, ut supra ostensum est. | I answer that, As has been said above (Article 2), what is assumed is not the term of the assumption, but is presupposed to the assumption. Now it was said (3, 1,2) that the individual to Whom the human nature is assumed is none other than the Divine Person, Who is the term of the assumption. Now this word "man" signifies human nature, as it is in a suppositum, because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4,11), this word God signifies Him Who has human nature. And hence it cannot properly be said that the Son assumed a man, granted (as it must be, in fact) that in Christ there is but one suppositum and one hypostasis. But according to such as hold that there are two hypostases or two supposita in Christ, it may fittingly and properly be said that the Son of God assumed a man. Hence the first opinion quoted in Sent. iii, D. 6, grants that a man was assumed. But this opinion is erroneous, as was said above (Question 2, Article 6). |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi locutiones non sunt extendendae, tanquam propriae, sed pie sunt exponendae, ubicumque a sacris doctoribus ponuntur; ut dicamus hominem assumptum, quia eius natura est assumpta; et quia assumptio terminata est ad hoc quod filius Dei sit homo. | Reply to Objection 1. These phrases are not to be taken too literally, but are to be loyally explained, wherever they are used by holy doctors; so as to say that a man was assumed, inasmuch as his nature was assumed; and because the assumption terminated in this--that the Son of God is man. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc nomen homo significat naturam humanam in concreto, prout scilicet est in aliquo supposito. Et ideo, sicut non possumus dicere quod suppositum sit assumptum, ita non possumus dicere quod homo sit assumptus. | Reply to Objection 2. The word "man" signifies human nature in the concrete, inasmuch as it is in a suppositum; and hence, since we cannot say a suppositum was assumed, so we cannot say a man was assumed. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod filius Dei non est homo quem assumpsit; sed cuius naturam assumpsit. | Reply to Objection 3. The Son of God is not the man whom He assumed, but the man whose nature He assumed. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei debuit assumere naturam humanam abstractam ab omnibus individuis. Assumptio enim naturae humanae facta est ad communem omnium hominum salutem, unde dicitur I Tim. IV, de Christo, quod est salvator omnium hominum, maxime fidelium. Sed natura prout est in individuis, recedit a sua communitate. Ergo filius Dei debuit humanam naturam assumere prout est ab omnibus individuis abstracta. | Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature abstracted from all individuals. For the assumption of human nature took place for the common salvation of all men; hence it is said of Christ (1 Timothy 4:10) that He is "the Saviour of all men, especially of the faithful." But nature as it is in individuals withdraws from its universality. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature as it is abstracted from all individuals. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, in omnibus quod nobilissimum est Deo est attribuendum. Sed in unoquoque genere id quod est per se potissimum est. Ergo filius Dei debuit assumere per se hominem. Quod quidem, secundum Platonicos, est humana natura ab individuis separata. Hanc ergo debuit filius Dei assumere. | Objection 2. Further, what is noblest in all things ought to be attributed to God. But in every genus what is of itself is best. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed self-existing [per se] man, which, according to Platonists, is human nature abstracted from its individuals. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed this. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, natura humana non est assumpta a filio Dei prout significatur in concreto per hoc nomen homo, ut dictum est. Sic autem significatur prout est in singularibus, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo filius Dei assumpsit humanam naturam prout est ab individuis separata. | Objection 3. Further, human nature was not assumed by the Son of God in the concrete as is signified by the word "man," as was said above (Article 3). Now in this way it signifies human nature as it is in individuals, as is plain from what has been said (3). Therefore the Son of God assumed human nature as it is separated from individuals. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Damascenus, in III libro, Dei verbum incarnatum neque eam quae nuda contemplatione consideratur naturam assumpsit. Non enim incarnatio hoc, sed deceptio, et fictio incarnationis. Sed natura humana prout est a singularibus separata vel abstracta, in nuda contemplatione cogitatur, quia secundum seipsam non subsistit, ut idem Damascenus dicit. Ergo filius Dei non assumpsit humanam naturam secundum quod est a singularibus separata. | On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "God the Word Incarnate did not assume a nature which exists in pure thought; for this would have been no Incarnation, but a false and fictitious Incarnation." But human nature as it is separated or abstracted from individuals is "taken to be a pure conception, since it does not exist in itself," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the Son of God did not assume human nature, as it is separated from individuals. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod natura hominis, vel cuiuscumque alterius rei sensibilis, praeter esse quod in singularibus habet, dupliciter potest intelligi, uno modo, quasi per seipsam esse habeat praeter materiam, sicut Platonici posuerunt; alio modo, sicut in intellectu existens, vel humano vel divino. Per se quidem subsistere non potest, ut philosophus probat, in VII Metaphys., quia ad naturam speciei rerum sensibilium pertinet materia sensibilis, quae ponitur in eius definitione; sicut carnes et ossa in definitione hominis. Unde non potest esse quod natura humana sit praeter materiam sensibilem. Si tamen esset hoc modo subsistens natura humana, non fuisset conveniens ut a verbo Dei assumeretur. Primo quidem, quia assumptio ista terminatur ad personam. Hoc autem est contra rationem formae communis, ut sic in persona individuetur. Secundo, quia naturae communi non possunt attribui nisi operationes communes et universales, secundum quas homo nec meretur nec demeretur, cum tamen illa assumptio ad hoc facta sit ut filius Dei in natura assumpta nobis mereretur. Tertio quia natura sic existens non est sensibilis, sed intelligibilis. Filius autem Dei assumpsit humanam naturam ut hominibus in ea visibilis appareret, secundum illud Baruch III, post haec in terris visus est, et cum hominibus conversatus est. Similiter etiam non potuit assumi natura humana a filio Dei secundum quod est in intellectu divino. Quia sic nihil aliud esset quam natura divina, et per hunc modum, ab aeterno esset in filio Dei humana natura. Similiter non convenit dicere quod filius Dei assumpserit humanam naturam prout est in intellectu humano. Quia hoc nihil aliud esset quam si intelligeretur assumere naturam humanam. Et sic, si non assumeret eam in rerum natura, esset intellectus falsus. Nec aliud esset quam fictio quaedam incarnationis, ut Damascenus dicit. | I answer that, The nature of man or of any other sensible thing, beyond the being which it has in individuals, may be taken in two ways: first, as if it had being of itself, away from matter, as the Platonists held; secondly, as existing in an intellect either human or Divine. Now it cannot subsist of itself, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, 26,27,29,51), because sensible matter belongs to the specific nature of sensible things, and is placed in its definition, as flesh and bones in the definition of man. Hence human nature cannot be without sensible matter. Nevertheless, if human nature were subsistent in this way, it would not be fitting that it should be assumed by the Word of God. First, because this assumption is terminated in a Person, and it is contrary to the nature of a common form to be thus individualized in a person. Secondly, because to a common nature can only be attributed common and universal operations, according to which man neither merits nor demerits, whereas, on the contrary, the assumption took place in order that the Son of God, having assumed our nature, might merit for us. Thirdly, because a nature so existing would not be sensible, but intelligible. But the Son of God assumed human nature in order to show Himself in men's sight, according to Baruch 3:38: "Afterwards He was seen upon earth, and conversed with men." Likewise, neither could human nature have been assumed by the Son of God, as it is in the Divine intellect, since it would be none other than the Divine Nature; and, according to this, human nature would be in the Son of God from eternity. Neither can we say that the Son of God assumed human nature as it is in a human intellect, for this would mean nothing else but that He is understood to assume a human nature; and thus if He did not assume it in reality, this would be a false understanding; nor would this assumption of the human nature be anything but a fictitious Incarnation, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11). |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod filius Dei incarnatus est communis omnium salvator, non communitate generis vel speciei, quae attribuitur naturae ab individuis separatae, sed communitate causae, prout filius Dei incarnatus est universalis causa salutis humanae. | Reply to Objection 1. The incarnate Son of God is the common Saviour of all, not by a generic or specific community, such as is attributed to the nature separated from the individuals, but by a community of cause, whereby the incarnate Son of God is the universal cause of human salvation. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod per se homo non invenitur in rerum natura ita quod sit praeter singularia, sicut Platonici posuerunt. Quamvis quidam dicant quod Plato non intellexit hominem separatum esse nisi in intellectu divino. Et sic non oportuit quod assumeretur a verbo, cum ab aeterno sibi affuerit. | Reply to Objection 2. Self-existing [per se] man is not to be found in nature in such a way as to be outside the singular, as the Platonists held, although some say Plato believed that the separate man was only in the Divine intellect. And hence it was not necessary for it to be assumed by the Word, since it had been with Him from eternity. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod natura humana, quamvis non sit assumpta in concreto ut suppositum praeintelligatur assumptioni, sic tamen assumpta est in individuo, quia assumpta est ut sit in individuo. | Reply to Objection 3. Although human nature was not assumed in the concrete, as if the suppositum were presupposed to the assumption, nevertheless it is assumed in an individual, since it is assumed so as to be in an individual. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei humanam naturam assumere debuit in omnibus individuis. Id enim quod primo et per se assumptum est, est natura humana. Sed quod convenit per se alicui naturae, convenit omnibus in eadem natura existentibus. Ergo conveniens fuit ut natura humana assumeretur a Dei verbo in omnibus suppositis. | Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature in all individuals. For what is assumed first and by itself is human nature. But what belongs essentially to a nature belongs to all who exist in the nature. Therefore it was fitting that human nature should be assumed by the Word of God in all its supposita. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, incarnatio divina processit ex divina caritate, ideo dicitur Ioan. III, sic Deus dilexit mundum ut filium suum unigenitum daret. Sed caritas facit ut aliquis se communicet amicis quantum possibile est. Possibile autem fuit filio Dei ut plures naturas hominum assumeret, ut supra dictum est, et, eadem ratione, omnes. Ergo conveniens fuit ut filius Dei assumeret naturam in omnibus suis suppositis. | Objection 2. Further, the Divine Incarnation proceeded from Divine Love; hence it is written (John 3:16): "God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son." But love makes us give ourselves to our friends as much as we can, and it was possible for the Son of God to assume several human natures, as was said above (Question 3, Article 7), and with equal reason all. Hence it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature in all its supposita. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, sapiens operator perficit opus suum breviori via qua potest. Sed brevior via fuisset si omnes homines assumpti fuissent ad naturalem filiationem, quam quod per unum filium naturalem multi in adoptionem filiorum adducantur, ut dicitur Galat. IV. Ergo natura humana debuit a filio Dei assumi in omnibus suppositis. | Objection 3. Further, a skilful workman completes his work in the shortest manner possible. But it would have been a shorter way if all men had been assumed to the natural sonship than for one natural Son to lead many to the adoption of sons, as is written Galatians 4:5 (cf. Hebrews 2:10). Therefore human nature ought to have been assumed by God in all its supposita. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod filius Dei non assumpsit humanam naturam quae in specie consideratur, neque enim omnes hypostases eius assumpsit. | On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the Son of God "did not assume human nature as a species, nor did He assume all its hypostases." |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod non fuit conveniens quod humana natura in omnibus suis suppositis a verbo assumeretur. Primo quidem, quia tolleretur multitudo suppositorum humanae naturae, quae est ei connaturalis. Cum enim in natura assumpta non sit considerare aliud suppositum praeter personam assumentem, ut supra dictum est; si non esset natura humana nisi assumpta, sequeretur quod non esset nisi unum suppositum humanae naturae, quod est persona assumens. Secundo, quia hoc derogaret dignitati filii Dei incarnati, prout est primogenitus in multis fratribus secundum humanam naturam, sicut est primogenitus omnis creaturae secundum divinam. Essent enim tunc omnes homines aequalis dignitatis. Tertio, quia conveniens fuit quod, sicut unum suppositum divinum est incarnatum, ita unam solam naturam humanam assumeret, ut ex utraque parte unitas inveniatur. | I answer that, It was unfitting for human nature to be assumed by the Word in all its supposita. First, because the multitude of supposita of human nature, which are natural to it, would have been taken away. For since we must not see any other suppositum in the assumed nature, except the Person assuming, as was said above (Article 3), if there was no human nature except what was assumed, it would follow that there was but one suppositum of human nature, which is the Person assuming. Secondly, because this would have been derogatory to the dignity of the incarnate Son of God, as He is the First-born of many brethren, according to the human nature, even as He is the First-born of all creatures according to the Divine, for then all men would be of equal dignity. Thirdly, because it is fitting that as one Divine suppositum is incarnate, so He should assume one human nature, so that on both sides unity might be found. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod assumi convenit secundum se humanae naturae, quia scilicet non convenit ei ratione personae, sicut naturae divinae convenit assumere ratione personae. Non autem quia convenit ei secundum se sicut pertinens ad principia essentialia eius, vel sicut naturalis eius proprietas, per quem modum conveniret omnibus eius suppositis. | Reply to Objection 1. To be assumed belongs to the human nature of itself, because it does not belong to it by reason of a person, as it belongs to the Divine Nature to assume by reason of the Person; not, however, that it belongs to it of itself as if belonging to its essential principles, or as its natural property in which manner it would belong to all its supposita. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod dilectio Dei ad homines manifestatur non solum in ipsa assumptione humanae naturae, sed praecipue per ea quae passus est in natura humana pro aliis hominibus, secundum illud Rom. V, commendat autem Deus suam caritatem in nobis, quia, cum inimici essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Quod locum non haberet si in omnibus hominibus naturam humanam assumpsisset. | Reply to Objection 2. The love of God to men is shown not merely in the assumption of human nature, but especially in what He suffered in human nature for other men, according to Romans 5:8: "But God commendeth His charity towards us; because when as yet we were sinners . . . Christ died for us," which would not have taken place had He assumed human nature in all its supposita. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ad brevitatem viae quam sapiens operator observat, pertinet quod non faciat per multa quod sufficienter potest fieri per unum. Et ideo convenientissimum fuit quod per unum hominem alii omnes salvarentur. | Reply to Objection 3. In order to shorten the way, which every skilful workman does, what can be done by one must not be done by many. Hence it was most fitting that by one man all the rest should be saved. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens ut filius Dei humanam naturam assumeret ex stirpe Adae. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Heb. VII, decebat ut esset nobis pontifex segregatus a peccatoribus. Sed magis esset a peccatoribus segregatus si non assumpsisset humanam naturam ex stirpe Adae peccatoris. Ergo videtur quod non debuit de stirpe Adae naturam humanam assumere. | Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature of the stock of Adam, for the Apostle says (Hebrews 7:26): "For it was fitting that we should have such a high priest . . . separated from sinners." But He would have been still further separated from sinners had He not assumed human nature of the stock of Adam, a sinner. Hence it seems that He ought not to have assumed human nature of the stock of Adam. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, in quolibet genere nobilius est principium eo quod est ex principio. Si igitur assumere voluit humanam naturam, magis debuit eam assumere in ipso Adam. | Objection 2. Further, in every genus the principle is nobler than what is from the principle. Hence, if He wished to assume human nature, He ought to have assumed it in Adam himself. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, gentiles fuerunt magis peccatores quam Iudaei, ut dicit Glossa, Galat. II, super illud, nos natura Iudaei, non ex gentibus peccatores. Si ergo ex peccatoribus naturam humanam assumere voluit, debuit eam magis assumere ex gentilibus quam ex stirpe Abrahae, qui fuit iustus. | Objection 3. Further, the Gentiles were greater sinners than the Jews, as a gloss says on Galatians 2:15: "For we by nature are Jews, and not of the Gentiles, sinners." Hence, if He wished to assume human nature from sinners, He ought rather to have assumed it from the Gentiles than from the stock of Abraham, who was just. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod Luc. III generatio domini reducitur usque ad Adam. | On the contrary, (Luke 3), the genealogy of our Lord is traced back to Adam. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin., poterat Deus hominem aliunde suscipere, non de genere illius Adae qui suo peccato obligavit genus humanum. Sed melius iudicavit et de ipso quod victum fuerat genere assumere hominem Deus, per quem generis humani vinceret inimicum. Et hoc propter tria. Primo quidem, quia hoc videtur ad iustitiam pertinere, ut ille satisfaciat qui peccavit. Et ideo de natura per ipsum corrupta debuit assumi id per quod satisfactio erat implenda pro tota natura. Secundo, hoc etiam pertinet ad maiorem hominis dignitatem, dum ex illo genere victor Diaboli nascitur quod per Diabolum fuerat victum. Tertio, quia per hoc etiam Dei potentia magis ostenditur, dum de natura corrupta et infirma assumpsit id quod in tantam virtutem et dignitatem est promotum. | I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 18): "God was able to assume human nature elsewhere than from the stock of Adam, who by his sin had fettered the whole human race; yet God judged it better to assume human nature from the vanquished race, and thus to vanquish the enemy of the human race." And this for three reasons: First, because it would seem to belong to justice that he who sinned should make amends; and hence that from the nature which he had corrupted should be assumed that whereby satisfaction was to be made for the whole nature. Secondly, it pertains to man's greater dignity that the conqueror of the devil should spring from the stock conquered by the devil. Thirdly, because God's power is thereby made more manifest, since, from a corrupt and weakened nature, He assumed that which was raised to such might and glory. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus debuit esse a peccatoribus segregatus quantum ad culpam, quam venerat destruere, non quantum ad naturam, quam venerat salvare; secundum quam debuit per omnia fratribus assimilari, ut idem apostolus dicit, Heb. II. Et in hoc etiam mirabilior est eius innocentia, quod de massa peccato subiecta natura assumpta tantam habuit puritatem. | Reply to Objection 1. Christ ought to be separated from sinners as regards sin, which He came to overthrow, and not as regards nature which He came to save, and in which "it behooved Him in all things to be made like to His brethren," as the Apostle says (Hebrews 2:17). And in this is His innocence the more wonderful, seeing that though assumed from a mass tainted by sin, His nature was endowed with such purity. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, oportuit eum qui peccata venerat tollere, esse a peccatoribus segregatum quantum ad culpam, cui Adam subiacuit, et quem Christus a suo delicto eduxit, ut dicitur Sap. X. Oportebat autem eum qui mundare omnes venerat, non esse mundandum, sicut et in quolibet genere motus primum movens est immobile secundum illum motum, sicut primum alterans est inalterabile. Et ideo non fuit conveniens ut assumeret humanam naturam in ipso Adam. | Reply to Objection 2. As was said above (ad 1) it behooved Him Who came to take away sins to be separated from sinners as regards sin, to which Adam was subject, whom Christ "brought out of his sin," as is written (Wisdom 10:2). For it behooved Him Who came to cleanse all, not to need cleansing Himself; just as in every genus of motion the first mover is immovable as regards that motion, and the first to alter is itself unalterable. Hence it was not fitting that He should assume human nature in Adam himself. |
| IIIª q. 4 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia Christus debebat esse maxime a peccatoribus segregatus quantum ad culpam, quasi summam innocentiae obtinens, conveniens fuit ut a primo peccatore usque ad Christum perveniretur mediantibus quibusdam iustis, in quibus perfulgerent quaedam insignia futurae sanctitatis. Propter hoc etiam in populo ex quo Christus erat nasciturus instituit Deus quaedam sanctitatis signa, quae incoeperunt in Abraham, qui primus promissionem accepit de Christo, et circumcisionem in signum foederis consummandi, ut dicitur Gen. XVII. | Reply to Objection 3. Since Christ ought especially to be separated from sinners as regards sin, and to possess the highest innocence, it was fitting that between the first sinner and Christ some just men should stand midway, in whom certain forecasts of (His) future holiness should shine forth. And hence, even in the people from whom Christ was to be born, God appointed signs of holiness, which began in Abraham, who was the first to receive the promise of Christ, and circumcision, as a sign that the covenant should be kept, as is written (Genesis 17:11). |
| IIIª q. 5 pr. Deinde considerandum est de assumptione partium humanae naturae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum filius Dei debuerit assumere verum corpus. Secundo, utrum assumere debuerit corpus terrenum, scilicet carnem et sanguinem. Tertio, utrum assumpserit animam. Quarto, utrum assumere debuerit intellectum. | Question 5. The parts of human nature which were assumed 1. Should the Son of God have assumed a true body? 2. Should he have assumed an earthly body, i.e. one of flesh and blood? 3. Should he have assumed a soul? 4. Should he have assumed an intellect? |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei non assumpserit verum corpus. Dicitur enim Philipp. II quod in similitudinem hominum factus est. Sed quod est secundum veritatem, non dicitur esse secundum similitudinem. Ergo filius Dei non assumpsit verum corpus. | Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a true body. For it is written (Philippians 2:7), that He was "made in the likeness of men." But what is something in truth is not said to be in the likeness thereof. Therefore the Son of God did not assume a true body. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, assumptio corporis in nullo derogavit dignitati divinitatis, dicit enim Leo Papa, in sermone de nativitate, quod nec inferiorem naturam consumpsit glorificatio, nec superiorem minuit assumptio. Sed hoc ad dignitatem Dei pertinet quod sit omnino a corpore separatus. Ergo videtur quod per assumptionem non fuerit Deus corpori unitus. | Objection 2. Further, the assumption of a body in no way diminishes the dignity of the Godhead; for Pope Leo says (Serm. de Nativ.) that "the glorification did not absorb the lesser nature, nor did the assumption lessen the higher." But it pertains to the dignity of God to be altogether separated from bodies. Therefore it seems that by the assumption God was not united to a body. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, signa debent respondere signatis. Sed apparitiones veteris testamenti, quae fuerunt signa et figurae apparitionis Christi, non fuerunt secundum corporis veritatem, sed secundum imaginariam visionem, sicut patet Isaiae VI, vidi dominum sedentem, et cetera. Ergo videtur quod etiam apparitio filii Dei in mundum non fuerit secundum corporis veritatem, sed solum secundum imaginationem. | Objection 3. Further, signs ought to correspond to the realities. But the apparitions of the Old Testament which were signs of the manifestation of Christ were not in a real body, but by visions in the imagination, as is plain from Isaiah 6:1: "I saw the Lord sitting," etc. Hence it would seem that the apparition of the Son of God in the world was not in a real body, but only in imagination. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octogintatrium quaest., si phantasma fuit corpus Christi, fefellit Christus. Et si fefellit, veritas non est. Est autem veritas Christus. Ergo non phantasma fuit corpus eius. Et sic patet quod verum corpus assumpsit. | On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 13): "If the body of Christ was a phantom, Christ deceived us, and if He deceived us, He is not the Truth. But Christ is the Truth. Therefore His body was not a phantom." Hence it is plain that He assumed a true body. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in libro de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, natus est Dei filius non putative, quasi imaginatum corpus habens, sed corpus verum. Et huius ratio triplex potest assignari. Quarum prima est ex ratione humanae naturae, ad quam pertinet verum corpus habere. Supposito igitur ex praemissis quod conveniens fuerit filium Dei assumere humanam naturam, consequens est quod verum corpus assumpserit. Secunda ratio sumi potest ex his quae in mysterio incarnationis sunt acta. Si enim non fuit verum corpus eius sed phantasticum, ergo nec veram mortem sustinuit; nec aliquid eorum quae de eo Evangelistae narrant, secundum veritatem gessit, sed solum secundum apparentiam quandam. Et sic etiam sequitur quod non fuit vera salus hominis subsecuta, oportet enim effectum causae proportionari. Tertia ratio potest sumi ex ipsa dignitate personae assumentis, quae cum sit veritas, non decuit ut in opere eius aliqua fictio esset. Unde et dominus hunc errorem per seipsum excludere dignatus est, Luc. ult., cum discipuli, conturbati et conterriti, putabant se spiritum videre, et non verum corpus, et ideo se eis palpandum praebuit, dicens, palpate et videte, quia spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere. | I answer that, As is said (De Eccles. Dogm. ii). The Son of God was not born in appearance only, as if He had an imaginary body; but His body was real. The proof of this is threefold. First, from the essence of human nature to which it pertains to have a true body. Therefore granted, as already proved (4, 1), that it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature, He must consequently have assumed a real body. The second reason is taken from what was done in the mystery of the Incarnation. For if His body was not real but imaginary, He neither underwent a real death, nor of those things which the Evangelists recount of Him, did He do any in very truth, but only in appearance; and hence it would also follow that the real salvation of man has not taken place; since the effect must be proportionate to the cause. The third reason is taken from the dignity of the Person assuming, Whom it did not become to have anything fictitious in His work, since He is the Truth. Hence our Lord Himself deigned to refute this error (Luke 24:37-39), when the disciples, "troubled and frighted, supposed that they saw a spirit," and not a true body; wherefore He offered Himself to their touch, saying: "Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have." |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod similitudo illa exprimit veritatem humanae naturae in Christo, per modum quo omnes qui vere in humana natura existunt, similes specie esse dicuntur. Non autem intelligitur similitudo phantastica. Ad cuius evidentiam, apostolus subiungit quod factus est obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis, quod fieri non potuisset si fuisset sola similitudo phantastica. | Reply to Objection 1. This likeness indicates the truth of the human nature in Christ--just as all that truly exist in human nature are said to be like in species--and not a mere imaginary likeness. In proof of this the Apostle subjoins (Philippians 2:8) that He became "obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross"; which would have been impossible, had it been only an imaginary likeness. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod per hoc quod filius Dei verum corpus assumpsit, in nullo est eius dignitas diminuta. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de fide ad Petrum, exinanivit seipsum, formam servi accipiens, ut fieret servus, sed formae Dei plenitudinem non amisit. Non enim filius Dei sic assumpsit verum corpus ut forma corporis fieret, quod repugnat divinae simplicitati et puritati, hoc enim esset assumere corpus in unitate naturae, quod est impossibile, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed, salva distinctione naturae, assumpsit in unitate personae. | Reply to Objection 2. By assuming a true body the dignity of the Son of God is nowise lessened. Hence Augustine [Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum ii): "He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, that He might become a servant; yet did He not lose the fulness of the form of God." For the Son of God assumed a true body, not so as to become the form of a body, which is repugnant to the Divine simplicity and purity--for this would be to assume a body to the unity of the nature, which is impossible, as is plain from what has been stated above (Question 2, Article 1): but, the natures remaining distinct, He assumed a body to the unity of Person. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod figura respondere debet quantum ad similitudinem, non quantum ad rei veritatem, si enim per omnia esset similitudo, iam non esset signum, sed ipsa res, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro. Conveniens igitur fuit ut apparitiones veteris testamenti essent secundum apparentiam tantum, quasi figurae, apparitio autem filii Dei in mundo esset secundum corporis veritatem, quasi res figurata sive signata per illas figuras. Unde apostolus, Coloss. II, quae sunt umbra futurorum, corpus autem Christi. | Reply to Objection 3. The figure ought to correspond to the reality as regards the likeness and not as regards the truth of the thing. For if they were alike in all points, it would no longer be a likeness but the reality itself, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26). Hence it was more fitting that the apparitions of the old Testament should be in appearance only, being figures; and that the apparition of the Son of God in the world should be in a real body, being the thing prefigured by these figures. Hence the Apostle says (Colossians 2:17): "Which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ's." |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non habuerit corpus carnale, sive terrestre, sed caeleste. Dicit enim apostolus, I Cor. XV, primus homo de terra, terrenus, secundus homo de caelo, caelestis. Sed primus homo, scilicet Adam, fuit de terra quantum ad corpus, ut patet Gen. II. Ergo etiam secundus homo, scilicet Christus, fuit de caelo quantum ad corpus. | Objection 1. It would seem that Christ had not a carnal or earthly, but a heavenly body. For the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 15:41): "The first man was of the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly." But the first man, i.e. Adam, was of the earth as regards his body, as is plain from Genesis 1. Therefore the second man, i.e. Christ, was of heaven as regards the body. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, I Cor. XV dicitur, caro et sanguis regnum Dei non possidebunt. Sed regnum Dei principaliter est in Christo. Ergo in ipso non est caro et sanguis, sed magis corpus caeleste. | Objection 2. Further, it is said (1 Corinthians 15:50): "Flesh and blood shall not [Vulgate: 'cannot'] possess the kingdom of God." But the kingdom of God is in Christ chiefly. Therefore there is no flesh or blood in Him, but rather a heavenly body. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, omne quod est optimum est Deo attribuendum. Sed inter omnia corpora corpus nobilissimum est caeleste. Ergo tale corpus debuit Christus assumere. | Objection 3. Further, whatever is best is to be attributed to God. But of all bodies a heavenly body is the best. Therefore it behooved Christ to assume such a body. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit Luc. ult., spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere. Caro autem et ossa non sunt ex materia caelestis corporis, sed ex inferioribus elementis. Ergo corpus Christi non fuit corpus caeleste, sed carneum et terrenum. | On the contrary, our Lord says (Luke 24:39): "A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have." Now flesh and bones are not of the matter of heavenly bodies, but are composed of the inferior elements. Therefore the body of Christ was not a heavenly, but a carnal and earthly body. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod eisdem rationibus apparet quare corpus Christi non debuit esse caeleste, quibus ostensum est quod non debuit esse phantasticum. Primo enim, sicut non salvaretur veritas humanae naturae in Christo si corpus eius esset phantasticum, ut posuit Manichaeus; ita etiam non salvaretur si poneretur caeleste, sicut posuit Valentinus. Cum enim forma hominis sit quaedam res naturalis, requirit determinatam materiam, scilicet carnes et ossa, quae in hominis definitione poni oportet, ut patet per philosophum, in VII Metaphys. Secundo, quia hoc etiam derogaret veritati eorum quae Christus in corpore gessit. Cum enim corpus caeleste sit impassibile et incorruptibile, ut probatur in I de caelo, si filius Dei corpus caeleste assumpsisset, non vere esuriisset nec sitiisset, nec etiam passionem et mortem sustinuisset. Tertio, etiam hoc derogat veritati divinae. Cum enim filius Dei se ostenderet hominibus quasi corpus carneum et terrenum habens, fuisset falsa demonstratio si corpus caeleste habuisset. Et ideo in libro de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus dicitur, natus est filius Dei carnem ex virginis corpore trahens, et non de caelo secum afferens. | I answer that, By the reasons which proved that the body of Christ was not an imaginary one, it may also be shown that it was not a heavenly body. First, because even as the truth of the human nature of Christ would not have been maintained had His body been an imaginary one, such as Manes supposed, so likewise it would not have been maintained if we supposed, as did Valentine, that it was a heavenly body. For since the form of man is a natural thing, it requires determinate matter, to wit, flesh and bones, which must be placed in the definition of man, as is plain from the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 39). Secondly, because this would lessen the truth of such things as Christ did in the body. For since a heavenly body is impassible and incorruptible, as is proved De Coel. i, 20, if the Son of God had assumed a heavenly body, He would not have truly hungered or thirsted, nor would he have undergone His passion and death. Thirdly, this would have detracted from God's truthfulness. For since the Son of God showed Himself to men, as if He had a carnal and earthly body, the manifestation would have been false, had He had a heavenly body. Hence (De Eccles. Dogm. ii) it is said: "The Son of God was born, taking flesh of the Virgin's body, and not bringing it with Him from heaven." |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus dicitur dupliciter de caelo descendisse. Uno modo, ratione divinae naturae, non ita quod divina natura esse in caelo defecerit; sed quia in infimis novo modo esse coepit, scilicet secundum naturam assumptam; secundum illud Ioan. III, nemo ascendit in caelum nisi qui descendit de caelo, filius hominis, qui est in caelo. Alio modo, ratione corporis, non quia ipsum corpus Christi secundum suam substantiam de caelo descenderit; sed quia virtute caelesti, idest spiritus sancti, est eius corpus formatum. Unde Augustinus dicit, ad Orosium, exponens auctoritatem inductam, caelestem dico Christum, quia non ex humano conceptus est semine. Et hoc etiam modo Hilarius exponit, in libro de Trinitate. | Reply to Objection 1. Christ is said in two ways to have come down from heaven. First, as regards His Divine Nature; not indeed that the Divine Nature ceased to be in heaven, but inasmuch as He began to be here below in a new way, viz. by His assumed. nature, according to John 3:13: "No man hath ascended into heaven, but He that descended from heaven, the Son of Man, Who is in heaven." Secondly, as regards His body, not indeed that the very substance of the body of Christ descended from heaven, but that His body was formed by a heavenly power, i.e. by the Holy Ghost. Hence Augustine, explaining the passage quoted, says (Ad Orosium [Dial. Qq. lxv, qu. 4, work of an unknown author): "I call Christ a heavenly man because He was not conceived of human seed." And Hilary expounds it in the same way (De Trin. x). |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod caro et sanguis non accipiuntur ibi pro substantia carnis et sanguinis, sed pro corruptione carnis et sanguinis. Quae quidem in Christo non fuit quantum ad culpam. Fuit tamen ad tempus quantum ad poenam, ut opus nostrae redemptionis expleret. | Reply to Objection 2. Flesh and blood are not taken here for the substance of flesh and blood, but for the corruption of flesh, which was not in Christ as far as it was sinful; but as far as it was a punishment; thus, for a time, it was in Christ, that He might carry through the work of our redemption. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc ipsum ad maximam Dei gloriam pertinet quod corpus infirmum et terrenum ad tantam sublimitatem provehit. Unde in synodo Ephesina legitur verbum sancti Theophili dicentis, qualiter artificum optimi non pretiosis tantum materiebus artem ostendentes in admiratione sunt, sed, vilissimum lutum et terram dissolutam plerumque assumentes, suae disciplinae demonstrantes virtutem, multo magis laudantur; ita omnium optimus artifex, Dei verbum, non aliquam pretiosam materiam corporis caelestis apprehendens ad nos venit, sed in luto magnitudinem suae artis ostendit. | Reply to Objection 3. It pertains to the greatest glory of God to have raised a weak and earthly body to such sublimity. Hence in the General Council of Ephesus (P. II, Act. I) we read the saying of St. Theophilus: "Just as the best workmen are esteemed not merely for displaying their skill in precious materials, but very often because by making use of the poorest . . . lay and commonest earth, they show the power of their craft; so the best of all workmen, the Word of God, did not come down to us by taking a heavenly body of some most precious matter, but shewed the greatness of His skill in clay." |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei animam non assumpserit. Ioannes enim, incarnationis mysterium tradens, dixit, verbum caro factum est, nulla facta de anima mentione. Non autem dicitur caro factum eo quod sit in carnem conversum, sed quia carnem assumpsit. Non ergo videtur assumpsisse animam. | Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul. For John has said, teaching the mystery of Incarnation (John 1:14): "The Word was made flesh"--no mention being made of a soul. Now it is not said that "the Word was made flesh" as if changed to flesh, but because He assumed flesh. Therefore He seems not to have assumed a soul. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, anima necessaria est corpori ad hoc quod per eam vivificetur. Sed ad hoc non fuit necessaria corpori Christi, ut videtur, quia ipsum Dei verbum est, de quo in Psalmo, domine, apud te est fons vitae. Superfluum igitur fuisset animam adesse, verbo praesente. Deus autem et natura nihil frustra faciunt, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in I de caelo. Ergo videtur quod filius Dei animam non assumpsit. | Objection 2. Further, a soul is necessary to the body, in order to quicken it. But this was not necessary for the body of Christ, as it would seem, for of the Word of God it is written (Psalm 35:10): Lord, "with Thee is the fountain of life." Therefore it would seem altogether superfluous for the soul to be there, when the Word was present. But "God and nature do nothing uselessly," as the Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 32; ii, 56). Therefore the Word would seem not to have assumed a soul. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, ex unione animae ad corpus constituitur natura communis, quae est species humana. In domino autem Iesu Christo non est communem speciem accipere, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro. Non igitur assumpsit animam. | Objection 3. Further, by the union of soul and body is constituted the common nature, which is the human species. But "in the Lord Jesus Christ we are not to look for a common species," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3). Therefore He did not assume a soul. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de agone Christiano non eos audiamus qui solum corpus humanum dicunt esse susceptum a verbo Dei; et sic audiunt quod dictum est, verbum caro factum est, ut negent illum hominem vel animam, vel aliquid hominis habuisse nisi carnem solam. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xxi): "Let us not hearken to such as say that only a human body was assumed by the Word of God; and take 'the Word was made flesh' to mean that the man had no soul nor any other part of a man, save flesh." |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de haeresibus, opinio primo fuit Arii, et postea Apollinaris, quod filius Dei solam carnem assumpserit, absque anima, ponentes quod verbum fuerit carni loco animae. Ex quo sequebatur quod in Christo non fuerunt duae naturae, sed una tantum, ex anima enim et carne una natura humana constituitur. Sed haec positio stare non potest, propter tria. Primo quidem, quia repugnat auctoritati Scripturae, in qua dominus de sua anima facit mentionem, Matth. XXVI, tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem; et Ioan. X, potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam. Sed ad hoc respondebat Apollinaris quod in his verbis anima metaphorice sumitur, per quem modum in veteri testamento Dei anima commemoratur, Isaiae I, Calendas vestras et solemnitates odivit anima mea. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus, in libro octogintatrium quaest., Evangelistae in evangelica narratione narrant quod miratus est Iesus, et iratus, et contristatus, et quod esuriit. Quae quidem ita demonstrant eum veram animam habuisse, sicut ex hoc quod comedit et dormivit et fatigatus est, demonstratur habuisse verum corpus humanum. Alioquin, si et haec ad metaphoram referantur, cum similia legantur in veteri testamento de Deo, peribit fides evangelicae narrationis. Aliud est enim quod prophetice nuntiatur in figuris, aliud quod secundum rerum proprietatem ab Evangelistis historice scribitur. Secundo, derogat praedictus error utilitati incarnationis, quae est liberatio hominis. Ut enim argumentatur Augustinus, in libro contra Felicianum, si, accepta carne, filius Dei animam omisit, aut, innoxiam sciens, medicinae indigentem non credidit; aut, a se alienam putans, redemptionis beneficio non donavit; aut, ex toto insanabilem iudicans, curare nequivit; aut ut vilem, et quae nullis usibus apta videretur, abiecit. Horum duo blasphemiam important in Deum. Quomodo enim dicetur omnipotens, si curare non potuit desperatam? Aut quomodo omnium Deus, si non ipse fecit animam nostram? Duobus vero aliis, in uno animae causa nescitur, in altero meritum non tenetur. Aut intelligere causam putandus est animae qui eam, ad accipiendum legem habitu insitae rationis instructam, a peccato voluntariae transgressionis nititur separare? Aut quomodo eius generositatem novit qui ignobilitatis vitio dicit despectam? Si originem attendas, pretiosior est animae substantia, si transgressionis culpam, propter intelligentiam peior est causa. Ego autem Christum et perfectam sapientiam scio, et piissimam esse non dubito, quorum primo, meliorem et prudentiae capacem non despexit; secundo, eam quae magis fuerat vulnerata, suscepit. Tertio vero, haec positio est contra ipsam incarnationis veritatem. Caro enim et ceterae partes hominis per animam speciem sortiuntur. Unde, recedente anima, non est os aut caro nisi aequivoce, ut patet per philosophum, II de anima et VII Metaphys. | I answer that, As Augustine says (De Haeres. 69,55), it was first of all the opinion of Arius and then of Apollinaris that the Son of God assumed only flesh, without a soul, holding that the Word took the place of a soul to the body. And consequently it followed that there were not two natures in Christ, but only one; for from a soul and body one human nature is constituted. But this opinion cannot hold, for three reasons. First, because it is counter to the authority of Scripture, in which our Lord makes mention of His soul, Matthew 26:38: "My soul is sorrowful even unto death"; and John 10:18: "I have power to lay down My soul [animam meam: Douay: 'My life']." But to this Apollinaris replied that in these words soul is taken metaphorically, in which way mention is made in the Old Testament of the soul of God (Isaiah 1:14): "My soul hateth your new moons and your solemnities." But, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80), the Evangelists relate how Jesus wondered, was angered, sad, and hungry. Now these show that He had a true soul, just as that He ate, slept and was weary shows that He had a true human body: otherwise, if these things are a metaphor, because the like are said of God in the Old Testament, the trustworthiness of the Gospel story is undermined. For it is one thing that things were foretold in a figure, and another that historical events were related in very truth by the Evangelists. Secondly, this error lessens the utility of Incarnation, which is man's liberation. For Augustine [Vigilius Tapsensis] argues thus (Contra Felician. xiii): "If the Son of God in taking flesh passed over the soul, either He knew its sinlessness, and trusted it did not need a remedy; or He considered it unsuitable to Him, and did not bestow on it the boon of redemption; or He reckoned it altogether incurable, and was unable to heal it; or He cast it off as worthless and seemingly unfit for any use. Now two of these reasons imply a blasphemy against God. For how shall we call Him omnipotent, if He is unable to heal what is beyond hope? Or God of all, if He has not made our soul. And as regards the other two reasons, in one the cause of the soul is ignored, and in the other no place is given to merit. Is He to be considered to understand the cause of the soul, Who seeks to separate it from the sin of wilful transgression, enabled as it is to receive the law by the endowment of the habit of reason? Or how can His generosity be known to any one who says it was despised on account of its ignoble sinfulness? If you look at its origin, the substance of the soul is more precious than the body: but if at the sin of transgression, on account of its intelligence it is worse than the body. Now I know and declare that Christ is perfect wisdom, nor have I any doubt that He is most loving; and because of the first of these He did not despise what was better and more capable of prudence; and because of the second He protected what was most wounded." Thirdly, this position is against the truth of Incarnation. For flesh and the other parts of man receive their species through the soul. Hence, if the soul is absent, there are no bones nor flesh, except equivocally, as is plain from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9; Metaph. vii, 34). |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cum dicitur, verbum caro factum est, caro ponitur pro toto homine, ac si diceret, verbum homo factum est, sicut Isaiae XL dicitur, videbit omnis caro salutare Dei nostri. Ideo autem totus homo per carnem significatur, quia, ut dicitur in auctoritate inducta, quia per carnem filius Dei visibilis apparuit, unde subditur et vidimus gloriam eius. Vel ideo quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro octogintatrium quaest. in tota illa unitate susceptionis principale verbum est, extrema autem atque ultima caro. Volens itaque Evangelista commendare pro nobis dilectionem humilitatis Dei, verbum et carnem nominavit, omittens animam, quae est verbo inferior, carne praestantior. Rationabile etiam fuit ut nominaret carnem, quae, propter hoc quod magis distat a verbo, minus assumptibilis videbatur. | Reply to Objection 1. When we say, "The Word was made flesh," "flesh" is taken for the whole man, as if we were to say, "The Word was made man," as Isaiah 40:5: "All flesh together shall see that the mouth of the Lord hath spoken." And the whole man is signified by flesh, because, as is said in the authority quoted, the Son of God became visible by flesh; hence it is subjoined: "And we saw His glory." Or because, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80), "in all that union the Word is the highest, and flesh the last and lowest. Hence, wishing to commend the love of God's humility to us, the Evangelist mentioned the Word and flesh, leaving the soul on one side, since it is less than the Word and nobler than flesh." Again, it was reasonable to mention flesh, which, as being farther away from the Word, was less assumable, as it would seem. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum est fons vitae sicut prima causa vitae effectiva. Sed anima est principium vitae corpori tanquam forma ipsius. Forma autem est effectus agentis. Unde ex praesentia verbi magis concludi posset quod corpus esset animatum, sicut ex praesentia ignis concludi potest quod corpus cui ignis adhaeret, sit calidum. | Reply to Objection 2. The Word is the fountain of life, as the first effective cause of life; but the soul is the principle of the life of the body, as its form. Now the form is the effect of the agent. Hence from the presence of the Word it might rather have been concluded that the body was animated, just as from the presence of fire it may be concluded that the body, in which fire adheres, is warm. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod non est inconveniens, immo necessarium dicere quod in Christo fuit natura quae constituitur per animam corpori advenientem. Damascenus autem negat in domino Iesu Christo esse communem speciem quasi aliquid tertium resultans ex unione divinitatis et humanitatis. | Reply to Objection 3. It is not unfitting, indeed it is necessary to say that in Christ there was a nature which was constituted by the soul coming to the body. But Damascene denied that in Jesus Christ there was a common species, i.e. a third something resulting from the Godhead and the humanity. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei non assumpsit mentem humanam, sive intellectum. Ubi enim est praesentia rei, non requiritur eius imago. Sed homo secundum mentem est ad imaginem Dei, ut dicit Augustinus, in libro de Trinit. Cum ergo in Christo fuerit praesentia ipsius divini verbi, non oportuit ibi esse mentem humanam. | Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a human mind or intellect. For where a thing is present, its image is not required. But man is made to God's image, as regards his mind, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 3,6). Hence, since in Christ there was the presence of the Divine Word itself, there was no need of a human mind. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, maior lux offuscat minorem. Sed verbum Dei, quod est lux illuminans omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, ut dicitur Ioan. I, comparatur ad mentem sicut lux maior ad minorem, quia et ipsa mens quaedam lux est, quasi lucerna illuminata a prima luce, Proverb. X, lucerna domini spiraculum hominis. Ergo in Christo, qui est verbum Dei, non fuit necessarium esse mentem humanam. | Objection 2. Further, the greater light dims the lesser. But the Word of God, Who is "the light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," as is written John 1:9, is compared to the mind as the greater light to the lesser; since our mind is a light, being as it were a lamp enkindled by the First Light (Proverbs 20:27): "The spirit of a man is the lamp of the Lord." Therefore in Christ Who is the Word of God, there is no need of a human mind. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, assumptio humanae naturae a Dei verbo dicitur eius incarnatio. Sed intellectus, sive mens humana, neque est caro neque est actus carnis, quia nullius corporis actus est, ut probatur in III de anima. Ergo videtur quod filius Dei humanam mentem non assumpserit. | Objection 3. Further, the assumption of human nature by the Word of God is called His Incarnation. But the intellect or human mind is nothing carnal, either in its substance or in its act. for it is not the act of a body, as is proved De Anima iii, 6. Hence it would seem that the Son of God did not assume a human mind. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de fide ad Petrum, firmissime tene, et nullatenus dubites, Christum, filium Dei, habentem nostri generis carnem et animam rationalem. Qui de carne sua dicit, palpate et videte, quia spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere, Luc. ult. Animam quoque se ostendit habere, dicens, ego pono animam meam, et iterum sumo eam, Ioan. X. Intellectum quoque se ostendit habere, dicens, discite a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde, Matth. XI. Et de ipso per prophetam dominus dicit, ecce intelliget puer meus, Isaiae LII. | On the contrary, Augustine [Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum xiv): "Firmly hold and nowise doubt that Christ the Son of God has true flesh and a rational soul of the same kind as ours, since of His flesh He says (Luke 24:39): 'Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have.' And He proves that He has a soul, saying (John 10:17): 'I lay down My soul [Douay: 'life'] that I may take it again.' And He proves that He has an intellect, saying (Matthew 11:29): 'Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart.' And God says of Him by the prophet (Isaiah 52:13): 'Behold my servant shall understand.'" |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de haeresibus, Apollinaristae de anima Christi a Catholica Ecclesia dissenserunt, dicentes, sicut Ariani, Christum carnem solam sine anima suscepisse. In qua quaestione testimoniis evangelicis victi, mentem defuisse animae Christi dixerunt, sed pro hac ipsum verbum in ea fuisse. Sed haec positio eisdem rationibus convincitur sicut et praedicta. Primo enim, hoc adversatur narrationi evangelicae, quae commemorat eum fuisse miratum, ut patet Matth. VIII. Admiratio autem absque ratione esse non potest, quia importat collationem effectus ad causam; dum scilicet aliquis videt effectum cuius causam ignorat, et quaerit, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Secundo, repugnat utilitati incarnationis, quae est iustificatio hominis a peccato. Anima enim humana non est capax peccati, nec gratiae iustificantis, nisi per mentem. Unde praecipue oportuit mentem humanam assumi. Unde Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod Dei verbum assumpsit corpus et animam intellectualem et rationalem, et postea subdit, totus toti unitus est, ut toti mihi salutem gratificet idest, gratis faciat, quod enim inassumptibile est, incurabile est. Tertio, hoc repugnat veritati incarnationis. Cum enim corpus proportionetur animae sicut materia propriae formae, non est vera caro humana quae non est perfecta anima humana, scilicet rationali et ideo, si Christus animam sine mente habuisset, non habuisset veram carnem humanam, sed carnem bestialem, quia per solam mentem anima nostra differt ab anima bestiali. Unde dicit Augustinus, in libro octogintatrium quaest., quod secundum hunc errorem sequeretur quod filius Dei beluam quandam cum figura humani corporis suscepisset. Quod iterum repugnat veritati divinae, quae nullam patitur fictionis falsitatem. | I answer that, As Augustine says (De Haeres. 49,50), "the Apollinarists thought differently from the Catholic Church concerning the soul of Christ, saying with the Arians, that Christ took flesh alone, without a soul; and on being overcome on this point by the Gospel witness, they went on to say that the mind was wanting to Christ's soul, but that the Word supplied its place." But this position is refuted by the same arguments as the preceding. First, because it runs counter to the Gospel story, which relates how He marveled (as is plain from Matthew 8:10). Now marveling cannot be without reason, since it implies the collation of effect and cause, i.e. inasmuch as when we see an effect and are ignorant of its cause, we seek to know it, as is said Metaph. i, 2. Secondly, it is inconsistent with the purpose of Incarnation, which is the justification of man from sin. For the human soul is not capable of sin nor of justifying grace except through the mind. Hence it was especially necessary for the mind to be assumed. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that "the Word of God assumed a body and an intellectual and rational soul," and adds afterwards: "The whole was united to the whole, that He might bestow salvation on me wholly; for what was not assumed is not curable." Thirdly, it is against the truth of Incarnation. For since the body is proportioned to the soul as matter to its proper form, it is not truly human flesh if it is not perfected by human, i.e. a rational soul. And hence if Christ had had a soul without a mind, He would not have had true human flesh, but irrational flesh, since our soul differs from an animal soul by the mind alone. Hence Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80) that from this error it would have followed that the Son of God "took an animal with the form of a human body," which, again, is against the Divine truth, which cannot suffer any fictitious untruth. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, ubi est ipsa res per sui praesentiam non requiritur eius imago ad hoc quod suppleat locum rei, sicut, ubi erat imperator, milites non venerabantur eius imaginem. Sed tamen requiritur cum praesentia rei imago ipsius ut perficiatur ex ipsa rei praesentia, sicut imago in cera perficitur per impressionem sigilli, et imago hominis resultat in speculo per eius praesentiam. Unde, ad perficiendam humanam mentem, necessarium fuit quod eam sibi verbum Dei univit. | Reply to Objection 1. Where a thing is by its presence, its image is not required to supply the place of the thing, as where the emperor is the soldiers do not pay homage to his image. Yet the image of a thing is required together with its presence, that it may be perfected by the presence of the thing, just as the image in the wax is perfected by the impression of the seal, and as the image of man is reflected in the mirror by his presence. Hence in order to perfect the human mind it was necessary that the Word should unite it to Himself. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod lux maior evacuat lucem minorem alterius corporis illuminantis, non tamen evacuat, sed perficit lucem corporis illuminati. Ad praesentiam enim solis stellarum lux obscuratur, sed aeris lumen perficitur. Intellectus autem seu mens hominis est quasi lux illuminata a luce divini verbi. Et ideo per lucem divini verbi non evacuatur mens hominis, sed magis perficitur. | Reply to Objection 2. The greater light dims the lesser light of another luminous body; but it does not dim, rather it perfects the light of the body illuminated--at the presence of the sun the light of the stars is put out, but the light of the air is perfected. Now the intellect or mind of man is, as it were, a light lit up by the light of the Divine Word; and hence by the presence of the Word the mind of man is perfected rather than overshadowed. |
| IIIª q. 5 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet potentia intellectiva non sit alicuius corporis actus, ipsa tamen essentia animae humanae, quae est forma corporis, requiritur quod sit nobilior, ad hoc quod habeat potentiam intelligendi. Et ideo necesse est ut corpus melius dispositum ei respondeat. | Reply to Objection 3. Although the intellective power is not the act of a body, nevertheless the essence of the human soul, which is the form of the body, requires that it should be more noble, in order that it may have the power of understanding; and hence it is necessary that a better disposed body should correspond to it. |
| IIIª q. 6 pr. Deinde considerandum est de ordine assumptionis praedictae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum filius Dei assumpserit carnem mediante anima. Secundo, utrum assumpserit animam mediante spiritu, sive mente. Tertio, utrum anima Christi fuerit prius assumpta a verbo quam caro. Quarto, utrum caro fuerit prius a verbo assumpta quam animae unita. Quinto, utrum tota humana natura sit assumpta mediantibus partibus. Sexto, utrum sit assumpta mediante gratia. | Question 6. The order of assumption 1. Did the Son of God assume flesh through the medium of the soul? 2. Did he assume the soul through the medium of the spirit or mind? 3. Was the soul assumed previous to the flesh? 4. Was the flesh of Christ assumed by the Word previous to being united to the soul? 5. Was the whole human nature assumed through the medium of the parts? 6. Was it assumed through the medium of grace? |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei non assumpserit carnem mediante anima. Perfectior enim est modus quo filius Dei unitur humanae naturae et partibus eius, quam quo est in omnibus creaturis. Sed in creaturis est immediate per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam. Ergo multo magis filius Dei unitur carni, et non mediante anima. | Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God did not assume flesh through the medium of the soul. For the mode in which the Son of God is united to human nature and its parts, is more perfect than the mode whereby He is in all creatures. But He is in all creatures immediately by essence, power and presence. Much more, therefore, is the Son of God united to flesh without the medium of the soul. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, anima et caro unita sunt Dei verbo in unitate hypostasis seu personae. Sed corpus immediate pertinet ad personam sive hypostasim hominis, sicut et anima. Quinimmo magis videtur se de propinquo habere ad hypostasim hominis corpus, quod est materia quam anima, quae est forma, quia principium individuationis, quae importatur in nomine hypostasis, videtur esse materia. Ergo filius Dei non assumpsit carnem mediante anima. | Objection 2. Further, the soul and flesh are united to the Word of God in unity of hypostasis or person. But the body pertains immediately to the human hypostasis or person, even as the soul. Indeed, the human body, since it is matter, would rather seem to be nearer the hypostasis than the soul, which is a form, since the principle of individuation, which is implied in the word "hypostasis," would seem to be matter. Hence the Son of God did not assume flesh through the medium of the soul. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, remoto medio, separantur ea quae per medium coniunguntur, sicut, remota superficie, cessaret color a corpore, qui inest corpori per superficiem. Sed, separata per mortem anima, adhuc remanet unio verbi ad carnem, quod infra patebit. Ergo verbum non coniungitur carni mediante anima. | Objection 3. Further, take away the medium and you separate what were joined by the medium; for example, if the superficies be removed color would leave the body, since it adheres to the body through the medium of the superficies. But though the soul was separated from the body by death, yet there still remained the union of the Word to the flesh, as will be shown (50, 2,3). Hence the Word was not joined to flesh through the medium of the soul. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Volusianum, ipsa magnitudo divinae virtutis animam sibi rationalem, et per eandem corpus humanum, totumque omnino hominem, in melius mutandum, coaptavit. | On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvi): "The greatness of the Divine power fitted to itself a rational soul, and through it a human body, so as to raise the whole man to something higher." |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod medium dicitur respectu principii et finis. Unde, sicut principium et finis important ordinem, ita et medium. Est autem duplex ordo, unus quidem temporis; alius autem naturae. Secundum autem ordinem temporis, non dicitur in mysterio incarnationis aliquid medium, quia totam naturam humanam simul sibi Dei verbum univit, ut infra patebit. Ordo autem naturae inter aliqua potest attendi dupliciter, uno modo, secundum dignitatis gradum, sicut dicimus Angelos esse medios inter homines et Deum; alio modo, secundum rationem causalitatis, sicut dicimus mediam causam existere inter primam causam et ultimum effectum. Et hic secundus ordo aliquo modo consequitur primum, sicut enim dicit Dionysius, XIII cap. Cael. Hier., Deus per substantias magis propinquas agit in ea quae sunt magis remota. Si ergo attendamus gradum dignitatis, anima media invenitur inter Deum et carnem. Et secundum hoc, potest dici quod filius Dei univit sibi carnem mediante anima. Sed secundum ordinem causalitatis, ipsa anima est aliqualiter causa carnis uniendae filio Dei. Non enim esset assumptibilis nisi per ordinem quem habet ad animam rationalem, secundum quam habet quod sit caro humana, dictum est enim supra quod natura humana prae ceteris est assumptibilis. | I answer that, A medium is in reference to a beginning and an end. Hence as beginning and end imply order, so also does a medium. Now there is a twofold order: one, of time; the other, of nature. But in the mystery of Incarnation nothing is said to be a medium in the order of time, for the Word of God united the whole human nature to Himself at the same time, as will appear (30, 3). An order of nature between things may be taken in two ways: first, as regards rank of dignity, as we say the angels are midway between man and God; secondly, as regards the idea of causality, as we say a cause is midway between the first cause and the last effect. And this second order follows the first to some extent; for as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiii), God acts upon the more remote substances through the less remote. Hence if we consider the rank of dignity, the soul is found to be midway between God and flesh; and in this way it may be said that the Son of God united flesh to Himself, through the medium of the soul. But even as regards the second order of causality the soul is to some extent the cause of flesh being united to the Son of God. For the flesh would not have been assumable, except by its relation to the rational soul, through which it becomes human flesh. For it was said above (Question 4, Article 1) that human nature was assumable before all others. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duplex ordo considerari potest inter creaturam et Deum. Unus quidem, secundum quod creaturae causantur a Deo et dependent ab ipso sicut a principio sui esse. Et sic, propter infinitatem suae virtutis, Deus immediate attingit quamlibet rem, causando et conservando. Et ad hoc pertinet quod Deus immediate est in omnibus per essentiam, potentiam et praesentiam. Alius autem ordo est secundum quod res reducuntur in Deum sicut in finem. Et quantum ad hoc, invenitur medium inter creaturam et Deum, quia inferiores creaturae reducuntur in Deum per superiores, ut dicit Dionysius, in libro Caelest. Hier. Et ad hunc ordinem pertinet assumptio humanae naturae a verbo Dei quod est terminus assumptionis. Et ideo per animam unitur carni. | Reply to Objection 1. We may consider a twofold order between creatures and God: the first is by reason of creatures being caused by God and depending on Him as on the principle of their being; and thus on account of the infinitude of His power God touches each thing immediately, by causing and preserving it, and so it is that God is in all things by essence, presence and power. But the second order is by reason of things being directed to God as to their end; and it is here that there is a medium between the creature and God, since lower creatures are directed to God by higher, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v); and to this order pertains the assumption of human nature by the Word of God, Who is the term of the assumption; and hence it is united to flesh through the soul. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, si hypostasis verbi Dei constitueretur simpliciter per naturam humanam, sequeretur quod corpus esset ei vicinius, cum sit materia, quae est individuationis principium, sicut et anima, quae est forma specifica, propinquius se habet ad naturam humanam. Sed quia hypostasis est prior et altior quam humana natura, tanto id quod est in humana natura propinquius se habet, quanto est altius. Et ideo propinquior est verbo Dei anima quam corpus. | Reply to Objection 2. If the hypostasis of the Word of God were constituted simply by human nature, it would follow that the body was nearest to it, since it is matter which is the principle of individuation; even as the soul, being the specific form, would be nearer the human nature. But because the hypostasis of the Word is prior to and more exalted than the human nature, the more exalted any part of the human nature is, the nearer it is to the hypostasis of the Word. And hence the soul is nearer the Word of God than the body is. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse causam alicuius quantum ad aptitudinem et congruitatem, quo tamen remoto, id non tollitur, quia, etsi fieri alicuius dependeat ex aliquo, postquam tamen est in facto esse, ab eo non dependet. Sicut, si inter aliquos amicitia causaretur aliquo mediante, eo recedente adhuc amicitia remanet, et si aliqua in matrimonium ducitur propter pulchritudinem, quae facit congruitatem in muliere ad copulam coniugalem, tamen, cessante pulchritudine, adhuc durat copula coniugalis. Et similiter, separata anima, remanet unio verbi Dei ad carnem. | Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents one thing being the cause of the aptitude and congruity of another, and yet if it be taken away the other remains; because although a thing's becoming may depend on another, yet when it is in being it no longer depends on it, just as a friendship brought about by some other may endure when the latter has gone; or as a woman is taken in marriage on account of her beauty, which makes a woman's fittingness for the marriage tie, yet when her beauty passes away, the marriage tie still remains. So likewise, when the soul was separated, the union of the Word with flesh still endured. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei non assumpsit animam mediante spiritu. Idem enim non cadit medium inter ipsum et aliquid aliud. Sed spiritus, sive mens, non est aliud in essentia ab ipsa anima, ut in prima parte dictum est. Ergo filius Dei non assumpsit animam mediante spiritu, sive mente. | Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind. For nothing is a medium between itself and another. But the spirit is nothing else in essence but the soul itself, as was said above (I, 77, 1, ad 1). Therefore the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, id quo mediante facta est assumptio, videtur magis assumptibile. Sed spiritus, sive mens, non est magis assumptibilis quam anima, quod patet ex hoc quod spiritus angelici non sunt assumptibiles, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod filius Dei non assumpserit animam mediante spiritu. | Objection 2. Further, what is the medium of the assumption is itself more assumable. But the spirit or mind is not more assumable than the soul; which is plain from the fact that angelic spirits are not assumable, as was said above (Question 4, Article 1). Hence it seems that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, posterius assumitur a primo mediante priori. Sed anima nominat ipsam essentiam, quae est prior naturaliter quam ipsa potentia eius quae est mens. Ergo videtur quod filius Dei non assumpserit animam mediante spiritu vel mente. | Objection 3. Further, that which comes later is assumed by the first through the medium of what comes before. But the soul implies the very essence, which naturally comes before its power--the mind. Therefore it would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de agone Christiano, invisibilis et incommutabilis veritas per spiritum animam, et per animam corpus accepit. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xviii): "The invisible and unchangeable Truth took a soul by means of the spirit, and a body by means of the soul." |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, filius Dei dicitur assumpsisse carnem anima mediante, tum propter ordinem dignitatis, tum etiam propter congruitatem assumptionis. Utrumque autem horum invenitur si comparemus intellectum, qui spiritus dicitur, ad ceteras animae partes. Non enim anima est assumptibilis secundum congruitatem nisi per hoc quod est capax Dei, ad imaginem eius existens, quod est secundum mentem, quae spiritus dicitur, secundum illud Ephes. IV, renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae. Similiter etiam intellectus, inter ceteras partes animae, est superior et dignior et Deo similior. Et ideo, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, unitum est carni per medium intellectum verbum Dei, intellectus enim est quod est animae purissimum; sed et Deus est intellectus. | I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), the Son of God is said to have assumed flesh through the medium of the soul, on account of the order of dignity, and the congruity of the assumption. Now both these may be applied to the intellect, which is called the spirit, if we compare it with the other parts of the soul. For the soul is assumed congruously only inasmuch as it has a capacity for God, being in His likeness: which is in respect of the mind that is called the spirit, according to Ephesians 4:23: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind." So, too, the intellect is the highest and noblest of the parts of the soul, and the most like to God, and hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that "the Word of God is united to flesh through the medium of the intellect; for the intellect is the purest part of the soul, God Himself being an intellect." |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si intellectus non sit aliud ab anima secundum essentiam, distinguitur tamen ab aliis partibus animae secundum rationem potentiae. Et secundum hoc competit sibi ratio medii. | Reply to Objection 1. Although the intellect is not distinct from the soul in essence, it is distinct from the other parts of the soul as a power; and it is in this way that it has the nature of a medium. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod spiritui angelico non deest congruitas ad assumptionem propter defectum dignitatis, sed propter irreparabilitatem casus. Quod non potest dici de spiritu humano, ut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt. | Reply to Objection 2. Fitness for assumption is wanting to the angelic spirits, not from any lack of dignity, but because of the irremediableness of their fall, which cannot be said of the human spirit, as is clear from what has been said above (I, 62, 8; I, 64, 2). |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod anima inter quam et Dei verbum ponitur medium intellectus, non accipitur pro essentia animae, quae est omnibus potentiis communis, sed pro potentiis inferioribus, quae sunt omni animae communes. | Reply to Objection 3. The soul, between which and the Word of God the intellect is said to be a medium, does not stand for the essence of the soul, which is common to all the powers, but for the lower powers, which are common to every soul. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi fuerit prius assumpta a verbo quam caro. Filius enim Dei assumpsit carnem mediante anima, ut dictum est. Sed prius pervenitur ad medium quam ad extremum. Ergo filius Dei prius assumpsit animam quam corpus. | Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ was assumed before the flesh by the Word. For the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul, as was said above (Article 1). Now the medium is reached before the end. Therefore the Son of God assumed the soul before the body. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, anima Christi est dignior Angelis, secundum illud Psalmi, adorate eum, omnes Angeli eius. Sed Angeli creati sunt a principio, ut in primo habitum est. Ergo et anima Christi. Quae non fuit ante creata quam assumpta, dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, quod nunquam neque anima neque corpus Christi propriam habuerunt hypostasim praeter verbi hypostasim. Ergo videtur quod anima fuerit ante assumpta quam caro, quae est concepta in utero virginali. | Objection 2. Further, the soul of Christ is nobler than the angels, according to Psalm 96:8: "Adore Him, all you His angels." But the angels were created in the beginning, as was said above (I, 46, 3). Therefore the soul of Christ also (was created in the beginning). But it was not created before it was assumed, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2,3,9), that "neither the soul nor the body of Christ ever had any hypostasis save the hypostasis of the Word." Therefore it would seem that the soul was assumed before the flesh, which was conceived in the womb of the Virgin. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, Ioan. I dicitur, vidimus eum plenum gratiae et veritatis, et postea sequitur, de plenitudine eius omnes accepimus, idest, omnes fideles quocumque tempore, ut Chrysostomus exponit. Hoc autem non esset nisi Christus habuisset plenitudinem gratiae et veritatis ante omnes sanctos qui fuerunt ab origine mundi, quia causa non est posterior causato. Cum ergo plenitudo gratiae et veritatis fuerit in anima Christi ex unione ad verbum, secundum illud quod ibidem dicitur, vidimus gloriam eius quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis; consequens videtur quod a principio mundi anima Christi fuisset a verbo Dei assumpta. | Objection 3. Further, it is written (John 1:14): "We saw Him [Vulgate: 'His glory'] full of grace and truth," and it is added afterwards that "of His fulness we have all received" (John 1:16), i.e. all the faithful of all time, as Chrysostom expounds it (Hom. xiii in Joan.). Now this could not have been unless the soul of Christ had all fulness of grace and truth before all the saints, who were from the beginning of the world, for the cause is not subsequent to the effect. Hence since the fulness of grace and truth was in the soul of Christ from union with the Word, according to what is written in the same place: "We saw His glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth," it would seem in consequence that from the beginning of the world the soul of Christ was assumed by the Word of God. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in IV libro, non, ut quidam mentiuntur, ante eam quae est ex virgine incarnationem, intellectus est unitus Deo verbo, et ex tunc vocatus est Christus. | On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 6): "The intellect was not, as some untruthfully say, united to the true God, and henceforth called Christ, before Incarnation which was of the Virgin." |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Origenes posuit omnes animas a principio fuisse creatas, inter quas etiam posuit animam Christi creatam. Sed hoc quidem est inconveniens, scilicet, si ponatur quod fuerit tunc creata sed non statim verbo unita, quia sequeretur quod anima illa habuisset aliquando propriam subsistentiam sine verbo. Et sic, cum fuisset a verbo assumpta, vel non esset facta unio secundum substinentiam; vel corrupta fuisset subsistentia animae praeexistens. Similiter etiam est inconveniens si ponatur quod anima illa fuerit a principio verbo unita, et postmodum in utero virginis incarnata. Quia sic eius anima non videretur eiusdem esse naturae cum nostris, quae simul creantur dum corporibus infunduntur. Unde Leo Papa dicit, in epistola ad Iulianum, quod non alterius naturae erat caro quam nostra, nec alio illi quam ceteris hominibus est anima inspirata principio. | I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8; ii, 8) maintained that all souls, amongst which he placed Christ's soul, were created in the beginning. But this is not fitting, if we suppose that it was first of all created, but not at once joined to the Word, since it would follow that this soul once had its proper subsistence without the Word; and thus, since it was assumed by the Word, either the union did not take place in the subsistence, or the pre-existing subsistence of the soul was corrupted. So likewise it is not fitting to suppose that this soul was united to the Word from the beginning, and that it afterwards became incarnate in the womb of the Virgin; for thus His soul would not seem to be of the same nature as ours, which are created at the same time that they are infused into bodies. Hence Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Julian. xxxv) that "Christ's flesh was not of a different nature to ours, nor was a different soul infused into it in the beginning than into other men." |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, anima Christi dicitur esse medium in unione carnis ad verbum secundum ordinem naturae. Non autem oportet ex hoc quod fuerit medium ex ordine temporis. | Reply to Objection 1. As was said above (Article 1), the soul of Christ is said to be the medium in the union of the flesh with the Word, in the order of nature; but it does not follow from this that it was the medium in the order of time. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Leo Papa in eadem epistola, dicit, anima Christi excellit non diversitate generis, sed sublimitate virtutis. Est enim eiusdem generis cum nostris animabus, sed excellit etiam Angelos secundum plenitudinem gratiae et veritatis. Modus autem incarnationis respondet animae secundum proprietatem sui generis, ex quo habet, cum sit corporis forma, ut creetur simul dum corpori infunditur et unitur. Quod non competit Angelis, quia sunt substantiae omnino a corporibus absolutae. | Reply to Objection 2. As Pope Leo says in the same Epistle, Christ's soul excels our soul "not by diversity of genus, but by sublimity of power"; for it is of the same genus as our souls, yet excels even the angels in "fulness of grace and truth." But the mode of creation is in harmony with the generic property of the soul; and since it is the form of the body, it is consequently created at the same time that it is infused into and united with the body; which does not happen to angels, since they are substances entirely free from matter. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod de plenitudine Christi omnes homines accipiunt secundum fidem quam habent in ipsum, dicitur enim Rom. III, quod iustitia Dei est per fidem Iesu Christi in omnes et super omnes qui credunt in ipsum. Sicut autem nos in ipsum credimus ut incarnatum, ita antiqui crediderunt in ipsum ut nasciturum, habentes enim eundem spiritum credimus, ut dicitur II Cor. IV. Habet autem fides quae est in Christum virtutem iustificandi ex proposito gratiae Dei, secundum illud Rom. IV, ei qui non operatur, credenti autem in eum qui iustificat impium, fides reputatur ad iustitiam secundum propositum gratiae Dei. Unde, quia hoc propositum est aeternum, nihil prohibet per fidem Iesu Christi aliquos iustificari antequam eius anima esset plena gratia et veritate. | Reply to Objection 3. Of the fulness of Christ all men receive according to the faith they have in Him; for it is written (Romans 3:22) that "the justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe in Him." Now just as we believe in Him as already born; so the ancients believed in Him as about to be born, since "having the same spirit of faith . . . we also believe," as it is written (2 Corinthians 4:13). But the faith which is in Christ has the power of justifying by reason of the purpose of the grace of God, according to Romans 4:5: "But to him that worketh not, yet believeth in Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice according to the purpose of the grace of God." Hence because this purpose is eternal, there is nothing to hinder some from being justified by the faith of Jesus Christ, even before His soul was full of grace and truth. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caro Christi fuit primo a verbo assumpta quam animae unita. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de fide ad Petrum, firmissime tene, et nullatenus dubites, non carnem Christi sine divinitate conceptam in utero virginis antequam susciperetur a verbo. Sed caro Christi videtur prius fuisse concepta quam animae rationali unita, quia materialis dispositio prius est in via generationis quam forma completiva. Ergo prius fuit caro Christi assumpta quam animae unita. | Objection 1. It would seem that the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul. For Augustine [Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum xviii): "Most firmly hold, and nowise doubt that the flesh of Christ was not conceived in the womb of the Virgin without the Godhead before it was assumed by the Word." But the flesh of Christ would seem to have been conceived before being united to the rational soul, because matter or disposition is prior to the completive form in order of generation. Therefore the flesh of Christ was assumed before being united to the soul. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut anima est pars naturae humanae, ita et corpus. Sed anima humana non habuit aliud principium sui esse in Christo quam in aliis hominibus, ut patet ex auctoritate Leonis Papae supra inducta. Ergo videtur quod nec corpus Christi aliter habuit principium essendi quam in nobis. Sed in nobis ante concipitur caro quam adveniat anima rationalis. Ergo etiam ita fuit in Christo. Et sic caro prius fuit a verbo assumpta quam animae unita. | Objection 2. Further, as the soul is a part of human nature, so is the body. But the human soul in Christ had no other principle of being than in other men, as is clear from the authority of Pope Leo, quoted above (3). Therefore it would seem that the body of Christ had no other principle of being than we have. But in us the body is begotten before the rational soul comes to it. Therefore it was the same in Christ; and thus the flesh was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut dicitur in libro de causis, causa prima plus influit in causatum, et prius unitur ei quam causa secunda. Sed anima Christi comparatur ad verbum sicut causa secunda ad primam. Prius ergo verbum est unitum carni quam anima. | Objection 3. Further, as is said (De Causis), the first cause excels the second in bringing about the effect, and precedes it in its union with the effect. But the soul of Christ is compared to the Word as a second cause to a first. Hence the Word was united to the flesh before it was to the soul. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, simul Dei verbi caro, simul caro animata, rationalis et intellectualis. Non ergo unio verbi ad carnem praecessit unionem ad animam. | On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2): "At the same time the Word of God was made flesh, and flesh was united to a rational and intellectual soul." Therefore the union of the Word with the flesh did not precede the union with the soul. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod caro humana est assumptibilis a verbo secundum ordinem quem habet ad animam rationalem sicut ad propriam formam. Hunc autem ordinem non habet antequam anima rationalis ei adveniat, quia simul dum aliqua materia fit propria alicuius formae, recipit illam formam; unde in eodem instanti terminatur alteratio in quo introducitur forma substantialis. Et inde est quod caro non debuit ante assumi quam esset caro humana, quod factum est anima rationali adveniente. Sicut igitur anima non est prius assumpta quam caro, quia contra naturam animae est ut prius sit quam corpori uniatur; ita caro non debuit prius assumi quam anima, quia non prius est caro humana quam habeat animam rationalem. | I answer that, The human flesh is assumable by the Word on account of the order which it has to the rational soul as to its proper form. Now it has not this order before the rational soul comes to it, because when any matter becomes proper to any form, at the same time it receives that form; hence the alteration is terminated at the same instant in which the substantial form is introduced. And hence it is that the flesh ought not to have been assumed before it was human flesh; and this happened when the rational soul came to it. Therefore since the soul was not assumed before the flesh, inasmuch as it is against the nature of the soul to be before it is united to the body, so likewise the flesh ought not to have been assumed before the soul, since it is not human flesh before it has a rational soul. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caro humana sortitur esse per animam. Et ideo ante adventum animae non est caro humana, sed potest esse dispositio ad carnem humanam. In conceptione tamen Christi spiritus sanctus, qui est agens infinitae virtutis, simul et materiam disposuit et ad perfectum perduxit. | Reply to Objection 1. Human flesh depends upon the soul for its being; and hence, before the coming of the soul, there is no human flesh, but there may be a disposition towards human flesh. Yet in the conception of Christ, the Holy Ghost, Who is an agent of infinite might, disposed the matter and brought it to its perfection at the same time. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod forma actu dat speciem, materia autem, quantum est de se, est in potentia ad speciem. Et ideo contra rationem formae esset quod praeexisteret naturae speciei, quae perficitur per unionem eius ad materiam, non autem est contra naturam materiae quod praeexistat naturae speciei. Et ideo dissimilitudo quae est inter originem nostram et originem Christi secundum hoc quod caro nostra prius concipitur quam animetur, non autem caro Christi, est secundum id quod praecedit naturae complementum, sicut et quod nos concipimur ex semine viri, non autem Christus. Sed differentia quae esset quantum ad originem animae, redundaret in diversitatem naturae. | Reply to Objection 2. The form actually gives the species; but the matter in itself is in potentiality to the species. And hence it would be against the nature of a form to exist before the specific nature. And therefore the dissimilarity between our origin and Christ's origin, inasmuch as we are conceived before being animated, and Christ's flesh is not, is by reason of what precedes the perfection of the nature, viz. that we are conceived from the seed of man, and Christ is not. But a difference which would be with reference to the origin of the soul, would bespeak a diversity of nature. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum Dei per prius intelligitur unitum carni quam anima per modum communem quo est in ceteris creaturis per essentiam, potentiam et praesentiam, prius tamen dico, non tempore, sed natura. Prius enim intelligitur caro ut quoddam ens, quod habet a verbo, quam ut animata, quod habet ab anima. Sed unione personali prius secundum intellectum oportet quod caro uniatur animae quam verbo, quia ex unione ad animam habet quod sit unibilis verbo in persona; praesertim quia persona non invenitur nisi in rationali natura. | Reply to Objection 3. The Word of God is understood to be united to the flesh before the soul by the common mode whereby He is in the rest of creatures by essence, power, and presence. Yet I say "before," not in time, but in nature; for the flesh is understood as a being, which it has from the Word, before it is understood as animated, which it has from the soul. But by the personal union we understand the flesh as united to the soul before it is united to the Word, for it is from its union with the soul that it is capable of being united to the Word in Person; especially since a person is found only in the rational nature |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei assumpserit totam naturam humanam mediantibus partibus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de agone Christiano, quod invisibilis et incommutabilis veritas per spiritum animam, per animam corpus, et sic totum hominem assumpsit. Sed spiritus, anima et corpus sunt partes totius hominis. Ergo totum hominem assumpsit mediantibus partibus. | Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God assumed the whole human nature through the medium of its parts. For Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xviii) that "the invisible and unchangeable Truth assumed the soul through the medium of the spirit, and the body through the medium of the soul, and in this way the whole man." But the spirit, soul, and body are parts of the whole man. Therefore He assumed all, through the medium of the parts. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, ideo Dei filius carnem assumpsit mediante anima, quia anima est Deo similior quam corpus. Sed partes humanae naturae, cum sint simpliciores videntur esse similiores ei, qui est simplicissimus, quam totum. Ergo assumpsit totum mediantibus partibus. | Objection 2. Further, the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul because the soul is more like to God than the body. But the parts of human nature, since they are simpler than the body, would seem to be more like to God, Who is most simple, than the whole. Therefore He assumed the whole through the medium of the parts. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, totum resultat ex unione partium. Sed unio intelligitur ut terminus assumptionis, partes autem praeintelliguntur assumptioni. Ergo assumpsit totum per partes. | Objection 3. Further, the whole results from the union of parts. But the union is taken to be the term of the assumption, and the parts are presupposed to the assumption. Therefore He assumed the whole by the parts. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, in domino Iesu Christo non partes partium intuemur, sed quae proxime componuntur, idest deitatem et humanitatem. Humanitas autem est quoddam totum, quod componitur ex anima et corpore sicut ex partibus. Ergo filius Dei assumpsit partes mediante toto. | On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 16): "In our Lord Jesus Christ we do not behold parts of parts, but such as are immediately joined, i.e. the Godhead and the manhood." Now the humanity is a whole, which is composed of soul and body, as parts. Therefore the Son of God assumed the parts through the medium of the whole. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum dicitur aliquid medium in assumptione incarnationis, non designatur ordo temporis, quia simul facta est assumptio totius et omnium partium. Ostensum est enim quod simul anima et corpus sunt ad invicem unita ad constituendam naturam humanam in verbo. Designatur autem ibi ordo naturae. Unde per id quod est prius natura, assumitur id quod est posterius. Est autem aliquid prius in natura dupliciter, uno modo ex parte agentis, alio modo ex parte materiae; hae enim duae causae praeexistunt rei. Ex parte quidem agentis, est simpliciter primum id quod primo cadit in eius intentione, sed secundum quid est primum illud a quo incipit eius operatio, et hoc ideo, quia intentio est prior operatione. Ex parte vero materiae, est prius illud quod prius existit in transmutatione materiae. In incarnatione autem oportet maxime attendere ordinem qui est ex parte agentis, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Volusianum, in talibus rebus tota ratio facti est potentia facientis. Manifestum est autem quod secundum intentionem facientis prius est completum quam incompletum, et per consequens, totum quam partes. Et ideo dicendum est quod verbum Dei assumpsit partes humanae naturae mediante toto. Sicut enim corpus assumpsit propter ordinem quem habet ad animam rationalem, ita assumpsit corpus et animam propter ordinem quem habent ad humanam naturam. | I answer that, When anything is said to be a medium in the assumption of Incarnation, we do not signify order of time, because the assumption of the whole and the parts was simultaneous. For it has been shown (3],4) that the soul and body were mutually united at the same time in order to constitute the human nature of the Word. But it is order of nature that is signified. Hence by what is prior in nature, that is assumed which is posterior in nature. Now a thing is prior in nature in two ways: First on the part of the agent, secondly on the part of the matter; for these two causes precede the thing. On the part of the agent--that is simply first, which is first included in his intention; but that is relatively first, with which his operation begins--and this because the intention is prior to the operation. On the part of the matter--that is first which exists first in the transmutation of the matter. Now in the Incarnation the order depending on the agent must be particularly considered, because, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii), "in such things the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer." But it is manifest that, according to the intention of the doer, what is complete is prior to what is incomplete, and, consequently, the whole to the parts. Hence it must be said that the Word of God assumed the parts of human nature, through the medium of the whole; for even as He assumed the body on account of its relation to the rational soul, so likewise He assumed a body and soul on account of their relation to human nature. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex verbis illis nihil datur intelligi nisi quod verbum, assumendo partes humanae naturae, assumpsit totam humanam naturam. Et sic assumptio partium prior est in via operationis intellectu, non tempore. Assumptio autem naturae est prior in via intentionis, quod est esse prius simpliciter, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1. From these words nothing may be gathered, except that the Word, by assuming the parts of human nature, assumed the whole human nature. And thus the assumption of parts is prior in the order of the intellect, if we consider the operation, but not in order of time; whereas the assumption of the nature is prior if we consider the intention: and this is to be simply first, as was said above. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus ita est simplex quod etiam est perfectissimus. Et ideo totum est magis simile Deo quam partes, inquantum est perfectius. | Reply to Objection 2. God is so simple that He is also most perfect; and hence the whole is more like to God than the parts, inasmuch as it is more perfect. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod unio personalis est ad quam terminatur assumptio, non autem unio naturae, quae resultat ex coniunctione partium. | Reply to Objection 3. It is a personal union wherein the assumption is terminated, not a union of nature, which springs from a conjunction of parts. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei assumpserit humanam naturam mediante gratia. Per gratiam enim unimur Deo. Sed humana natura in Christo maxime fuit unita. Ergo illa unio facta fuit per gratiam. | Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God assumed human nature through the medium of grace. For by grace we are united to God. But the human nature in Christ was most closely united to God. Therefore the union took place by grace. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut corpus vivit per animam, quae est eius perfectio, ita anima per gratiam. Sed humana natura redditur congrua ad assumptionem per animam, ut dictum est. Ergo et anima redditur congrua ad assumptionem per gratiam. Ergo filius Dei assumpsit animam mediante gratia. | Objection 2. Further, as the body lives by the soul, which is its perfection, so does the soul by grace. But the human nature was fitted for the assumption by the soul. Therefore the Son of God assumed the soul through the medium of grace. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, Augustinus, XV de Trin., dicit quod verbum incarnatum est sicut verbum nostrum in voce. Sed verbum nostrum unitur voci mediante spiritu. Ergo verbum Dei unitur carni mediante spiritu sancto, et ita mediante gratia, quae spiritui sancto attribuitur, secundum illud I ad Cor. XII, divisiones gratiarum sunt, idem autem spiritus. | Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 11) that the incarnate Word is like our spoken word. But our word is united to our speech by means of "breathing" [spiritus]. Therefore the Word of God is united to flesh by means of the Holy Spirit, and hence by means of grace, which is attributed to the Holy Spirit, according to 1 Corinthians 12:4: "Now there are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit." |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod gratia est quoddam accidens animae, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Unio autem verbi ad humanam naturam est facta secundum subsistentiam, et non secundum accidens ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo natura humana non est assumpta mediante gratia. | On the contrary, Grace is an accident in the soul, as was shown above (I-II, 110, 2). Now the union of the Word with human nature took place in the subsistence, and not accidentally, as was shown above (Question 2, Article 6). Therefore the human nature was not assumed by means of grace. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in Christo ponitur gratia unionis, et gratia habitualis. Gratia ergo non potest intelligi ut medium in assumptione humanae naturae, sive loquamur de gratia unionis, sive de gratia habituali. Gratia enim unionis est ipsum esse personale quod gratis divinitus datur humanae naturae in persona verbi, quod quidem est terminus assumptionis. Gratia autem habitualis pertinens ad specialem sanctitatem illius hominis, est effectus quidam consequens unionem, secundum illud Ioan. I, vidimus gloriam eius quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis; per quod datur intelligi quod hoc ipso quod ille homo est unigenitus a patre, quod habet per unionem, habet plenitudinem gratiae et veritatis. Si vero intelligatur gratia ipsa voluntas Dei aliquid gratis faciens vel donans, sic unio facta est per gratiam, non sicut per medium, sed sicut per causam efficientem. | I answer that, In Christ there was the grace of union and habitual grace. Therefore grace cannot be taken to be the medium of the assumption of the human nature, whether we speak of the grace of union or of habitual grace. For the grace of union is the personal being that is given gratis from above to the human nature in the Person of the Word, and is the term of the assumption. Whereas the habitual grace pertaining to the spiritual holiness of the man is an effect following the union, according to John 1:14: "We saw His glory . . . as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth"--by which we are given to understand that because this Man (as a result of the union) is the Only-begotten of the Father, He is full of grace and truth. But if by grace we understand the will of God doing or bestowing something gratis, the union took place by grace, not as a means, but as the efficient cause. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unio nostra ad Deum est per operationem, inquantum scilicet eum cognoscimus et amamus. Et ideo talis unio est per gratiam habitualem, inquantum operatio perfecta procedit ab habitu. Sed unio naturae humanae ad verbum Dei est secundum esse personale, quod non dependet ab aliquo habitu, sed immediate ab ipsa natura. | Reply to Objection 1. Our union with God is by operation, inasmuch as we know and love Him; and hence this union is by habitual grace, inasmuch as a perfect operation proceeds from a habit. Now the union of the human nature with the Word of God is in personal being, which depends not on any habit, but on the nature itself. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod anima est perfectio substantialis corporis, gratia vero est perfectio animae accidentalis. Et ideo gratia non potest ordinare animam ad unionem personalem, quae non est accidentalis, sicut anima corpus. | Reply to Objection 2. The soul is the substantial perfection of the body; grace is but an accidental perfection of the soul. Hence grace cannot ordain the soul to personal union, which is not accidental, as the soul ordains the body. |
| IIIª q. 6 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum nostrum unitur voci mediante spiritu, non quidem sicut medio formali, sed sicut per medium movens, nam ex verbo concepto interius procedit spiritus, ex quo formatur vox. Et similiter ex verbo aeterno procedit spiritus sanctus, qui formavit corpus Christi ut infra patebit. Non autem ex hoc sequitur quod gratia spiritus sancti sit formale medium in unione praedicta. | Reply to Objection 3. Our word is united to our speech, by means of breathing [spiritus, not as a formal medium, but as a moving medium. For from the word conceived within, the breathing proceeds, from which the speech is formed. And similarly from the eternal Word proceeds the Holy Spirit, Who formed the body of Christ, as will be shown (32, 1). But it does not follow from this that the grace of the Holy Spirit is the formal medium in the aforesaid union. |